### 3. Preparatory Training

Most national coaches believe that preparation of the national squad of players over a four-year period has an important bearing on the team's performance in the Final Competition. There are several contributing and restricting factors summarised as follows:

(I) The general fabric of football and financial resources supporting its development.

(II) The standard of club football and particularly the standard and international experience of the clubs from which players are selected.

(III) Relationship between demands of club football and that of the national team and the availability of players for national matches and squad training sessions.

(IV) The authority given to the national coach and the manner in which he exercises it.

(V) Cooperation between club coaches and the national coach.

There are major differences in preparation between countries of South America and Europe. The public, football associations and clubs in South America greatly value the prestige and stimulation from success of the national team and are prepared to support extensive programmes of squad training and matches, even though it may cause disruption of club programmes. This applies particularly in the year of the Final Competition when long periods of preparatory training involving match tours abroad are planned. Studious attention is paid to fitness and tactical training of players in the national squad. During this time, selected players for the squad are segregated from their clubs.

Preparatory training schedules of successful Brazilian national teams have been widely publicised and emulated. It was to be expected therefore that the host country, Argentina, would do everything in its power to ensure that its national team was well-prepared for this competition. We feel that the programme in preparing the champion team and how the objectives were realised deserve special mention in this report. The way football has developed in Europe has created a vivid public interest in club competition. In some countries, club programmes, including national and international competition, extend to more than fifty matches a season. It is difficult enough to arrange national fixtures in such a crowded fixture list, let alone obtain additional time for training get-togethers of the national squad. In consequence, great reliance has to be placed on choosing a squad, using in the main players from one or two outstanding clubs, and keeping to the same selection over a series of matches. Players chosen for the national team on this basis have an intuitive understanding of each other's play and a confidence borne of their experience in the successful achievements of their clubs in national and international competition. Confidence in each other and in the team as a whole is considered by many European coaches to be a crucial factor at the start of a Final Competition, something which, it is felt, can be missing after long periods of squad training. Indeed, a squad spending too much time together can produce its own problems as, for example, in over-planning and stereotyping of technique and tactics to the neglect of spontaneous individual play.

Germany F.R.'s confidence was thought to have been weakened by the realisation that a settled team had not emerged after several world class star players had retired from the national squad. Though Germany F.R. had a successful South American tour, they were still experimenting with different players at the start of the Tournament and the team never seemed to reach its full potential. It is no easy or quick task to replace talented players who have made up the backbone of a national squad for several years. After the event it is simple to offer opinion as to where things went wrong. The coach knows this and he is also aware that finding replacements for talented players who play consistently and knit a national team together can only be achieved by a gradual process of trial and error.

Menotti's bold approach and his thorough preparatory training programme which lifted Argentina's performance, was amply justified by the winning of the trophy. Yet there were moments when the team could have faltered had fortune not smiled, and their critics would then have readily pointed to defects in preparation and selection. Views and assessments are generally slanted by results. The study group is asked, however, to evaluate the methods of preparing a successful national squad which also aim at improving the quality of football, thereby enhancing the image of soccer as a game to be played and watched. Members of the study group, after discussion with national coaches about their programmes, emphasise the following points:

(I) It is essential to build upon basic qualities of football as they have developed and been shaped by national and regional competition.

(II) It is difficult and takes time to bring about fundamental changes in attitude and practice. A coach may be well aware of ideal techniques, tactics and the kind of originality which are the makings of a good team, but it may not be possible for the players at his disposal to use them. A realisation of the limitations in abilities of players is important to the coach as he seeks to improve their play. Several national coaches admire the Dutch "total football" style, with players constantly and intelligently moving to and fro into attacking and defensive functions. Yet they know that this style has taken years to develop. If a new direction in tactical play is contemplated, even in the short term of a few years, then both the players and club coaches must accept the need for the change and wholly commit themselves to it.

(III) There is a shortage of skilled players who are also outstanding personalities. The development of world class footballers depends on a number of factors: the dedication of practice and competitive selection of players from a young age; the quality and training of coaches at all levels; early apprenticeship in senior football; and a club hierarchy where the best players tend to move to the best clubs to gain extensive international experience. Coaches see the need for special attention to be given to schemes whereby outstanding young players who are also resourceful and inspirational in character, are given the opportunity to express and develop their leadership qualities especially in international football.

(IV) The teams of Germany F.R. and Holland which competed in the '74 final in Munich, each included six players from one club. In Western Europe where the time for special preparation of the national team is minimal, there is advantage if the squad is composed of several players from one or two clubs, particularly if these clubs feature regularly in European championship club competitions. In Argentina, Italy's squad contained ten players from Juventus and six from Turin and the...
coaches of both these teams were invited to help the national coach. Until
the match against Holland, the Italian team looked set to write a new page of
history in its international football.

(V) A coach/manager in charge of the national team must be a strong charac-
ter and a motivating leader in order to win the wholehearted cooperation from
the players and coaches. If he has to take
a bold line in pursuance of the policy he
believes in, he must be prepared to lay
himself on the line. At the same time,
the authority of the national coach must
be wholly supported by the Football
Association and individual members of
its international committee during the
four year period of preparation. There is
nothing less conducive to progress than
wavering in policy and views either of
the national coach or the Association.
Then, too, both the Association and
national coach should encourage
cooperation and collaboration from the
media. A progressive scheme can be
halted and even pushed aside by adver-
se publicity resulting from slight set-
backs in results of games, only to find
subsequently that the imposed changes
are less worthwhile.

(VI) Broadly, there are two schools of
thought - one which staunchly sticks to
the evolution of the national team and
its pattern of play from a sequence of
trials, and the other which believes in
forward planning both in the short and
long term to build a team and shape it in
attitude and style of play. Selection of
players is vital to the success of both
methods, but in the latter there is con-
scious planning in the evaluation and
development of younger players with
the right disposition and abilities to take
the places of older players at the
appropriate time.
Preparatory Training

Group I

The competition between the teams in the First Group was seen to be the tightest of the whole Competition. Each team on its strength and recent performance had the chance to be successful. The outcome of every match was uncertain and teams had to play to the best of their ability and try to win. It is fitting therefore to look first at the preparatory training programmes of the teams in this group and to start with Argentina, the World Champions, followed by Italy who won all their matches in the first round.

