

Group Commentary



Based on the results of the second round, there were four European teams in the semi-finals once more. The standard of both semi-finals was good and impressive. Both teams to reach the Final, Italy and Germany FR, had been world champions twice over (Italy in 1934 and 1938 and Germany FR in 1954 and 1974). With their victory, Italy could join Brazil as threefold titleholders.

Brazil 1970




Italy 1982



Germany F. R. 1974

Factors influencing performance



- Climate
- Travel during World Cup
- Average age of players
- Players active abroad

Climatic Data

When judging the performance of different teams, account should also be taken of *climatic pre-requisites*.

These consist of three factors:

- temperature
- humidity
- altitude


As one can see from the following diagram, Spain can be roughly divided into three climatic zones on the basis of data available at the time of the World Cup.


These are:

1. The Atlantic zone with the venues: Bilbao, Gijon, Oviedo, La Coruña and Vigo.
 2. The central High Plateau zone with the venues: Zaragoza, Madrid and Valladolid.
 3. The Mediterranean zone with the venues: Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante, Elche, Malaga and Sevilla.
- A general analysis of the three zones revealed that the Atlantic zone had low temperatures, the same humidity and altitude as the Mediterranean zone. Here there was only a difference in the

temperature of the Atlantic zone. However, the venues on the central High Plateau, particularly Valladolid and Madrid, had varying values particularly with regard to temperature, humidity and altitude. It became apparent that the teams in the preliminary round did not have any climatic problems because they could prepare for the climatic conditions of the group venues in the medium- and long-term. Problems arose as from the 2nd final round. These will be dealt with separately in this chapter. Problems of this kind resulted from a combination of all three climatic components: the temperature and humidity in connection with the altitude. Separately seen, the three do not play a decisive role. However, their combination could have a bearing on performance in certain cases.







Mean and individual temperatures of venues during the preliminary round at kick-off time.



Altitude of World Cup venues.



Comparative humidity at the venues.

Travel during World Cup

During the World Cup, an additional investigation was made of the *influence of climatic conditions in connection with travel activities*.

One can conclude that those teams staying at one venue always had climatic advantages over the teams having to travel.

Taking the example of the CSSR, a study revealed that *climatic influences can possibly be of major significance for the results during the World Cup*. The CSSR team had their camp base in Valladolid where they also played their first match against Kuwait. All climatic details can be seen from the enclosed diagrams. These were established on the basis of altitude, humidity and temperature.

Consideration was also made of the travel days which are normally used for resting by those teams stationed in one venue. The changes brought on from having to travel between match days were certainly an additional burden for a team during the competition.

The CSSR had their first match in Valladolid. They then travelled to Bilbao and returned to Valladolid. In other words, within the space of a few days, from 17-24 June, there were differences in temperature, altitude and humidity which, together with the additional efforts of travelling, certainly had a bearing on the team's performance.



Europe's biggest football stadium: "Nou Camp" of Barcelona F. C. with 120,000 spectator capacity

The scene of the Final of the XII World Football Cup: the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. Capacity: 91,000.





"Balaidos", Vigo

Capacity: 56,790



"El Molinón", Gijón

Capacity: 45,153



"San Mamés", Bilbao

Capacity: 46,223



"La Romareda", Zaragoza

Capacity: 41,806



"Luis Casanova", Valencia

Capacity: 47,542



"Nuevo Estadio Altavix", Elche

Capacity: 53,290




"Benito Villamarín", Sevilla

Capacity: 50,253



"Vicente Calderón", Madrid

Capacity: 65,695



Czechoslovakia

Station	Match No	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away		Temperature	Altitude	Attendance	Result
						Home	Away				
Valladolid	11	17.6.82 ↓ 3 days	17.15	Valladolid	Kuwait	▲	▲	+27°C	698.30m	25 000	1.1
	20	20.6.82 ↓ 4 days	17.15	Bilbao	England	▲	▲	+21°C	270m	41 123	0.2
	32	24.6.82	17.15	Valladolid	France	▲	▲	+23°C	698.30m	30 043	1.1

Possible burdens brought on by travelling during the World Cup are illustrated here with the example of CSSR.

As already mentioned above, climatic changes and possible handicaps only arose between the 1st and 2nd final rounds. Taking the examples of Belgium, Brazil, the USSR and Argentina, the following diagram should show that there were no climatic differences and therefore no possible influences between the 1st and 2nd final rounds.

1. Thus, *Argentina* did not have climatic problems in any respect. The team could adapt to climatic conditions since they had already played in a friendly match in Alicante the previous year. The change to Barcelona for the 2nd final round did not involve any problems because temperature, humidity and altitude remained the same during the entire stay in both rounds.

In this respect, *Italy* which later joined this group in the 2nd final round, had an advantage which will be referred to later on (see Italy).

2. *Brazil* just like *Argentina* did not have any concrete adaptation problems at any stage.

Climatic conditions in the 1st and 2nd final rounds were the same for *Brazil* as during the preparatory stage.

3. *USSR*. The same applies to this team as with *Argentina* and *Brazil*. The *USSR* team were well prepared for the venues of the 1st final round which had been known to them for a long time.

4. *Belgium*. Like the above-mentioned teams, *Belgium* had played in the Mediterranean group right from the start and therefore did not have any adaptation difficulties between the 1st and 2nd final rounds. All components: altitude, humidity and temperature remained the same more or less.

Conditions hardly changed in the 2nd round. Other reasons than climate must have been responsible for performance not to have climbed (possible intervals between matches, change in rhythm, stagnation).

The diagram on page 172 demonstrates the conditions which may possibly have had a negative bearing on the performance of participating teams.

1. *Germany FR* encountered virtually the same climatic conditions as at home in the preliminary round. There

were no adaptation problems. Readjustment difficulties arose because of the climate in the 2nd round. There was little time to adjust to the changed conditions. Temperatures in the central High Plateau rose considerably and the altitude changed from sea-level to 655,36 m. Thus, efficiency was especially influenced by the higher temperature.

2. *England* did not have to face any unusual climatic conditions at its base or at least nothing unusual for players coming from the other side of the sea. Their early arrival also accounted for their improved physical shape. Difficulties arose with the relatively short time-span between the 1st and 2nd final rounds.

Upon choosing their quarters for the 2nd final round, however, one did attempt at adjusting to the changed environmental conditions. All the climatic readjustments together with the short adaptation period in relation to the altitude may have influenced *England's* performance and prevented its intensification compared with *Italy* and *Poland*.

3. *Austria*. In the preliminary round, *Austria* adapted well to the specific climatic conditions of temperature, altitude and humidity.

The change from the preliminary round to the 2nd final round in Madrid seems to have caused problems with higher temperatures and a higher location. Under normal circumstances, a change from sea-level to 700 m does not seem to cause important problems of altitude. Additional factors may have reduced the performance level especially since the period between the last match of the 1st final round and the 1st match of the 2nd final round was relatively short. Particular mention should be made of the important match against France who as we shall see, brought along "better" pre-requisites with regard to climate.

Smaller details on victory and defeat (performance) are often decisive among teams with more or less the same strength.

The team's performance was decidedly slack; they lost and never increased their efficiency contrary to the other teams (*Poland*, *Italy*), which could have been possible in view of *Austria's* potential.

4. *Northern Ireland*. Actually there were no major problems. The trips to Zaragoza in the preliminary round could be regarded as a tiring factor, though. On arriving in Madrid, the *Northern Irish* had the same problems with the altitude as the *Spanish* team. Moreover, it should be pointed out that there was considerably more oxygen in Valladolid at sea-level because matches were played in the evenings there. However, in Madrid the kick-off was at 17.15 hours. Air could not circulate in the Calderon stadium and smog hung over the city at that time. As other teams, they did not manage to recuperate on their days off at the training camp due to the altitude.

5. *Spain*. Of course, *Spain* did not have any problems adjusting to the climate in the preliminary round. This is especially so since the team knew ever since the start of the plans for the World Cup that they would be playing in Valencia.

In the 2nd round, they had to play at Madrid's altitude like the other teams. This did not really present a problem for them since there was plenty of time to adjust. This is especially so when one recalls that the *Spaniards* are also exposed to such demands in normal league matches. However, a parallel can be drawn here to *Germany FR* and *England* who also came from sea-level and whose quality of play did not make any major progress.

Argentina

Station	Match No	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temperature	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Villajoyosa Alicante	1	13.6.82 5 days	20:00	Barcelona	Belgium	Home	15°C	9m	95,000	0:1
	14	18.6.82 5 days	21:00	Alicante	Hungary	Away	15°C	8m	32,000	4:1
	29	23.6.82 6 days	21:00	Alicante	El Salvador	Home	15°C	8m	32,500	2:0
2nd Round Change in time of play	29	29.6.82 3 days	17:15	Barcelona	Italy	Home	15°C	9m	45,000	1:2
Earlier hours might have affected play	43	2.7.82	17:15	Barcelona	Brazil	Home	15°C	9m	44,000	1:3

Belgium

Station	Match No	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temperature	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Elche (Alicante)	1	13.6.82 6 days	20:00	Barcelona	Argentina	Away	15°C	9m	95,000	1:0
	17	19.6.82 3 days	21:00	Elche	El Salvador	Home	+24°C	8580m	15,000	1:0
	26	22.6.82 6 days	21:00	Elche	Hungary	Home	+30°C	8580m	37,000	1:1
2nd Round No change in time of play	38	28.6.82 3 days	21:00	Barcelona	Poland	Home	15°C	9m	65,000	0:3
	42	1.7.82	21:00	Barcelona	URSS	Home	15°C	9m	45,000	0



Brazil

Station	Match No	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temperature	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Sevilla	3	14.6.82 4 days	21:00	Sevilla	USSR	Home	15°C	11m	68,000	2:1
	15	18.6.82 5 days	21:00	Sevilla	Scotland	Home	15°C	11m	47,379	4:1
	30	23.6.82 9 days	21:00	Sevilla	New Zealand	Home	15°C	11m	43,000	4:0
2nd Round Change in time of play	43	2.7.82 3 days	17:15	Barcelona	Argentina	Home	15°C	9m	44,000	3:1
	47	5.7.82	17:15	Barcelona	Italy	Home	15°C	9m	44,000	2:3

USSR

Station	Match No	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temperature	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Málaga	3	14.6.82 5 days	21:00	Sevilla	Brazil	Away	15°C	11m		1:2
	18	19.6.82 3 days	21:00	Málaga	New Zealand	Home	+25°C	11m	19,000	3:0
	27	22.6.82 9 days	21:00	Málaga	Scotland	Home	+35°C	11m	32,000	2:2
2nd Round No change in time of play	42	1.7.82 3 days	21:00	Barcelona	Belgium	Home	15°C	9m	45,000	1:0
	46	4.7.82	21:00	Barcelona	Poland	Home	15°C	9m	65,000	0:0


This diagram shows that there were hardly any climatic differences between the venues of this group.

