

Bahrain



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Kuwait - Bahrain	0:1
Iraq - Bahrain	1:1
Oman - Bahrain	1:5

Final Round

Bahrain - Korea Rep.	1:1
Korea DPR - Bahrain	0:1
Bahrain - Sri Lanka	7:0
Bahrain - Qatar	2:0
Saudi Arabia - Bahrain	2:0

Results obtained at the WYC

Bahrain - Colombia	0:1	(0:1)
Bahrain - Scotland	1:1	(1:0)
Bahrain - GDR	0:2	(0:0)

Team Coach: **Salman Ahmed Shareeda**

Preparation

As far as football goes, Bahrain is rather an exceptional case, like its neighbour on the Persian Gulf, Qatar. There are only 35 junior teams in the country that play in regular leagues, involving scarcely a thousand players in all - hardly a great pool for the selectors to choose from. Nonetheless the association, represented by a selection committee and the national trainer, always come up with enough players to put together a technically skilled team. But an injury to one of their regular players can have a drastic effect on the team, since so few others

are available as replacements, and in this respect the team was not blessed by good fortune, especially during the training camp in Portugal.

Being a small country does however have one advantage - players and officials all know each other and the team manager and coach are in close contact with their players. This is evident in their training, where everything takes place in a more relaxed atmosphere. Before the WYC, the team practised once a day at first, later increasing to twice a day. Technical improvement was foremost in

the plan, and this remained true during the three-and-a-half week stay in Portugal, from where they travelled straight on to Chile. Following injuries to several key players as mentioned above, the leader of the Bahrain delegation, Abdul Aziz Salman Al-Hassan, was particularly concerned that this would adversely affect the team's finishing ability, but hoped that by making a real effort and using their good skills, they would be able to reach the quarter-finals.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Colombia 0:1	Scotland 1:1	GDR 0:2	1/4 Final	1/2 Final	Final	
1	Habib Ebrahim	02.09.69	Bahrain	Res.	Res.	Res.				0
2	Abass Abdul Razzaq	03.10.69	Ahli	90	90					180
3	Al Hamadi Sameer	05.04.68	Ahli	90	90	90				270
4	Al Jazaf Hamed	20.10.69	Bahrain	Res.	90	90				180
5	Marzooq Juma	21.10.68	Wehda							0
6	Marhab Juma	27.10.69	Wehda	90	90	90				270
7	Al Hayki Sami	08.12.69	Qadisias		48	90				138
8	Kamal Jasim	05.11.70	Ahli	90		90				180
9	Sowar Bader	25.08.69	Wehda	90	Res.	61				151
10	Showaiter Waleed	16.02.69	Bahrain	15	90	90				195
11	Al Nusuf Abdullah	10.11.69	East Riffa	32	15	Res.				47
12	Al Kharraz Mohamed	12.09.71	Muharraq	90	42					132
13	Ahmed Khalid	21.08.69	Manama	58	75	90				223
14	Khalfan Hasan	29.01.69	Wehda	90	90	90				270
15	Thani Khamis	11.08.68	West Riffa	90	90					180
16	Ali Abdul Rahman	01.03.69	Muharraq	75	Res.	29				104
17	Jowher Naser	11.12.69	Wehda	Res.	90	90				180
18	Mohamed Abdul Rahman	23.03.69	Al Hala	90	90	90				270

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

The Bahrain team's organisation, its game patterns and its overall concept have been shaped over the years by the various trainers from different countries who have been engaged to coach there. Based on their training tour, the expectation was that they could provide serious opposition for the group favourites. In the event they only showed a good team performance in isolated patches. They employed a traditional 4-4-2 system, and man-marking in the area. The defence played in line across the pitch, with their libero covering on both sides behind them, and he was the central figure and organiser in this part of the team. The outer-backs only rarely managed to take a prominent part in an attack, while the mid-field quartet, all very skilled, played without much cohesion. Drive and support from behind was just not there for long stretches, and so with only two men up front, attacking moves with any surprise value were rather scarce. The strikers were too isolated and their efforts usually fell to pieces.

Offensive Tactics

The attacking strategy that had been planned only came into effect during a few phases of the game. The forwards were pretty well stranded up front and only rarely could they combine to put an attack together, and in addition had to cover long distances to get into the opponent's area. Since their own defenders were often overloaded with defensive duties, there was little opportunity for them to go forward and lend support. Seldom did the ball come into the midfielders' range, and even then, although they were technically good players, they sometimes had trouble keeping the stream of passes going. The individual forward bursts of the four mid-fielders were too transparent and usually easily intercepted by the opposing defence. In the last group game, against East Germany, the forwards finally showed their skills and created several good chances.

Defensive Tactics

The goalkeeper and the four in-line defenders formed a relatively compact block. In the three group games they conceded only four goals. Some attention should be given to the fact that three of these goals came in the last fifteen minutes of a match. Lapses of concentration, not only in defence, but also on the part of the midfielders, led to problems around their goal time and again. As mentioned earlier, the Arabs' defence had more than

enough to do and were often penned into their own half. Even so, it is a point in their favour that they seldom resorted to unfair means, and they usually attempted to stop their opponents by using their own technical skills.


Strengths of the team

The ball-skills of nearly every member of the team constitute the high point of this group. Physically they could hold their own for the first 75 minutes of a game and during this phase were the equal of their opponents. The chances that they created in their last group game, and then squandered, confirmed their team officials' fears. But at least the team showed its attacking potential for once

and indicated what they might have been capable of with a bit more luck.

Weaknesses

The Bahrain team, taking part in the finals of a FIFA competition for the first time, were not really up to the standard of their opponents in this group, despite their long and serious preparation. They showed a lack of international experience and only in spells were they able to meet the mental and physical demands of a tournament at this level. Individually the players had excellent skills, but as a team they did not fulfill what was expected of them, and their rather amateur behaviour made it hard for them to keep up with their opponents over the full distance.



Brazil



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Brazil - Ecuador	2:0
Argentina - Brazil	1:0
Brazil - Peru	5:1

Final Round

Uruguay - Brazil	1:1
Argentina - Brazil	1:3
Brazil - Colombia	0:0

Results obtained at the WYC

Brazil - Nigeria	4:0 (3:0)
Brazil - Italy	0:1 (0:0)
Brazil - Canada	1:0 (0:0)
Brazil - Yugoslavia	1:2 (1:0)

Team Coach: **Gilson Siqueira Nunes**

Preparation

The first steps towards preparing a team for the tournament in Chile in '87 were taken as early as December 1985, with trainer Gilson Nunes in charge. As a run-up to the South American Championships, the team played a number of successful friendly games, some as far away as Qatar and PR China. Following an early setback against Argentina in their group game in the South American tournament, the Brazilians were able to improve in the final round and finished second, thus earning the right to play in Chile.

About 40 players, most of them professionals with Brazilian clubs, were invited by the association and a selection committee to take part in the first trials. However, talking with some of their officials we learned that the Brazilians had not in fact brought the best possible squad to Chile. One of the reasons is that the selectors have so many to choose from, that it is not possible to make a definitely best selection from such a large number. Another reason was that many youngsters who were judged to be better players had to stay at home because

of their education or on account of some of the criteria for selection, such as height and weight. The team's managers were of the opinion that only three or four of the players would perhaps make the jump into the Olympic team for Seoul or even into the national team for Italia '90. Confronted with all these problems the coaches put their hopes mainly on the maturity and the mental readiness of players who already had experience in the national league.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Nigeria 4:0	Italy 0:1	Canada 1:0	1/4 Final Yugoslavia 1:2	1/2 Final	Final	
1	Ronaldo Soares Geovanelli	20.11.67	Corinthians	90	90	90	90			360
2	Cesar Sampaio Campos Carlos	30.03.68	Santos	90	90	90	90			360
3	Sandro Scapin Luiz	24.08.67	Gremio FPA	90	90	90	90			360
4	André Cruz Alves	20.09.68	Ponte Preta	90	90	90	90			360
5	Anderson Batista Cardoso	26.10.68	America	90	90	66	Res.			246
6	Wanderley Gomes Bernardino	10.08.67	Botafogo	90	90	90	90			360
7	Alcindo Sartori	21.10.67	Flamengo	90	90	90	90			360
8	Dacroce Luiz Carlos	24.03.68	Internacional	90	90	90	90			360
9	Edilson Barbosa	09.01.68	Botafogo	90	68	90	90			338
10	Bismark Barreto Faria	17.09.69	Vasco da Gama	90	68	60	90			308
11	William Cesar de Oliveira	17.10.68	Vasco da Gama	90	90	90	90			360
12	Palmieri Roberto de Souza	15.08.68	Bangu	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.			0
13	Mauricio Maciel Pires	25.07.69	E.C. Bahia		Res.	Res.				0
14	Celio Wagno do Nascimento	25.05.68	Americano	Res.			Res.			0
15	Junior Arlindo da Rocha	14.05.68	Joinville							0
16	Andreoli Paulo Henrique	23.02.68	Fluminense	Res.	Res.	24	90			114
17	Galil José Ricardo Azevedo	05.06.68	Flamengo	Res.	22	30	Res.			52
18	Ze Maria da Silva	14.08.68	Fluminense	Res.	22	Res.	Res.			22

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

The Brazilian team took the field with two central defenders, two outer defenders who often went forward down the wings, four mid-field players and two very agile forwards who frequently interchanged positions. The team gave a very compact impression; hardly ever were gaps visible between the different sections. Bismarck and William Cesar pulled the strings in mid-field, while Sandro Luiz and Andre Cruz were the generals in defence.

Offensive Tactics

The South Americans attacked in a very coordinated fashion and looked strong in this aspect too. Every player in the team could hit accurate passes, short or long. Usually the ball was played on directly after being brought under control, and if the opponent was trying to make things tight, the one-two or a quick direct pass would follow. Overall the build-up of an attack was excellent, mainly because there were four players in mid-field.

The two forwards were continually on the move, always looking for space to push through. The superb passes from mid-field meant danger for an opponent's defence, and the two outer backs added to this as they pressed forward down the wings. The space for these wing attacks was created by the thrusts of Alcindo, with or without the ball, and he was usually sent on his way by a long pass from Andre Cruz. It was always a pleasure to watch these attacking moves.

Defensive Tactics

The defence looked very safe at all times, including the goalkeeper Ronaldo, although he did not really have a lot to do. Cesar Sampaio and Andre Cruz were always in command of the situation, and whenever a set piece arose they would go forward to take part. It was these two who provided most of the long passes, and ensured good distribution of the ball. Even under pressure the defenders looked very calm, but their task was made easier by the fact that often there were seven or eight players involved in defensive actions. All the players had the ability to harry the man on the ball, and if one of them was under pressure from an opponent his team colleagues offered assistance. This was often most obvious when one of the opponents carried the ball down to the corner where he would be harassed by at least three Brazilians, who usually managed to dispossess him.


Strengths of the team

As usual, these artistic players showed great skills on the ball. Control, moving with or without the ball, incisive short passes alternating with long balls down the field – these were the exciting features of their game. There were also the abilities to time a pass perfectly, to alter the pace of the game at will, plus strength in tackling and in the air. The Brazilians also proved masters at stealing the ball from an opponent. We've already mentioned the outer backs attacking down the wings and the central defenders coming up for free kicks; in the latter case Andre Cruz showed his very best in scoring two splendid goals from free kicks.

Weaknesses

The first point that should be mentioned is that all the players should improve their individual speed. Second would

come the criticism that the Brazilians always employed the same offensive tactics regardless of who the opponent was; if the other team tried to match them in this, they suffered, as evidenced by Nigeria's 4-0 drubbing. But if the South Americans faced a team that stayed back, like Italy or Canada, they would run into an eleven-man defence and were very vulnerable to counters. This was clear in their 0-1 defeat by Italy and in the last ten minutes of the game against Canada. In summary it should be added that they tended to overdo things and somewhat lacked the killer instinct. Even in the penalty area, another elegant pass would be played, well past the point when a shot was called for. The Brazilians believe that their style, which is an expression of their character, is the best way of playing football. But they should be prepared to learn a lesson from Europe and to adopt at least some aspects of a realistic defensive pattern.



Bulgaria



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Cyprus - Bulgaria	1:5
Bulgaria - Hungary	0:2
Bulgaria - Greece	5:1
Hungary - Bulgaria	0:1
Bulgaria - Cyprus	6:0

Final Round

Bulgaria - Scotland	0:1
Belgium - Bulgaria	0:1

Results obtained at the WYC

Bulgaria - USA	1:0 (1:0)
Bulgaria - Germany FR	0:3 (0:0)
Bulgaria - Saudi Arabia	2:0 (2:0)
Bulgaria - GDR	0:2 (0:0)

Team Coach: **Hristo Andonov**

Preparation

With one exception, Bulgaria also came to these World Championships with all their best players, and their declared aim was to reach the semi-finals. That they failed in this enterprise is not so much due to the strength of the opposition but rather to their own weaknesses in finishing. "In the Bulgarian league, goals are pretty rare", said national trainer Andonov, "and I'm afraid that poor finishing is also the weak point of my team." The lads did not disprove their trainer's prophecy: they brought their league's problem with them and only scored three goals in their four games.

After the qualification for Chile had been achieved, Hristo Andonov wanted to cut down the number of players from 35 to a really strong smaller group, and in doing so he left out five of those who'd already played, partly because they were out of form, partly because of injury. The players came from clubs, from schools and from local and regional representative sides, and had gained some experience already in playing in the association's youth teams, so they were familiar with the characteristic collective style of the Bulgarian Youth team.

During the preparatory period, Andonov

did not put special emphasis on any one aspect of the game: skill, tactics and conditioning were all drilled to an equal extent in two two-week training camps. The games arranged with preparation for Chile in mind gave no definite evidence as to the actual strength of the team. After playing six matches against local junior sides, they beat a club team from Kuwait very easily, 8:1, but lost two close games against Yugoslavia 1:2 and 2:3.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				USA 1:0	Germany FR 0:3	Saudi Arabia 2:0	1/4 Final GDR 0:2	1/2 Final	Final	
1	Kolev Plamen	04.01.68	Osam	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.			0
2	Velkov Anton	15.07.68	Locomotiv Sofia	90	44	90	90			314
3	Dartilov Valentin	14.08.67	Pirin	90	90	90	90			360
4	Kiriakov Ilian	04.08.67	Etar	90	90	90	90			360
5	Ouroukov Marious	24.08.67	Spartak Pleven	90	90	90	90			360
6	Slavtchev Ivo	21.01.68	Minior Pernik	90	90	90	90			360
7	Kostadinov Emil	12.08.67	Sredetz	80	90	90	90			350
8	Dimov Alexandre	25.09.67	Madara	90	90	90	90			360
9	Kalaydjiev Radko	28.09.67	Beroe	64	33	71	77			245
10	Petkov Plamen	17.10.67	Locomotiv Rousse	90	90	90	77			347
11	Mintchev Mintcho	31.10.67	Dimitrovgrad			Res.	Res.			0
12	Dragov Stoytcho	30.08.68	Beroe	90	90	90	90			360
13	Andonov Kiril	01.11.68	Spartak Plovdiv	Res.	46					46
14	Hristov Kiril	31.01.69	Spartak Varna	26	Res.	19	13			58
15	Valkov Valeri	18.08.67	Sliven	10	Res.	12	13			35
16	Vassilev Dimitre	25.08.67	Spartak Varna	90	90	78	90			348
17	Stoyanov Roumen	19.09.68	Sredetz	Res.	57	Res.	Res.			57
18	Kirilov Kiril	04.11.68	Dounav Rousse							0

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

All in all, the Bulgarians had a very solid and compact team, with a clearly defined concept and style. They invariably used a 4-4-2 system and were able to field practically the same players each time. They did not offer exciting football, but their collective strength was impressive. The players had good basic skills and physical ability, and although not gifted they showed that they were a hard-working, combative and well-organised team.