Argentina

Because Argentina was the country which was organizing the Final Competition, its people fervently wanted its team to win. For many years the football of Argentina had produced and exported world class players, many of whom had elevated the football of the clubs for which they played. Yet, paradoxically, since 1930, the national team had poor results in World Competition. It was beginning to be accepted that although Argentina possessed many players with high-class talent, they were too individual in character to be welded into a successful national team.

When Menotti was appointed national coach in 1974, he was given immense authority as is shown by the clauses in the contractual arrangements for the preparation of the representative side of Argentina. He quickly produced a draft plan which was subsequently amended by experience and further study and evaluation. Whilst making use of the best facets of Argentinian football, Menotti realised the need to add other essential ingredients, such as a winning mentality in the team as a whole, calling for continuous effort of each player throughout each game and an all-out attacking disposition whilst still maintaining a powerful defence, able to withstand Europe's forceful style of play. The planned programme over the four years from 1974-78 is an example of building a team by purposeful method and of creating a collective spirit in the squad in support of the new style of play and the manner of its development. Menotti had noted the lack of organised preparation in the past and the reliance on improvisation in work and styling of play wherein individual expression was preferred to collective play. Slow and sometimes almost static play with too many short passes was a characteristic feature and team performance was often badly affected by emotional incidents in the game or by adverse fortune. Periods of preparatory training were short and lacked thoroughness and continuity due to frequent change of training staff. He noted also that Argentinian players rarely achieved more than thirty international appearances during their football careers, compared with eighty or more selections achieved by players in Europe.

Menotti selected his staff carefully and discussed the programme with them. They were men steeped in football having also a knowledge and interest in the theories and sciences associated with the game. Some of them toured Europe to study methods of coaching and conditioning training and to evaluate the style of play of successful national sides and the performance of outstanding players. Visits were made to Germany, F.R., England, France, Italy and Spain. Other coaches were formed into groups to note the players at various levels of Argentinian football who merited consideration for selection. 1975 was the year of selection and, though the best of the 1974 squad were kept, there was a search for young players who would react favourably to cooperative discipline and were able to make continuous play at a high work rate. About a hundred players were chosen and it is interesting to note that from the junior selections such players as Gallego, Tarantini, Valencia and Pasarella were found.

Then it was essential to plan a calendar of matches to test the new selections and methods of play and to gain experience against European as well as South American teams. Some 63 matches were played, 17 against local teams, and 46 official international games spread over the four-year period, as follows:

1974 - 3 international matches
1975 - 8 international matches (using four team selections)
1976 - 15 international matches and 6 against local teams
1977 - 12 international matches and 5 against local teams
1978 - 8 international matches and 6 against local teams

Thus, whereas Labruna, a great international player, achieved only 35 national selections in a 16 year footballing career, Ardiles and Gallego achieved the same number of appearances in three years. The conditioning sessions and the skill and tactics practices were specifically aimed at cementing the principles of the new style of play: the will to win by using the natural individual flair for ball control; passing and running with the ball but at greater speed, and in constant flow of attack; cooperative effort to move into spaces to help each other and to defend when not in possession of the ball; and strong and fearless tackling to win possession of the ball.

Players whose form oscillated were omitted and so were those who could not comply with the rigour of total commitment during matches. As an example of total effort, Ardiles was making well over a hundred "play" contacts with the ball and running distances of around 8,000 metres in each game, a higher attainment than outstanding midfield players in Europe. This kind of increased effort was symptomatic of the whole team.

As one would expect, Menotti's plan had its detracting critics among other coaches, players and journalists, but the results of the matches in the tour of Europe in 1976 strengthened the resolve to keep to the policy and principles. By 1977 the team was consolidating and players were by then convinced that the style of play was right and were strongly and openly in favour of the methods of achieving the objectives. Personalities like Fillol, Posarella and Kempes who commanded great respect, helped enormously both on and off the field.

In January 1978, twenty-five players were chosen to make up the squad and were separated from the league for a special programme. This started with thirty days' vacation followed by a period of general and specific conditioning training and skill and tactical practice. Then there was a series of matches during March and April and finally in May the "closed" training sessions, sometimes with local friendly matches, helping to establish the tactics for the Competition matches. Although only twenty-two players could be nominated for the Tournament, such was the spirit of cooperation of the squad by this time that the three players who were not chosen were invited to continue training with the squad and to share in the rewards.

Italy

The mini preparation of the Italian team clearly demonstrates the contrast between Western Europe and South America. Yet it is interesting to see how
Bearzot, the national coach, like Menotti, sought to develop a new mentality in support of an attacking style of play and had to face heavy criticism in so doing. For many years major clubs in Italian football have played well in European tournaments using the renowned "catenaccio" defensive style of play and this had been used by the national team sometimes successfully as in Mexico 1970. Indeed, it is often said in Italy that a match played without any game gives the best results.

However, Bearzot's impressions of the World Cup Final Competition in Germany F.R. 1974 convinced him that the Italian national team would have to change and modernise its game to have any real chance of success in the future. Bearzot did not become the independent selector and technical manager of the Italian side until October '77, though he had been a joint selector from September '75. One can realise the magnitude of his task in trying to achieve a fundamental change in style of play in the short time at his disposal.

Bearzot had noted the manner in which Dutch players performed several functions and he wondered whether he could get the Italian players, whilst maintaining the best elements of the defensive game, to move quickly into concerted attack. Certainly the players had natural skill to attack as well as defend. The most favourable occasion for experimenting with the change of pattern was in the Anniversary Tournament of the United States of America in 1976. During these games, the method of play was deemed to be more important than the results and there were clear indications in phases of each game against England and Brazil and throughout the match with America that the players could successfully adapt to the new attacking role. Because of the poor results against England and Brazil and defensive lapses, the concept was heavily criticised and there was the danger of a rift between the players and the technical manager. Fortunately, at a special meeting, Bearzot won the cooperation of the players towards the new plan.

The Italian team subsequently qualified for the World Cup Final Competition by a mixture of the new and old patterns of play. The selection of several players from Juventus and Turin became an important factor in the strategy and so did the cooperation of the two young coaches of these teams and the assistance from Facchetti who could not make the selection because of injury. The basic team was comprised of players from Juventus with three other players whose selection was justified by their ability to fit into the new concept of play.