Austria

Station	Match No.	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temp. (°C)	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Oviedo	10	16.6.82	4 days	Oviedo	Chile	Home	+18°C	280m	2752	1-0
	22	21.6.82	4 days	Oviedo	Algeria	Home	+22°C	280m	12028	2-0
	34	25.6.82	3 days	Oviedo	Germany FR	Home	+22°C	414m	8127	0-1
2nd Round No change in time of play										
	35	28.6.82	3 days	Madrid	France	Away	+31.5°C	660m	22728	0-1
	41	1.7.82	17 days	Madrid	Northern Ireland	Away	+31.5°C	660m	2000	2-2

Germany FR

Station	Match No.	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temp. (°C)	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Gijón	7	16.6.82	4 days	Gijón	Algeria	Home	+22°C	414m	4200	1-2
	19	20.6.82	5 days	Gijón	Chile	Home	+18°C	414m	4200	4-1
	38	25.6.82	4 days	Gijón	Spain	Home	+22°C	414m	4100	1-0
2nd Round Change in time										
	40	29.6.82	3 days	Madrid	England	Away	+31.5°C	660m	7500	0-0
	44	1.7.82	21 days	Madrid	Spain	Away	+31.5°C	660m	7500	2-1



England

Station	Match No.	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temp. (°C)	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Bilbao	8	16.6.82	4 days	Bilbao	France	Home	+34°C	270m	4112	3-1
	26	20.6.82	3 days	Bilbao	Czechoslovakia	Home	+31°C	270m	4112	2-0
	28	25.6.82	4 days	Bilbao	Ukraine	Home	+29°C	270m	4420	1-0
2nd Round Change in time of play										
	40	29.6.82	3 days	Madrid	Germany FR	Away	+31.5°C	660m	7500	0-0
	48	5.7.82	21 days	Madrid	Spain	Away	+31.5°C	660m	7500	0-0

Northern Ireland

Station	Match No.	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temp. (°C)	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Valencia	12	11.6.82	4 days	Zaragoza	Yugoslavia	Home	+30°C	260m	2000	0-0
	24	21.6.82	4 days	Zaragoza	Honduras	Home	+32°C	260m	1500	1-1
	36	25.6.82	3 days	Valencia	Spain	Home	+28°C	238m	4990	1-0
2nd Round Change in time of play										
	41	1.7.82	3 days	Madrid	Austria	Away	+31.5°C	660m	2000	2-2
Earlier hours, night time, affected play										
	45	4.7.82	17 days	Madrid	France	Away	+31.5°C	660m	3700	1-4

Spain

Station	Match No.	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temp. (°C)	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Valencia	9	16.6.82	4 days	Valencia	Honduras	Home	+25°C	228m	4960	1-1
	21	20.6.82	3 days	Valencia	Yugoslavia	Home	+28°C	228m	4800	2-1
Sevilla	36	25.6.82	3 days	Sevilla	Northern Ireland	Home	+38°C	228m	4990	0-1
	44	1.7.82	3 days	Madrid	Germany FR	Away	+31.5°C	660m	9000	1-2
	48	5.7.82	31 days	Madrid	England	Away	+31.5°C	660m	7500	0-0

The teams which had to go up to Madrid in the central High Plateau from sea-level.

Positive Outcome of the 2nd Round?

1. *Poland* did not actually have any acclimatization problems in the preliminary round. They played in normal temperatures of +21 °C on the average. Being near the Atlantic, humidity was relatively high with an average of 75%.

However, the team's performance improved in the preliminary round already (against Peru 5:1).

A climatic readjustment was unnecessary. All the same, they did have to travel from Western to Eastern Spain for the 2nd final round with 6 days at their disposal. The temperature was somewhat higher which may have boosted performance in this case. Altitude remained the same (also at sea-level) and humidity did not change either. Poland's opponents, USSR and Belgium, stayed in the same surroundings.

Climatically seen, matches of the 2nd final round in Barcelona and Alicante did not create any problems.

2. *Italy*. Italy did not have climatic problems in the preliminary round either. Their performance was not hampered by the transfer to Eastern Spain. Hence, the 2nd final round did not create any problems. Madrid came at the end for the Italians. As can be seen from the pertaining diagram, Italy always kept to the same climatic conditions. Acclimatization was optimally prepared.

Thus, one can only repeat that some teams had problems on reaching the 2nd final round, namely England, Germany FR, Austria, Spain and Northern Ireland. Obviously, Italy and Poland did not have any problems. France maintained an optimal climatic sequence.

All the remaining teams in the 2nd final round were not influenced by weather conditions. Thus, other reasons than the climate must be responsible for the sinking performance curve.

France's Positive Path

France only faced adjustment difficulties in the 1st match, because the team had descended from the high-altitude training camp in the Pyrenees to sea-level in surroundings with relatively high temperatures and humidity.


Later, France adjusted very positively to climatic conditions. Valladolid was chosen as base camp, thereby enabling the team to return to a higher altitude and to remain there.

As the 2nd final round was played in Madrid and their quarters were located at a high altitude too, France had the advantage over Austria and Northern Ireland of not having to adjust to the altitude at the 2nd round.

As was expected from the star teams, play could be fully developed and was not influenced by climatic conditions. Thus, the positive adjustment to environmental factors contributed towards the increased performance.

Climatic conditions at matches of the final round in Sevilla and Alicante did not cause any additional problems.






Italy

Station	Match No.	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temperature	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Pontevedra	2	14.6.82	17.15	Vigo	Poland	Home	+20°C	27.84 m	33,000	0:0
	13	18.6.82	17.15	Vigo	Peru	Away	+20°C	27.84 m	25,000	1:1
	28	23.6.82	17.15	Vigo	Cameroon	Home	+23°C	27.84 m	17,000	1:1
2nd Round No change in time of play	39	29.6.82	17.15	Barcelona	Argentina	Home		9 m	43,000	2:1
	47	5.7.82	17.15	Barcelona	Brazil	Home		9 m	44,000	3:2

Poland

Station	Match No.	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home/Away	Temperature	Altitude	Attendance	Result
La Coruña	2	14.6.82	17.15	Vigo	Poland	Home	+20°C	27.84 m	33,000	0:0
	16	19.6.82	17.15	La Coruña	Cameroon	Away	+22°C	26.33 m	19,000	0:0
	25	22.6.82	17.15	La Coruña	Peru	Home	+20°C	26.33 m	25,000	5:1
2nd Round Change in time for better result	38	29.6.82	21.00	Barcelona	Belgium	Home		9 m	65,000	3:0
	46	4.7.82	21.00	Barcelona	USSR	Home		9 m	65,000	0:0

The itineraries of the Polish and Italian teams. These did not influence their efficiency.



France

Station	Match No.	Date	Time	Venue	Opponent	Home / Away	Temperature	Altitude	Attendance	Result
Valladolid	8	16.6.82	17.15	Bilbao	England	Home	+34°C	270m	44172	1:3
	23	21.6.82	17.15	Valladolid	Kuwait	Away	+29°C	686.30m	30043	4:1
	32	24.6.82	17.15	Valladolid	Czechoslovakia	Away	+23°C	686.30m	30043	1:1
2nd Round No change in time of play	37	28.6.82	17.15	Madrid	Austria	Home	+31.5°C	655m	37000	1:0
Might have helped in their performance	45	4.7.82	17.15	Madrid	Northern Ireland	Home	31°C	655m	37000	4:1

France's itinerary from the preliminary round passing through the 2nd round and up to the match for the 3rd place.

Average Age of Players

A team's buildup with a long-, medium- or short-term planning target is also reflected in the average age. The participation of 24 teams in the '82 World Cup provided a vast, representative quantity of statistical material. This has been prepared and presented below free of any evaluation in order to

encourage thought or as a possible method of application.

The following diagram presents the average age in statistics as can be calculated from the official FIFA list of 22 players.

According to these statistics, El Salvador had the youngest and England the oldest team participating in the World Cup.



El Salvador	Kuwait	New Zealand	USSR	Poland	Germany FR	Brazil	Algeria	Austria	Yugoslavia	France	Spain	Cameroon	Argentina	Honduras	Scotland	Hungary	Northern Ireland	Belgium	Italy	Chile	Peru	Czechoslovakia	England	
532	554	558	560	572	585	588	590	592	592	593	593	598	602	603	603	607	609	612	611	614	614	620	631	14233
24,2	25,2	25,4	25,5	26,0	26,6	26,8	26,8	26,9	26,9	26,9	26,9	27,2	27,4	27,4	27,4	27,6	27,7	27,8	27,8	27,9	27,9	28,2	28,7	26,9

Average age in statistics of all teams having participated in the World Cup.



El Salvador



England

The *statistical age difference* is
4.5 years.

In the search for the ideal average age of a team, statistics reveal that the team's age is

26.9 years.

Indeed, one may well ask whether the notion of *ideal average age* actually exists in the practical, planned buildup since it is calculated differently in every team and depends on a variety of influences.



El Salvador	Kuwait	New Zealand	USSR	Poland	Germany FR	Brazil	Algeria	Austria	Yugoslavia	France	Spain	Cameroon	Argentina	Honduras	Scotland	Hungary	Northern Ireland	Belgium	Italy	Chile	Peru	Czechoslovakia	England	
24,2	25,2	25,4	25,5	26,0	26,6	26,8	26,8	26,9	26,9	26,9	26,9	27,2	27,4	27,4	27,4	27,6	27,7	27,8	27,8	27,9	27,9	28,2	28,7	Ø22
26,4	27,2	26,0	25,4	26,1	27,6	27,9	26,7	27,9	27,3	27,8	27,0	27,8	26,7	26,5	27,8	29,1	27,0	28,1	28,9	28,0	29,0	27,4	27,4	1st match
26,4	25,7	24,7	25,4	26,1	27,6	27,3	26,7	27,6	27,1	27,3	26,3	27,8	27,5	27,0	27,7	27,7	27,0	26,6	28,9	28,1	29,0	28,1	27,2	2nd match
26,4	25,8	24,2	25,4	26,4	27,6	27,2	26,7	27,7	27,1	27,3	26,3	28,2	27,8	27,2	27,6	28,6	26,1	26,6	28,8	28,1	29,4	27,8	28,1	3rd match
26,4	26,2	25,0	25,4	26,2	27,6	27,5	26,7	27,7	27,2	27,5	26,5	27,9	27,3	26,9	27,7	28,5	26,7	27,1	28,9	28,1	29,2	27,8	27,6	Ø

The actual average age of players in the first final round

Statistics only relate to reality when the average age of those players actually having participated in the preliminary round is subsequently taken into account.

This result is more realistic because it reveals that all the coaches in the World Cup first resorted to older players.

Obviously experience counts a lot in criteria for the team's composition. This subdivision in *statistics and actual average age* results in the players being classified as

regular players

substitute players

On the whole, regular players are older.

Often, *younger players* have only been included in the World Cup squad in order to *gain experience* within the context of long-term planning.

There were some teams which pursued this principle and employed players in 1982, who still belonged to the substitutes' group at the '78 World Cup in Argentina (see respective chapter).



El Salvador

1. Guevara Mora	Luis Ricardo	2.09.61
2. Castillo	Mario Alfonso	30.10.51
3. Jovel Cruz	Francisco	26.05.51
4. Recinos Ortiz	Carlos Humberto	30.06.50
5. Fagoaga	Ramón Alfredo	12.01.52
6. Ventura	Joaquín Alonso	27.10.56
7. Aquino	Silvio Romeo	30.06.49
8. Rugamas Portillo	José Luis	5.06.53
9. Hernández	Francisco Ever	11.12.58
10. Huevo Montoya	José Norberto	6.06.56
11. González Barillas	Jorge Alberto	13.03.57
12. Osorto Guardado	Francisco Salvador	20.03.57
13. Rivas Martínez	José María	12.05.58
14. Ramírez Zapata	Luis Baltasar	6.01.54
15. Rodríguez	Jaime Alberto	17.01.59
16. Alfaro Valladares	Mauricio Alberto	13.02.56
17. Lorenzana Ragazzone	Guillermo Salvador	5.01.56
18. Díaz Arevalo	Miguel Angel	27.01.57
19. Hernández Fuentes	Julio Eduardo	31.01.58
20. Munguia	José Luis	28.10.59

With an average age of 24,2 years, El Salvador, the youngest team to have participated in the World Cup in Spain.



England

1. Clemence	Ray	5.08.48
2. Anderson	Viv	29.07.56
3. Brooking	Trevor	2.10.48
4. Butcher	Terry	28.12.58
5. Coppell	Steve	9.07.55
6. Foster	Steve	24.09.57
7. Keegan	Kevin	14.02.51
8. Francis	Trevor	19.04.54
9. Hoddle	Glenn	27.10.57
10. McDermott	Terry	8.12.51
11. Mariner	Paul	22.05.53
12. Mills	Mick	4.01.49
13. Corrigan	Joe	18.11.48
14. Neal	Phil	20.02.51
15. Rix	Graham	23.10.57
16. Robson	Bryan	11.01.57
17. Sansom	Kenny	26.09.58
18. Thompson	Phil	21.01.54
19. Wilkins	Ray	14.09.56
20. Withe	Peter	30.08.51
21. Woodcock	Tony	6.12.55
22. Shilton	Peter	18.09.49

With a great deal of experience and years to its name, the English team had an average age of 28,7 years.



To the left: the youngest player ever to have participated in a World Cup: Whiteside/Northern Ireland, born on 7 May 1965.




To the right: the oldest player at the World Cup: Zoff/Italy, who celebrated his 40th birthday on 28 February 1982.