Offensive tactics

The Bulgarian team certainly did not lack chances: in fact the most characteristic feature of this group was its ability to create scoring opportunities, only to waste them in a way that was often unbelievably thoughtless. This goal-shy behaviour began in the game against the USA, was even worse against West Germany, and finally against Saudi Arabia reached epidemic proportions.

Many promising attacks began in midfield, where a succession of precise, short, deep passes would get things going forward. In addition, the Bulgarians were good at counter-attacking raids, sending defenders off down the wings – Kiriakov was particularly noticeable in this respect – to create dangerous situations in front of the opponent's goal. Kostadinov, who often burst forward irresistibly, and the team's schemer, Petkov, equally strong with either foot, both contributed to the build-up of forward momentum. Up front the two very nimble strikers, Vassilev and the talented dribbler Kostadinov, would sprint into the centre to make room for their team-mates to come through down the flanks.

Defensive Tactics

Bulgaria played with a libero and employed man-to-man marking in the area. Dartilov, as libero, was the focal point in this part of the team, rarely going forward with an attack but showing a strong personality and good positioning, two valuable assets in this position. The centre-back, Ouroukov, was a tough opponent and very strong in the air, while the two outer-backs, particularly Kiriakov, liked to go forward and had the skills necessary for this style of play.

Strengths of the Team


In addition to the defence, the great strength of this team lay in its cohesion.

Every man knew when and how to bring his team-mates into the game, and distributing the ball or starting an attack was never a problem. One of the reasons for this is that Andonov nearly always selected the same side, and even after the 0:3 against Germany did not make radical changes, but gave the players a chance to re-establish themselves.

Weaknesses

We've already mentioned the chronic inability to score goals, and so we need

not go into that again here. What also caused great problems was the team's susceptibility to blackouts, as shown in the game against Berti Vogts' eleven. After being on top for the first half (no goals scored, of course), the Bulgarians fell behind 0:1 – a perhaps debatable penalty – and then lost their heads and played right into the opponent's hands. The 0:2 was the result of a colossal defensive error as two defenders got in each other's way and Witczek scored his usual goal, while the third goal came when Reinhardt had been completely overlooked.



Canada



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Canada - Bermuda	3:0
Trinidad/Tobago - Canada	0:4
Canada - Antigua	6:0
Barbados - Canada	0:2

Final Round

USA - Canada	1:1
Trinidad/Tobago - Canada	0:5
Canada - Cuba	2:1

Results obtained at the WYC

Canada - Italy	2:2 (2:0)
Canada - Nigeria	2:2 (1:2)
Canada - Brazil	0:1 (0:0)

Team Coach:

Tony Taylor

Preparation

The Canadians began their preparations for the CONCACAF Championship in August 1985. The selectors went about their task very carefully and looked at potential candidates in a number of regional and national competitions. Chief trainer Tony Taylor would be responsible for the final selection, but he was supported by other delegates of the Canadian association. After winning their continental championship in a very convincing fashion and thus qualifying for Chile, the same junior team took part in

the Pan-American games where they were beaten 1-4 by Brazil, 0-2 by Cuba and managed a 2-2 draw against Chile. Asked whether he felt that this experiment had been worthwhile, Tony Taylor replied: "Certainly, our main aim was only to gain experience and to be able to play against the professionals." During the actual preparation period, Taylor concentrated equally on improving technique, tactics and conditioning, and he was of the opinion that the players available to him at the time were the best, but

not necessarily the most talented. An interesting point in this respect is that in addition to those unable to take part because the physical demands were too much, or their education would not allow it, others were missing because their parents would not let them; in other countries where football is more highly rated, this would be hard to imagine.

As a final phase, the Canadian team went on a European tour before going to Chile, in which they played four matches.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Italy 2:2	Nigeria 2:2	Brazil 0:1	1/4 Final	1/2 Final	Final	
1	Onstad Pat	13.01.68	Vancouver 86'ers	Res.	Res.	Res.				0
2	Sarantopoulos Peter	02.05.68	Wexford	90	90	90				270
3	Carter Ian	20.09.67	Toronto Italia			Res.				0
4	Kaiser Burke	20.10.67	Calgary	90	90	90				270
5	Jansen Steve	04.11.67	Winnipeg Fury	90	90					180
6	Celebrini Rick	16.10.67	Edmonton Brickmen	Res.	Res.	90				90
7	Wilkinson Neil	10.08.67	Unattached	90	74	81				245
8	Rizi Marco	15.09.68	Montreal	Res.	35	9				44
9	Grimes James	26.03.68	North York	75	90	74				239
10	Desantis Nick	11.09.68	Montreal	90	90	90				270
11	McKinty Doug	01.07.68	Vancouver 86'ers	Res.						0
12	Pignatiello Tony	29.04.68	Toronto Italia	90	55	90				235
13	Fitzgerald John	04.12.68	Wexford	90	90	90				270
14	Serafini Peter	12.03.69	Toronto Italia		Res.	Res.				0
15	Mobilio Domenic	14.01.69	Vancouver 86'ers	90	90	90				270
16	Boin Guido	01.01.68	Hamilton	90	90	90				270
17	Domezetis Billy	18.12.67	Hamilton	15	16	16				47
18	Forest Craig	20.09.67	Ipswich Town	90	90	90				270

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

Canada's team managers decided to use two men in a defensive axis, with Burke, the team's outstanding player taking the role of deep-lying libero. In mid-field the drive came from Desantis and Pignatiello. The plan was to leave space down the left side for the attacking runs of full back Boin and the No. 7 Wilkinson. The latter proved to be a tireless worker and covered enormous distances in the course of a game. Two strikers and an orthodox right winger in the person of Fitzgerald completed the line-up.

Attacking Tactics

The North American team's most frequently used attacking strategy was to hit long balls in the direction of the two strikers, Grimes and Mobilio. But neither of these was good at holding the ball until support arrived from mid-field; however part of the blame here must lie with mid-field themselves, since they were slow in getting forward.

On the right wing, Fitzgerald's dribbling and good centers were a positive factor, while on the left Boin and Wilkinson made use of the open spaces. For set situations Burke and Celebrini would come up and use their size and power to good effect. On the whole, however, the Canadian attack must be summarised as lacking ideas and penetration.

Defensive Tactics

The Canadian defence made a sound impression and there were always enough players present to do an effective job. They did not shirk their tackles, marked their opponents tightly and were well supported by their colleagues from mid-field. At the back, Burke directed the defence and covered his teammates. But, in mid-field the marking was a bit loose, and many a ball was lost in this crucial part of the field. There was also a weakness in the lack of constant fore-checking over the whole pitch. The forwards did not harry the opponent's defence and allowed them to play long accurate passes undisturbed.

Strengths of the team

The most positive feature of this Canadian team and its officials was their pleasant and fair attitude towards the game. Although the physically robust North American players tackled hard, they were always fair. In the air they were strong too. When the opponent was attacking, it was above all Burke who held


the team together and he showed real leadership. The tireless Domezetis was always working away, and all the running he did in mid-field and down the left wing was very valuable. In goal, Forest turned in satisfactory performances. The most noticeable aspect of the team's play was the long pass up to the strikers, which lead to two goals against Italy, one directly and one indirectly (the Canadian striker was fouled and from the free kick Mobilio headed a splendid goal).

Weaknesses

The weak points of this big and strongly-built side were most obvious when they were faced with a quick and agile oppo-

nent such as Brazil. Suddenly their game appeared to be transparent and slow, and their long passes were intercepted easily by the defenders, as also were many of their inaccurate short ones.

What the team really lacked at such moments was a creative player; their best man was usually occupied with defensive duties. It was also apparent that this technically only average side did not try often enough to switch the play to the open half of the pitch, nor did they really come forward effectively, despite Boin's efforts in this respect. In the vicinity of the opponent's penalty area they did not attempt the one-two pass, nor did they shoot enough when they were within range of the goal.



Chile



Qualification

Chile - Bolivia	3:1
Uruguay - Chile	2:1
Paraguay - Chile	3:5
Colombia - Chile	3:0

Results obtained at the WYC:

Chile - Yugoslavia	2:4 (1:2)
Chile - Togo	3:0 (2:0)
Chile - Australia	2:0 (1:0)
Chile - Italy	1:0 (0:0)
Chile - FR Germany	0:4 (0:3)
Chile - GDR	1:1 a.e.-t. (1:1:0:0) Pen. 1:3

Team Coach:

Luis Ibarra

Preparation

As the host country, Chile was entitled to take part in this competition automatically; it was their first time in WYC finals, and of all the teams in group A they had the longest time in which to prepare. The first step was to choose likely players, and these came from all parts of the country. Starting in April 1986, the Chile squad took part in a number of tournaments as part of their preparatory programme, and this led to the selection of the best eleven. In April 1986 they played

five games in China and in March 1987 they took part in the "Juventud de America" tournament in which they won twice and lost twice. In May of that year the team went on a tour, in which they were able to analyse the different football styles of teams in the CONCACAF region and in Europe. While they were in Europe Luis Ibarra's selection played against teams in Wales, France, West Germany, Italy and Belgium. The Chilean association divided their

team's preparation into three phases: first a conditioning / technique period, then a technical / tactical session, and finally a general polishing up. The pool of players was gradually reduced, so that of 30 who were being considered in August 1987, only 18 remained by October of that year.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Yugoslavia 2:4	Togo 3:0	Australia 2:0	1/4 Final Italy 1:0	1/2 Final Germany FR 0:4	Final GDR 1:1 (pen. 1:3)	
1	Velasco Guillermo	02.06.68	Everton	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
2	Soto Mauricio	21.02.69	Puerto Montt	90	90	90	90	90	Res.	450
3	Ramirez Carlos	26.02.68	Huachipato	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
4	Cortez Hugo	03.06.68	Cobreandino	90	90	90	90		120	480
5	Margas Javier	10.05.69	Colo Colo	79	Res.	90	90	90	120	469
6	Musri Luis	24.12.69	Universidad de Chile	90	90	90	57	90		417
7	Tupper Raimundo	07.01.69	Universidad Catolica	45	73	8	Res.	45	120	291
8	Navarrete Sandro	01.08.68	Huachipato	90	17	90	90	45	57	389
9	Tudor Lukas	21.02.69	Universidad Catolica	90	90	90	90	90		450
10	Estay Fabian	05.10.68	Universidad Catolica	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
11	Gonzalez Pedro	17.10.67	Valdivia		Res.	Res.		69	120	189
12	Reiher Gerhard	21.04.68	Osorno	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	0
13	Latin Miguel	27.07.68	Santiago-Wanderers	11	90	90	33	21	52	297
14	Carreno Juan	16.11.68	Colo Colo	Res.	45		Res.	Res.	63	108
15	Hoffman Reinaldo	18.03.70	Colo Colo			Res.		Res.	120	120
16	Cabello Hector	14.01.68	La Serena	Res.	45	Res.	90	90	68	293
17	Pino Camilo	04.03.68	Cobreloa	90	90	82	90	90	120	562
18	Reyes Juan	31.08.67	O'Higgins	45			Res.		Res.	45

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

The team had to be organised according to which players trainer Luis Ibarra would have at his disposal for a long enough period to be considered an adequate build-up time. A large number of players were given trials, many practice games were carried out, and the group that Chile took to the finals were the best available players. It was not a great team, but they were able to carry out the instructions that their trainer decided upon to a satisfactory extent, in spite of the weaknesses that came to light on the day.

Offensive Tactics

As far as the Chileans attacking efforts went, their hopes lay mainly on the shoulders of Lukas Tudor, who, once in possession of the ball, could be relied on to make the best out of a given situation. Often he was supported by Camilo Pino, who proved to be the host team's main driving force out of the mid-field. The other mid-field players, Musrri, Estay and Carreno were also successful to some extent, even against stronger teams, in gaining the midfield advantage. But as soon as they were confronted by a well-organised team they were no longer able to get their attack going and to create danger near their opponent's goal.

Against tactically weaker but equally physically strong teams they managed to come through, thanks to their technical skills, and in this respect some of their players were indeed outstanding.

Defensive Tactics

Like their mid-field players and forwards, the Chilean defence were always trying to bring order into their game and to divide up the spaces between them. However, faced by speed and power, particularly that of the European teams, the South Americans soon found themselves out of their depth, and many dangerous situations developed in front of Velasco's goal.

As the last man in defence, Cortez directed the trio in front of him, Soto, Ramirez and Latin, covered for them and went to the rescue when needed. On many occasions however, the marking was too slack and this led to total confusion in the defence. It was mainly against quick attacks or breakaways that the limitations of the South Americans' defence was most obvious. On the whole, the Chilean defenders were often poorly positioned, and their opponents were able to penetrate the danger zone from any angle.

Strengths of the team

As organisers of the tournament, Chile had the advantage of being at home and of playing all their games in the Estadio Nacional. Their natural desire to win every game and to cut a good figure at the WYC led them to make that extra effort that overcame any technical or physical deficiencies. On the technical side they indeed had some outstanding players, who were almost good enough for a place in the country's national team. As far as tactics went, every player carried out the assignment that had been set for him by the technical commission.


Weaknesses

The fact that Chile was in the same group as Yugoslavia and Australia proved to be a disadvantage in terms of the team's physical condition, for the

games against these two opponents turned out to be quite exhausting for the South Americans. Many of their players were simply not able to do any better in terms of speed, strength and stamina.

The skills of the Chilean team as a whole must be described as average rather than good; too many inaccurate passes and weaknesses in shooting prevented them from building up good moves and from being successful near goal.

The lack of coordination in defence, the inadequate strength and creativity in mid-field and the fact there were only ever two strikers are the main reasons for Chile's poor performance. Whenever the South Americans were tightly marked, they seemed unable to free themselves, and their rather slight physical stature was a disadvantage to them in the air right from the start, which was a considerable handicap to their game.



Colombia



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Uruguay - Colombia	0:1
Colombia - Bolivia	5:0
Colombia - Paraguay	0:1
Colombia - Chile	3:0

Final Round

Argentina - Colombia	0:2
Uruguay - Colombia	0:1
Brazil - Colombia	0:0

Results obtained at the WYC

Colombia - Bahrain	1:0 (1:0)
Colombia - GDR	1:3 (0:2)
Colombia - Scotland	2:2 (0:0)

Team Coach: **José Finot Castano R.**

Preparation

In the "Juventud de America" tournament, Colombia suffered two defeats in their group games, but suddenly found irresistible form in the final round and finished up as South American champions. They came to Chile very well prepared. These young players had all travelled the same road via the schoolboy national team into the junior side, and after winning the South American title returned to their clubs, before the actual preparation for the WYC began in September 1987. Their coach, Jose Finot Castano Ramirez, was directly responsi-

ble to the association in matters of team selection, and for his first trial assembled 40 players, who would then be reduced to a pool of 25, and finally whittled down to 18. Criteria applied during the selection process were a player's physical type and his technical and motor abilities.

First, these youngsters went through a phase of primarily fitness training, before moving on to a second phase in which tactics and skill were first priority. Immediately before the tournament, the team officials focussed their attention

predominantly on the tactical training of their players.