Between the two World Championship Finals, Italy played 30 international matches. The Italian League season extended until 7 May 1978 and from then to 12 May the selected players had a short vacation. So, the only period of special preparatory training was from 12 to 18 May in Rome when the team played against Yugoslavia. This game ended in a no-score draw and was followed by mounting criticism of the policy. The squad then travelled to Buenos Aires to stay alongside the French side at the famous Hindu Club where the Italian organisation was excellent in the arrangements for training and in the social, press and public relations fields.

The way Italy performed in this Competition shows that the proposed changes in style have not yet been fully realised. There were clear signs of successful attacking play with four and five players advancing, despite the presence of the old classical habit of retreating to produce an almost impenetrable defensive screen. Much will now depend upon wider adoption of these methods by other coaches of major clubs and the syndicate of professional players. Then, too, the development of the national scheme of coaching should contribute to future progress.

France
Except for the World Cup Final Competition in Sweden in 1958, France has not achieved any distinction in national team championships, but the improvement in recent years in European club competition and the steady development of the youth football scheme herald a "renaissance" in French football. In the period prior to the Final Competition, France had won or played to a draw, matches against Brazil, Argentina, Italy, Germany F.R., Russia, Portugal, Belgium, Rumania, Tunisia and Iran.

There are several other sports and games in France which receive strong public support and the prolonged school day in education leaves little time for practising sport. The French Football Association has rightly concentrated a good deal of attention on regional selection and coaching of young players in the 14-16 and 16-18 age groups and their introduction into senior clubs. The growing interest in youth is evident from the spectacular tournament in Monaco where teams from many countries compete and methods of play and coaching young players are studied. As a result there is a reader acceptance by senior clubs of modern methods of coaching young talent and a general improvement in the numbers and the quality of training of coaches.

The manager of selection and national coach is Michel Hidalgo, who is assisted by four coaches, each with special duties in the range of international competition.

At the end of the league season in 1978, it was planned to hold four sessions of special training each of four days' duration, in April and May. It suits the French temperament and social life better to bring players together for short spells with breaks to return to their homes for rest and relaxation. Unfortunately a bad winter seriously interrupted the club programmes and several clubs still had commitments in April and May. Then a few of the selected players needed time for treatment and recovery from injury. In the event, therefore, only half of the squad were able to fulfil the very brief programme of preparatory training.

For those who have not been faced with the situation it is difficult to imagine the size of the task of motivating tired players after a strenuous end to a competitive league programme and of renewing their confidence to participate in a major world event. Yet such is the spirit and enthusiasm in French football that the selected players were eager for the challenge of the tough competition in the first group. Their play against the Argentinian team had a modern flair, showing the sound basis of the revival of domestic football. It had a positive and open attacking style which earned universal praise, even though two matches out of three were lost.

Hungary
Since 1966 Hungary had not participated in the World Championship Final Competition, a sad reflection after the successful era of the fifties. The situation was examined by a special group of coaches who looked at the winter interval in the football season to see if it could be better utilised for the training and development of coaches and the training and testing of fitness and skill of players.

Baroti was again persuaded to accept
Preparatory Training

Group 2

Appointment as national coach after two other coaches had withdrawn due to illness. As a leader with over a hundred international matches, Baroti brought with him mature experience and confidence in handling a national squad. In the qualifying competition he kept roughly to the same selection. When friendly matches were played, the squad assembled for three days' special training and on the occasion of World Cup qualifying matches, this training extended to seven days. In addition, there were regular Monday meetings of players, which made it possible because almost all the players in the selected squad came from Budapest or nearby. This is a unique situation, of great value to team understanding, as is the close circle of contact between coaches of clubs in the first league and the national coach. As an example of the extent of this cooperation, a cross-country run for all players of first division clubs was organized before the start of each season. The belief in Hungary is that the influence of the coach represents a thirty per cent factor of the whole, with the remainder depending upon players and their personal ability to adapt and improve their play. Players are therefore encouraged to react as they see fit to games situations and not to feel too dependent on the coach or on pre-match planning.

The size of the squad going to Argentina was limited to twenty players on the grounds that too many reserves would induce a negative attitude. The football season in Hungary prior to the World Cup Final competition was specially arranged to end one month earlier on 22 April, and a friendly match was then played against Czechoslovakia to test the team, followed by a programme of preparatory training before the flight to Argentina on 2 June. This programme included matches, training and relaxation keeping to the rhythm of the timetable of matches in Argentina in an attempt to adjust to the physiological and biological requirements. Not all the planned test matches for 1978 took place, however, and the result and style of the match against England on the way to Argentina were unfavourable.

Germany F.R.

The German Football Association has good relationships with clubs and there is excellent organisation and collaboration in preparing teams for school, youth, amateur, under-twenty-three and national selections. Coaches are well-trained with a knowledge of modern methods of training and evaluating performance. There is a methodical element to preparatory training demanding a sense of dedication and determination which German players at all levels accept willingly. Physical condition is assured.

The German team, being World Champions of 1974, already had a place in the World Cup Final Competition. They used the four intervening years playing matches against strong teams, thereby risking some failure and criticism at a time when the team was being rebuilt following the loss of several star players, and then by making an orientation tour in South America. Only the intense national league and European competitions interfered with this programme.

There was too short a time after the end of the national team's participation in the World Cup Final Competition. The team was rebuilt, and then by making an orientation tour in South America. Only the intense national league and European competitions interfered with this programme.

There was too short a time after the end of the league season in May 1978 to recover from "after season" tiredness. This is the biggest disadvantage suffered by Western European teams, compared with other countries, especially in South America. Even so, the motivation of the players was excellent and they were able to recharge their batteries sufficiently before the start of the Competition.

In Germany F.R., squad training of the national team is thought to be of little significance in improving condition and skill though it is helpful in developing a cooperative attitude. More reliance is placed on the maturing experience of the players from international matches and tactical discussions.

There was, however, specific preparation for the first game in the Group, and thereafter players were encouraged to enjoy relaxed training sessions to recover from the enormous pressure of the tournament. The national team coach has to be prepared to talk collectively and individually according to the mood and the result of the previous game. Only from actual games of the Competition does a coach learn how to select players and with so many factors affecting a player's performance, changes are nearly always essential.