If a more detailed analysis is made of the team which actually played, considerable age differences can be registered within the team sectors. This comparison indicates the age difference within a team depending on a player's position or function.

Specific qualities which are mainly relevant to age are expected from every player in his position or function.

From the goalkeeper: experience, maturity, control, positioning and reliability.

From the forward: dynamism, vigour, speed, strength and reaction.



Country	Goalkeepers	Team Average	Difference
El Salvador	22,7	24,2	-1,5
Kuwait	29,3	25,2	+4,1
New Zealand	25,3	25,4	-0,1
USSR	26,3	25,5	+0,8
Poland	27,4	26,0	+1,4
Germany FR	28,0	26,6	+1,4
Brazil	28,3	26,8	+1,5
Algeria	26,3	26,8	-0,5
Austria	29,0	26,9	+2,1
Yugoslavia	28,0	26,9	+1,1
France	29,0	26,9	+2,1
Spain	31,0	26,9	+4,1
Cameroon	28,7	27,2	+0,5
Argentina	29,7	27,4	+2,3
Honduras	31,0	27,4	+3,6
Scotland	28,3	27,4	-0,9
Hungary	28,7	27,6	+1,1
Northern Ireland	31,3	27,7	+3,6
Belgium	29,0	27,8	+1,2
Italy	31,7	27,8	+3,9
Chile	26,3	27,9	-1,9
Peru	30,0	27,9	+2,1
Czechoslovakia	27,3	28,2	-0,9
England	33,7	28,7	+5,0
	28,6	26,9	

The average age of the goalkeepers in comparison with the average age of the whole team.

- Goalkeepers
- average 22
- difference

An examination carried out from this angle appears to confirm these empirical values.

The age average is above that of the field players.

This age differential continues within the team's structure and goes from the goalkeeper over defence and midfield players to the forwards.

This confirms that special leading positions and functions are held by older players.



El Salvador	Kuwait	New Zealand	USSR	Poland	Germany FR	Brazil	Algeria	Austria	Yugoslavia	France	Spain	Cameroon	Argentina	Honduras	Scotland	Hungary	Northern Ireland	Belgium	Italy	Chile	Peru	Czechoslovakia	England	
24,2	25,2	25,4	25,5	26,0	26,6	26,8	26,8	26,9	26,9	26,9	26,9	27,2	27,4	27,4	27,4	27,6	27,7	27,8	27,8	27,9	27,9	28,2	28,7	Ø22
24,4	24,7	25,4	25,6	25,5	26,4	26,6	26,9	26,7	26,5	26,6	26,5	27,3	26,9	27,5	27,4	27,3	26,9	27,6	27,0	28,0	27,6	28,3	27,9	

Comparison of average age of entire team with average age excluding goalkeeper

The official FIFA competitions (World Youth Championship and Olympic Football Tournament) have contributed towards lowering the average age without losing experience and maturity to dynamism and youth. Youth and junior players go through a systematic process of promoting performance according to age. A young player matures faster thanks to experiences gained at an early stage. He then achieves higher tactical and

technical performance at the Final Competition of a World Cup than colleagues of the same age who did not go through this systematic buildup.

On the basis of the preceding data about the existing relationship *age/experience*, the following tendencies emerge:


1. The average age of goalkeepers is above that of field players.

2. Special leading positions and functions are predominantly held by older players.

3. Old, experienced players have been together for years. They know each other and form the core of the national selection when this is built up.

4. The World Youth Championships and Olympic Football Tournaments contribute towards the lowering of a national team's average age.

Players Active Abroad



Players on teams participating in the World Cup who were playing abroad at the time and were called to their national team for the Final Competition.

During the '82 World Cup, it became clear that many top footballers were playing for clubs outside their country.

Clubs in Central and Western Europe are notably attractive in this sense. *(Diagram page 183)*

Seen in numbers, the players from the English league represent the largest uniform sector. Thus, the teams from Northern Ireland and Scotland which were represented in Spain consisted for the most part of players from English clubs. If one adds 13 Scots and 10 Northern Irish to the 22 English players, English league football was represented by 45 players. *(Diagram page 184)*

However, the remaining strong divisions in Europe do not lose their attraction for star players.

Contrary to the English Division, transfers within European divisions are often reduced to *player personalities*. The following explanations thus include only a few examples as illustrations.

The Bundesliga attracted foreign star players such as Woodcock (England), Six (France), Pezzey and Hintermaier (both from Austria).


The Italian Division also employed star players from Austria (Schachner and Prohaska), Yugoslavia, Argentina (Bertoni) and Brazil (Falcao).

The Spanish Division had the same appeal with the German Stielike playing a special role. *(Diagram page 185)*


The Algerian and Cameroonian teams played a good role, which is partly due to the fact that players active abroad (for the most part in France) were systematically integrated in the squad of 11 players. *(Diagram page 186)*

In South America, top players also had the possibility of being active in clubs abroad. All the same, this particularly applied to Argentina, Brazil and Peru. *(Diagram page 187)*


As the experiences of World Cup players in Spain have shown, reintegrating in the national team is often not simple and can cause some difficulties for the coach.




Players having signed a professional contract in Central and Western European countries.




The English Division attracts players from Northern Ireland and Scotland, who are then included in the World Cup selection.



Top players are individually "exchanged" in the Central and Western European Divisions.





South and Central America both "export" star players.

Four points crop up time and again in discussions.

1. Problems in a team's long-, medium- and short-term buildup.

On the basis of obligations a player has towards his club, he is often not available for the already limited number of matches which have been planned. This is why many coaches only hesitatingly agree to accept such players since they cannot or do not want any talent in their country to go to waste.

2. Problems in the lead

By recalling players to the most important positions on a team, problems arise about the lead or about responsibilities. Thus, this can have an influence on the human aspect as well as the organisation on the field of play.

3. Organisation on the field of play

A negative bearing on the organisation of play could arise if it is oriented to the style of team players active abroad. Such a playing style must not necessarily correspond to the *specific style of the national team* which can be dominated by the influence of foreign club or league football. Thus, one cannot expect uniform performance.


4. Age problems

As a result of investigations made in Spain, coaches confirmed that the average age of players active in foreign clubs exceeded that of the team. This fact had negative effects for some teams during the World Cup as far as the game's dynamism was concerned. As long as the older, foreign player could have an indisputable leading role

within the systematic buildup for the World Cup, his capacity as leader on the field was appreciated and evident. If, for various reasons (injury, individual marking by the opposition, etc.), the player did not attain the expected performance, the team remained leaderless and disorganised on the field. Problems also arose when play developed too fast or one's team remained behind and then had to speed up the pace.

All the coaches to have been questioned arrived at the same conclusion about players who had been called back from abroad. Each case should be decided upon individually and negative accompanying factors should be weighed up objectively.

Analyses



- Tactical observations of the game



Orderly, modern team play was particularly illustrated by the French team - here at the kick-off against Austria.

Tactical observations of the game

On the basis of the increasing complexity of football, it is becoming more and more difficult to recognize and treat individually the fundamental elements of tactics, technique and fitness.

This is why the '82 World Cup with the participation of 24 teams offered a host of ideas which were analyzed and served in the recognition of possible future trends.

Human conduct as well as reactions and forms of expression conditioned by mentality are reflected in the teams' organisation on the field of play.

The styles of play in Spain expressed this varying mentality. With many teams this clearly concerns reconsidering one's own specific human values.

The playing style of European teams is subject to an Anglo-Saxon and continental European influence. Whilst a uniformity was noted in the first sector, regional differences distinguish continental European teams in spite of some similar elements in the game. A cross-section of football styles in Europe reveals the multitude as well as the differentiation in components of the game.

The latter's varying proportional composition was expressed in the teams' performance during the World Cup. The following diagram illustrates the independence of each country also encouraging ideas about possible combinations and influences.

Style as the expression of specific human mentality is not only reduced to Europe but is also more pronounced with teams from Central and South America, Africa and the Near East. Officials and coaches repeatedly say that one expects improved performance *when contemplating one's own strength*.

Imitating a style even if this is done successfully by foreign teams is rejected by most players on the basis of past experience.

This conclusion demands courage and patience to develop one's own specific style.

The technical analysis and honest assessment of a competition are the pre-requisite for increased performance with one's own elements of style. A compatriot's commitment to supervise the national team serves as a basis for this target. Only he can be familiar with his players' character, speaks their language and shares the same

background. Brazil's example illustrates these conclusions. At the time of the '74 World Cup, a leaning towards the European style of play was noticeable. Thus, preparations for Argentina included many of these alien elements. When the analysis of the '78 World Cup could not reveal the expected success, the trend towards accepting specific Brazilian components of football was strengthened once more.

This development was consequently followed and thus led to the enthusiastic performances of the Brazilian team in Spain — though unfortunately without any effective success.

In Spain, one encountered the same spirit though also in a positive sense in teams such as Algeria, Honduras, etc. who sought their own style as well. They were supervised by qualified, native coaches who knew how to adapt inborn qualities such as temperament, constitution, etc. to the elements of tactics, technique and fitness.

The French team also showed a great deal of courage in playing their own style, thereby raising themselves above the stereotype notion of "general European football".

When analyzing past World Cups, one often attempted at explaining the organisational form on the field of play as a new tactical system.


Schematic match systems such as W.M., 4-2-4, 4-3-3 and 4-4-2 were often taken as tactical conclusions drawn from matches of the Final Competition and erroneously recommended as examples to be followed. One therefore ignored that the World Cup system has the form of a tournament and involves other tactical forms of organisation within the team as can be found in normal league football. Precisely the matches of the 1st final round in Spain were often subject to special tactical considerations which were exclusively oriented towards success (i.e. to reach the 2nd final round). Although no spectacular systems were created, the matches of the '82 World Cup cannot be dismissed as tactically deceiving and unproductive. Far more so, the tactical tendencies which had evolved since Argentina were confirmed and consolidated in expanding volume.

1. Organisational forms within the team became more compact on the field of play.
2. The trend towards an enforced mid-field continued.
3. Based on the growing consideration of the players' specific mentality as well as their individual and collective spiritual mobility, a creative dynamism evolved in midfield which made play more positive, diversified and impenetrable.

In the first place, all the teams set up play from the defence. To do this successfully, mental concentration and physical readiness for action were necessary for the entire duration of the game.

The coaches of the World Cup teams demanded the right mental approach from their players to the constantly changing situations in attack and defence.

When the opponents were in possession of the ball, the whole team moved to the back leaving only one or two strikers in the centre of attack.



Area marking

In order to get possession of the ball, preference is given to specific human qualities of individual players such as instinct and reaction rather than to a complicated collective-intellectual defence strategy.

In spite of efforts made in defence to develop superior numbers, this cannot be considered as a one-sided style of play oriented towards defence. On the contrary, there was a clear distribution of duties and specializations among all teams at the games in Spain.




Area marking with advancing defence players

Nevertheless, one came to the important conclusion that the players' competences in attack and defence became more extensive and diversified.

The influence of factors which are conditioned by mentality and lead to the personality's development is also evident from the organisational forms on the field of play.

Starting with the fundamental notion of developing the style of play from the defence, three forms of basic organi-




Marshalling in area marking

sation become evident which then vary according to the team. The following diagram gives a general survey of this.

Thus, there were teams which mainly relied on area marking, whilst others counted on man-to-man marking with an additional free defence player. The third group skilfully combined the elements of man and area marking, thereby giving an example of the afore-mentioned compactness.

Area marking



Man-to-man marking with free defence player



Combined man/area marking with free defence player



Area Marking

Preference was given to area marking by the Brazilian team who employed it to perfection right up to their match against the subsequent world champions, Italy. With their afore-mentioned virtues such as instinct and capacity of reaction which are conditioned by their mentality, the Brazilians were predestined for this kind of defence organisation. The defence reigned in all matches of the preliminary round especially as it was relieved of its own penetrating attacking play and hardly challenged by the opposing teams. Only in the match against Italy did *exclusive area marking* reach its bounds. Without a defence player strictly covering in a deep position, the team's compactness is increased. This has a particularly positive effect when switching over from a defensive situation to the attack and vice versa.



Man-to-man Marking

A majority of teams played with a clear distribution of duties regarding area and man marking.