In Finot's opinion twelve of his squad were potential future professionals and ready for the leap into the national team, with the next FIFA World Cup in mind. Asked how he rated the chances of his team in the WYC, he expressed the opinion that he felt that they were quite capable of winning, since not only did they have unquestioned skills when attacking, but had also improved their defensive tactics and were now capable of much steadier performances.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Bahrain	GDR	Scotland	1/4 Final	1/2 Final	Final	
				1:0	1:3	2:2				
1	Niño Eduardo	08.08.67	Santa Fé	90	90	90				270
2	Diaz Alfonso	09.09.67	Junior	90	90	90				270
3	Muñoz William	06.07.68	Cali	90	90	90				270
4	Campos Vladimir	29.01.68	Cali	90	45	Res.				135
5	Caicedo Martin	02.10.68	Cali	90	90	90				270
6	Valderrama Ronald	04.12.67	Union Magdalena	90	90	90				270
7	Guerrero Miguel	07.09.67	Atletico Bucaramanga	90	90	90				270
8	Estrada Andres	12.11.67	Cali	Res.		65				65
9	Cabrera Wilmer	15.09.67	Santa Fé	87	90	90				267
10	Perez Wilson	09.08.67	Junior	72	45	90				207
11	Pimiento Carlos	15.10.68	Tolima	Res.	Res.	25				25
12	Cordoba Oscar	03.02.70	Cali	Res.	Res.	Res.				0
13	Pareja Oscar	10.08.68	Independiente Medellin			Res.				0
14	Jimenez John	08.08.68	America	90	90	90				270
15	Correa Diego	14.09.67	Independiente Medellin	3	37	Res.				40
16	Cañon Roberto	02.04.69	Santa Fé	18	53					71
17	Trellez John J.	29.04.68	Atletico Nacional	90	90	90				270
18	Samaniego Eugenio	27.12.68	Pereira		Res.					0

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

The Colombian team employed a quite free 4-4-2 system, with the defence mostly using man-to-man marking in the area. In goal they still had the experienced Nino, who had also played in the USSR two years earlier. The defence was a sound structure, with Campos on the right, Munoz on the left, libero Caicedo lying slightly back and Jimenez as stopper. In mid-field, the technically brilliant Diaz played on the right, Cabrera in the middle, Valderrama also in the middle but slightly deep and, usually on the left, the more offensive Perez. The variations that they employed in attack gave the defenders plenty of opportunities to join in. Guerrero and Trellez, who had also both played in Russia, moved around a great deal and often switched positions on the wings.

Offensive Tactics

The South American Champions of 1987 showed a relatively straightforward style of football, and for Latin Americans it seemed almost unnatural. True, they used the short-passing game, particularly in attack, but their forwards seemed to lack the usual creativity. Changes of pace were quite rare and not very systematically employed. Thus there were few moments of surprise, and this led to players bunching up between the half-way line and the opponent's penalty box.

John Trellez, who has the potential to become a top-class striker, could have been the leading scorer in this tournament, but missed too many chances and his overall performance, like that of his whole team, fell below the expected level.

Defensive Tactics

Considering the skills of the individual players, this defence should have performed better. The games against East Germany and Scotland showed the weak points in this area: the outer-backs did not mark tightly enough, the central defenders did not react with sufficient speed, especially as centres came in. The East German striker, Sammer, did not find much to hinder him in picking his way through this defence.


Strengths of the team

The technical level of the individual South American champions was above average. They could all control the ball with ease, and their dribbling skills and feints left their opponents standing. The long and intensive preparatory period af-

ter winning the South American title in their own country had nothing but positive effects. In their last do-or-die group game against Scotland they put on a terrific performance, which saw them 2:0 in front after 58 minutes and looking likely winners. Their splendid mid-field, the star of the team, Trellez, on the left, and above all the scorer of both goals, Guerrero, all showed their worth and the score could have been higher. If they had shown the attacking qualities that this game brought out of them on earlier occasions they could have had the qualification in the bag already.

Weaknesses

If one analyses the potential of the defence, it can only be said that they performed below par. The reason for their failure lies in their undisciplined behaviour against Scotland, where they ignored the most elementary rules after taking a 2:0 lead. If they had used better tactics they could certainly have stayed ahead, but a failure in marking and a completely unnecessary hand-ball in the box cost them a top position in this tournament. It has to be said that Colombia were the disappointment of this group.



German Democratic Republic



Qualification

Preliminary Round

GDR - Norway	1:0
GDR - Sweden	2:1
Finland - GDR	0:1
GDR-Finland	2:0
Norway - GDR	1:1
Sweden - GDR	0:0

Final Round

Yugoslavia - GDR	0:2
GDR - Germany FR	1:0
GDR - Italy	3:1

Results obtained at the WYC

GDR - Scotland	1:2 (1:2)
GDR - Colombia	3:1 (2:0)
GDR - Bahrain	2:0 (0:0)
GDR - Bulgaria	2:0 (0:0)
GDR - Yugoslavia	1:2 (0:1)
GDR - Chile	1:1 a.e.-t. (0:0; 1:1) Pen. 3:1

Team Coach: **Eberhard Vogel**

Preparation

Like other sports in East Germany, football is organised on a scientific basis and the authorities leave nothing to chance in seeking out, developing and looking after talented athletes. The title of European Junior Champions which they won in Yugoslavia in 1986 was a logical consequence of this effort, and the aim of reaching the last four at the WYC in Chile was pursued with the same degree of thoroughness.

When their trainer Eberhard Vogel began to select players in 1985, he was able to take advantage of the association's excellent infra-structure, which

develops players from the schoolboy level, through the U-16 and U-20 stages and into the senior game. As is characteristic in the socialist countries, Vogel could not only call upon players from the different clubs, but also those from the so-called "Works Sports Communities". In addition, his players already had considerable experience in representative teams, be it in the U-21, the Olympic or even the national team. In this respect the two best-known were Matthias Sammer and Rico Steinmann who had both played with the national team.

During the actual preparation for Chile,

the main emphasis was development of technique, but tactical schooling and conditioning were not neglected. To round off the training, a number of games were played during the summer against other national junior teams. Just before the tournament, the East Germans were cautiously optimistic. What bothered the team officials was their players' nervousness and their inability to play in a relaxed manner, but the hope was that effort, determination and good team organisation would make up for these deficiencies.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Scotland	Colombia	Bahrain	1/4 Final Bulgaria	1/2 Final Yugoslavia	Final Chile	
				1:2	3:1	2:0	2:0	1:2	1:1 (pen. 3:1)	
1	Hiemann Holger	12.01.68	FC Karl-Marx-Stadt	90	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	37	127
2	Amstein Uwe	20.08.67	FC Carl Zeiss	Res.	90	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	90
3	Neitzel Karsten	17.12.67	Dynamo Dresden	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
4	Schuster Dirk	29.12.67	Sachsenring Zwickau	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
5	Kracht Torsten	04.10.67	1. FC Lokomotiv Leipzig	90		90	90	90	120	480
6	Köller Marco	25.06.69	BFC Dynamo	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
7	Steinmann Rico	26.12.67	FC Karl-Marx-Stadt		90		90	90	120	390
8	Minkwitz Stefan	01.06.68	1. FC Magdeburg	60	10	61			52	183
9	Prasse Jörg	28.04.68	Dynamo Dresden	90	90	90	80	45	Res.	395
10	Sammer Matthias	05.09.67	Dynamo Dresden	90	90	90	90	72		432
11	Jähmig Uwe	26.08.69	Dynamo Dresden	90	45		85	90	120	430
12	Ritter Thomas	10.10.67	Dynamo Dresden	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
13	Herzog Hendrik	02.04.69	BFC Dynamo	Res.	Res.	11	10	Res.	Res.	21
14	Liebers Heiko	18.12.67	Motor Grimma	30	45	90	Res.	18	68	251
15	Lange Timo	19.01.68	Stahl Brandenburg			Res.				0
16	Saager Ingo	26.11.68	1. FC Lokomotiv Leipzig	Res.	90	90	90	90	83	443
17	Zimmerling Matthias	06.09.67	1. FC Lokomotiv Leipzig	45	80	79	5	45	120	374
18	Wosz Darius	08.06.69	HFC Chemie	45	Res.	29	90	90	120	374

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

For their first appearance at a WYC, the European Champions from East Germany, unlike other European countries, were able to take along their strongest team, aside from a couple of injuries. The team excelled mainly because of its extremely disciplined style of play. However, it lacked a clearly defined set of defensive duties and in organisation on the field. Responsibilities were not clearly understood by all sections of the team, and the creativity of individual players remained without a positive impulse. The GDR changed their system between a classic 4-4-2 and a very loose 4-3-3, according to the opponent, but always employed tight man-to-man marking in the area. The backbone of the team was formed by libero Neitzel, stopper Kracht, the mid-field strategist Steinmann and centre-forward Sammer. They ensured that the trainer's plans went into effect and played decisive roles in shaping the team's game.

Offensive Tactics

The whole concept of offence in this team was based upon excellent team play. Creative touches and individual efforts were the exception. Play down the wings was all too often neglected, as the direct route to getting Sammer into the game was followed. The rhythm of the game matched their steady temperaments, but in the semi-final against Yugoslavia they managed to shake off their shadows and demonstrated some fine changes of pace and superb attacking moves.

Defensive Tactics

While the defensive block was very compact, they committed too many tactical errors. There seemed to be little co-ordination between the strengthened defence with its deep-lying libero and the often too-defensively oriented left side of the mid-field e.g. when some forechecking was necessary. Only rarely did the team put pressing tactics into operation, and then it involved only a few players. Individually the two technically excellent central defenders stood out, often going forward into attack, and overshadowing the relatively modest performances of the two outer-backs.

Strengths of the team

Although not all of its members showed the same command of technical skills,


the general level was good, and they were particularly strong in the air. Another positive point was their intelligence on the field, which enabled them to put their coach's plan into operation at any time.

The sheer physical presence of this team was also impressive. All well-built and very athletic players, in top physical condition when they arrived in Chile, they managed to keep up their rhythm for the full 90 minutes with never a sign of flagging.

Weaknesses

For the GDR team, taking part in a WYC for the first time, all the travel and publi-

city proved to be a bit of a strain, and this was most evident in their opening game against Scotland. The pressure on them to perform well in this match was too great a handicap and they were never able to shake it off. In the next three games they improved considerably and began to win, until they met Yugoslavia in the semi-final, where their too-stereotyped game with its numerous square passes was exposed. The unfortunate left side of the mid-field was, in contrast to the rest of the team, not up to par, and this put the defence in danger time and time again. The explanation for this is that injuries to regular team members had forced some changes to be made, and these made the differing standards within the team even more obvious.



Germany FR



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Germany FR - Switzerland	2:0
Denmark - Germany FR	1:3
Poland - Germany FR	0:2
Switzerland - Germany FR	0:2
Germany FR - Denmark	3:1
Germany FR - Poland	3:0

Final Round

Germany FR - Romania	3:0
GDR - Germany FR	1:0
Germany FR - Scotland	1:0

Results obtained at the WYC

Germany FR - Saudi Arabia	3:0 (3:0)
Germany FR - Bulgaria	3:0 (0:0)
Germany FR - USA	2:1 (1:1)
Germany FR - Scotland	1:1 a.e.-t. (1:1; 1:1) Pen. 4:3
Germany FR - Chile	4:0 (3:0)
Germany FR - Yugoslavia	1:1 a.e.-t. (1:1; 0:0) Pen. 4:5

Team Coach:

Berti Vogts

Preparation

Berti Vogts, who has been training the U-20 team with considerable success for several years now, brought a team to Chile that most of their opponents rated as being among the top favourites for this tournament. Justifiably too, for at the European Championships in Yugoslavia they had been very impressive – skill, speed, persistence and the team's style had all been strongly in evidence. Judged by their performances in World Cup final rounds over the last twenty

years, Germany FR must be about the top footballing country, and they brought their best players of this age group to the WYC. Vogts selected the players, the association made them available to him – a good example of serious preparation for the future and a measure of the importance the association in Germany attaches to this event. However, even here a long preparatory period was not possible because of calendar problems. The German team ma-

nagers put their faith in the individual skills of their players. Thus only the most important aspects of the game, such as mutual understanding, harmony between the different parts of the team and skills were given special attention. In terms of conditioning and tactics there was not much more for these players to learn, as evidenced by the way they could alter their strategy when they needed to.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Saudi Arabia 3:0	Bulgaria 3:0	USA 2:1	1/4 Final Scotland 1:1 (pen. 4:3)	1/2 Final Chile 4:0	Final Yugoslavia 1:1 (pen. 4:5)	
1	Brunn Uwe	20.11.67	1. FC Köln	90	Res.	90	120	90	120	510
2	Heidenreich Hans Jürgen	17.08.67	1. FC Nürnberg	90	24	90	120		14	338
3	Luginger Jürgen	08.12.67	Fortuna Düsseldorf	90	90		120	90	120	510
4	Metz Gunter	08.08.67	Karlsruher SC	90	90		120	90	120	510
5	Strehmel Alexander	20.03.68	VfB Stuttgart	90	90	90	120	90	120	600
6	Schneider Martin	24.11.68	1. FC Nürnberg	90	90	90	120	90	120	600
7	Spyrka Adrian	01.08.67	Borussia Dortmund	90	90	90	120	90	120	600
8	Dammeier Detlev	18.10.68	Hannover 96	90	45	45	44	90	106	420
9	Epp Thomas	07.04.68	VfL Bochum	77	90	Res.	76	Res.	46	289
10	Möller Andreas	02.09.67	Eintracht Frankfurt	90	66	90	120	81	120	567
11	Eichenauer Henrik	07.07.68	Waldhof Mannheim	13		15	Res.	90	74	192
12	Clauss Andreas	13.01.69	Waldhof Mannheim	Res.	90	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	90
13	Witeczek Marcel	18.10.68	Bayer 05 Uerdingen	67	90	90	120	90	120	577
14	Klinkert Michael	07.07.68	FC Schalke 04	Res.	90	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	90
15	Reinhardt Knut	27.04.68	Bayer 04 Leverkusen		45	90	120	90	120	465
16	Würzburger Frank	03.12.68	Kickers Offenbach		Res.	45				45
17	Claasen Andreas	03.11.67	Bayern München	Res.		90		Res.		90
18	Preetz Michael	17.08.67	Fortuna Düsseldorf	23	Res.	75	Res.	9	Res.	107

Team Analysis

Team organisation, offensive and defensive tactics

Apart from minor variations and tactical subtleties that were adopted to suit the opponent's formation, the West German team stayed with the same system and the same team organisation during the whole tournament. At all times they played a compact game, and there were never gaps between the different parts of the team, but always a connecting link.

In this German team's manual, attack, mid-field and defence on the one hand, and skill, tactics and conditioning on the other are given equal amounts of attention; the different chapters are not studied separately, but as parts of a whole.

Their game was founded on a strong defence, and flexibility in mid-field; from the tactical viewpoint this was the most interesting part of the team. In attack, the two strikers used the full width of the field for their diagonal rushes and thus created space for quick and surprising advances by the players coming through behind them. Here the mid-field players offered effective support and joined in the attacks with clever one-two passes.

The defence was arranged around a libero who was chiefly concerned with covering against oncoming attacks. Usually it was Luginger who played in this position, but against Bulgaria it was Strehmel, and against the USA Spyrka.

In front of the libero, the two close-marking defenders Metz and Strehmel looked after the opposition's strikers, whom they followed doggedly all over the field. Both these defenders were extremely strong in the tackle and in the air, and also had good positional sense. They were very seldom beaten, and the same can be said for the lively Heidenreich, whose style was reminiscent of that of his trainer, Berti Vogts.

Strengths of the team


One of the team's strengths was certainly its mid-field. This block assisted in defence by forming the first line of resistance to oncoming attacks, which often came to a halt right here. They also provided splendid passes for the forwards, and sent lovely diagonal crosses out to the side-lines where Spyrka and Reinhardt would lie in wait, and a surprise attack would be created by this unexpected switching of the play. Moeller, who showed lovely skills, could also read the game well and he called the tune, while Schneider was a real dynamo, always using his speed and strength to drive the game forward.

Up front, Witczek showed cunning, quick dribbles, feints and good shooting as he constantly caused trouble for the opposing defence. This very interesting player, who ended up as top goal-scorer of this WYC and was one of the strongest in his team, was unlucky in that his nerves let him down at the crucial moment and he failed to score during the penalty-shooting in the final.

Weaknesses

There was only one weak point for Germany FR: Yugoslavia. Knowing that there were several key players missing from the East European team, and being regarded as hot favourites following their great semi-final performance against Chile, the Germans, perhaps inevitably, found their game a bit un-

settled, never really got into their usual rhythm and failed to shake off their anxiety. The game that the Yugoslavians played was tactically the worst thing that could have happened to the Germans: when the Yugoslavians were in possession they used short passes and a fine touch to keep the ball and their opponents on the move. They also allowed their opponents to attack, but occupied the flanks and from time to time launched a counter-attacking raid. The Yugoslavians had prepared their tactics for this game down to the last detail, and their plan to freeze the game as a means of countering the expected German attack worked during the entire time. The Germans lost their bearings in this cleverly constructed trap and did not have enough imagination or creativity to provide the magic moment that would turn the game around.