Poland

Within State control of East European countries, it is possible to create a structure of football development. In Poland there are competitions at schools and in small district clubs for youngsters of twelve years and upwards. A junior player aged sixteen, if selected, can become a member of a senior club and there are also special sports institutions where exceptionally talented players can be coached. There are special squad training sessions for youth, under twenty-three, A and B national selections. Advantage is taken of the winter break of one to two months in the season for clubs to organise well-planned fitness training. This programme is prepared by a group of specialists, centrally directed, including physicians, biologists, fitness trainers and coaches. Every three months, fitness tests are arranged to keep a record of individual condition. The physical training concentrated on interval distance running between 200-1000 metres and a combination of endurance and resistance activities with the ball. Each individual has his own specific schedule of fitness requirements. Players are encouraged to play in different team positions in match practice and each one knows thoroughly what is expected of his own function in the team.

Tunisia

The Tunisian Football Association has so far not adopted any long-term plans or made structural changes in preparing for international competition but they are prepared to improve when circumstances warrant extra preparation. When the team qualified in 1977, a special preparatory plan was approved, leading to the formation of a group of experts to assist Chetali, the manager. In addition to a doctor, this group included several physical education instructors and coaches.

A work programme was planned from January 1978 which, until May during the league programme, consisted of special training at regional level. There were also discussions with club coaches who arranged the daily physical conditioning schedule of selected players taking into account the nature of Tunisian physique which seems to lack natural strength and is unable to stand up to heavy work-loading.

Periodic training camps of two to three days each second week were also organized which included friendly international and local matches to improve
Preparatory Training

Group 3

Brazil

In Brazil where the national championship involves seventy-two teams, there is difficulty in scouting for talent yet there is no problem in obtaining players for the national side when wanted, for the clubs are willing to release them. Selected players are tested in many international matches including special tours of Europe. They apply themselves to strenuous training both at club and national levels.

The intense public interest in the performance of the Brazilian team and the belief that Brazil should forever be World Champion is both a motivating and scouring factor. Anything short of this ideal is seen to be a disaster with ensuing pressure to change the coach and members of the international committee. The commitment of the Association to keep Brazil on top is seen in the extent of the preparatory training programme and the size of the resources of staff and facilities to support the team. There is a constant search for the best methods in conditioning training and the evaluation of football styles and trends elsewhere. In recent years, Brazil has seen the need to remain at the forefront of World Competition. The preparatory programme was similar in scale to that of the Argentinian team.

Austria

As with several other European countries, the season extends from August to June with a winter interval of at least two months. The trend of development for higher standards rests with the best clubs attaining a better competitive environment and a more determined, intensive and extended range of training and coaching. This has triggered off a more thorough search for talented young players and a keener interest in coaching them. There are national training centres attached to clubs, serving a regional catchment of around one hundred kilometres, which are subsidised by the national association. Contracts are drawn so that clubs can safeguard their players attending these centres and receive compensation if they go elsewhere.

The preparatory programme started in 1976 with players in Austria and those playing abroad. It is thought to be beneficial for players to go abroad to gain experience and mature in their tactical understanding, for these tend to become the key players in the national side.

The Austrian Football Association has a good relationship with clubs in the First and Second Divisions who are willing to adapt their requirements to fit the national programme. Sometimes joint training camps are established. This cooperation extends also to general tactics of play, with the national system being accepted by clubs so that selected players can stabilise their tactical role through club matches.

The national team averaged seven to eight matches in a season except in the year 1978 when four matches took place before the team assembled for final squad training and flying to Argentina. In the final stages and during the Tournament, the training consisted of rehearsing tactical and technical features of the game with emphasis on speed and of fitness training with emphasis on maintaining elasticity of muscles.

Sweden

Football in Sweden is now reorganised from four to two leagues, intended to produce a higher level of competition and more purposeful selective training and coaching of players. Club interests have a priority and the Association is not always sure which of their best players are available irrespective of those playing abroad. Clubs have a programme of league and cup-matches and the training of the national squad must fit into this as best as it can. There is a fluctuation in the form of national players and that of younger talent which comes forth during a period of four years. In consequence, the selected team varies a good deal but within the last two years before the Final Competition the selection settled down.

The final round of preparation started with a training camp in February '78, during the winter interval in the club programme. From then on assistance was sought from club coaches to help with fitness training and coaching especially of functional play in games. A final preparatory session of two weeks included a match against Czechoslovakia and a top English club before leaving for Argentina.

Players of the national team have a sense of responsibility towards the cooperative venture. They can be relied upon to be sensible in the use of their leisure. The choice of headquarters in the centre of Buenos Aires indicated a preference for a luxurious and lively environment instead of a centre in a secluded area.
Preparatory Training
Group 4

Peru
During the four-year period of preparation, Peru played 31 international games, but surprisingly did not seek experience of playing in Europe. Yet, as with other South American teams, the Peruvian squad of players were assembled in January 1978 for a prolonged period of special training preparation. Peru set up a technical commission to look closely into fitness conditioning and technical standards of play. In the South American football championship, a special study was carried out to assess the physiological and psychological effects of training when playing at high altitude. Individual examinations and evaluations were made of the changes in pattern of behaviour, the application of skill and endurance qualities of players. The general conclusion was that it is important to involve medical assessment and advice in the physical preparation of footballers and that repeated short periods of exposure to change of environment give improved acclimatisation results. One has to experience the change often to overcome its worst effects.

Holland
In the period between '75 and '78, the Dutch team played 21 matches, 7 at home and 14 abroad. The results of these games indicate the steady improvement in the building of a coordinated team.

1975 – 7 matches, 2 wins, 1 draw, 4 defeats
1976 – 6 matches, 4 wins, 1 draw, 1 defeat
1977 – 6 matches, 5 wins, 1 draw
1978 – 2 matches, 2 wins

The squad was experienced, having most of the players which played in the team of the last World Cup. The progress in these international games bolstered the confidence of the players and helped to develop the coordination of team play so essential to the Dutch style of total football. New players were able to slot into the system without disrupting the overall pattern. The team manager, Ernst Happe, assisted by Jan Zwartkruis, had only twelve days at the end of the football season to prepare the squad before the departure for Argentina. Several Dutch players were playing for clubs in other European countries, making it almost impossible to get the whole squad together during the season except for the few international games. Interest in football has grown immensely in Holland due to the success of Ajax and Feyenoord in European competition and the great achievement and quality of play of the national team in the World Cup Competition in Germany. A recent investigation has shown that more than 3,000 amateur teams are in need of grounds which will be difficult to supply in a small crowded country.