The schematic presentation of this defence is depicted in the introductory diagram (page 192). The teams which followed this principle were governed by the expected attacking formation of the opposition (1, 2 or 3 strikers). In front of a defence player covering behind him, the defence took on defensive, man-to-man marking functions whilst including midfield players when the opponents were in possession of the ball. The example of the Italian defence organisation is a classical variant of this.

In comparison with the remarks about strict area marking, other criteria ensue here:

1. There is a clear, simple distribution of tasks for those players directly concerned.
2. With this measure, opposing strikers can be better controlled and possibly eliminated.



Both photos illustrate the defence's vulnerability in area-marking without depth. Here Italy's goal against Brazil.

3. The defence becomes less vulnerable to the opposition's high through balls and centres into the free space in front of the goal.

4. Through this form of organisation, especially weak teams like using the additional possibility of consolidating their own play when under pressure from the opponents and of developing systematic counter-attacks.

Combined man and area marking

Two obvious tendencies are reflected in the last form of organisation:

1. Starting play with a safe defence.
2. Including the dynamic midfield in the active support of the direct defence players.

Brief mention was made of the advantages and disadvantages of both defence formations.

This third possibility presents a synthesis whilst taking modern trends into consideration.

Ahead of the free defender, only a few defenders are entrusted with direct tasks of man-to-man marking. On the other hand, the dynamic midfield organises itself in a funnel-or fan-shaped formation whilst marking space. This affects the game's development as can be illustrated by several examples.

Extensive attacking moves as well as individual playing actions get caught in this defence net thanks to its clever marshalling.

Owing to the funnel-shaped organisation of area marking, many attacks end far from the goal.

The fair procedure of the entire World Cup was positively influenced by this widely used defence formation. On getting the ball from the opposing team, there is lots of free space available in front for the development of one's own counter-attacks. Depending on their qualities, this can be employed by the players.



Man-to-man marking by the French players in front of Tresor marking the area.



Tresor demonstrating that also when man-marking, the free defence player moves in behind his defenders.

The style of play from the defence and the compactness of a team were observed as two continuing tendencies ever since 1978. However, this development cannot be termed as a trend towards more defensive play. Skilful impulses proceeded rather from the defence and were carried forward by the dynamic yet compact midfield. As with the defensive forms of organisation, each team also found its specific modification with regard to the basic formations of attack. In the analysis of the '78 World Cup in Argentina, the lack of top player personalities was registered as an explanation for the apparent levelling off of the playing standard. This superficial judgement did not take the actual development of the game into account.

Each measure involves a counter-measure

The tactical path taken in Argentina was the unchallenged trend towards defensive play and thus towards enforced defence whilst including a midfield tending towards the rear of the field.

The team's organisation became more compact and thereby narrowed down the space needed for offensive play.

Play makers who were used to the old style could not develop their capacities in midfield.



1. They were easier to eliminate with reinforced defensive measures (man-to-man marking).
2. Depending on the superior number of opponents in the defence, there were hardly any open spaces. The long passes which opened the defence and created these open spaces were thus eliminated.

Coaches and players in Argentina were certainly not ready for this development. However, one recognized the trends and made efforts at releasing the game from its defensive rigidity in order to return to a more dynamic, offensive style of play. The functions forming the game were thus distributed among various players. This is how the opponents managed to counteract man-to-man marking and the possible elimination of the only playmakers. The initiatives for attack thus became more varied and less perceptible. However, greater mental and physical claims were made of the players as the new roles considerably expanded their normal functions.

With the teams' growing compactness, the open spaces were considerably narrowed and only offered few possibilities for the development of offensive play. Depending on the afore-mentioned funnel-shaped organisation in defence, free spaces opened up on the sidelines. Most teams transferred their system of counter-attacks into those zones when in possession of the ball. The organisation of attacks from a reinforced defence varied from one team to another and oriented itself according to the players' individual efficiency.

Two fundamental tendencies could be determined here.

1. Attacking moves starting with an offensive defender from the rearmost defence row. These moves were soon discerned by the opposing teams and reduced with the appropriate tactical counter-measures.
2. Attacking moves starting with a mid-field player who switched over to the offensive immediately after getting hold of the ball. At the same time, the remaining players on his team were in a position to receive the ball. One could observe that this dynamism demanding the rapid assessment of a situation was quite pronounced with the French team.



The players Platini, Giresse, Genghini and Tigana made a particularly fine show here.

As they all moved forwards from the rear midfield towards the attack, attacking play could not be calculated. This made it successful because the opposing defence ranks had to face surprising situations. The danger was increased all the more with the capacity of the four French midfield players of shooting at goal with long-range shots as well as penetration into the opponents' penalty area.

As with the enlarged functions of the defence and midfield, the direct attackers adjusted themselves to the changed match situation.

Depending on the match situation, a team's top attackers are included in the team's compactness which is particularly stamped with the dynamic action of the midfield.

When the opponents attack, they tend to retreat without becoming defenders. In this defence position in the first row, they attempt at halting the opponents' buildup without being limited in their dynamism or function through special tasks.

When in possession of the ball, they mainly fulfill four functions:

1. They are in a position *to receive the ball* from their own defence. In this case, they exert a *distributive function*.

2. This measure delays their own attacking play giving the midfield players the opportunity to move up. Once the square or back pass has been effected, the attacker returns to his original position up front and the function of a leading goal-scorer in the centre of attack.

This way, the midfield's compactness breaks up for defence purposes and *free spaces are created in midfield besides those in the wings*.

The dynamic midfield is thereby given the opportunity to orient itself towards the front and *keep in contact with the strikers* in order to encourage the latter's development whilst also acting as "intercepting net" around the opponents' penalty area.

Two world stars: Gentile marking Maradona



In possession of the ball, the free defender becoming the starting point for counterattacks




The midfield retreating when opponents attack. Individual actions getting caught in the funnel formation.




In spite of an apparent defensive attitude, the Italian players backed up their own team's attacks.





Systematic presentation of counter-attacks from a reinforced defence





Already at the opening match, Belgium demonstrated their funnel-shaped defence organisation with a sweeper




In the opening match, the Argentine star players Ardiles and Maradona could not develop their qualities due to a lack of free space.

See also following diagrams.






Individual and team players in attack and defence from match: Argentina v Belgium







The compact midfield no longer allows for the old style of playmaker. Here Platini (France) against Northern Ireland.




Counter-measures against reinforced midfield



Clearly distributed duties in midfield (Match 37)



France's marking pattern



2 rear defenders using man-to-man marking against front-runners

France played with a convincing sweeper who also moved ahead occasionally



It already became dangerous with the development of attacks from the midfield. Here: Lato (Poland) against Belgium.



Once in possession of the ball, each player has to be more creative in midfield and initiate attacks to the fore.



The French midfield were particularly brilliant in the match against Northern Ireland.


There were no more liberos of the old school (Beckenbauer, Germany FR). The free spaces needed to go forward only existed in the wings. Tresor (France) created an exceptional situation here.




The West German Stielike who has the qualities of a libero, was too concerned with the organisation of his own defence during the World Cup.




Match No. 8



Match No. 37



Match No. 8






The Kuwait team presenting a well-formed wall in this scene against CSSR.




Brazil's opponents always have to reckon with unexpected versions of the free-kick


Match No. 6




Match No. 37




Match No. 41




Match No. 38




Match No. 6



Match No. 9



Match No. 20



Whilst considering the question of players' substitution an attempt should be made to corroborate, *in accurate figures, the empirical evaluation universally known.*

The practical evaluation and application depend anyhow on the individual coaches themselves, as they alone have to make the decisions in given situations.

Nevertheless, an analysis of the diagram on page 218 (below) and the relevant figures disclose certain trends which can possibly be regarded as generally valid. The relation between the number of substitutions in the first and second halves of 9:112 still comes as a surprise.

We can presume that substitutions made in the first half are usually due to injury. It is unlikely that players are exchanged for tactical reasons. This indicates that the coaches must have been perfectly satisfied with the organisation of the game. There are several reasons for this:

1. The players are in possession of sufficient mental concentration to enable them to carry out their strategical tactics.
2. They are not yet physically tired, i.e. the fitness factor has not yet showed its negative aspect.

As well as these reflections about one's own team, consideration must be given to the steps made by the opponents, who, more often than not, act cautiously during the first half. In this way one's own defects, if any, are still concealed. In any event the result at the end of the first half is not regarded as irreversible, either positively or negatively.

As the diagram on page 218 (below) shows, the half-time interval represents a critical turning-point.

There are three major reasons for making a substitution of players at this point:

1. Injury of players
2. slackening physical condition
3. tactical reasons.

Some teams make this a regular practice.

The proportion previously mentioned of 9:112 substitutions in favour of the second half reflects quite clearly on the intensity, development and result of play.

The large amount of substitutions made between the 60th and 84th minute is particularly conspicuous.



This is apparently the stage at which not only tactical considerations, but also psychological motives, prompt coaches to try and influence the course of the game.

It is interesting to see that this is also the stage when most goals are scored. This is depicted in the diagram on page 218 (above).

A final spate of substitutions usually occurs in the last minutes of a match. It was actually noticed that players were often exchanged at this final stage so as to upset the rhythm of the opponents' game.

Warming-up is vitally important in enabling a player to become a totally integrated member of the team as soon as he enters the field as a substitute.





These remarks apply particularly when a player's team is only slightly in the lead and is trying to ward off the onslaught of the other side.

Every coach applies his own specific methods, gained by experience, in connection with the succession of goals, just as he does for substitution. The diagram on page 218 (above) showing the succession of goals in Spain is in a relationship of 53:96 in favour of the second half. Clear parallels can be drawn here with substitutions (see the diagram on page 220).

Alone the fact that less goals scored in the first half indicates an overall caution at this stage. This wary attitude is especially obvious shortly before the half-time whistle: anything rather than concede a goal!

Apparently most teams try to consolidate the score as from the 36th minute. In the second half the graph grows more obvious and shows more details. The zigzag movement of the graph can be explained as follows:

After a goal has been scored, the scoring team often holds back so as to avoid any risk when the opponents are provoked into counter-attack. Even teams who have conceded a goal tend to hold back as a rule so as not to risk conceding yet another goal. Hence the match slows down for a while before picking up momentum again.

There is also evidence that a large number of goals are usually scored immediately after the half-time interval (between the 45th and 54th minute). This signifies that full advantage has been taken of the interval. However, as the diagram shows, the majority of goals were scored between the 57th and 72nd minute. The extreme zigzag line of the graph, previously mentioned, is obvious proof of this.

The final offensive starts in earnest at approximately the 81st minute. The large number of goals can also be attributed in part to extra-time and the need for penalty "shoot outs".

The diagram on page 220 is merely an indication of the general situation. However it is interesting to take a look at the scores of some of the competing teams.

France and Poland often scored immediately before and after the half-time interval. This can be interpreted as a sure sign of the high standard of concentration.

40th-44th	47th-49th	F
40th-44th	-48th	P

The USSR and Brazil also deserve to be mentioned as fine examples of concentration on play and full exploitation of the half-time interval.

47th-48th-49th	USSR
47th-49th	Brazil

On the other hand, the World Champions, Italy, scored most of their goals in the middle of the first and second halves of the game.

18th-20th minute	60th-74th minute
(3)	(3)

Furthermore, individual analysis reveals that:

Cameroon
Kuwait
New Zealand
Honduras
El Salvador
Chile


scored no goals at all in the first half, which implies either a primarily defensive style, or that their opponents did not give them chance to develop their game.

Diagram 3 is an attempt to correlate substitution with the succession of goals.

The result proves there is an obvious connection, particularly in the first half. However, it is not clear which of the two triggered off the procedure. Were the players substituted first and then the goals scored, or were the goals conceded before the players were exchanged?


This is how a substitution should be made correctly





3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27	30	33	36	39	42	45	48	51	54	57	60	63	66	69	72	75	78	81	84	87	90	
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	3	0	1	0	24	3	4	3	4	3	8	10	12	10	11	11	8	10	6	5	11	
3	1	4	5	4	5	4	5	6	4	5	3	0	2	2	5	8	4	4	1	9	4	6	12	2	8	5	4	5	9	14

Special reports



- adidas World Cup Trophies
- Refereeing
- Fair Play

**Paolo Rossi wins both adidas/
France Football World Cup Trophies**

The Italian, Paolo Rossi, the star of the 1982 World Cup in Spain won both of the competitions set up by adidas and France Football for the award of "the golden ball" and "the golden shoe" as best player and best goal-scorer of the competition.