Italy



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Portugal - Italy	0:2
Malta - Italy	0:5
Austria - Italy	2:1
Italy - Malta	4:0
Italy - Portugal	2:0
Italy - Austria	5:2

Final Round

Belgium - Italy	1:2
Italy - Scotland	1:0
GDR - Italy	3:1

Results obtained at the WYC

Italy - Canada	2:2 (0:2)
Italy - Brazil	1:0 (0:0)
Italy - Nigeria	2:0 (2:0)
Italy - Chile	0:1 (0:0)

Team Coach: **Giuseppe Lupi**

Preparation

The Italian team was rather an unknown factor, for there had been great problems in selecting players. Various clubs blocked the idea of releasing their youngsters for more than a month, and the Italian delegation arrived with only 15 players. After several interventions, three more were selected later. The uncertainty as to which players would be available made the task of their coach, Giuseppe Lupi, that much more difficult, since the purpose of getting them to-

gether for training was above all to improve mutual understanding and to develop a tactical concept for the team as a whole. Thus nobody was in a position to make an exact estimate of the team's strength, but most of the experts did not rate Italy amongst the favourites.

The team had qualified for Chile as runners-up in the European Championships, in which they had lost 1-3 in the final. The players were brought together for training camps with the WYC in view,

but the feeling among the team managers was that these players had trained enough with their clubs and that their experience in games in the league would have provided sufficient exposure to playing under pressure for them to be able to match whatever was demanded of them in Chile. All the players made a strong physical impression, played calmly and purposefully and looked quietly confident that they would be able to give a good performance.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Canada	Brazil	Nigeria	1/4 Final Chile	1/2 Final	Final	
1	Limonta Daniele	24.11.67	AC Milan	90	90	90	90			360
2	Rivolta Alberto	04.11.67	FC Internazionale	90	Res.	Res.	Res.			90
3	Manzo Mario	20.10.67	Brescia Calcio	90	90	90	90			360
4	Zanutta Michele	20.10.67	UC Sampdoria	Res.	90	90	90			270
5	Rocchigiani Andrea	29.08.67	AC Fiorentina	90	90	90	90			360
6	Giunchi Luca	02.08.67	Fano AC	90	90		90			270
7	Melli Alessandro	11.12.69	AC Parma	45	90	82	90			307
8	Sinigaglia Marco	29.02.68	Sanbenedettese Calcio	90	90	90	58			328
9	Impallomeni Stefano	24.10.67	AC Parma	90	Res.	90	90			270
10	Carrara Marco	01.11.67	US Arezzo	73	2	90	32			197
11	Mandelli Paolo	04.12.67	Sanbenedettese Calcio	90	45	8	14			157
12	Caniato Massimiliano	19.10.67	SC Licata	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.			0
13	Garzja Luigi	07.07.69	US Lecce	90	90	90	90			360
14	Cuicchi Andrea	29.11.67	Catania Calcio	Res.		Res.				0
15	Caverzan Andrea	14.09.68	FC Juventus		88	90	90			268
16	Fiorentini David	07.09.67	SC Pisa	17	90	90	76			273
17	Rizzolo Antonio	22.04.69	S.S. Lazio		45	Res.				45
18	Compagno Giuseppe	25.08.67	Atalanta Calcio	45			Res.			45

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

Italy's basic plan was to play with a libero and three defenders in front of him, who would mark the opposing forwards. Lupi decided to use four men in mid-field, and therefore only to have two strikers, albeit very mobile ones. In the event, the strength of the Italian team lay quite definitely in their compact mid-field. As a team they showed themselves able to adjust their game to suit the opponent, varying from solidly defensive (against Brazil) to definitely offensive (against Nigeria).

Offensive Tactics

At the start of a game no clear attacking pattern would be discernible; this would only emerge when the Italians were forced either to act or to react. Against Canada, the game seemed to be lost at half time, but the Azzurri turned things around and went all out on to the attack. Playing against a strong opponent such as Brazil, they cut their offensive actions down to counter-attacking raids; but faced with a weaker team they did not take long in going over to a full attack in order to reach an early decision. That such total turn-arounds were possible is due to their brilliant mid-field. Plus of course the games that they had all played in the hard school of the Italian league where they had learned to cope with pressure.

Defensive Tactics

With the exception of the opening game, the Italian defence gave a safe and solid impression. The only lapse was against the apparent outsiders, Canada, in which game they were a bit too casual. The game against Brazil showed how experienced, disciplined and compact the Italians were in their defensive duties. Against Nigeria the defensive pattern was relaxed again, and a more flexible approach was taken. Again the main strength of the defence was the mid-field block, who fulfilled their defensive obligations most thoroughly, as indeed did the two strikers. The result was non-stop fore-checking even in the opponent's half, where many a ball was won.

Strengths of the team

The Italians made a positive impression in several ways, but first mention must go to their disciplined and decisive atti-


tude. The Southern Europeans were strong in the air and in the tackle, but could also take a bit of hard play themselves. In addition their ability to see a difficult situation through (as against Canada), where they fought till they were ready to drop, showed a strong team morale, which perhaps once again can be traced back to their professional experience. The shining feature, however, remained the mid-field, always creating driving impulses, and forming a homogeneous unit, containing sometimes as many as seven men.

Weaknesses

It would have been nice if the Italians had been able to provide more attractive and entertaining football, without neglecting their defensive obligations. All too often the ball was just played back to the goalkeeper, too often unreasonable

amounts of time were wasted before free kicks, throw-ins and corners were taken.

A heavy burden on the team was the number of warnings. It's hard to believe that a team could collect ten yellow cards in three games. Something really has to be done to stop all the fouls and petty incidents that occur even when the ball is nowhere near. Very often the Italians were guilty of deliberately provoking their opponents or of using professional fouls. They also protested far too frequently against referees' decisions. Such uncontrolled behaviour can lead to unpleasant consequences, particularly in a tournament. Giunchi had two yellow cards before the third game began, and so he missed this match, while Melli's attack in the quarter-final against Chile reduced the team to ten men, at a moment when they needed every available player.



Nigeria



Qualification

Zambia - Nigeria	2:2
Nigeria - Zambia	1:0
Nigeria - Egypt	4:0
Egypt - Nigeria	2:1
Nigeria - Somalia	1:0
Somalia - Nigeria	0:1
Nigeria - Togo	3:0
Togo - Nigeria	1:2

Results obtained at the WYC

Nigeria - Brazil	0:4 (0:3)
Nigeria - Canada	2:2 (2:1)
Nigeria - Italy	0:2 (0:2)

Team Coach: **Christopher Udemezue**

Preparation

In March 1986 the search was started for talented players, who would be invited to a training camp before the 5th African Junior Championships began. National trainer Christopher Udemezue and observers from the Ministry of Education and from the schools all looked over a number of likely candidates. Their task was a hard one because of the size of their country and the population density. In the end practically all those selected were members of state teams.

During the continental competition, which would decide who would go to Chile, a number of changes were made, and it was basically the re-organised team that won the final against Togo and went as African champions to the tournament in South America.

As far as preparation for the WYC went, the association did not enter the team in any tournaments. Instead they played against a number of local first division clubs and also went to a high altitude

training camp in Kenya where they also played a few games.

The general tone of the Nigerian delegation, also known as the "Flying Eagles", was quite positive just before the tournament. "We are not afraid of the big names. We have come to Chile to show the world that Nigeria will be the future stronghold of football."

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Brazil 0:4	Canada 2:2	Italy 0:2	1/4 Final	1/2 Final	Final	
1	Okpara Williams	06.09.68	A.C.B. FC	90	90	90				270
2	Adamu Sani	02.11.68	J.I.B. FC							0
3	Niekietien Peter	26.11.68	Julius Berger FC	39	90	90				219
4	Effa Okon Ene	15.03.69	B.B.C. FC	90	90	90				270
5	Ugbade Nduka	06.09.69	El-Kanemi FC	90	90	90				270
6	Babalola Oladipupo	04.08.68	Julius Berger FC	90	90	90				270
7	Adekola Adeolu	19.05.68	Julius Berger FC	90	90	90				270
8	Omorieghe Ikpowosa	04.11.67	A.C.B. FC	51	5	33				89
9	Akpoborie Jonathan	20.10.68	Julius Berger FC	12	69	Res.				81
10	Esin Etim	05.10.69	Iwuanyanwu N. FC	90	90	90				270
11	Ukaegbu Lawrence	15.09.69	Iwuanyanwu N. FC	78	16	Res.				94
12	Agbonsevbafe Lucky	12.08.69	El-Kanemi	Res.	Res.	Res.				0
13	Igbinoba Victor	08.10.69	Flash F. FC	Res.	Res.	57				57
14	Ndiyo Eyo Esien	25.12.68	Ranchers FC	Res.	Res.	45				45
15	Oliha Thompson	04.10.68	Bendel Ins. FC	90	90	90				270
16	Ahmed Baba Ibrahim	08.12.68	El-Kanemi FC	90	90	45				225
17	Osador Nosa	27.08.68	A.C.B. FC	90	90	90				270
18	Adegbenro Biodun	17.12.71	Stationery S. FC							0

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

The African champions employed a modified 4-3-3 system. At the heart of the defence two central defenders each covered the other, but the definition of their roles was not concrete enough and often confusion resulted. Of the three men in mid-field, Effa was the outstanding figure; he was the real motor of the team, appearing one moment in defence and the next in attack where his strong shooting was a positive factor. Niekietien, only a substitute in the opening game, was used as a deep-lying left-winger in the next two. His partner up front, Esin, ran free on many occasions but received too little support from his team-mates and was thus frequently isolated.

Attacking Tactics

In the attack there was a clear lack of penetration, and nobody seemed willing to take on the responsibility of shooting for goal. Such shots as they managed were not properly controlled and went wide. In the air none of the Africans was able to win the ball, and only two goals resulted overall. In mid-field, there seemed to be a lack of players who could read the game and who knew intuitively where the ball would be played. In addition a huge gap often opened up between mid-field and attack, and nobody was able to open the game up.

Defensive Tactics

At the back the Nigerian team was weak and lacked a real organiser. When play was concentrated in their area, there were often misunderstandings between the two central defenders, and even if one of them won possession he seemed to lack any concept of playing safe or of how to distribute the ball. The outer backs were also often outplayed by their opponents, and with the mid-field players and forwards frequently neglecting their defensive duties, not making much attempt at forechecking in the opponent's half, the picture was made even worse. Marking was lax, and as soon as players on the other team began to interchange positions, the Nigerian defensive plan broke down. Only goalkeeper Okpara made a creditable showing.

Strengths of the team

Most of the players were very fast and had great stamina, but these strengths should have been used better in controlling wider areas of the pitch. The more a team can cover the whole field, the less space an opponent has for manoeuvring. On the ball the Nigerians were very


quick and tricky and in this respect outshone the Europeans. Another positive aspect was their short-passing game, which they really should have made more use of, instead of resorting to the long ball. Although they had the idea of going for goal, they could have made more attempts from a suitable distance and with greater accuracy. Off the field the team was very entertaining, and their lively behaviour contributed a lot towards the good atmosphere that prevailed in Concepcion. Unfortunately this did not help them during their games.

Weaknesses

The reasons for Nigeria's early elimination must be sought in various tactical and technical areas. The team should have stuck to the style that they had practised for years. The defence is another area where im-

provement is called for. The players went into a tackle either without coordination or with too little determination. Often opponents were allowed to enter the Nigerian half before they were challenged; nobody seemed to be aware that they should fight for the ball everywhere on the pitch.

Free kicks were also a weak point of the Nigerians; not only when they were awarded one, but even more when they were called upon to defend against one. Out of three free kicks against them, two goals resulted. They also need to improve their variations of the corner, and their heading in such situations. Finally, it needs to be mentioned that all the players must develop more qualities of leadership, and the ability to take on responsibility. The team has sufficient potential to be able to do better than this, but they need to be coached more specifically and to play more regularly against European teams.



Saudi Arabia



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Saudi Arabia - Syria	1:0
Saudi Arabia - Yemen AR	2:0

Final Round

Saudi Arabia - India	4:0
Indonesia - Saudi Arabia	0:7
Saudi Arabia - Qatar	2:1
Saudi Arabia - Korea DPR	2:0
Saudi Arabia - Bahrain	2:0

Results obtained at the WYC

Saudi Arabia - Germany FR	0:3	(0:3)
Saudi Arabia - USA	0:1	(0:0)
Saudi Arabia - Bulgaria	0:2	(0:2)

Team Coach: **Oswaldo Sampaio Junior**

Preparation

The Saudi Arabian association made every effort to give their players an optimal preparation for the WYC. With long-range planning it should be possible to achieve the level necessary for success, and thoughts turned to the future right after the U-16 World Championships in 1985. Thus the players were brought together in good time and they travelled to Brazil on September 1st, 1987. There they attended a training camp for a full month and played a number of friendly games, most of which they won, as a

preparation for the difficult task ahead of them. In training, their Brazilian coach, Oswaldo Sampaio, laid equal stress on the different aspects of the game and tried to make the good skills of his players even better. Just before the tournament began, the atmosphere in the Saudi delegation was one of optimism, which, as events were to prove, was rather unjustified. The team's managers made no secret of the fact that they thought their lads would finish towards the top. Thus the showing of this team

was generally eagerly awaited, for not only had they had won a lot of sympathy and goodwill by their behaviour, but had also shown up well at the last WYC in the USSR. In addition, if the Arabs could play as well as, or better than before, or achieve even better results, it would be a sign of positive development in world football. As it turned out, however, their ambitions did not come to fulfillment, for a variety of reasons.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Germany FR 0:3	USA 0:1	Bulgaria 0:2	1/4 Final	1/2 Final	Final	
1	Mubarak Nawaf S.	12.12.69	Al-Nasr	90	Res.	Res.				90
2	Altekhaif Abdulrahman A.	10.01.70	Al-Helal	90	19					109
3	Al-Saleh Zrki T.A.	22.11.70	Al-Ettefak	55	90	90				235
4	Al-Roomi Abdulrahman A.	28.10.69	Al-Shabab	90	90	90				270
5	Madani Ahmed J.M.	06.01.70	Al-Ettehad	90	90	90				270
6	Abu-Dawad Bassim A.	07.11.67	Al-Ahli	90	90	90				270
7	Al-Dukkan Rashed A.R.	14.12.69	Al-Nasr	35		Res.				35
8	Al-Razgan Abdulaziz M.	06.12.69	Al-Shabab	90	71	73				234
9	Al-Suraiti Saadoun H.Kh.	14.07.70	Al-Ettefak	90	Res.	45				135
10	Al-Dosary Yousef J.Z.	13.10.68	Al-Helal	90	90	45				225
11	Al-Hammad Saud A.Z.	19.03.68	Al-Helal		76					76
12	Al-Harbi Khaled A.M.	11.10.69	Al-Ahli	90	90	90				270
13	Al-Muwallid Khaled M.F.	23.11.71	Al-Ahli	Res.	90	90				180
14	Al-Dosary Adel S.	04.10.70	Al-Ettefak	Res.		Res.				0
15	Al-Fahad Nasser T.A.	03.07.69	Al-Nasr	90	90	90				270
16	Dagriri Mansour H.H.	04.11.69	Al-Ahli	Res.	Res.	90				90
17	Shalgan Mohammed H.M.	28.10.70	Al-Nasr		14	17				31
18	Bedewi Musa P.S.	20.10.70	Al-Wadeha	Res.	90	90				180

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

Saudi Arabia used complete zone marking. Four players in a line covered the defensive area, and three looked after the mid-field region. One forward operated between midfield and the real forward line, in which the two strikers up front stayed permanently in an advanced position. To the amazement of observers of the first game - and the fault remained uncorrected in the next two - the Saudi Arabians did not make space tight for their opponents, nor did they act as a compact unit, as a zone system really demands, but instead left great gaps all over and failed to offer the necessary mutual support.