Scottland
Scotland played 31 games, seventeen in Glasgow in the four-year period. The remainder were played in Europe, except that in June 1977 the team made a tour of South America to gain valuable experience of style of play and general conditions. The results in this tour, a win against Chile, a draw with Argentina and a defeat by Brazil, were sufficiently encouraging to give the manager, Alistair McLeod and his team confidence. Unfortunately, the results in the United Kingdom championship with two draws and one defeat were disappointing. The manager was experimenting to find the right blend of players and these performances did not change the view that Scotland at its best would be a formidable side.

As with other national teams in Western Europe, many Scottish players play for clubs outside their own country and there is no chance to bring them together for special training except briefly in the two or three days before international matches. There was little time for special preparatory training to allow the manager to consolidate team tactics before departure for Cordoba. The shattering defeat by Peru and the discovery that one of their players had responded positively to a dope test must have sapped the morale of the team for the vital second game against Iran.

Iran
Since 1940, when Iran played its first match abroad, the team has had an impressive record in qualifying for Olympic Games in 1964, 1972 and 1976 when they reached the quarter finals in winning the Asian Nations Cup in 1968, 1972 and 1976, and in qualifying for the 1978 World Cup Competition, being the only unbeaten team in the Asia-Oceania qualifying group.

The national league which was formed in 1973 features 16 of the top clubs. The Football Federation inaugurated in the same year a nationwide youth tour-
nament which involves 3,000 under-20
teams. The national youth team has won
the Asian Youth Cup every year from
1973-76 and in the World Youth Cup in
Tunisia, Iran finished second to Brazil in
its group. Football has become a part of
the daily lives of the Iranian people and
much of the rapid development of the
game is attributed to the success of the
national side.

Iran were successful in qualifying for the
Olympic Games during 1975 when the
national team played six matches. In
1976, ten matches were played includ-
ing those of the Olympic Games in
Canada. Then in 1977 Iran played
sixteen matches, twelve of which were
qualifying matches for the World Cup
Finals. During 1978, the team played six
matches against European teams in-
cluding a tournament in Paris.

Heshmat Mohajerani was one of the
four Iran national coaches assisting the
national coach in 1974. He had coached
their youth selection to win the Asia
Youth Cup in 1973 and continued with
the youth team until 1976 when he was
appointed coach to the national team. In
the two years before the Argentina Final
Tournament he had guided the national
team through 28 international games,
winning 16 of them, drawing 8 and losing
4. He qualified as a coach at the FIFA
Coaching School in Tokyo in 1969 and
then studied in Hungary and Russia. Of
the teams in the first league, five have
foreign coaches and the players are well
conditioned physically but to compete
at truly international level they need
more matches against teams outside
Iran and more time for special training.
The season extends from February to
November so the World Cup Final
Competition fell right in the middle of it.
There was little more than three weeks
to prepare for the World Cup, during
which they played six matches. Moha-
jerani sees the need to play in Western
European and South American coun-
tries to gain experience of different play-
ing styles.
4. Match Appraisal

General Summary
The study group are of the opinion that the general standard of football in this Competition was not as good as seen in Germany F.R. '74 nor were there as many great games as in Mexico '70. Still, there is no reason to take a pessimistic outlook about the future of world competition between national teams for there were encouraging signs that more teams are beginning to break away from negative defensive play. This positive attitude must be fostered and referees must give more protection against violent foul play on attacking players and unfair “last ditch” methods of arresting good scoring approaches. Several teams which participated in the Competition of '74 did not play as well in this Competition, particularly Germany F.R. and Poland. Two teams which improved on their performance were Argentina and Italy, and though Brazil never really expressed their full potential, they played more consistently and were the only unbeaten team at the end of the Tournament. Indeed, but for the amazing victory of Argentina over Peru, Brazil would have featured for the amazing victory of Argentina the end of the Tournament. Indeed, but for the amazing victory of Argentina over Peru, Brazil would have featured in the Final Competition of '74. Both teams played more consistently and were the only unbeaten team at the end of the Tournament. Indeed, but for the amazing victory of Argentina over Peru, Brazil would have featured once again in the Final. Holland were taken aback by a spirited performance from Scotland, but subsequently showed their mettle in matches of the second round to earn a well-deserved place in the Final.

Of the new teams from Western Europe to be featuring in a Final Competition, France, with its open style of football, and Austria gave fine displays. Then, too, the emerging but yet small footballing countries of Iran and Tunisia surprised most observers by the competence of their football, deserving credit to the development of senior football in those countries and to the preparation, training and motivation of the teams by their national coaches.

The play of Germany F.R. against Poland in the opening game was most disappointing and indicates how external pressures and the fear of failure at the first hurdle can induce a cautious defensive manner. The question is often posed as to why teams need to play so negatively and defensively. It is argued by those who rely on this style of play that more favourable results are achieved. As is said “a no-game is a game which gets results”. The commercial aspect in competitive football adds its own influence, so that teams calculate and give priority to plans to nullify the play of their opponents, relying on a few breakaway counter attacks to score an odd goal. Results have become so commercially important that individual skill and expression is sacrificed to stereotyped tactical play. No one wants to lose, and therefore the playing of positive attacking football must be shown to get results. Then again, if one team adopts a cautious, defensive style it is very difficult to make an attractive spectacle of the game.

Most teams now collect and document information on the tactics of opposing teams and the strengths of individual players. It is easier to plan defensive measures to stop good players than it is to coach more open play and encourage innovation. One can spot the weaknesses in defensive marking and tackling and deal with them. In consequence, greater attention is paid to defensive roles and forwards and midfield players are asked to fulfil their function in defence rather than go for concerted attack which produces risk. Defence, in both technical and tactical aspects, has improved far more than attack and the gap between the standards of play in these functions is widening. On top of this, the pressures to win have brought about an increase in physical intimidation by violent tackling and the use of unfair methods to stop good attacking play.