Rossi's six goals contributed enormously to Italy becoming World Champion.

He scored 3 goals against Brazil, two in the semi-final against Poland and one against Germany F.R. in the Final.

Rossi (26) who plays for Juventus Turin in the Italian League was also nominated as best player of the tournament by the journalists attending the World Cup.

Rossi had hitherto played 27 times for his national team, scoring a total of 13 goals.

Karl-Heinz Rummenigge (Germany F. R.) similarly won two adidas World Cup trophies. With 5 goals to his credit he was the second-best scorer of the competition. The press nominated him the third best player of the 1982 World Cup.

In 60 internationals for Germany F.R., Rummenigge (27) totted up 20 goals. He is registered with Bayern Munich and was voted "Europe's footballer of the year" in the adidas/France Football competition.

Two star players from Brazil won the other two adidas trophies.

Falcao (29), who plays for AC Rome, was elected second best player of the tournament.


Zico (28), registered with Flamengo, was the third best scorer, with a total of four goals. Zico won the title of "Footballer of the Year" in South America and has already played 77 times for the Brazilian national side.



List of Goalscorers

adidas "Golden Shoe" Trophy

- 6 goals Paolo Rossi (Italy)
- 5 goals Karl-Heinz Rummenigge (Germany FR)
- 4 goals Zico (Brazil) and Zbigniew Boniek (Poland)



- 3 goals Kiss (Hungary) Armstrong (Northern Ireland)
- Giresse (France) Falcao (Brazil)

- 2 goals Assad (Algeria) Maradona (Argentina)
- Fazekas (Hungary) Nyilasi (Hungary)
- Pölöskei (Hungary) Robson (England)
- Wark (Scotland) Schachner (Austria)
- Socrates (Brazil) Panenka (Czechoslovakia)
- Six (France) Francis (England)
- Rocheteau (France) Ghengini (France)
- Bertoni (Argentina) Hamilton (Northern Ireland)
- Passarella (Argentina) Platini (France)
- Serginho (Brazil) Littbarski (Germany FR)
- Fischer (Germany FR) Tardelli (Italy)
- Eder (Brazil)

- 1 goal Al-Buloushi (Kuwait) Coeck (Belgium)
- Al-Dakhil (Kuwait) Conti (Italy)
- Archibald (Scotland) Dalglish (Scotland)
- Ardiles (Argentina) Diaz (Peru)
- Bal (USSR) Hrubesch (Germany FR)
- Baltacha (USSR) Gavrillov (USSR)
- Belloumi (Algeria) Gudelj (Yugoslavia)
- Petrović (Yugoslavia) Letelier (Chile)
- Laing (Honduras) Ramon Diaz (Argentina)

Junior (Brazil)	Vandenberg (Belgium)
Jordan (Scotland)	Zapata (El Salvador)
Souness (Scotland)	Ramirez (El Salvador)
Nadjer (Algeria)	Zelaya (Honduras)
Czerniatynski (Belgium)	Chivadze (USSR)
Lato (Poland)	Shengelia (USSR)
Buncol (Poland)	Wooddin (New Zealand)
La Rosa (Peru)	Varga (Hungary)
Bossis (France)	Smolarek (Poland)
Juanito (Spain)	Graziani (Italy)
Bensaoula (Algeria)	Ciolek (Poland)
Pezzey (Austria)	Tresor (France)
Oganesian (USSR)	Neira (Chile)
Lopez Ufarte (Spain)	Krankl (Austria)
Mariner (England)	Cabrini (Italy)
Moscoso (Chile)	Szentes (Hungary)
Narey (Scotland)	Hintermaier (Austria)
Oscar (Brazil)	Zamora (Spain)
M'Bida (Cameroon)	Girard (France)
Reinders (Germany FR)	Couriol (France)
Robertson (Scotland)	Szarmach (Poland)
Saura (Spain)	Majewski (Poland)
Blokhin (USSR)	Kupcewicz (Poland)
Soler (France)	Altobelli (Italy)
Sumner (New Zealand)	Breitner (Germany FR)
Toth (Hungary)	

Own goal Barmos (Czechoslovakia)

The winners of the adidas trophies - "Golden shoe" and "Golden ball" competitions

1982 Football World Cup

a) *the best goal-scorers:*

1. Rossi	Italy	6 goals	Golden shoe
2. Rummenigge	Germany FR	5 goals	Silver shoe
3. Zico	Brazil	4 goals	Bronze shoe

b) *the best players:*

1. Rossi	Italy	437 points	Golden ball
2. Falcao	Brazil	252 points	Silver ball
3. Rummenigge	Germany FR	207 points	Bronze ball



The average age of this group of referees was 39. 29 of them had already participated in one or more competitions

organized by FIFA (World Cup, Olympic Football Tournament, World Youth Championship).

Lacarne (Moscow '80)
 Ithurralde (Tunisia '77, Argentina '78, Japan '79)
 Boskovic (Germany FR '74, Australia '81)
 Wöhler (Tunisia '77, Moscow '80)
 Coelho (Montreal '76, Tunisia '77, Argentina '78, Australia '81)
 Castro (Australia '81)
 Siles (Moscow '80)
 Christov (Moscow '80)
 Lund-Sørensen (Australia '81)
 Vautrot (Tunisia '77)
 Prokop (Montreal '76, Argentina '78)
 Eschweiler (Munich '72, Germany FR '74)
 Dwomoh (Montreal '76)
 Mendez (Australia '81)
 Chan Tam Sun (Japan '79)

Palotai (Munich '72, Germany FR '74, Montreal '76, Argentina '78)
 Klein (Mexico City '68, Mexico '70, Montreal '76, Argentina '78)
 Rubio (Japan '79, Moscow '80)
 Corver (Argentina '78)
 Ortiz (Japan '79)
 Labo (Moscow '80)
 Jarguz (Argentina '78, Japan '79, Australia '81)
 Garrido (Argentina '78)
 Rainea (Germany '74, Argentina '78)
 Valentine (Moscow '80, Australia '81)
 Lamo (Japan '79)
 Cardellino (Japan '79)
 Stupar (Moscow '80)
 Soriano (Australia '81)


At the afore-mentioned meeting, other subjects were also discussed, such as the accommodation of appointed referees, a course for the uniform application of the Laws of the Game, physical training, etc.

Once the respective decisions had been made, the appointed referees and their National Associations received two circulars (on 16 and 25

March 1982) informing them of their appointment as well as of additional organizational details.

All the National Associations confirmed their referees' participation in the Final Competition of the FIFA World Cup. Both circulars also mentioned that all referees had to be in Madrid, the centre of all activities in Spain, by 7 June 1982 at the latest and

without exception. Moreover, the referees had to attend a theory course on the standardization of the Laws of the Game and a physical training course from 8 to 11 June. The course took place according to schedule under the supervision of Adolfo Reginato. The theoretical part was held at the Palacio de Congresos y Exposiciones in Madrid, whilst the practical part and



fitness training were carried out in the excellent premises of Real Madrid. Professor Carlos Martinez Garcia was responsible for the fitness training programme. On 9 June, all the referees had to have a check-up at the National Institute for

Physical Education (INEF), which consisted in the testing of sight, hearing and the heart as well as a blood and urine test. After this exacting examination, all the referees were considered medically sound. On 10 June, they had to pass the physical fitness tests laid

down by the Referees' Committee (4×10 m, 50 m, 400 m, and the Cooper Test).

Below are the test results of the referees of the 1982 World Cup:

Position	4 × 10 m	50 m	400 m	Cooper	Position	4 × 10 m	50 m	400 m	Cooper
1	9,9 sec.	6,2 sec.	1,00 min.	2950 m	23	11,2 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,07 min.	2950 m
2	10,1 sec.	6,6 sec.	0,59 min.	3100 m	24	11,6 sec.	6,7 sec.	1,07 min.	2900 m
3	10,3 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,05 Min.	3250 m	25	11,2 sec.	6,7 sec.	1,09 min.	2950 m
4	10,2 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,05 min.	3150 m	26	10,6 sec.	6,6 sec.	1,11 min.	2650 m
5	10,4 sec.	6,6 sec.	1,05 min.	2800 m	27	10,7 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,07 min.	2750 m
6	10,8 sec.	6,2 sec.	1,07 min.	2750 m	28	11,4 sec.	7,3 sec.	1,06 min.	2850 m
7	10,4 sec.	6,5 sec.	1,07 min.	2850 m	29	10,7 sec.	6,9 sec.	1,11 min.	2650 m
8	10,8 sec.	6,7 sec.	1,06 min.	2900 m	30	11,9 sec.	7,2 sec.	1,08 min.	2900 m
9	10,4 sec.	6,4 sec.	1,09 min.	2850 m	31	10,4 sec.	7,2 sec.	1,09 min.	2700 m
10	10,3 sec.	6,9 sec.	1,08 min.	2700 m	32	10,8 sec.	6,9 sec.	1,07 min.	2250 m
11	11,1 sec.	6,8 sec.	1,07 min.	3000 m	33	11,5 sec.	7,0 sec.	1,09 min.	2700 m
12	10,8 sec.	6,8 sec.	1,08 min.	2950 m	34	11,0 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,12 min.	2650 m
13	10,4 sec.	6,8 sec.	1,08 min.	2850 m	35	10,6 sec.	7,0 sec.	1,09 min.	2400 m
14	10,8 sec.	6,6 sec.	1,08 min.	2850 m	36	10,6 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,10 min.	2350 m
15	10,8 sec.	6,9 sec.	1,09 min.	2900 m	37	10,9 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,12 min.	2600 m
16	11,3 sec.	6,2 sec.	1,07 min.	2550 m	38	10,8 sec.	7,6 sec.	1,09 min.	2700 m
17	11,0 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,06 min.	2850 m	39	11,1 sec.	7,4 sec.	1,12 min.	2550 m
18	11,3 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,06 min.	2950 m	40	10,9 sec.	7,0 sec.	1,09 min.	2350 m
19	10,2 sec.	6,7 sec.	1,08 min.	2550 m	41	11,1 sec.	7,7 sec.	1,12 min.	2350 m
20	10,8 sec.	7,1 sec.	1,07 min.	2900 m	42	11,4 sec.	7,5 sec.	1,10 min.	2600 m
21	10,9 sec.	6,9 sek.	1,03 sec.	2750 m	43	11,5 sec.	7,6 sec.	1,14 min.	2700 m
22	11,2 sec.	6,9 sec.	1,07 sec.	2650 m	44	10,6 sec.	8,4 sec.	1,28 min.	2600 m
					∅	10,8 sec.	6,9 sec.	1,05 min.	2750 m

As one can see from this list, the referees concerned answered the minimum requirements of FIFA and were in optimal physical shape with one exception due to injury. Once the results of the check-ups and tests were known, the FIFA Referees' Committee appointed the referee quartets for the matches of the 1st round of the 1982 FIFA World Cup at its meeting No. 60 on 10 June. All the nominations for the 1st round are contained in the following list.

See page 227.

The first round was the toughest for the referees because they had to travel to three and even four different cities in two weeks. They left Madrid one day prior to the match and returned one day after it. In seven cases the referees

even stayed one day longer because on the next day they had to officiate at another match which was only located a few kilometres away from the first venue (Elche-Alicante, Oviedo-Gijon, La Coruña-Vigo). The referees who had been nominated for the matches in nearby Valladolid left Madrid early on the match day and returned on the same day. They always travelled by plane with the exception of the short distance to Valladolid which was covered by car.

At its meeting 61 on 26 June 1982, the Referees' Committee examined the reports of the referee inspectors for the 1st round and drew up a new list of referees for the 2nd round of the Final Competition. These appointments figure on the following list.

See page 227.

Once the second round was over, the Referees' Committee examined the referee inspectors' reports and appointed the referees for the semi-finals at its Meeting No. 62 on 6 July 1982. Moreover, it was decided to meet once more on 9 July (Meeting No. 63) in order to nominate the referees for the match for the 3rd and 4th places and for the final.