Offensive Tactics

By contrast with the freedom that the Arabs allowed their opponents, the Germans, the Bulgarians and especially the Americans allowed the Saudis very little room in which they could think and act. Sampaio Junior's squad found itself constantly harried and under pressure and they were forced to demonstrate their technical skills at high speed and in the face of close marking. Having to cope with such difficulties made them commit numerous errors, waste a number of good chances and eventually the Arabs took to shooting from the most impossible distances.

Defensive Tactics

The Arab defence in itself was not very solid, and since they were unable to count on effective support from their half-backs, it was possible for the other teams to get through to the Saudis' penalty area relatively easily. The mid-field was too slow and too easily penetrated as a first line of defence. The four defenders waited along a line at the edge of the penalty area and seldom left this position. The two central defenders proved to be too static, and also played too much on a line to be of much value in covering each other.

Strengths of the team

When a team ends up with no points from three games, and a goal aggregate of 0:6, it is not easy to talk about its strengths, perhaps rays of hope would be a more appropriate title. However, it should be noted that the Arabs were unlucky in two respects. First, they had the misfortune to play against West Germany in their opening game, and secondly they lost one of their defenders, Altekhaif, early on in the game against the USA. The re-organisation made neces-

sary by this injury really threw the team's plan into confusion.


Despite all this, the Saudi Arabians' undoubted technical skills would spark into life from time to time, and they put some good moves together. Against the USA they more or less held their own, and only a well-rehearsed free kick cost them the decision. Against Bulgaria they played much better as a team and created a number of chances, which were wasted without exception.

Weaknesses

The Saudis' defensive problems, and their inability to cover spaces and to operate as a compact unit are ideas that have already been discussed. At this point a hypothesis can be offered which includes several possible reasons why

the Arabs performed as poorly as they did.

It seems that they started this tournament at a moment when their physical and mental resources were on the wane. Such a decline is understandable, since it has also happened to many great national sides. If a team prepares for a specific event over a long period, and also entertains great ambitions, they are liable to feel, all of a sudden, what pressure they are under. Suddenly, their freshness and clarity of purpose fade, and technical and tactical errors creep into their game. The players continue to fight and to run, but they don't seem to get on top or achieve much. This WYC should indicate to them that they should take a closer look at the kinds of problem that the art and science of football pose for a competing team.



Scotland



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Enland - Scotland	1:2
Scotland - Ireland Rep.	1:1
Iceland - Scotland	0:2
Scotland - Iceland	2:0
Iceland Rep. - Scotland	1:0
Scotland - England	4:1

Final Round

Bulgaria - Scotland	0:1
Italy - Scotland	1:0
Germany FR - Scotland	1:0

Results obtained at the WYC

Scotland - GDR	2:1 (2:1)
Scotland - Bahrain	1:1 (0:1)
Scotland Colombia	2:2 (0:0)
Scotland - Germany FR	1:1 a.e.-t. (1:1; 1:1)
	Pen. 3:4

Team Coach

Ross Mathie

Preparation

Like East Germany, who would be one of their opponents in this group, the Scottish Football Association began as early as 1985 to prepare for the European Championships. Players were observed in club, school and college sides, and those selected played in preparatory games and in the qualifying round. Team manager Ross Mathie had to face the tricky problem of players' availability, which caused great variation within his squad. For his final selection he ran into almost insuperable difficulties when club commitments (European Cup

competitions) forced more than ten of his players to withdraw. But the team that finally went to Chile had one thing in common: they were not perhaps the best players but they fitted into their trainer's plan and were full of fighting spirit and team morale. As far as actual team preparation went, the main point was to develop tactical sense and mutual understanding between the players, who hardly knew each other. Practising dead ball situations received most attention. Fitness was no problem since they had all trained enough with their clubs.

The finishing touch to the preparation was two games against the Chilean clubs, Everton and Universidad Catolica, both of which they won.

The team's officials had some worries about the climatic conditions in Chile, when the players had problems coming from their cold and damp homeland into the warmth of a Chilean spring. However, as it turned out, the team managed very well in this respect, since they pulled two games out of the fire in the closing stages.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				GDR 2:1	Bahrain 1:1	Colombia 2:2	1/4 Final Germany FR 1:1 (pen. 3:4)	1/2 Final	Final	
1	McKeown Kevin	12.10.67	Motherwell	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.			0
2	McRobb Robert	13.09.68	Aberdeen	90	90	90	120			390
3	Welsh Brian	23.02.69	Dundee United	Res.	19	15	120			154
4	Weir James	15.06.69	Hamilton Academical							0
5	Nisbet Scott	30.01.68	Rangers	90	90	90	120			390
6	Mathie Alex	20.12.68	Celtic	Res.			Res.			0
7	Murray Steven	01.12.67	Celtic	90	90	81	120			381
8	McKinlay William	22.04.69	Dundee United	90	90	75	120			375
9	Wright Paul	17.08.67	Aberdeen	90	71	90				251
10	Hunter Paul	30.08.68	East Fife	90	90	90	120			390
11	McLeod Joseph	30.12.67	Dundee United	90	90	90	120			390
12	Main Alan	05.12.67	Dundee United	90	90	90	120			390
13	Redpath Alan	19.08.67	Heart of Midlothian	90	90	90	120			390
14	Ogilvie Gary	16.11.67	Dundee	Res.	Res.	9	Res.			9
15	Campbell Steven	20.11.67	Dundee	90	90	90	120			390
16	Butler John	25.01.69	St. Mirren	90	66	90	45			291
17	Cook Derek	26.04.68	Kilmarnock		Res.	Res.	75			75
18	Crabbe Scott	12.08.68	Heart of Midlothian	Res.	24	Res.	Res.			24

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

The Scottish team employed its traditional 4-4-2 system, with clear and sharply-divided zone marking. Although this British team was handicapped by the absence of a number of first-choice players who were not released, they in fact showed a compact organisation and their no-nonsense style brought them considerable success. The team lacked top-class players, but their "never-say-die" spirit more than made up for this.

Offensive Tactics

The team played a physically demanding brand of football, as usual. They would play long passes out of defence which caught their opponents out again and again. The two strong headers up front, McLeod and Hunter, together with the offensive mid-fielders, managed some really brave efforts. In classic fashion the two outer-backs, McRobb and Welsh, would make runs down the wings, and they and the two mid-fielders out on the touchline, Butler and Campbell, caused opposing defences a great deal of trouble. Even if the conversion of chances was not all that it might have been, the attacking play of the Scots was more than satisfactory. Only a lot of bad luck in the quarter-final against West Germany prevented them from going further.

Defensive Tactics

The Scottish defenders all practised very effective but exhausting forechecking tactics, and in this respect their defensive organiser, Nisbet, was outstanding. When they got the ball away from an opponent a quick counter-attack would be set in motion, and the whole defence would immediately advance up to the half-way line. For any individual player on an opposing team, the way through this defence was a tough one indeed.


Strengths of the team

Once again the Scots' game was carried along by their unbelievable, healthy enthusiasm, their all-out effort and the attacking spirit of their players. The victory over the much-fancied East German team contributed a lot to their morale, which was most evident when they fought back from the apparently hopeless position of being 0-2 down against Colombia in the decisive group game. Captain Nisbet was the most prominent player in this balanced team and ought to have a fine professional career ahead of him. In the same bracket we should mention the goalkeeper, Main, who not only played well himself but also steadied the team around him: despite the

five goals he let in, he was one of the mainstays of his side. Other players also earned good marks: first, the outstanding attacking mid-field player Wright, who, after being sent off in the game against Colombia, was clearly missed in the quarter-final against the Germans; then also McLeod, the left-side striker, who showed strong nerves as a penalty-taker. Having scored from the spot against East Germany and Colombia, it was unlucky for him that when he again converted a penalty during the regular playing time against West Germany, the referee ordered a re-take because one of his team-mates had moved into the box too quickly, and he failed at the second attempt.

Weaknesses

While the Scots put on a brave performance, they lacked outstanding personalities in their team. They also had trouble in keeping up the pace of their quick and adventurous style for a full game, and this showed up in individual errors. Misunderstandings in mid-field led to the team's becoming somewhat unsettled, and then the differences in standard between some of the seasoned players and the youngsters in the team became apparent. Another negative factor was the lack of discipline shown by some players; the most serious case being Nisbet's dismissal from the field during the quarter-final against East Germany.



Togo



Qualification

Togo - Ghana	0:2
Ghana - Togo	1:1
Ghana disqualified	
Tunisia - Togo	1:1
Togo - Tunisia	0:0
Morocco - Togo	1:0
Togo - Morocco	2:0
Nigeria - Togo	3:0
Togo - Nigeria	1:2

Results obtained at the WYC

Togo - Australia	0:2 (0:2)
Togo - Chile	0:3 (0:2)
Togo - Yugoslavia	1:4 (0:2)

Team Coach:

Rainer Wilfeld

Preparation

Having qualified for the finals of a World Youth Championship for the first time in their history, Togo prepared conscientiously for the event so that they would be worthy representatives of the African continent.

When the Togolese association entered their team for the qualifying games in Africa, the team managers put their hopes in the existing potential of their ta-

lented junior players. And for the World Championships too they remained optimistic.

With a year still to go before the WYC, the team played in a tournament in Châteauroux (France) in 1986, finishing a creditable third on that occasion. After they had earned their tickets to Chile in the African Junior Championships, the training programme was placed in the

hands of the German coach Rainer Wilfeld. The most important aspect of the plan was the development of the players' physical condition, taking into consideration their natural talents in the areas of mobility and speed. At the same time attempts were made to improve their technical qualities and to drill them tactically, so that they would be able to play a modern game at the WYC.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Australia 0:2	Chile 0:3	Yugoslavia 1:4	1/4 Final	1/2 Final	Final	
1	Apedo Mawuena	01.07.68	Gomido	90	90					180
2	Amouzou-Kpakpa Koffi	12.12.69	Entente II	71	90					161
3	Hounze Koffi	30.03.70	Olympique Demr.	19	Res.	90				109
4	Kpakpakpi Kodjo Messan	24.04.73	Agaza	90	Res.	Res.				90
5	Affo Atty	27.08.70	Semassi	90	90	90				270
6	Hope Kossi	13.08.70	Agaza	68	90	90				248
7	Agunyo Kwami	20.09.69	Entente II	90	90	90				270
8	BoukpeSSI Safiou	26.08.68	Propriano Corse	Res.	90	90				180
9	Ali Salissou	09.12.68	Aiglons	90	90	90				270
10	Koudouwovoh Tete	30.10.72	Agaza		36	Res.				36
11	Amuzu Komi	21.09.70	Agaza	Res.	54	90				144
12	Akondo Gao	01.11.69	Asko	Res.	Res.	90				90
13	Somu Mensah	27.11.67	Gomido	90						90
14	Bassarou Massassaba	24.07.68	Agaza	90	90	90				270
15	Salou Bachirou	06.08.70	Agaza	90	90					180
16	Kegbalo Kodjovi	19.08.70	Agaza	90	90					180
17	Amouzougan Kounama-Adama	12.09.69	Doumbe			90				90
18	Okouto-Kro Ati	16.08.68	Gomido	22	Res.	90				112

Team Analysis

Organisation

In the Togo team, their physical limitations were evident: the players were unable to control their speed and often went into a tackle confusing hard, fair play with an overdone attack. For this reason the team's collection of warnings and expulsions, not to mention injuries, led to their having to operate below full strength.

Agunyo and Salou were two players who caught the eye because of their speed, but they were sometimes not able to play up to their full potential because strength and stamina were lacking.

From the technical point of view the team improved from game to game. They were at their best when they were careful in building up an attack and the players gave their full attention to the job in hand e.g. passing, and did not try to rush things.

In defence, understanding between the players was not very evident nor did the midfield succeed in getting things going forward and making use of the wings. Without adequate support, the forwards were often stranded, just as the midfield players were left without help from behind.

Basically the Africans were capable of putting on a better show than they did, and in view of the general progress that has been made on that continent at both younger and older levels, as demonstrated in international competitions, this group did not really come up to expectations.

Offensive Tactics

As far as Togolese attacks went, the hopes were all pinned on the speed of Agunyo, who, apart from occasional support from Salou, was left pretty much alone, for the assistance that these two players could have used was never provided by the mid-field. The players in this part of the team were never able to take charge of a game, and this weakness, coupled with the forwards' poor showing, meant that they only managed to create a few promising moves and only one real chance. However, they did improve from game to game, and against Yugoslavia the first signs of an attempt at coordinating their moves were clearly recognisable.

Defensive Tactics

Togo decided to operate with a 4-4-2 system, and thus to put their money on having a strong defence and a strong

mid-field. Affo was the team's best player and as libero it was his task to direct the rest of the defence. In this area of the field the main faults were a lack of covering at the back, the inability of the players to read the game, poor marking, and the countless fouls, many of which verged on being nasty assaults. This exaggeration of the physical side of the game meant that the Togo team only had two substitutes available for their last match.


Strengths of the team

All the Togolese players seemed to have been born with speed and agility, and they showed the usual physical talents of African teams. As far as technical skills went they were certainly not among the worst, but also failed to show any really outstanding performances. They all tried to carry out the duties that had been assigned to them, and in this

they were most successful in the game against Yugoslavia.

Weaknesses

Togo's team was made up of small players, and on the whole they were not very strongly built. In addition, the willingness that they showed in terms of physical effort was not something that they could keep up for a full 90 minutes. A lack of strength prevented them from shooting really hard and from hitting long passes. On the technical side they looked a bit limited in such skills as receiving or giving passes, and this did not seem to come naturally to them. Their weak and inaccurate passes often landed right at an opponent's feet. In the air, the Africans were clearly disadvantaged right from the start. Little wonder that in the course of three games, they only managed to score one goal.



USA



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Mexico - USA	0:3
USA - Cuba	0:0
Jamaica - USA	0:5
USA - Surinam	0:1

Final Round

USA - Canada	1:1
USA - Cuba	1:0
Trinidad/Tobago - USA	1:0

Results obtained at the WYC

USA - Bulgaria	0:1 (0:1)
USA - Saudi Arabia	1:0 (0:0)
USA - Germany FR	1:2 (1:1)

Team Coach: **Derek Armstrong**

Preparation

In the past few years, following the end of the NASL, football in the USA has taken another upsurge, particularly at younger age levels. The potential has not yet been fully tapped, but it is there and the hope is that by working systematically in the next few years it will be possible to form a healthy foundation for the game at higher levels. The newly-formed American Soccer League is the first step in this direction: together with the qualification of the U-16 and the U--

20 teams for the FIFA tournaments, this league should bring more public interest to the game.