There are coaches, however, who believe fervently in optimal football, where players throughout the team will attack and defend to the best of their ability. These coaches must continually search for ways of improving attack - using quicker, more skilful and more powerful shooting and heading; fast and all-out attacking on a wide front; and unorthodox skills and deceptive inter-passing movements to penetrate defensive screens. It is suggested that it would help if coaches who advocate this concept of football were to meet more often so as to create a movement towards positive play. Associations have a responsibility to the future development of the game to encourage coaches, especially of youth teams, to give more attention to attacking football so that versatility in attack as well as defence will be a standard quality. Close man-to-man marking is an ingredient of the modern defensive game and young players should be taught not only how to do it but also how to combat it.

The attacking football displayed by Holland and Argentina operated so as to fully commit opposing defenders. If defence belongs to everybody so does attack and defenders as well as midfield players must be eager and able to advance forward as occasion permits. This kind of play needs courage and demands high competence in individual skill. In the case of Holland, the movement of attack often leaves only three players at the back as the immediate defence to a counter attack, but these defenders are expert in judging whether to go for quick interception or to steady the situation whilst colleagues race back to assist. One of the features of Holland’s play in this Competition was the “on target” shooting from long distances, and several goals were scored this way at critical moments in their games. Dircceu’s brilliant winning goal for Brazil in the third place final against Italy was also of this calibre.

Though the well-known skills of quick ball control and change of pace in close interpassing play were evident in Brazil’s performances, they did not produce the same problems as on past occasions. Their players, however, were free to move from their basic positions over a wide area to take part in attacking movements; a positive feature of play which has yet to be fully exploited.

Little use was made of centres in many matches. Some fast low centres created problems but most of the high crosses did not sufficiently place the goalkeeper at a disadvantage. There was also a lack of variation in corner kicks and throw ins. We saw more examples of goalkeepers moving confidently out of the penalty area to clear long through passes, and also of goalkeepers using a quick throw or short kick to start up attack. Yet most goalkeepers were defensively orientated and invariably held on to the ball and then made long high clearance kicks downfield. In the past it has been customary to select tall and strongly built players for positions in central defence but in this Competition several teams used central defenders of smaller stature who were quick to pounce on the ball to cut off dangerous moves.

A general impression of the study group was that there were fewer consistent performances of an outstanding quality to merit star grading than seen in past competitions. This may be incidental or could reflect the tendency to subordinate the individual to the team. Coaches want to see more development of individual flair and commanding leadership within a team’s composite
performance. They see little purpose, however, in a best player award except in its sponsorship publicity value. If this is to continue, then it should be extended to produce awards for different functions of play. How can a consistently brilliant goalkeeper's performance, like that of Fillol, be assessed against the exhilarating goal scoring efforts of his team mate Kempes?

**Attacking Penetration**

Scores of penetrative attacks taken during this Competition showed again that the teams which sought to attack were on the whole more successful, though no team dominated consistently throughout their games as did Holland and Germany F.R. in 74.

A penetrative attack is registered when a team makes a positive approach into the last 30 metres of its opponent's half. Argentina achieved the high total of 65 penetrative attacks in the critical game against Peru who managed only 16 attacks in reply. Argentina had 29 attempts to score with 6 goals, compared with Peru's 7 attempts and no goals. Argentina lost by the odd goal against Italy. In this match they made 54 attacks with 17 attempts to score against Italy's 22 and 10.

In the final with Holland including extra time, Argentina registered 48 attacks, 18 attempts to score with 3 goals, against Holland's 55 attacks, 18 attempts to score and 1 goal. Holland's match against Scotland produced scores of Holland 38 attacks, 12 shots and two goals, to Scotland's 40 attacks, 14 shots and 3 goals.

Apart from the match against Sweden (42:10:1), Brazil (38:9:1) produced consistently better marks than their opponents. In the final match against Italy for third place, Brazil achieved 48:17:2 against 24:11:1. Brazil also attacked well against Peru, the scores being 56:24:3 against 38:18:0. In the match Brazil v. Argentina which was marred by the many fouls, the scores were 43:18:0 to Brazil and 32:10:0 to Argentina.

Italy showed their new attacking zeal in the match against Hungary with scores of 43:15:3 against 42:12:1. In the no-goal drawn match against Germany F.R. the totals were Italy 41:13:0 and Germany F.R. 39:8:0.

One could see the extent of the cautionary play of Germany F.R. in the opening match by the scores which read Germany F.R. 25:12:0, Poland 38:18:0.

Such is the inclination to maintain solid defence that most teams now form a six, seven and sometimes eight man defensive screen between the ball and goalkeeper when possession is lost in midfield and their opponents begin to mount an attack. Usually two attackers remain upfield though there may be occasions when one or both of the forward attackers drop back to help in desperate situations. See diagram (I) and photographs.

It is difficult to argue against the contention that such defensive groupings, especially if the players are fast and sure in the tackle and interception of the ball, are effective in stifling attacks. It is what the defending team does when it gains possession of the ball that sets the pattern and strength of attack. Teams that go for all-out attack such as Holland, immediately press forward with up to seven players thereby leaving only three rear defenders to deal with any fast counter attack and to cover the two opposing forwards near the halfway line. See diagram (II).
There is clearly a risk, for, given quick service of the ball, two fast and skilful forwards could out-manoeuvre three defenders before other colleagues could recover. Much depends upon the willingness and ability of the four or five midfield players in adjusting their positions from attack to defence and the confidence of the three back defenders in using their skill and tactics to cut out the long clearance, slow down the play of the attacking forwards and use an offside trap. It is strange how goalkeepers have been so conditioned that whenever they gain possession of the ball they should then delay play and make a long clearance kick into the opponents' half of the field where there is a congestion of players of both teams. This may be a safety tactic, yet a back defender does not repeatedly make such long clearances. There are times when a quick throw from the goalkeeper to a well-placed colleague would provide a better situation for a counter attack.