See page 227.

In conclusion, mention should be made of the excellent work of both coordinators, Miguel Galan (FIFA) and Pablo A. Sanchez Ibañez (RCOE/RFEF). Thanks to their efforts, the entire administration in the refereeing sector proceeded smoothly. Miguel Galan is also the author of the present report on refereeing.

Campaign for Fair Play

Various incidents on football pitches throughout the world have prevailed upon FIFA to address an appeal for fairness to players on all those teams participating in the World Cup. With the circular printed below, players commit themselves to observe the Laws of the Game and to respect the referees and opponents. This measure which acts as a curb in the increased tendency towards foul play in recent times, resembles the Olympic oath which Olympic players take on with deep emotion.

Campaign against Violence – Campaign for Fair Play

Dear President,
Dear Sirs,

We have the pleasure herewith to invite you to participate in the "Campaign against violence – campaign for fair play" in connection with the FIFA 1982 World Cup in Spain. Taking up the initiative of the "Association Internationale contre la Violence dans le Sport" (AICVS), which the FIFA has joined, the President of the Fédération Internationale de Football, Dr. João Havelange, kindly requests the 24 Football Associations

qualified for the Final Competition of the 1982 World Cup to sign the pledge quoted hereafter:

"Violence distorts and disgraces sport. We are going to play the World Cup watched by hundreds of millions of spectators.

We are aware of our responsibilities and undertake to play with respect for the Laws, the referees and our opponents. We shall do our utmost to ensure that the World Cup will be a display of manly conduct and that the triumph will be football's."

FIFA and its President therefore invite the qualified National Associations to approve and sign this document, either by the President or General Secretary, or – which would be even better – also by the coach and team captain concerned. We would be grateful if you would return the Declaration enclosed herewith, duly signed.

(signed): *Joseph S. Blatter*
General Secretary

The following pages answer the question whether this initiative was successful or not.

Whilst the players' conduct can be exactly analyzed on the basis of the referees' reports which were sent in, the spectators' behaviour has been commented upon by Sir Walter Winterbottom on behalf of the Technical Study Group. Seen subjectively, one can conclude from the good experiences gained in Spain that there is a causal connection between what happens on the pitch and in the spectator stands.

Sport Billy – the FIFA Fair Play Trophy

Winner: Brazil

Regulations for the Fair Play Trophy**

1. FIFA is awarding a "Fair Play" trophy (Sport-Billy) for good conduct with the aim of encouraging fair play among the players of the finalist teams.
2. All matches of the Final Competition are taken into consideration for the classification.
3. The classification will be decided at the end of the Final Competition by the 1982 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee. Its decisions are final.
4. The following number of points will be awarded for each match played by a team:

– for the first round	5
– for the second round	6
– for the semi-finals	7
– for the finals	8

Points will be deducted
as follows:

	<i>Deductions</i>
– no remark in the referee's report or the report of the official inspector	0
– caution to a player confirmed by the Disciplinary Committee	1
– expulsion of a player from the field	3
– official suspension as decided by the Disciplinary Committee, per match	5
– warning: referee's intervention with the team captain, intended for the entire team	5
– a player leaving the field without the referee's permission	2
– the whole team leaving the field	22
– delay of a team at the beginning of the match	5

Any other incident not mentioned above will be judged and points deducted by the FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee, whose decisions will be final.

5. The *total number of points will be divided by the number of matches played by each team.*

6. The team having gained the highest *average value* of points will be declared the winner of the "Fair Play" and will receive a diploma and a trophy. If several teams are in the

same position, the number of matches played and – if necessary – the award of "good conduct" points may determine the order.

7. These Regulations were adopted by the 1982 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee.



Disciplinary Measures**Cautions****ALGERIA**

7	Germany FR v. Algeria	11 Rabah Madjer	rough play
22	Algeria v. Austria	16 Faouzi Mansouri	rough play

ARGENTINA

1	Argentina v. Belgium	4 Daniel Bertoni	foul play
29	Argentina v. El Salvador	9 Americo Gallego	rough play
		14 Jorge Olguin	rough play
39	Italy v. Argentina	11 Mario Kempes	dissent
		10 Diego Maradona	dissent
		1 Osvaldo Ardiles	dissent
43	Argentina v. Brazil	15 Daniel Passarella	dissent

AUSTRIA

10	Chile v. Austria	4 Josef Degeorgi	rough play
		6 Roland Hattenberger	rough play
34	Germany FR v. Austria	10 Reinhold Hintermaier	dangerous tackling
		7 Walter Schachner	dissent
37	Austria v. France	3 Erich Obermayer	foul play
41	Austria v. Northern Ireland	12 Anton Pichler	foul play

BELGIUM

1	Argentina v. Belgium	3 Luc Millecamps	dissent
26	Belgium v. Hungary	1 Jean-Marie Pfaff	ungentlemanly conduct
		4 Walter Meeuws	ungentlemanly conduct

BRAZIL

43	Argentina v. Brazil	1 Waldir Peres	ungentlemanly conduct
		15 Paulo Roberto Falcao	dangerous play



CAMEROON

4	Peru v. Cameroon	1 Thomas Nkono	ungentlemanly conduct
16	Poland v. Cameroon	16 Ibrahim Aoudou 9 Albert Roger Milla	foul play ungentlemanly conduct
28	Italy v. Cameroon	4 René Ndjeja	dangerous play

CHILE

10	Chile v. Austria	2 Lizardo Garrido	rough play
19	Germany FR v. Chile	6 Rodolfo Dubo Segovia 21 Miguel Gamboa	rough play rough play
31	Algeria v. Chile	9 Juan Letelier	dangerous play

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

20	England v. Czechoslovakia	16 Pavel Chaloupka	foul play
32	France v. Czechoslovakia	8 Antonin Panenka	ungentlemanly conduct

ENGLAND

8	England v. France	4 Terry Butcher	holding an opponent
35	England v. Kuwait	11 Paul Mariner	dissent
48	Spain v. England	19 Ray Wilkins	rough play

FRANCE

23	France v. Kuwait	2 Manuel Amoros	ungentlemanly conduct
32	France v. Czechoslovakia	2 Manuel Amoros *	ungentlemanly conduct
45	France v. Northern Ireland	14 Jean Tigana	dissent
50	Germany FR v. France	12 Alain Giresse 9 Bernard Genghini	dissent tripping an opponent
51	Poland v. France	20 Gérard Soler	foul play

GERMANY FEDERAL REPUBLIC

7	Germany FR v. Algeria	9 Horst Hrubesch	rough play
40	Germany FR v. England	15 Ulrich Stielike	dangerous play
44	Germany FR v. Spain	8 Klaus Fischer 2 Hans-Peter Briegel	foul play foul play
50	Germany FR v. France	5 Bernd Förster	foul play
52	Italy v. Germany FR	6 Wolfgang Dremmler 7 Pierre Littbarski 15 Ulrich Stielike *	foul play dissent dissent

HONDURAS

33	Honduras v. Yugoslavia	6 Ramón Maradiaga	dissent
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HUNGARY

5	Hungary v. El Salvador	7 Laszlo Fazekas 8 Tibor Nyilasi	ungentlemanly conduct ungentlemanly conduct
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NORTHERN IRELAND

12	Yugoslavia v. N. Ireland	16 Norman Whiteside	rough play
36	Spain v. Northern Ireland	11 William Hamilton 10 Samuel McIlroy	rough play rough play
45	France v. Northern Ireland	11 William Hamilton *	foul play

ITALY

2	Italy v. Poland	11 Giampiero Marini 7 Gaetano Scirea	failing to retire 10 yards failing to retire 10 yards
13	Italy v. Peru	14 Marco Tardelli	dangerous play
28	Italy v. Cameroon	9 Giancarlo Antognoni	ungentlemanly conduct
39	Italy v. Argentina	20 Paolo Rossi 6 Claudio Gentile	dissent dangerous play
47	Italy v. Brazil	13 Gabriele Oriali 6 Claudio Gentile *	foul play foul play
49	Poland v. Italy	5 Fulvio Collovati	ungentlemanly conduct
52	Italy v. Germany FR	16 Bruno Conti 13 Gabriele Oriali *	rough play rough play

* see under "suspensions"

KUWAIT

23	France v. Kuwait	10 Abdul-Aziz Al-Anbari 7 Fathi Marzouk	failing to retire 10 yards foul play
35	England v. Kuwait	2 Naeem Mubarak	holding an opponent

NEW ZEALAND — *no cautions***PERU**

13	Italy v. Peru	2 Jaime Duarte	dangerous play
25	Poland v. Peru	16 Jorge Olaechea	persistent infringements of the Laws of the Game

POLAND

2	Italy v. Poland	20 Zbigniew Boniek	failing to retire 10 yards
16	Poland v. Cameroon	14 Andrzej Palasz	persistent infringements of the Laws of the Game
38	Poland v. Belgium	11 Włodzimierz Smolarek	dangerous play
46	Poland v. USSR	13 Andrzej Buncol	tripping an opponent
49	Poland v. Italy	20 Zbigniew Boniek * 10 Stefan Majewski 9 Władysław Zmuda	rough play ungentlemanly conduct
51	Poland v. France	11 Włodzimierz Smolarek * 12 Roman Wojcicki 13 Andrzej Buncol *	ungentlemanly conduct foul play foul play

EL SALVADOR

17	Belgium v. El Salvador	12 Francisco Osorto 5 Ramón Fagoaga	ungentlemanly conduct ungentlemanly conduct
29	Argentina v. El Salvador	4 Carlos Recinos 14 Luis Ramírez Zapata 12 Francisco Osorto *	rough play rough play rough play

SCOTLAND

27	USSR v. Scotland	4 Graeme Souness	dissent
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SPAIN

21	Spain v. Yugoslavia	10 Jesús Zamora 3 Rafael Gordillo	failing to retire 10 yards rough play
36	Spain v. Northern Ireland	7 Juan Gomez	foul play
44	Germany FR v. Spain	6 José Ramón Alesanco 16 José Vicente Sánchez 2 José Antonio Camacho	foul play foul play foul play

USSR

42	Belgium v. USSR	8 Vladimir Bessonov	failing to retire 10 yards
46	Poland v. USSR	3 Alexandr Chivadze 14 Sergei Borovski 5 Sergei Baltacha	dangerous play dangerous play tripping an opponent

YUGOSLAVIA

21	Spain v. Yugoslavia	5 Nenad Stojković 8 Edhem Šljivo	tripping an opponent repeated foul play
33	Honduras v. Yugoslavia	6 Zlatko Krmpotić	holding an opponent



The overall picture includes the conduct of the coaches . . .