It is therefore doubly interesting to observe the efforts of the USSF officials to develop a Junior team, in which the next generation of players is represented. Even though manager Derek Armstrong and his assistant Steve Heighway (of Liverpool fame), claim that their team has no real style of its own, nonetheless certain features are noticeable. It was

evident, for example, that the emphasis in training was on the tactical side, since the players were in top physical condition anyway and also looked good in terms of skills. As far as actual preparation went, the team wanted practice games to exercise their skills and to improve their already strong level of team play. It was also an aim of the officials to do something about the inconsistency problem and to consolidate the level of performance.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Bulgaria 0:1	Saudi Arabia 1:0	Germany FR 1:2	1/4 Final	1/2 Final	Final	
1	Meola Tony	21.02.69	Oceanside S.C.	90	90	90				270
2	Reasoner Tommie	27.10.67	University of Tampa	Res.	90	90				180
3	Pfeil David	04.12.67	Dallas Comets		Res.					0
4	Agoos Jeff	02.05.68	Dallas Comets	90	90	90				270
5	Szanto Chris	17.09.67	Poughkeepsie S.C.	90	90	90				270
6	Santel Mark	05.07.68	Scott Gallagher	90	90	90				270
7	Benedict Brian	27.12.68	USA Soccer Club	Res.	25	90				115
8	Gutierrez Hendrig	28.08.68	Miami Lakes	30	90	90				210
9	Unger Chris	14.03.68	Union Lancers	90	82	88				260
10	Balboa Marcelo	08.08.67	Fram-Culver	90	90	90				270
11	Henderson Ed	11.09.67	Sport Haus F.C.	60	8	2				70
12	Gwin John	31.10.68	Boise Nationals	14		55				69
13	Constantino Michael	05.02.69	Brooklyn Italians	90	90	90				270
14	Gaitan Adrian	10.11.67	Oceanside S.C.		Res.	Res.				0
15	Pena Danny	17.06.68	Fram-Culver	90	90	35				215
16	Fernandez Ray	05.03.68	Torrance S.C.	76						76
17	Martin Lucas	22.02.68	La Jolla Nomads	90.	65	Res.				155
18	Keller Kasey	29.11.69	Federal Way Force	Res.	Res.	Res.				0

Team Analysis

Organisation

The team's British coach, Armstrong, a believer in playing with a definite libero and in man-to-man marking in the area, was in charge of a team whose players had no experience of top-level football, and who did not have the talent or the other qualities that would be necessary if a miracle were to be hoped for. However, it must be noted that the USA team went into all three group games with a definite system, within which each part of the team followed a clear strategy. The team played with a lot of spirit and never missed an opportunity to try to get positive results.

Knowing their own limits, and having been carefully and intelligently drilled in tactics before each game, this highly-motivated team found itself able to turn in some creditable performances, both in terms of the games themselves and the final results. The US boys played better match by match, and their last game – against the experienced and strong West German side – was from the technical-tactical point of view the most even game in Group D, and also the most interesting. That the German coach, Berti Vogts, found himself forced to take another look at his tactics and in fact to play the second half with more caution and more respect for the opponent is a real tribute to the American team.

Offensive Tactics

The offensive strategy of the Americans was based mainly around the surprise effect of quick counter-attacks, which thanks to the good athletic qualities of their players could be put into effect at speed and with determination. In this respect the outstanding figure was Michael Constantino, who was very mobile and capable of penetrating a defence, as well as being a skilful and creative player. With a bit more luck and killer-instinct he could have had a glorious afternoon against the West Germans.

Defensive Tactics

The defensive scheme of the USA team consisted of Santel as permanent libero, in front of him Szanto as the strong-in-the-air central defender who made life hard for the opposing central striker, plus two outer-backs who marked their opponents closely in the area. Behind them, goalkeeper Meola showed his skill, bringing off difficult saves on a number of important occasions, and his interception of high balls gave the defenders around him a sense of security.

The four mid-field players, on occasions five, carried out their part of the plan by putting pressure on the opponent, but also kept in contact with the defence whom they assisted and covered, as well as getting counter-attacks under way as soon as they obtained possession. The mobility of the whole team, their generous efforts and their team spirit all enabled them to operate as a compact unit and to minimise the spaces between the different lines.


But in any discussion of the strengths of the USA team, the name of Marcello Balboa must be mentioned – he proved to be their most valuable and most complete player: if the team were on the defensive he would be found marking an opponent or operating as a second libero, but once an attack started he would be needed in mid-field as the link man, supporting his team-mates efforts in build-up and in attack.

Strengths of the team

In addition to their determination and top physical shape, the Americans had another trump card, and this became evident early on, which was the fact that they had studied dead ball situations better than anyone and had practised them in training. One of their well-planned variations in fact led to the winning goal in the important game against Saudi Arabia.

Weaknesses

The capital mistake made by this team, which had no real tradition and experience behind it, and which was unused to facing top level opposition, was perhaps the exaggerated shyness they showed against Bulgaria in their opening game. There the inferiority complex when playing against well-known teams was evident in terms of individual tactical immaturity – but this was quite understandable.



Yugoslavia



Qualification

Preliminary Round

Yugoslavia - Spain	3:0
Yugoslavia - Luxemburg	8:0
Yugoslavia - France	1:2
Luxemburg - Yugoslavia	1:6
France - Yugoslavia	0:0
Spain - Yugoslavia	1:3

Final Round

Yugoslavia - GDR	0:2
Yugoslavia - Romania	5:0

Results obtained at the WYC:

Yugoslavia - Chile	4:2 (2:1)
Yugoslavia - Australia	4:0 (2:0)
Yugoslavia - Togo	4:1 (2:0)
Yugoslavia - Brazil	2:1 (0:1)
Yugoslavia - GDR	2:1 (1:0)
Yugoslavia - Germany FR	1:1 a. e. -t. (1:1; 0:0)
	Pen. 5:4

Team Coach:

Mirko Josic

Preparation

This was the first time since 1979, when the Yugoslavians finished 10th in Japan, that they had managed to qualify for the finals of a World Youth Championship. With only very reluctant support from the clubs involved, the association found itself forced to exert some pressure in order to secure the players' release for a short period of preparation before the competition in Chile. What made the problem even more complicated was that the juniors selected were often key

players in their club teams, who were right in the middle of the championship at the time of the WYC.

Another negative factor was that ten of the players who had achieved the qualification for Chile were required for military service and were not available to the association. In the end only five of the original squad made the journey to South America.

The team's organisers began their preparation in March 1987, when the trainer,

Mirko Josic, started to observe potential candidates in league games. The basis for the team's preparation was a conditioning test, on the results of which a technique and conditioning programme was set up. Eleven training matches, three of them internationals, completed the team's preparation, and they were expected to be among the favourites in the competition.

Players' Appearances

No.	Name	Date of Birth	Club	1 st Match	2 nd Match	3 rd Match	4 th Match	5 th Match	6 th Match	Total
				Chile 4:2	Australia 4:0	Togo 4:1	1/4 Final Brazil 2:1	1/2 Final GDR 2:1	Final Germany FR 1:1 (pen. 5:4)	
1	Leković Dragoje	21.11.67	Budućnost	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
2	Brnovic Branko	08.08.67	Budućnost	90	90		90	90	120	480
3	Jarni Robert	26.10.68	Hajduk Split	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
4	Pavličić Dubravko	28.11.67	Dinamo Zagreb	90	90	90	90	90	120	570
5	Janković Slavoljub	17.02.69	Crvena Zvezda (Roter Stern)	90	90	Res.	90		120	390
6	Štimac Igor	06.09.67	Dinamo Vinkov	90	90		90	90		360
7	Mijucić Zoran	23.12.68	Vojvodina	77		37	45	87	120	366
8	Boban Zvonimir	08.10.68	Dinamo Zagreb	90	75	37	81	90	120	493
9	Prosinečki Robert	12.01.69	Crvena Zvezda (Roter Stern)	90	76	53	90	90		399
10	Pavlović Milan	30.12.67	Željezničar	45	15	90	45	Res.	88	283
11	Mijatović Predrag	19.01.69	Budućnost	45	90	90	90	90		405
12	Piplica Tomislav	05.04.69	Iskra	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	Res.	0
13	Šuker Davor	01.01.68	Osijek	90	90	53	90	89	120	532
14	Petrić Goran	30.07.69	OFK Beograd	13	Res.	90	Res.	90	120	313
15	Škorić Pero	18.06.69	Vojvodina	Res.	Res.	90	9	Res.	120	219
16	Antonić Dejan	22.01.69	Crvena Zvezda (Roter Stern)			90			Res.	90
17	Djurković Slaviša	18.08.68	Sutjeska		90	Res.		1	Res.	91
18	Žirojević Ranko	01.09.67	Sutjeska	Res.	14	90	Res.	3	32	139

Team Analysis

Team Organisation

The Yugoslavian team's organisation can be described as excellent in all departments; defence, mid-field and attack. With Lekovic in goal, Pavlovic and Jankovic in defence, Stimac and Boban in mid-field, and Prosinecki and Suker up front, the team had a very solid core. Lekovic was a safe, calm and technically outstanding keeper, and he could count on Pavlovic and Jankovic in front of him to have the defence very well organised. In mid-field, Stimac and Boban provided the impulses for many an attack and distributed the ball well, while Prosinecki, with Suker almost always in support, was constantly using his speed off the mark to find the quickest way to goal. Every one of the team was very skilled on the ball, with good control, the ability to play short or long passes, and able to finish with a hard and well-placed shot. If all the first choice players had been available to the selectors then this team would have been even better on the technical side. All the same, they made a great impression, and their results truly reflect the tremendous technical skills of the Yugoslavian players.

Offensive Tactics

The entire attacking strategy of the Yugoslavians was based on having a solid defence, which would break up the opposition's moves and then set their mid-field going with a short accurate pass. Here the terrific talents of Boban, Stimac and Mijucic came into play, as they brought the constantly inter-changing forwards, Mijatovic, Suker and Prosinecki into dangerous positions in front of goal. In the first round the Yugoslavians scored no less than twelve times, and in the later stages added another five; some of them splendidly created goals. An extra factor in the Yugoslavian attack was the penetration of the full backs, such as Brnovic, down the line. He interpreted his role in a very modern way down the right flank. Other characteristics of this team were their deep passing, their creative involvement in the game and a good understanding of their offensive duties.

Defensive Tactics

Any really great team needs to have a reliable goalkeeper, and Lekovic was one of the best on view at this WYC. His positional play was first class, his reflexes and agility outstanding, and in addition to these qualities he had a good command of the organisation of the defenders around him. Another key figure was the libero, Jankovic, who directed the players in front

of him, Jarni, Pavlicic and Brnovic, in their task of stopping any oncoming attacks.

Stimac was equally effective in midfield, marking his opposite number thoroughly, and together with Boban forming the first line of defence when the tide was rolling towards the Yugoslavian goal. An additional strength of the team was that if they lost possession, they would immediately take up defensive positions and keep a balance between the various sections of the team. Good positional play and understanding between team members meant that the Yugoslavians had an excellent defensive formation, in which they operated man-to-man or zone marking according to the situation.


Strengths of the team

Their outstanding physical condition made it possible for this already excellent squad to operate in any part of the

field. Speed, agility, stamina, – these were the factors that made them able to use their technical skills to the full, and in doing so offer a demonstration of attractive and modern football.

Weaknesses

From time to time, the team's managers had to have a word with their players, not only because of tactics but also because a lack of discipline on the field made it necessary for them to intervene in order to restore order to the ranks. Also, on occasion, some of the players would rather selfishly go for goal themselves instead of passing to a team mate in a better position. In the final itself, their trainer Josic had to put a new team together because players had been sent off or suspended for several warnings; three key players were missing. Despite their general high level of fitness, some of the players showed signs of exhaustion, mostly in the form of cramp.



Technical and tactical Analysis

The technical and tactical analysis of the tournament was carried out by the members of the Technical Study Group, who were appointed by the FIFA Executive Committee. Their task was to look for the reasons behind success and failure, to study the teams' defensive concepts, their attacking strategies and their individual tactical behaviour. In this way they hoped to reach general conclusions, to ascertain what the current trends were and to follow the development of participating teams.

In comparison with earlier competitions for this age-group, these Championships in Chile brought new tactical and technical impulses. These nearly all stemmed from the European teams and this fact was reflected in the results: the top three teams came from Europe, plus places 5 and 6. Only the team from the host country managed to break into this block.

32 games – 86 goals – not one goal-less draw

The fourth WYC showed a general and welcome trend towards more attacking football, in comparison to the previous event in USSR (80 goals). Teams banking on playing a largely defensive game were fortunately not in evidence. The tactics on view were quite varied, the players were able to show the versatility of their training and also their great stamina. They were all prepared to take a

by Walter Gagg

risk, in that if they scored a goal, the aim would be to try to score another one rather than simply defend. This positive approach was also reflected in the list of results – not a single goal-less draw in 32 matches. On the other hand the even standard of the teams can also be seen: only three results show a clear goal difference (4:0 in each of the games Yugoslavia–Australia, Brasil–Nigeria, and FR Germany–Chile). By contrast, in the later rounds, three games were only decided after penalty-shooting, following extra time: one quarter-final (Germany FR–Scotland), the game for 3rd/4th places (German DR–Chile) and the final itself (Yugoslavia–FR Germany). Some outstanding players set the tone in the better teams and made that subtle difference that led to their teams' success. In the winning Yugoslavian team these were Boban, Prosinecki and Suker; for FR Germany Witczek, Schneider and Moeller; for GDR Sammer and Steinmann. For the host team, Chile, Pino and Tudor were the stars. With technical skills far above the average and a good overview, these players were able to dictate a methodical build-up for their team, they could suddenly switch the point of attack, combined fluidly and yet in a controlled fashion. Plus, they all had a lot of confidence in their own game.

A factor that certainly contributed to making this tournament a success was the fine opening game between the hosts, Chile, and Yugoslavia, with six goals being scored. A start like this, with the eventual champions Yugoslavia winning 4:2 in front of a 65,000 crowd in the

Estadio Nacional, provided a good example of attacking behaviour for all the games to follow. Interest in the tournament was aroused, and the atmosphere surrounding the games gave the players an extra impetus to do well. On average there were 21,000 spectators for each of the 32 games, and Chile was proud that the confidence shown in selecting that country as host for the IVth World Youth Championships for the FIFA/Coca-Cola Cup proved to be justified.

Europe's Resounding Success

World Champions Yugoslavia were dominant in their group, winning every game. They beat Chile, Australia and Togo, and finished with an impressive goal aggregate of 12:3. In their quarter-final match in Santiago they played against Brasil, who had won the title on two previous occasions, and in a game that would have been a worthy final they beat the South Americans 2:1, despite trailing 0:1 at half-time. In the semi-final against

East Germany, the Yugoslavians again came out on top with a score of 2:1, but it is worth noting that they played all six of their games in Santiago, so they were practically playing "at home" and avoiding all the problems of travelling that other teams had to face. After five wins in a row, the Yugoslavians had to be content with a draw in the final against West Germany (1:1 after 90 minutes), then played extra time and finally succeeded in winning the title at the penalty-shooting stage.

The West Germans too came through their group games without dropping a point, their only difficult match being against the U.S.A. (2:1). In the quarter-final against Scotland in Antofagasta they were taken to extra-time and on into penalty-shooting, which cost them energy that was perhaps missing in the final. The East Germans, despite losing a group game against Scotland, reached the quarter-final where they won against Bulgaria, only to be defeated by the subsequent champions in the semi-final.

Only the Chilean team managed to break into this phalanx of European sides. They eliminated the Italians in the quarter-final match in Concepción, but then went down 0:4 to Berti Vogts' well-balanced team in the semi-final, despite the support of a crowd of almost 40,000. In the course of the tournament it became clear that a team aspiring to one of the top positions in world football would need to have a solid defensive basis, to practice a style incorporating the strengths of Central European football and also to have players with outstanding skills. In the top three teams, the best players were also able to fit into the roles that their team organisation required, without losing their own style and individuality.



The Brazilian "spider's web": André Cruz, César Sampaio and Sandro are zooming in on a Nigerian forward.

Disappointment for the Africans

Of the two teams representing the CAF, it was the Nigerians that were most disappointing, since they had finished third in fine style in the IIIrd WYC in 1985. From the moment their squad was announced, there was a great deal of surprise among the experts, for of the team that had caused a sensation by finishing third in the USSR in 1985, not a single player had been nominated for Chile, even though seven of that group were still young enough to be eligible. The Nigerian team this time were only a shadow of the previous side, which had showed fresh, non-stop, technically brilliant, high-speed football. In Concepción their game was characterised by individual errors, and a ponderous build-up with little in the way of surprises. Technically only a few of the players seemed up to standard, and physically they were over-taxed in all three group games, the result being last place in the group, with their only point being obtained in a rather flattering draw against Canada. Perhaps the heavy defeat that they had suffered against Brasil in the opening game had had a detrimental effect.