Looking at the teams which defend well and also play good attacking football, we see the need for players with outstanding skill ability and verve, who are willing to go forward, run fast with the ball, dribble and make accurate passes including quick one-two movements. The attacking players using the wings must be able to turn and run very fast with the ball and centre quickly and accurately. Midfield players and defenders who attack should be able to run into the gaps or break through a defence line with a dribble or passing movement. All players involved in attack must develop a flair for shooting and heading at goal from short and long range. Individual skill in ball control, selling the dummy, making measured passes and early centres across the line of defence, and the ability to time a run to meet the pass or centre are essential to this kind of positive attacking football.
Match Appraisal
Group 1

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Argentina v. Hungary

Having played each other in 1976 and 1977, both Argentina and Hungary were thoroughly familiar with each other's tactics and style of play. The unusual tense atmosphere in the stadium affected the teams more than the difference in technique and tactics. Argentina were nervous to do well before their enthusiastic supporters in the first match and pressed forward in non-stop attacking play to try the score quickly. Hungary were also under pressure trying to ignore the partisanship of the crowd and resist the Argentinian surging attacks. Up to a point they did well and it was a shame and out of character that their composure cracked after Argentina's second goal and two players had to be sent off the field. The subsequent suspension of these two young and competent players ended the team's chances; a pity, after the painstaking preparation. Whatever provocation, players of this experience, having reached the final stage of World Cup Competition, should be able to control their behaviour towards the referee. In the electric atmosphere, the players of Hungary were no doubt frustrated to be losing the match at a stage when they were having the better of play, and particularly after gaining a goal lead in the first half when their open movements of play had disturbed the Argentine defence.

The Hungarians defended using man to man marking whereas Argentina played zone defence with four rear defenders in a straight line. In attack, the Hungarian winger Csapo (13) on the right and Nagy (18) on the left kept largely to the flanks with Javosik (9) having great freedom of movement. Other Hungarian players formed small groups near the ball, creating spaces elsewhere for a quick switch of play. Fillol (5), who otherwise defended his goal well, only partially blocked a strong shot from Nagy (18) and Csapo (13) was able to seize an easy chance to score.

This goal spurred the Argentinian team into renewed effort and they began to control midfield play and mount a succession of dangerous attacks. The equalising goal followed a free kick from Kempes (10) which Gujdar (1), seemingly unsighted could only parry for the ball to rebound giving Luque (14) his chance to shoot into an undefended goal. In the taking of the free kick several Argentinian players ran in dif-
different directions to unlock the defensive wall for the shot to go through. The winning goal came after combination play by Alonso (1) and Luque (14) led to a shot which Gudar (14) failed to hold and Bertoni (4), the replacement for Houseman (9), took an easy chance to score.

Teams:

**Argentina:**
2 Ardiles, 5 Fillol, 6 Gallego, 7 Galvan, 9 Houseman (67 min 4 Bertoni), 10 Kempes, 14 Luque, 15 Olguin, 19 Passarella, 20 Tarantini, 21 Valencia (75 min 1 Alonso)

**Hungary:**
1 Gujdar, 2 Török (46 min 12 Martos), 3 Kocsis, 4 Toth, 5 Zombori, 6 Kereki, 8 Nyílasi (89 min expulsion), 9 Törőcsik (88 min expulsion), 10 Pinter, 13 Csápa, 18 Nagy

Goals:
9 Houseman (9), took an easy chance to score. The winning goal came after combination play by Alonso (1) and Luque (14) led to a shot which Gudar (1) failed to hold and Bertoni (4), the replacement for Houseman (9), took an easy chance to score.

After the Argentinian team had scored at the beginning of the second half, the French side began to play even better and it could be said that they were the only team of Group I in matches against Argentina to produce better better play for sustained periods.

Unfortunately for France their final goal did not match their superiority in attacking approach from defence and midfield and good chances to score went begging at a time when, with the score at 1:1, France were pressing. With Tresor (8) moving forward frequently, France were also taking risks. The defect in the French style of play was that they sometimes overplayed their attacking approach using too many passes. They needed the occasional flash of lightning to upset the Argentinian defence and particularly the composure of goalkeeper Fillol (5). Fillol (5) indeed made three marvellous saves when a goal seemed certain, and had ten other brilliant interventions in critical moments of the game. His performance in this game bears out the saying that to win the championship a team must first of all have a good goalkeeper playing in excellent form.

Strangely, in this match, many passes of the Argentinian players went wrong, including passes from such good players as Olguin (15), Passarella (19), Gallego (6) and Ardiles (2). Their two best field players on this occasion were Luque (14) and Kempes (10). Powerful and dynamic attackers in "play ending" terrain and Passarella's first goal was an exceptional volley shot from 25 metres. It was Luque who was threatening goal with an individual run which forced a desperate defensive tangle resulting in the controversial penalty decision and the winning goal for Argentina.

Teams:

**Argentina:**
5 Fillol, 2 Ardiles, 6 Gallego, 7 Galvan, 9 Houseman, 10 Kempes, 14 Luque, 15 Olguin, 19 Passarella, 20 Tarantini, 21 Valencia (64 min 1 Alonso - 71 min 16 Ortiz)

**France:**
21 Bertrand-Demanes (58 min 1 Baratelli), 2 Battiston, 3 Bossis, 6 Lopez, 8 Tresor, 9 Bithenay, 11 Michel, 15 Platini, 17 Lacombe, 18 Rochetau, 19 Six

Goals:
1:0 (45 min) 19 Passarella; 1:1 (60 min) 15 Platini; 2:1 (73 min) 14 Luque

Referee and Linesmen:
Dubach (Switzerland) - Orozco (Peru), Winsemann (Canada)

Argentina v. Italy

By the time of the third match, both Argentina and Italy were qualified but for Argentina it was important to win in order to play in Group A of the second round and to continue playing in the River Plate Stadium in Buenos Aires. Cynics were to say that Argentina preferred to play in Group B because they were familiar with the play of the two other South American teams. Considering the manner in which the match was played by both Argentina and Italy, one can discount such calculations.

The Italians had slightly the better goal difference 5:2 as against 4:2 and therefore a drawn match would keep the Italians in first place in the Group. In consequence, the Argentinians had to force play to win the game. Their efforts are well reflected in the scores of penetrative attacks, Argentina having 54 with 17 attempts to score against Italy's 22 and 10 attempts to score. Argentina were without Luque (14) who had an injured elbow and in consequence Kempes (10) assumed the role of striker with Ortiz (16) playing on the left flank and Bertoni (4) on the right in the classical formation of three front line attackers. The Italians, after losing Belligi (2) at the heart of their defence, played a close marking defensive game using seven players, five of whom had specific players to mark. Scirea (8) played as a defensive libero and Antognoni (9) defended as the situation of play developed in midfield. The Argentinian team found it difficult to play against such strict man-to-man play and their zone defensive system had problems in holding at bay the strong, fast and skilful play of Causio (16), Rossi (21) and Bettega (18). There were many occasions when only two of these players working in tandem were successful in technical, tactical combinations against four Argentinian defenders. The only goal of the match was scored in such a situation, when a final combination play of Bettega
(18) and Rossi (21) left Olguin (15), Galvan (7), Passarella (19), Tarantini (20) and the goalkeeper stranded. The point was that whenever any of these Italian forwards received the ball, there was always a gap between them and the defender who then rushed in to tackle, giving the skilled player chance to dribble or flick the ball and run to a new position. In other words, the Argentinian defence began when the Italian forwards had possession of the ball. Although fewer attacks were made by the Italians, they nevertheless produced some dangerous goal scoring situations.