Expulsions/Suspensions


(in accordance with the provisions of the FIFA Memorandum on Disciplinary Measures)

29	Argentina v. El Salvador	L. Barrancos, Bolivia
El Salvador:	No. 12: Francisco Osorto	rough play
	2nd caution: suspended for the next international "A" match	
32	France v. Czechoslovakia	P. Casarin, Italy
France:	No. 2: Manuel Amoros	ungentlemanly conduct
	2nd caution: suspended for match No. 37: Austria v. France	
CSSR:	No. 9: Ladislav Vizek	kicking an opponent
	Expulsion: suspended for the next international "A" match	
33	Honduras v. Yugoslavia	G. Castro, Chile
Honduras:	No. 20: Gilberto Yerwood	kicking an opponent
		when play was stopped
	Expulsion: suspended for the next two international "A" matches	
36	Spain v. Northern Ireland	H. Ortiz, Paraguay
N. Ireland:	No. 3: Malachy Donaghy	punching an opponent
	Expulsion: suspended for match No. 41: Austria v. Northern Ireland	
39	Italy v. Argentina	N. Rainea, Rumania
Argentina:	No. 9: Americo Gallego	rough play
	Expulsion: suspended for match No. 43: Argentina v. Brazil	
43	Argentina v. Brazil	M. Rubio, Mexico
Argentina:	No. 10: Diego Maradona	rough play
	Expulsion: suspended for the next international "A" match	
45	France v. Northern Ireland	A. Jarguz, Poland
N. Ireland:	No. 11: William Hamilton	foul play
	2nd caution: suspended for the next international "A" match	
46	Poland v. USSR	R. Valentine, Scotland
Poland:	No. 20: Zbigniew Boniek	foul play
	2nd caution: suspended for match No. 49: Poland v. Italy	
47	Italy v. Brazil	A. Klein, Israel
Italy:	No. 6: Claudio Gentile	foul play
	2nd caution: suspended for match No. 49: Poland v. Italy	
49	Poland v. Italy	J. Cardellino, Uruguay
Poland:	No. 11: Wlodzimierz Smolarek	ungentlemanly conduct
	2nd caution: suspended for match No. 51: Poland v. France	
51	Poland v. France	A. Garrido, Portugal
Poland:	No. 13: Andrzej Buncol	foul play
	2nd caution: suspended for the next international "A" match	
52	Italy v. Germany FR	A. Coelho, Brazil
Italy:	No. 13: Gabriele Oriali	rough play
	2nd caution: suspended for the next international "A" match	
Germany FR:	No. 15: Ulrich Stielike	dissent
	2nd caution: suspended for the next international "A" match	



... and spectators

Final Placings Teams	First Final Round			Second Final Round		Semi-Finals and Final Matches			
	First match Points deducted Number of points after first match	Second match Points deducted Number of points after second match	Third match Points deducted Number of points after third match	Fourth match Points deducted Number of points after fourth match	Fifth match Points deducted Number of points after fifth match	Semi-Finals Points deducted Number of points after semi-finals	Match for 3rd place and Final Points deducted Number of points after final matches	Total no. of points divided by the no. of matches	Final standing (average)
1 Brazil	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 0 = 10	+5 - 0 = 15	+6 - 2 = 19	+6 - 0 = 25	-	-	25:5 = 5.00	
2 New Zealand	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 0 = 10	+5 - 0 = 15	-	-	-	-	15:3 = 5.00	
3 France	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 1 = 9	+5 - 3 = 11	+6 - 0 = 17	+6 - 1 = 22	+7 - 2 = 27	+8 - 1 = 34	34:7 = 4.86	
4-5 Belgium	+5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 0 = 9	+5 - 2 = 12	+6 - 0 = 18	+6 - 0 = 24	-	-	24:5 = 4.80	
England	+5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 0 = 9	+5 - 1 = 13	+6 - 0 = 19	+6 - 1 = 24	-	-	24:5 = 4.80	
6 Scotland	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 0 = 10	+5 - 1 = 14	-	-	-	-	14:3 = 4.66	
7 USSR	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 0 = 10	+5 - 0 = 15	+6 - 1 = 20	+6 - 3 = 23	-	-	23:5 = 4.60	
8 Germany FR	+5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 0 = 9	+5 - 0 = 14	+6 - 1 = 19	+6 - 2 = 23	+7 - 1 = 29	+8 - 5 = 32	32:7 = 4.57	
9-11 Algeria	+5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 1 = 8	+5 - 0 = 13	-	-	-	-	13:3 = 4.33	
Hungary	+5 - 2 = 3	+5 - 0 = 8	+5 - 0 = 13	-	-	-	-	13:3 = 4.33	
Peru	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 1 = 9	+5 - 1 = 13	-	-	-	-	13:3 = 4.33	
12-13 Austria	+5 - 2 = 3	+5 - 0 = 8	+5 - 2 = 11	+6 - 1 = 16	+6 - 1 = 21	-	-	21:5 = 4.20	
Spain	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 2 = 8	+5 - 1 = 12	+6 - 3 = 15	+6 - 0 = 21	-	-	21:5 = 4.20	
14 Yugoslavia	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 2 = 8	+5 - 1 = 12	-	-	-	-	12:3 = 4.00	
15 Italy	+5 - 2 = 3	+5 - 1 = 7	+5 - 1 = 11	+6 - 2 = 15	+6 - 4 = 17	+7 - 1 = 23	+8 - 4 = 27	27:7 = 3.86	
16 Poland	+5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 1 = 8	+5 - 0 = 13	+6 - 1 = 18	+6 - 4 = 20	+7 - 5 = 22	+8 - 4 = 26	26:7 = 3.71	
17-18 Cameroon	+5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 2 = 7	+5 - 1 = 11	-	-	-	-	11:3 = 3.66	
Chile	+5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 2 = 7	+5 - 1 = 11	-	-	-	-	11:3 = 3.66	
19 Northern Ireland	+5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 0 = 9	+5 - 7 = 7	+6 - 0 = 13	+6 - 3 = 16	-	-	16:5 = 3.20	
20-21 Czechoslovakia	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 1 = 9	+5 - 6 = 8	-	-	-	-	8:3 = 2.66	
El Salvador	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 2 = 8	+5 - 5 = 8	-	-	-	-	8:3 = 2.66	
22-23 Honduras	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 0 = 10	+5 - 8 = 7	-	-	-	-	7:3 = 2.33	
Kuwait	+5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 7 = 3	+5 - 1 = 7	-	-	-	-	7:3 = 2.33	
24 Argentina	+5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 0 = 9	+5 - 2 = 12	+6 - 8 = 10	+6 - 6 = 10	-	-	10:5 = 2.00	



The Behaviour of Players on the Pitch and the Spectators' Reaction

Rioting by the general public at football matches is recognized as part of social malaise nowadays.

Although sports cannot be looked on as a cause for social unrest, sports events often give this impression when the spectators' unpredictable conduct is taken into account.

nature can take place in or outside the stadium. Notorious hooligans use matches as a pretext for riots. Fortunately nowadays, protective fences as well as security forces in the stadium precincts nearly always manage to ward off penetration on the field of play.

Football Associations are clearly conscious of the fact that violence among spectators can be caused by incidents

groups to separate parking lots and stadium sectors.

Although the reaction of the police was over-sensitive when a slight incident arose at the first match, their presence in the stadium precincts did act as a deterrent.

This kind of coordination between the public security forces and the police is recommendable.

Apart from two serious incidents out-



The different aspects of the problem of public disorder in connection with sport have been the object of intense investigations in many countries. It preoccupies not only state authorities for public order but also sports organisations. A key position is held by football whose representatives are anxiously concerned in freeing themselves from the stigma of hooliganism. Riots can develop in various forms: they can cause the destruction of property as well as open fights between individuals and groups with the police. Some people involved in these conflicts often carry arms. Riots of this

on the field. Spectators verbally insult opponents and the referee for the main part.

Prior to the World Cup, one feared that serious incidents could arise among groups of young supporters of rival teams.

One was particularly concerned about the English fans. The British Minister of Sports and the Football Association were both aware of this fact. The mayor and chief of police of Bilbao were invited to London in order to exchange ideas and discuss means of avoiding disturbances.

One also thought of allocating rival fan

side the stadia, which required a serious investigation, the British fans turned out to be noisy though content with their team's partial success.

The large contingent of enthusiastic supporters of Brazil and Italy created a colourful entertaining background prior to the matches with their banners, drums, horns and chanting. The stadia in Valencia and Madrid reverberated with the deafening cheers of the Spanish fans.


Otherwise during the 52 matches no serious incidents had their origin on the field of play.

The matches between Kuwait and



France as well as Germany FR and Austria were the only exceptions. One often asks oneself how far the players' conduct on the pitch can lead to aggressions among the spectators. The blind, biased spectator will always ignore his own team's mistakes and get excited about the opponents' conduct. His reaction is provoked by incidents on the pitch and is primarily expressed in whistles and boos. In extreme cases, this can lead to tussles.

The author of this contribution is Sir Walter Winterbottom, who observed the spectators' conduct in and outside the stadium in his capacity as special representative of the Technical Study Group.





Did colourful tokens of sympathy such as this contribute towards Italy's victory?

Observations on the Financial Settlement of the '82 World Cup in Spain

Final Account of the 1982 FIFA World Cup in Spain

The figures published below show that the '82 World Cup was financially successful for the organizers and participating teams in spite of the precarious economic situation and the bad forecasts of some finance strategists in the media sector.

With regard to receipts, over SFr. 40 million worth of tickets were sold. In other words, a total of 2 million tickets were sold at an average price of SFr. 20.- per ticket. 83% of the overall offer was sold. However, as many package deals were made, the stadia were poorly attended for some matches. TV and ground advertising reached minimum amounts in view of the event's importance. All the same, SFr. 115 million were made and with SFr. 51 million expenses, this came to a net profit of SFr. 64 million. These figures strictly apply to the actual technical realization of the World Cup and turnovers achieved in Spain and the whole world in connection with football tourism, the souvenir trade and different lotteries and tombolas using the World Cup as their image were not taken into account.

A thorough examination of the expenses revealed that items 1, 3, 5, 9 and 11 were paid out in Spain as well as parts of items 6, 7 and 8 so that the organizing Association and its country were finally left with the tidy sum of approximately SFr. 50 million from the World Cup, including the 25% participation in profits of the Spanish football Association to the amount of SFr. 16 million and the share of the Spanish national team in the 65% for the participating Associations, i.e. approximately SFr. 2 million.

Out of the SFr. 41,5 million paid out to the 24 participating Associations on the distribution basis of the number of matches played and the spectators in the stadia concerned, each team received approximately SFr. 1 million in the first round with the same amount for the 2nd and 3rd rounds. Europe could cash in the lion's share of this money with 14 teams qualified, four of which reached the semi-finals. Of FIFA's share, SFr. 900 000 were paid out to the Confederation involved, whereby the distribution was even with SFr. 150 000.- for each Confederation.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that the World Cup which takes place every four years, serves to finance FIFA's organization and administration on a 4 year rota.

INCOME

- Sale of tickets
- Television
- Advertising
- Percentage of friendly matches

	Sw.Frs.
	40,058,928.-
	39,000,000.-
	36,000,000.-
	200,000.-
	<u>115,258,928.-</u>

EXPENSES (according to Art. 33 of the competition Regulations)

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. Taxes (Article 1.1) | 6,008,839.- |
| 2. Percentages of matches played during the Final Competition due directly to FIFA (Art. 1.2) | 2,383,759.- |
| 3. Expenses of hire of grounds (Art. 1.3) | 6,008,839.- |
| 4. Travel expenses of participating Associations: international travel and transportation in Spain (Art. 1.4) | 2,505,643.- |
| 5. Hotel and daily expenses of participating Associations in Spain (Art. 1.5) | 4,774,500.- |
| 6. Travel expenses (international travel and transportation in Spain), hotel and daily expenses of referees and linesmen (Art. 1.6) | 1,217,888.- |
| 7. Expenses of the FIFA Organising Committee, expenses of international travel and transportation in Spain, hotel and daily expenses of all the FIFA delegation including the members of Committees and Standing Committees, expenses of inspections, meetings and translators (Art. 1.7) | 5,286,728.- |
| 8. Administrative and organisational expenses of FIFA during 4 years' preparatory period and execution of '82 World Cup (Art. 1.8) | 5,502,949.- |
| 9. Expenses due to RFEF for organisation of matches in Spain (Art. 1.9) - Control, tickets etc. | 1,702,504.- |
| 10. Payment to FIFA development fund (Art. 1.10) | 1,155,259.- |
| 11. Additional general organisational expenses especially including the infrastructure necessary in the stadia for the press centre and places for the mass media representatives, expenses for doping control (Art. 1.11, 1.13, 1.14 and 1.15), building costs for additional stands etc. | 9,171,122.- |
| 12. Insurance expenses: civil liability, spectators' insurance, members' insurance, insurance covering possible loss of gate receipts due to the cancellation of the competition (Art. 1.12) | 5,602,000.- |
| | <u>51,320,030.-</u> |

SUMMARY

— Receipts	115,258,928.—
— less expenditure	51,320,030.—
<i>Profit</i>	<u>63,938,898.—</u>

Distribution of Profit

— 10 % to FIFA	6,393,890.—
— 25 % to the RFEF	15,984,725.—
— 65 % to the participating Associations	41,560,283.—
	<u>63,938,898.—</u>

Outlook on the 1986 FIFA World Cup

Whilst the Final Competition of the 1982 World Cup was still in full swing, the FIFA Executive Committee was already handling the theme of the 1986 World Cup at its meeting in Madrid on 8 July, 1982.

The following decisions resulted from that meeting:

Fundamental decision

It was decided to hold the Final Competition of the 1986 World Cup with 24 teams once more.