For Togo, taking part in the Final Competition of a WYC for the first time, these championships undoubtedly came too soon. At no stage in any of their group games could this team really come out of its own half in a decisive fashion and put together an attack that involved three or four players. Often their technical deficiencies were the cause of the problem, plus their obvious physical inferiority. This led to a certain awkwardness in tackling, that at times was beyond the limits of fairness. In short, they lacked maturity at the international level; that can only be developed and improved in a number of serious encounters at this level. However, they had made a start in international football, and can take some



Free-kick for Chile against Togo. Careno's beautifully curved shot, however, will fail to penetrate into the Africans' goal.

consolation in the fact that their only goal was scored against the tournament winners from Yugoslavia.

African football had been making progress at nearly all levels since 1982, but in Chile received a set-back in this age-group that was a surprise for all the experts and followers of the game.

A standstill in Brazilian progress

In contrast to the teams that had played in the WYC's in Mexico and the USSR, the 1987 Brazilian group lacked the quality of player that could almost decide the course of a game single-handedly. In 1983 Geovani, Dunga and Bebeto were

the ones who had been able to give their team the kind of impulse that could swing a game round, and two years later there were no less than seven outstanding players in the South American team: Henrique, Dida, Silas, Muller, Balalo, João Antonio and Gerson.

This time the promising class of Alcindo, André Cruz, Wanderley, Bismarck and William was not sufficient to overcome the homogeneous team-work of the Yugoslavians in the quarter-final. At decisive moments the team was too cautious, and really seemed to lack players of the highest class with the necessary imagination. Too often play would be built up via the same players, and when these few were blocked in, command of the game was lost. After deservedly taking the lead against Yugoslavia, the title-holders should have continued to keep up the pressure, but instead they allowed their opponents to take the initiative. A pity for the Brazilians, for had they won this game they probably would have reached the final and might have won that too. But to achieve this sort of ambition, it is necessary to take some risks; simply having above-average skills is not enough at this level.

Their early elimination threw the team and its officials into a state of mourning. Had they been over-confident? Hardly, for the defeat by Italy in the group must have been a shake-up. But even with this warning behind them, the Brazilians' approach to subsequent games was far from being convincing and realistic. And this fact seems to be the main problem with Brazilian football. National trainers at all levels there would do well to pay attention to this situation. Talent is obviously abundant, but it has to be channelled into sensible and realistic pathways. With good ideas, flair for the game and the ability to improvise, the old standard should be reached again soon.



After Pavlicic's misheader, the usually very calm Yugoslavian rearguard for once loses its composure.

Tactical and Technical Analysis

If there are to be any conclusions drawn that will be useful in the near future – and there is certainly still plenty of room for development in the game of football – then the progress that has been made in the last few years needs to be analysed in a detached and factual way. There is no place for preconceived opinions or stubborn adherence to out-dated notions in a discussion of this kind.

Concepts and systems

In the areas of team concepts and playing systems, things have not kept up with other developments, and there remain considerable possibilities for the future in these areas. It is up to each football instructor to select an approach to the game that is suited to his team, and to seek out the way of using any advantage the group might have to make it a winning team. If one looks closely at the IVth WYC in Chile, then one can see a general assimilation of the widespread 4-4-2 system.

Defence

Many of the players at even this age have been schooled in professional leagues and have already had considerable experience in high-level European games, so that from them one can see what the modern concept of defensive play is like. Features of this type of play usually include central defenders playing in depth, with the libero playing to one side of the stopper, who would close mark or zone-mark as the occasion demanded. The outer backs would usually employ zone-marking tactics. It was the mixed man-to-man and zone-marking that gave the Togo and Bahrain teams a lot of trouble. At times it proved to be a problem for the host country Chile, and for South American champions Colombia too, and they were then open to counter-attacks. Modern zone-marking can only be employed successfully by a team well-accustomed to each other; it requires the ability to read a situation quickly, to adjust continually to changes and a flexible relinquishing of one defensive duty in order to take over a different one. In addition players must also be capable of taking action, rather than merely reacting, so that they can mount surprise attacks on an opponent. In this respect, the teams from FR Germany and Yugoslavia were well ahead of their rivals and made use of this advantage time and time again.

Mid-Field

The tendency towards trying to achieve numerical superiority in mid-field, and to cut down the space available for the op-

ponent was noticeable in the previous tournament in the USSR. The 32 matches in Chile showed that the tendency has now developed into a fully-fledged, recognised principle. In a number of games the trainers put all their strongest weapons into mid-field and a "game within a game" was the outcome (e.g. Yugoslavia-Brasil and Yugoslavia-FR Germany).

To use an anatomical analogy, the mid-field now assumes the roles of both the "heart" and the "brain" of a team. By creating spaces down the sides and then "feeding" them, the supply of passes to the forwards, which can be likened to their oxygen intake, is guaranteed. Decisions are taken here as to where the ball will be played, how the "oxygen supply" can best be used, whether it should be out to the sides or deep into the opponent's half. But the mid-field players are also required to use some of their energy for defensive duties, and their role in modern football pretty well requires them to be present in attack and in defence at the same time and equally effective in both places.

It is therefore in mid-field that the class of a team is apparent – that's why the "thinkers" of the side operate here – since this is where the decisions are taken as to when the game should be slowed down and when speeded up. The modern mid-field player must be capable of reading a game and knowing intuitively where the ball will be played next, and it is this that lifts him above the average. This is not surprising that in the victorious Yugoslavian team, Boban and Prosinecki, and in the West German side, Moeller, we saw the mid-field players who were the outstanding figures of this tournament.

Attack

The classical attacking formation with three strikers only existed on paper. Most teams took the field with just two forwards, and in extreme cases some teams tried to achieve success with only one. It was clear that not all teams were able to call on a number of variations in their attacking play. Obviously a team with a number of real attackers will have more penetrating power and therefore more success, and if a coach has such players available to him he should use them in this way. However, if he has only one striker in his side then he must find a

concept that fits this situation, and offers that forward sufficient support. Solving this problem successfully depends on the trainer's judgement.

The Re-birth of Forwards as Goal-scorers

At the WYC in the USSR in 1985, the forwards scored 41 of the 80 goals, or just over 50 per cent. At the fourth FIFA World Youth Championships in Chile the forwards re-discovered their goal-scoring qualities and were responsible for 64 of the 87 goals, which is almost 75 per cent. On the basis of these figures one can certainly speak of a renaissance of the goal-scoring forward, and this was also quite noticeably the case between the last two World Cups in 1982 and 1986. In Spain the forwards scored 49 per cent of the goals, while in Mexico their share rose to 58 per cent.

Not many goals from set-pieces

66 per cent of all the goals came as a result of a continuous action during the game, only 34 per cent from dead-ball situations. These figures also stand comparison with those of the '82 and '86 World Cups, where the figure was 33 per cent of the goals from dead-ball situations on both occasions. From these statistics it can be concluded that there is still room for improvement in the future for successful results from free kicks and corners, if these set-pieces are practised under game conditions in training.

Football of the Future?

Well, we can't give a definite answer to this question. It is a fact that there is no better way of learning to play a realistic game under today's conditions than by actually playing competitive matches. During the game and from the game, we can learn what training elements need to be repeated, and what we need to do to improve. The game itself should indicate the type of training necessary, and how intensely it needs to be practised. The actual training session should reflect the challenges that will be faced during a game, and the theory and practical work involved should bring progress and success for the future.

Special Trophies

FIFA Fair Play Competition

Sport Billy Trophy

GDR Won Fair Play Competition

Only six times in all did the referees need to flourish the yellow card to the players from the GDR and not one of them was warned a second time or sent off. Thus, a team won the Fair Play award whose players and coaches proved by reaching third place that success can also be achieved when combined with discipline and sporting behaviour.

Trophies donated by adidas

Golden Ball

(for The Best Player)

and

Golden Shoe

(for The Best Goal Scorer)

The award for the best player and best goal scorer with a special trophy donated by ADIDAS has already become a tradition. At the banquet, the two winners accepted these awards with somewhat mixed feelings.

Two cautions had obliged Robert Prosinečki, whom sports journalists had nominated as the best player in the Tournament, to take a seat on the Yugoslavian players' bench for the final.

As for Marcel Witeczek, good and bad luck had gone hand in hand. His equaliser for 1:1 with a cold-blooded penalty shot in the 87th minute of the final had not only forced extra time but also made him the top marksman. But when it came to the conclusive penalty shoot-out, his nerves had failed him and he was the only one of the ten players who bungled his shot. The Bronze Ball he won in addition to the prize for best goal scorer was little consolation for this missed opportunity.

Two other players from the World Champion line-up also received awards, namely, Zvonimir Boban (Silver Ball) and Davor Šuker (Silver Shoe). The Chilean schemer, Camilo Pino, won the Bronze Shoe for scoring five goals.



The GDR captain, Karsten Neitzel, with the Sport Billy trophy.

The previous winners of the special trophies were:

Sport-Billy Trophy

Brazil	Tunisia '77
Poland	Japan '79
Australia	Australia '81
Korea Republic	Mexico '83
Colombia	USSR '85

Golden Ball

Vladimir Bessonov (USSR)	Tunisia '77
Diego Armando Maradona (Argentina)	Japan '79
Romulus Gabor (Romania)	Australia '81
Geovani Silva (Brazil)	Mexico '83
Paulo Silas Pereira (Brazil)	USSR '85

Golden Shoe

Aguinaldo R. Gallion (Brazil)	Tunisia '77	4 Goals
Ramon Angel Diaz (Argentina)	Japan '79	8 Goals
Maok Koussas (Australia)	Australia '81	4 Goals
Geovani Silva (Brazil)	Mexico '83	6 Goals
Sebastian Losada (Spain)	USSR '85	3 Goals



The players who contributed most to their team's success: (left to right) Marcel Witeczek (FR Germany), Robert Prosinečki and Zvonimir Boban (both Yugoslavia) proudly display their awards.



Davor Šuker (Yugoslavia, left) and Marcel Witeczek.

Goal Scorers

7 goals	Witeczek (FRG)	2 goals	Reinhardt (FRG)	1 goal	Carrara (ITA)
6 goals	Šuker (YUG)	2 goals	Stimac (YUG)	1 goal	Impallomeni (ITA)
5 goals	Pino (CHI)	1 goal	Al Kharraz (BAH)	1 goal	Rizzolo (ITA)
4 goals	Sammer (GDR)	1 goal	Hope (TOG)	1 goal	Butler (SCO)
3 goals	Tudor (CHI)	1 goal	Edwards (AUS)	1 goal	Wright (SCO)
3 goals	Boban (YUG)	1 goal	Reynolds (AUS)	1 goal	Gonzalez (CHI)
3 goals	Mijatovic (YUG)	1 goal	Adekola (NIG)	1 goal	Kracht (GDR)
2 goals	Guerrero (COL)	1 goal	Effa (NIG)	1 goal	Liebers (GDR)
2 goals	Trellez (COL)	1 goal	Constantino (USA)	1 goal	Prasse (GDR)
2 goals	Melli (ITA)	1 goal	Unger (USA)	1 goal	Steinmann (GDR)
2 goals	Alcindo (BRA)	1 goal	Kalaydjiev (BUL)	1 goal	Dammeier (FRG)
2 goals	André Cruz (BRA)	1 goal	Slavtchev (BUL)	1 goal	Eichenauer (FRG)
2 goals	William (BRA)	1 goal	Vassilev (BUL)	1 goal	Epp (FRG)
2 goals	McLeod (SCO)	1 goal	Domezetis (CAN)	1 goal	Möller (FRG)
2 goals	Nisbet (SCO)	1 goal	Grimes (CAN)	1 goal	Strehmel (FRG)
2 goals	Wosz (GDR)	1 goal	Jansen (CAN)	1 goal	Brnovic (YUG)
		1 goal	Mobilio (CAN)	1 goal	Prosinecki (YUG)
				1 goal	Zirojevic (YUG)

Annex

Standings after Group Matches

A	1. Yugoslavia	3	3	0	0	12:3	6	Goals scored	22	Qualified for Quarter Finals			
	2. Chile	3	2	0	1	7:4	4						
	3. Australia	3	1	0	2	2:6	2				Cautions	22	Yugoslavia
	4. Togo	3	0	0	3	1:9	0				Expulsions	3	Chile

B	1. Italy	3	2	1	0	5:2	5	Goals scored	16	Qualified for Quarter Finals			
	2. Brazil	3	2	0	1	5:1	4						
	3. Canada	3	0	2	1	4:5	2				Cautions	17	Italy
	4. Nigeria	3	0	1	2	2:8	1				Expulsions	0	Brazil

C	1. GDR	3	2	0	1	6:3	4	Goals scored	16	Qualified for Quarter Finals			
	2. Scotland	3	1	2	0	5:4	4						
	3. Colombia	3	1	1	1	4:5	3				Cautions	21	GDR
	4. Bahrain	3	0	1	2	1:4	1				Expulsions	3	Scotland

D	1. Germany FR	3	3	0	0	8:1	6	Goals scored	13	Qualified for Quarter Finals			
	2. Bulgaria	3	2	0	1	3:3	4						
	3. USA	3	1	0	2	2:3	2				Cautions	13	Germany FR
	4. Saudi Arabia	3	0	0	3	0:6	0				Expulsions	0	Bulgaria

1985 in China and the USSR – 1987 in Chile

The final in Chile was no new ground for many of the young footballers. As the following list shows, no fewer than 38 players had already represented their country in 1985 at the

1st FIFA U-16 World Tournament in China or the III World Youth Championship for the FIFA/Coca-Cola Cup in the USSR.

Australia:	Bouhoutsos George (China '85) Grbac Anthony (China '85) Hristodoulou Louis (USSR '85) Trimboli Paolo (China '85)	Colombia:	Cabrera Wilmer (USSR '85) Niño Eduardo (USSR '85) Trellez John (USSR '85)
Brazil:	Anderson (China '85) André Cruz (China '85) Bismarck (China '85) Maurício (China '85) Palmieri Roberto (China '85) William César (China '85)	Nigeria:	Adamu Sani (China '85) Agbonsevbafe Lucky (China '85) Akpoborie Jonathan (China '85) Igbinoba Victor (China '85) Ugbade Nduka (China '85)
Bulgaria:	Kalaydjiev Radko (USSR '85) Kostadinov Emil (USSR '85) Petkov Plamen (USSR '85)	Saudi Arabia:	Abu-Dawad Bassim A. (USSR '85) Al-Dosary Adel S. (China '85) Al-Fahad Nasser T.A. (China '85) Al-Harbi Khaled A.M. (China '85) Al-Razgan Abdulaziz M. (China '85 and USSR '85) Al-Roomi Abdulrahman A. (China '85 and USSR '85)
Germany FR:	Dammeier Detlev (China '85) Schneider Martin (China '85) Witeczek Marcel (China '85)	USA:	Al-Suraiti Saadoun H.Kh. (China '85) Dagriri Mansour H.H. (China '85) Mubarak Nawaf S. (China '85) Benedict Brian (China '85) Gutierrez Hendrig (China '85) Gwin John (China '85)
Italy:	Caverzan Andrea (China '85) Garzja Luigi (China '85)		

Attendances as Registered for All Matches of WYC 1987 Chile

Total of spectators: **650 000** (\bar{x} =21 000)

(WYC '83 Mexico: 1 160 000)

(WYC '85 USSR: 860 000)

Statistical information on attendances as per round/match days

Match Day	Matches	Attendances	Average
1st match day	(i.e. matches 1-8)		
Santiago	(matches 1 and 5)	82 000	
Concepción	(matches 2 and 6)	40 500	
Valparaíso	(matches 3 and 7)	15 000	
Antofagasta	(matches 4 and 8)	26 000	
		<u>163 500</u>	(\bar{x} =20 475)
2nd match day	(i.e. matches 9-16)		
Santiago	(matches 9 and 13)	80 000	
Concepción	(matches 10 and 14)	23 000	
Valparaíso	(matches 11 and 15)	7 000	
Antofagasta	(matches 12 and 16)	13 000	
		<u>123 000</u>	(\bar{x} =15,375)
3rd match day	(i.e. matches 17-24)		
Santiago	(matches 17 and 21)	87 000	
Concepción	(matches 18 and 22)	17 000	
Valparaíso	(matches 19 and 23)	7 000	
Antofagasta	(matches 20 and 24)	11 500	
		<u>122 500</u>	(\bar{x} =15 300)

Statistical information on attendances as per venue

Santiago	249 000	(\bar{x} =41 500)
Concepción	80 500	(\bar{x} =13 400)
Valparaíso	29 000	(\bar{x} = 4 800)
Antofagasta	50 500	(\bar{x} = 8 400)
	<u>409 000</u>	(\bar{x} =17 000)
Quarter Finals		
Santiago	60 000	
Concepción	35 000	
Valparaíso	3 000	
Antofagasta	4 000	
	<u>102 000</u>	(\bar{x} =25 500)
Subtotal (409 000+102 000)	511 000	(\bar{x} =18 250)
Semi-Finals		
Santiago	35 000	
Concepción	36 000	
	<u>71 000</u>	(\bar{x} =35 500)
Subtotal (511 000+71 000)	582 000	(\bar{x} =19 400)
Finals		
Match for 3rd place		
Final	68 000*	
Total (582 000+68 000)	650 000*	(\bar{x} =21 000)

* The match for 3rd place and the final were staged as a double-header. Therefore the number of spectators is included only once in the final account. As for the average attendances, the total number of spectators has been divided by 31.