Terms of Reference

It was decided to appoint Messrs. Hermann Neuberger and General Secretary Joseph S. Blatter to establish a list of conditions to be fulfilled for the 1986 World Cup.

Below you will find an excerpt from the above-mentioned Terms of Reference. However, this is limited to the fundamental provisions (which are not necessarily related to Colombia):

1. Fundamental Provisions

1.1. Competences

The FIFA World Cup is a competition of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and is thus embodied in the Federation's Statutes.

In its capacity as executive body of FIFA, the Executive Committee delegates its competences as *organizer* of the World Cup to the FIFA Organizing Committee which thus takes on the responsibility for the organisation and execution.

The FIFA Executive Committee also appoints one of the National Associations affiliated to FIFA as *executive agent* of the World Cup. This National Association is also answerable to the FIFA Organizing Committee, whatever the internal regulations may be concerning the local organization.

It is also important to point out here that the FIFA World Cup can only be assigned to *one* National Association and that the entire competition must take place within the frontiers of this *one* country.

The appointed National Association and its organizing committee (the LOC - Local Organizing Committee) are subject to the control of the FIFA Organizing Committee for the World Cup. The latter shall have the last say in fundamental decisions about all matters.

FIFA does not recognize any 3rd parties or organizations outside the Football Association. Any pending problems and questions shall be settled directly with the National Association affiliated to FIFA or with the LOC. Hence, the local organizing committee shall consist for the most part of representatives from the Football

Association. This will guarantee that the authorized National Association bears the responsibility and control in its own country and not the other instances which are also necessary for carrying out a World Cup.

1.2 Approval in organizing country

The organization and execution of a FIFA World Cup is no longer possible nowadays without the direct involvement and efficient support of the government of the respective country. It is not sufficient for a National Association affiliated to FIFA to provide together with a consortium of sponsors the financial guarantee for the organization of a World Cup. Too many important factors fall directly within the governmental sector of the executive country. Thus, it is absolutely indispensable that prior to the final assignment of a FIFA World Cup, a governmental decision be in force which:

- a) welcomes the Football World Cup to the country,
- b) gives all guarantees for the success of this World Cup.

Official Results
Résultats officiels
Resultados oficiales
Offizielle Resultate

First Final Round
Premier Tour Final
Primera Vuelta Final
Erste Finalrunde

Final Competition in Spain / Compétition finale en Espagne
Competición final en España / Endrunde in Spanien

Group I (Italy, Poland, Peru, Cameroon)

14.6.	Vigo	Italy v. Poland	0:0 (0:0)	M. Vautrot, France			
15.6.	La Coruña	Peru v. Cameroon	0:0 (0:0)	F. Wöhrer, Austria			
18.6.	Vigo	Italy v. Peru	1:1 (1:0)	W. Eschweiler, Germany FR			
19.6.	La Coruña	Poland v. Cameroon	0:0 (0:0)	B. Ponnert, Belgium			
22.6.	La Coruña	Poland v. Peru	5:1 (0:0)	M. Rubio, Mexico			
23.6.	Vigo	Italy v. Cameroon	1:1 (0:0)	B. Dotschev, Bulgaria			
Classification:							
	1. Poland	3	1	2	0	5:1	4
	2. Italy	3	0	3	0	2:2	3
	3. Cameroon	3	0	3	0	1:1	3
	4. Peru	3	0	2	1	2:6	2
		12	1	10	1	10:10	12

Qualified for Second Final Round: **POLAND** (A1) and **ITALY** (C7)

Group II (Germany FR, Algeria, Chile, Austria)

16.6.	Gijón	Germany FR v. Algeria	1:2 (0:0)	E. Labó, Peru			
17.6.	Oviedo	Chile v. Austria	0:1 (0:1)	J. Cardellino, Uruguay			
20.6.	Gijón	Germany FR v. Chile	4:1 (1:0)	B. Galler, Switzerland			
21.6.	Oviedo	Algeria v. Austria	0:2 (0:0)	T. Boskovic, Australia			
24.6.	Oviedo	Algeria v. Chile	3:2 (3:0)	R. Mendez, Guatemala			
25.6.	Gijón	Germany FR v. Austria	1:0 (1:0)	R. Valentine, Scotland			
Classification:							
	1. Germany FR	3	2	0	1	6:3	4
	2. Austria	3	2	0	1	3:1	4
	3. Algeria	3	2	0	1	5:5	4
	4. Chile	3	0	0	3	3:8	0
		12	6	0	6	17:17	12

Qualified for Second Final Round: **GERMANY FR** (B4) and **AUSTRIA** (D10)

Group III (Argentina, Belgium, Hungary, El Salvador)

13.6.	Barcelona	Argentina v. Belgium	0:1 (0:0)	V. Christov, Czechoslovakia			
15.6.	Elche	Hungary v. El Salvador	10:1 (3:0)	E. Al-Doy, Bahrain			
18.6.	Alicante	Argentina v. Hungary	4:1 (2:0)	B. Lacarne, Algeria			
19.6.	Elche	Belgium v. El Salvador	1:0 (1:0)	M. Moffatt, Northern Ireland			
22.6.	Elche	Belgium v. Hungary	1:1 (0:1)	C. White, England			
23.6.	Alicante	Argentina v. El Salvador	2:0 (1:0)	L. Barrancos, Bolivia			
Classification:							
	1. Belgium	3	2	1	0	3:1	5
	2. Argentina	3	2	0	1	6:2	4
	3. Hungary	3	1	1	1	12:6	3
	4. El Salvador	3	0	0	3	1:13	0
		12	5	2	5	22:22	12

Qualified for Second Final Round: **BELGIUM** (A3) and **ARGENTINA** (C9)

Group IV (England, France, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait)

16.6.	Bilbao	England v. France	3:1 (1:1)	A. Garrido, Portugal			
17.6.	Valladolid	Czechoslovakia v. Kuwait	1:1 (1:0)	B. Dwomoh, Ghana			
20.6.	Bilbao	England v. Czechoslovakia	2:0 (0:0)	C. Corver, Netherlands			
21.6.	Valladolid	France v. Kuwait	4:1 (2:0)	M. Stupar, USSR			
24.6.	Valladolid	France v. Czechoslovakia	1:1 (0:0)	P. Casarin, Italy			
25.6.	Bilbao	England v. Kuwait	1:0 (1:0)	G. Aristizábal, Colombia			
Classification:							
	1. England	3	3	0	0	6:1	6
	2. France	3	1	1	1	6:5	3
	3. Czechoslovakia	3	0	2	1	2:4	2
	4. Kuwait	3	0	1	2	2:6	1
		12	4	4	4	16:16	12

Qualified for Second Final Round: **ENGLAND** (B6) and **FRANCE** (D12)

Group V (Spain, Honduras, Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland)

16.6.	Valencia	Spain v. Honduras	1:1 (0:1)	A. Ithurralde, Argentina
17.6.	Zaragoza	Yugoslavia v. Northern Ireland	0:0 (0:0)	E. Fredriksson, Sweden
20.6.	Valencia	Spain v. Yugoslavia	2:1 (1:1)	H. Lund-Sørensen, Denmark
21.6.	Zaragoza	Honduras v. Northern Ireland	1:1 (0:1)	Chan Tam Sun, Hong Kong
24.6.	Zaragoza	Honduras v. Yugoslavia	0:1 (0:0)	G. Castro, Chile
25.6.	Valencia	Spain v. Northern Ireland	0:1 (0:0)	H. Ortiz, Paraguay

<i>Classification:</i>	1. Northern Ireland	3	1	2	0	2:1	4
	2. Spain	3	1	1	1	3:3	3
	3. Yugoslavia	3	1	1	1	2:2	3
	4. Honduras	3	0	2	1	2:3	2
		12	3	6	3	9:9	12

Qualified for Second Final Round: **NORTHERN IRELAND** (D11) and **SPAIN** (B5)

Group VI (Brazil, USSR, Scotland, New Zealand)

14.6.	Sevilla	Brazil v. USSR	2:1 (0:1)	A. Lamo Castillo, Spain
15.6.	Malaga	Scotland v. New Zealand	5:2 (3:0)	D. Socha, USA
18.6.	Sevilla	Brazil v. Scotland	4:1 (1:1)	L. Siles, Costa Rica
19.6.	Malaga	USSR v. New Zealand	3:0 (1:0)	Y. El-Ghoul, Libya
22.6.	Malaga	USSR v. Scotland	2:2 (0:1)	N. Rainea, Rumania
23.6.	Sevilla	Brazil v. New Zealand	4:0 (2:0)	D. Matovinovic, Yugoslavia

<i>Classification:</i>	1. Brazil	3	3	0	0	10:2	6
	2. USSR	3	1	1	1	6:4	3
	3. Scotland	3	1	1	1	8:8	3
	4. New Zealand	3	0	0	3	2:12	0
		12	5	2	5	26:26	12

Qualified for Second Final Round: **BRAZIL** (C8) and **USSR** (A2)

Second Final Round
Deuxième Tour Final
Segunda Vuelta Final
Zweite Finalrunde

Group A (Poland, USSR, Belgium)

28.6.	Barcelona	Poland v. Belgium	3:0 (2:0)	L. Siles, Costa Rica
1.7.	Barcelona	Belgium v. USSR	0:1 (0:0)	M. Vautrot, France
4.7.	Barcelona	Poland v. USSR	0:0 (0:0)	R. Valentine, Scotland

<i>Classification:</i>	1. Poland	2	1	1	0	3:0	3
	2. USSR	2	1	1	0	1:0	3
	3. Belgium	2	0	0	2	0:4	0
		6	2	2	2	4:4	6

Qualified for Semi-Finals: **POLAND**

Group B (Germany FR, Spain, England)

29.6.	Madrid	Germany FR v. England	0:0 (0:0)	A. Coelho, Brazil
2.7.	Madrid	Germany FR v. Spain	2:1 (0:0)	P. Casarin, Italy
5.7.	Madrid	Spain v. England	0:0 (0:0)	A. Ponnet, Belgium

<i>Classification:</i>	1. Germany FR	2	1	1	0	2:1	3
	2. England	2	0	2	0	0:0	2
	3. Spain	2	0	1	1	1:2	1
		6	1	4	1	3:3	6

Qualified for Semi-Finals: **GERMANY FR**

Group C (Italy, Brazil, Argentina)

29.6.	Barcelona	Italy v. Argentina	2:1 (0:0)	N. Rainea, Rumania
2.7.	Barcelona	Argentina v. Brazil	1:3 (0:1)	M. Rubio, Mexico
5.7.	Barcelona	Italy v. Brazil	3:2 (2:1)	A. Klein, Israel

<i>Classification:</i>	1. Italy	2	2	0	0	5:3	4
	2. Brazil	2	1	0	1	5:4	2
	3. Argentina	2	0	0	2	2:5	0
		6	3	0	3	12:12	6

Qualified for Semi-Finals: **ITALY**

Group D (Austria, Northern Ireland, France)

28.6.	Madrid	Austria v. France	0:1 (0:1)	K. Palotai, Hungary
1.7.	Madrid	Austria v. Northern Ireland	2:2 (0:1)	A. Prokop, GDR
4.7.	Madrid	France v. Northern Ireland	4:1 (1:0)	A. Jarguz, Poland

<i>Classification:</i>	1. France	2	2	0	0	5:1	4
	2. Austria	2	0	1	1	2:3	1
	3. N. Ireland	2	0	1	1	3:6	1
		6	2	2	2	10:10	6

Qualified for Semi-Finals: **FRANCE**

**Semi-Finals / Demi-finales
Semifinales / Halbfinals**

8.7.	Barcelona	Poland v. Italy	0:2 (0:1)	J. Cardellino, Uruguay
8.7.	Sevilla	Germany FR v. France	3:3* (1:1/1:1)	C. Corver, Netherlands
		*after extra-time — Penalty kicks: 5:4		

**Match for third place
Match pour la 3e place
Partido por el 3° puesto
Spiel um den 3. Platz**

10.7.	Alicante	Poland v. France	3:2 (2:1)	A. Garrido, Portugal
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Final / Finale / Endspiel

11.7.	Madrid	Italy v. Germany FR	3:1 (0:0)	A. Coelho, Brazil
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