Goal Statistics – World Youth Championships in Comparison

Mexico '83:	Total of goals scored:	91	(\bar{x} =2,84)	Total number of goals scored:	86
USSR '85:	"	80	(\bar{x} =2,50)	Group matches:	67
Chile '87:	"	86	(\bar{x} =2,69)	Quarter finals:	8
				Semi-finals:	7
				Finals:	4
Opening match:	Chile – Yugoslavia 2-4 – 6 goals, highest number of goals ever scored in an opening match.			How they were scored:	
Highest score:	4:0 (Yugoslavia – Australia, Germany FR – Chile, Brazil – Nigeria). There were no real "walkovers".			Group matches:	47
Goals scored:	86	(\bar{x} =2,69, 32 matches)		- from the run of play	6
Group matches:	67	(\bar{x} =2,79, 24 matches)		- after a corner-kick	3
		Forwards: 53 goals (79,0%)		- after an indirect free-kick	3
		Midfielders: 7 goals (10,5%)		- from a direct free-kick	8
		Defenders: 7 goals (10,5%)		- from a penalty	<u>67</u>
Quarter finals:	8	(\bar{x} = 2,00, 4 matches)		Quarter finals:	4
		Forwards: 4 goals (50,0%)		- from the run of play	0
		Midfielders: 3 goals (37,5%)		- after a corner kick	1
		Defenders: 1 goal (12,5%)		- after an indirect free-kick	1
Semi-finals:	7	(\bar{x} = 3,50, 2 matches)		- after a direct free-kick	<u>2</u>
		Forwards: 5 goals (71,4%)		- from a penalty	8
		Midfielders: 1 goal (14,3%)		Semi-finals::	4
		Defenders: 1 goal (14,3%)		- from the run of play	2
Finals:	4	(\bar{x} = 2,00, 2 matches)		- after a corner-kick	1
		Forwards: 2 goals (50,0%)		- after an indirect free-kick	0
		Midfielders: 1 goal (25,0%)		- from a direct free-kick	<u>0</u>
		Defenders: 1 goal (25,0%)		- from a penalty	7
Aggregates:		Forwards: 64 goals (74,4%)		Finals:	2
		Midfielders: 13 goals (15,1%)		- from the run of play	1
		Defenders: 9 goals (10,5%)		- after a corner-kick	0
		86 goals (100 %)		- after an indirect free-kick	0
				- from a direct free-kick	<u>1</u>
				- from a penalty	4
				Aggregates:	57
				- from the run of play	9
				- after a corner-kick	5
				- after an indirect free-kick	4
				- from a direct free-kick	<u>11</u>
				- from a penalty	86

FIFA Delegations

Referees



Claude Bouillet

France
8.5.1944
Civil Servant



Karl Heinz Tritschler

Germany FR
16.9.1949
Commercial Clerk



Carlo Longhi

Italy
10.3.1944
Engineer



Allan Gunn

England
23.1.1943
Purchasing Manager



Emilio Soriano Aladrén

Spain
29.10.1945
Sales Manager



Rune Larsson

Sweden
25.6.1952
Bank Bookkeeper



Stjepan Glavina

Yugoslavia
27.8.1941
Clerk



Günther Habermann

GDR
23.2.1950
Electrical Engineer



Abdullah Al-Nasir

Saudi Arabia
28.7.1950
Manager



Soetoyo Hartosardjono

Indonesia
15.2.1943
Teacher



Sano Toshikazu

Japan
10.11.1940
Civil Servant



Diramba Jean-Fidèle

Gabon
15.6.1952
Electricien



Mohamed Hansal

Algeria
6.11.1947
Project Head



Badou Jasseh

Gambia
12.6.1943
Mechanical Engineer



Arnaldo D.C. Coelho

Brazil
15.1.1943
Teacher



Juan C. Loustau

Argentina
13.7.1947
Commercial Clerk



Enrique Marín Gallo

Chile
2.10.1948
Bank Clerk



Octavio Sierra Mesa

Colombia
8.12.1940
Sales Representative



Enrique Labó Revoredo

Peru
2.3.1939
Clerk



John B. Meachin

Canada
6.10.1941
Phys. Educ. Teacher



Rodolfo Martínez Mejía

Honduras
20.3.1946
Businessman



Vincent Mauro

USA
23.10.1943
Engineer



Chow Yi-Fa

Chinese Taipei
5.3.1948
Teacher



Richard Lorenc

Australia
3.12.1951
Teacher



**Guillermo
Budge Aguirre**

Chile
21.3.1940
Clerk



**Salvador
Imperatore
Marcone**

Chile
3.11.1950
Engineer



**Hernan
Silva Arce**

Chile
5.11.1948
Engineer



**Gaston
Castro Makuc**

Chile
23.8.1948
Engineer



**Victor
Ojeda Cruz**

Chile
28.11.1944
Chemist



**Victor
Vásquez Sánchez**

Chile
23.6.1940
Businessman

These six Chilean FIFA referees acted as linesmen/reserves.

Technical Study Group CHILE '87

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Walter Gagg (Switzerland)	Head of FIFA Technical Department Responsible for editing this Report		
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Nagalinggam Raju (Malaysia)	Expert for competition organisation	First nomination for TSG:	1982



Standing from left to right: Pedro Morales (Head of Technical Dept. of Chilean F.A.), Nagalinggam Raju, Lello Antoniotti, Andreas Herren (Assistant TSG). Sitting: Walter Gagg, Harry H. Cavan, José Bonetti.

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Survey of Results WYC '87

Chile, 10 – 25 October 1987

Group A – Santiago (Australia, Chile, Togo, Yugoslavia)

10.10.87	Chile v. Yugoslavia	2:4 (1:2)	J.C. Loustau, Argentina
11.10.87	Togo v. Australia	0:2 (0:2)	A. Al-Nasir, Saudi Arabia
13.10.87	Chile v. Togo	3:0 (2:0)	V. Mauro, USA
14.10.87	Yugoslavia v. Australia	4:0 (2:0)	M. Hansal, Algeria
17.10.87	Chile v. Australia	2:0 (1:0)	E. Soriano Aladrén, Spain
18.10.87	Yugoslavia v. Togo	4:1 (2:0)	R. Larsson, Sweden

1. Yugoslavia	3	3	0	0	12:3	6
2. Chile	3	2	0	1	7:4	4
3. Australia	3	1	0	2	2:6	2
4. Togo	3	0	0	3	1:9	0

Group B – Concepción (Brazil, Canada, Italy, Nigeria)

11.10.87	Brazil v. Nigeria	4:0 (3:0)	A. Gunn, England
12.10.87	Italy v. Canada	2:2 (0:2)	E. Labo Revoredo, Peru
14.10.87	Brazil v. Italy	0:1 (0:0)	R. Martinez, Honduras
15.10.87	Nigeria v. Canada	2:2 (2:1)	S. Hartosardjono, Indonesia
17.10.87	Brazil v. Canada	1:0 (0:0)	O. Sierra Mesa, Colombia
18.10.87	Nigeria v. Italy	0:2 (0:2)	G. Habermann, GDR

1. Italy	3	2	1	0	5:2	5
2. Brazil	3	2	0	1	5:1	4
3. Canada	3	0	2	1	4:5	2
4. Nigeria	3	0	1	2	2:8	1

Group C – Valparaiso (Bahrain, Colombia, GDR, Scotland)

11.10.87	GDR v. Scotland	1:2 (1:2)	A.D.C. Coelho, Brazil
12.10.87	Colombia v. Bahrain	1:0 (1:0)	J.B. Meachin, Canada
14.10.87	GDR v. Colombia	3:1 (2:0)	R. Larsson, Sweden
15.10.87	Scotland v. Bahrain	1:1 (0:1)	B. Jasseh, Gambia
17.10.87	GDR v. Bahrain	2:0 (0:0)	R. Lorenc, Australia
18.10.87	Scotland v. Colombia	2:2 (0:0)	C. Bouillet, France

1. GDR	3	2	0	1	6:3	4
2. Scotland	3	1	2	0	5:4	4
3. Colombia	3	1	1	1	4:5	3
4. Bahrain	3	0	1	2	1:4	1

Group D – Antofagasta (Bulgaria, Germany FR, Saudi Arabia, USA)

11.10.87	USA v. Bulgaria	0:1 (0:1)	J.F. Diramba, Gabon
12.10.87	Saudi Arabia v. Germany FR	0:3 (0:3)	C. Longhi, Italy
14.10.87	USA v. Saudi Arabia	1:0 (0:0)	S. Glavina, Yugoslavia
15.10.87	Bulgaria v. Germany FR	0:3 (0:0)	E. Marin Gallo, Chile
17.10.87	USA v. Germany FR	1:2 (1:1)	T. Sano, Japan
18.10.87	Bulgaria v. Saudi Arabia	2:0 (2:0)	Y. Chaow Yi-Fa, Chinese Taipei

1. Germany FR	3	3	0	0	8:1	6
2. Bulgaria	3	2	0	1	3:3	4
3. USA	3	1	0	2	2:3	2
4. Saudi Arabia	3	0	0	3	0:6	0

Quarter Finals – 21.10.87

Santiago	Yugoslavia v. Brazil	2:1 (0:1)	E. Soriano Aladrén, Spain
Concepción	Italy v. Chile	0:1 (0:0)	R. Larsson, Sweden
Valparaiso	GDR v. Bulgaria	2:0 (0:0)	A. Gunn, England
Antofagasta	Germany FR v. Scotland	1:1 (1:1)	J.C. Loustau, Argentina
		1:1 after extra time	
		4:3 after penalty-kicks	

Semi-Finals – 23.10.87

Santiago	Yugoslavia v. GDR	2:1 (1:0)	R. Lorenc, Australia
Concepción	Chile v. Germany FR	0:4 (0:3)	C. Bouillet, France

Match for third place – 25.10.87

Santiago	GDR v. Chile	1:1 (0:0)	A.D.C. Coelho, Brazil
		1:1 after extra-time	
		3:1 after penalty-kicks	

Final – 25.10.87

Santiago	Yugoslavia v. Germany FR	1:1 (0:0)	J.C. Loustau, Argentina
		1:1 after extra-time	
		5:4 after penalty-kicks	

Table:

Gold medals: Yugoslavia

Silver medals: Germany FR

Bronze medals: GDR

4.	Chile
5.	Italy
6.	Scotland
7.	Brazil
8.	Bulgaria
9.	Colombia
10.	Canada
11.	USA
12.	Australia
13.	Bahrain
14.	Nigeria
15.	Saudi Arabia
16.	Togo

Permanent Table

FIFA World Youth Championship						Tunisia	Japan	Australia	Mexico	USSR	Chile	
						1977	1979	1981	1983	1985	1987	
1. Brazil	25	18	4	3	53:15	40	3	-	6	1	1	7
2. Uruguay	19	11	5	3	28:15	27	4	3	5	5	-	-
3. Argentina	15	12	1	2	37:7	25	-	1	9	2	-	-
4. USSR	20	8	7	5	32:20	23	1	2	-	15	4	-
5. Germany FR	12	9	2	1	26:7	20	-	-	1	-	-	2
6. Mexico	18	4	9	5	27:21	17	2	11	11	13	5	-
7. Spain	16	5	6	5	19:20	16	7	6	13	-	2	-
8. Poland	15	6	3	6	27:15	15	-	4	10	3	-	-
9. Yugoslavia	9	6	1	2	22:9	13	-	10	-	-	-	1
10. Australia	13	3	5	5	14:19	11	-	-	7	9	11	12
11. Korea Republic	12	4	3	5	12:17	11	-	9	11	4	-	-
12. Nigeria	12	4	3	5	11:18	11	-	-	-	10	3	14
13. Paraguay	10	4	2	4	17:11	10	5	5	-	-	12	-
14. Scotland	8	3	3	2	10:8	9	-	-	-	6	-	6
15. Romania	6	4	1	1	6:3	9	-	-	3	-	-	-
16. Bulgaria	8	3	2	3	8:9	8	-	-	-	-	6	8
17. Hungary	9	3	2	4	11:15	8	10	14	-	-	9	-
18. German Dem. Rep.	6	3	1	2	10:6	7	-	-	-	-	-	3
19. Chile	6	3	1	2	9:9	7	-	-	-	-	-	4
20. England	9	2	3	4	11:12	7	-	-	4	-	13	-
21. Qatar	6	3	1	2	7:9	7	-	-	2	-	-	-
22. Colombia	7	2	3	2	9:15	7	-	-	-	-	8	9
23. Italy	10	2	3	5	7:12	7	12	-	16	-	-	5
24. China PR	7	3	0	4	10:13	6	-	-	-	12	7	-
25. USA	9	2	1	6	6:16	5	-	-	15	11	-	11
26. Canada	9	1	3	5	7:17	5	-	13	-	-	14	10
27. Honduras	3	2	0	1	3:1	4	6	-	-	-	-	-
28. Czechoslovakia	4	2	0	2	8:8	4	-	-	-	7	-	-
29. Netherlands	4	1	2	1	5:5	4	-	-	-	8	-	-
30. Egypt	4	1	2	1	9:10	4	-	-	8	-	-	-
31. Portugal	4	1	2	1	2:3	4	-	7	-	-	-	-
32. Algeria	4	1	2	1	2:6	4	-	-	8	-	-	-
33. France	3	1	1	1	3:3	3	7	-	-	-	-	-
34. Iran	3	1	1	1	4:5	3	9	-	-	-	-	-
35. Saudi Arabia	6	1	1	4	1:7	3	-	-	-	-	10	15
36. Ivory Coast	6	0	3	3	4:13	3	13	-	-	14	-	-
37. Japan	3	0	2	1	1:2	2	-	12	-	-	-	-
38. Iraq	3	1	0	2	6:8	2	11	-	-	-	-	-
39. Tunisia	6	1	0	5	3:13	2	14	-	-	-	16	-
40. Cameroon	3	0	1	2	3:6	1	-	-	14	-	-	-
41. Bahrain	3	0	1	2	1:4	1	-	-	-	-	-	13
42. Austria	6	0	1	5	1:16	1	15	-	-	16	-	-
43. Ireland Rep.	3	0	0	3	3:7	0	-	-	-	-	15	-
44. Togo	3	0	0	3	1:9	0	-	-	-	-	-	16
45. Morocco	3	0	0	3	0:6	0	16	-	-	-	-	-
46. Guinea	3	0	0	3	0:10	0	-	15	-	-	-	-
47. Indonesia	3	0	0	3	0:16	0	-	16	-	-	-	-