In contrast, every Argentinian forward was challenged as the ball was passed to him, and this tackling pressure caused the Argentinians to dribble and play more as individuals, or to push the ball more often sideways and backwards. Though the Argentinian team lost this important game, the exultation of the Argentinian people was remarkable and celebrating crowds paraded the streets throughout the night. This ambience created by the public and supported by the media helped to maintain the positive morale and enthusiasm of the team and became a powerful stimulating influence in the matches played at Rosario in the second round.

Teams:

Italy:
1 Zoff, 2 Bellugi (6 min 4 Cucurredru), 3 Cabrini, 5 Gentile, 8 Scirea, 9 Antognoni (73 min 15 Zaccarelli), 10 Benetti, 14 Tardelli, 16 Causio, 18 Bettega, 21 Rossi

Argentina:
2 Ardiles, 4 Bertoni, 5 Filol, 6 Gallego, 7 Galvan, 10 Kemes, 15 Olguin, 16 Ortiz (72 min 9 Houseman), 19 Passarella, 20 Tarantini, 21 Valencia

Goals:
1:0 (67 min) 18 Bettega

Referee and Linesmen:
Klein (Israel) – Rion (Belgium), Ar- chundia (Mexico)

Italy v. France

Italy's first match against France saw Lacombe (17) of France score the first goal of the Competition, in 38 seconds. The movement started with goalkeeper Demanes (21), the ball going to the left defender Rossini (3), then to the outside left Six (19) who evaded his opponent and linked in a one-two play with Guila- lou (10) to collect the ball in open space and send across a centre shot which Lacombe (17) headed, leaving the excellent goalkeeper Zoff (1) helpless. This shocked the Italians and made them throw aside the mantle of negative play and adopt an offensive game which surprised everyone. Cabrini (3), the left defender, began to move into constructive situations in midfield and into attack and the opposing French player Daigle (16) was unable to follow him. Scirea (8), the libero, also moved readily upfield with and without the ball. Gentile (5), the right defender, accepted a similar new mission, with strong individual penetrating runs with the ball. These players helped to produce numerical superiority in attacking situations which in the end gave Italy a deserved victory. France, on the other hand, saw their key offensive players Platini (15) eliminated by the successful marking plays of Tardelli (14). With Causio (16) creating openings at will, Rossi (21) continually seeking the path to goal and Bettega (18) moving intelligently into free spaces, especially on the left, the French defence was hard pressed.

The equalising goal came from Rossi (21) shooting from the left and the winning goal resulted from the attacking play of Gentile (5) providing Zaccarelli (15), the replacement for Antognoni (9), with a favourable chance.

Teams:

France:
3 Bossis, 4 Janvion, 7 Rio, 8 Tresor, 10 Guillou, 11 Michel, 15 Platini, 16 Dalger, 17 Lacombe (72 min 14 Berdoll), 19 Six (7 min 20 Rouyer, 21 Bertrand-Demanes)

Italy:
1 Zoff, 2 Bellugi, 3 Cabrini, 5 Gentile, 8 Scirea, 9 Antognoni (46 min 15 Zaccarelli), 10 Benetti, 14 Tardelli, 16 Causio, 18 Bettega, 21 Rossi

Goals:
1:0 (1 min) 17 Lacombe; 1:1 (30 min) 21 Rossi; 1:2 (51 min 15 Zaccarelli)

Referee and Linesmen:
Rainea (Romania) – Linemayr (Austria), Silvaggio (Chile)

Italy v. Hungary

Both Italy and Hungary had to play to win in their second match. Italy had a complete team whereas Hungary were without four key players, two suspended and two injured. The Italians adapted their style which, whilst assembling seven players in defence, moved forward quickly to provide four and sometimes five players in advanced attack.

In the first half, Hungary's football was more precise in attack but the final move was often spoiled. Nagy (18) dribbled brilliantly past four men only to shoot over the bar from 7 metres. The early centreing of the ball across the front of a flat defence caused trouble but Italy's defence so often intercepted before the final shot could be taken. Hungary made 25 penetrating attacks in the first half with 6 attempts to score and Italy had 20 penetrating attacks also with 6 attempts to score. Yet out of those attempted, Italy scored two goals in quick succession after half an hour's play. The first was from a long shot which ricocheted and the goalkeeper could only parry the ball, giving an easy chance to Rossi (21) to shoot into the empty goal. The second was caused by two defending players Kocsis (3) and Kereki (6) mixing up on a seemingly harmless pass from Rossi (21) for Bettega (18) to seize his chance quickly and skillfully. From then on, Italy acquired the better rhythm especially in the beginning of the second half when Benetti ran on to square pass to send in an unstoppable shot from 25 metres. This settled the match and Italy, using fast one-two passing movements, had several other near misses. The crossbar was hit four times. Hungary were dejected enough to miss an open goal but in the end had slight consolation for some of their missed chances by scoring from a penalty.

Teams:

Italy:
1 Zoff, 2 Bellugi, 3 Cabrini (79 min 4 Cucurredru), 5 Gentile, 8 Scirea, 10 Benetti, 14 Tardelli, 16 Causio, 18 Bettega (83 min 19 Graziani), 21 Rossi

Hungary:
21 Meszaros, 3 Kocsis, 4 Toth, 5 Zombori, 6 Kereki, 7 Fazekas (46 min 19 Toth, Andras), 10 Pinter, 12 Martos, 13 Csapo, 17 Pusztai, 18 Nagy (46 min 16 Halasz)

Goals:
1:0 (34 min) 21 Rossi; 2:0 (35 min) 18 Bettega; 3:0 (60 min) 10 Benetti; 3:1 (80 min) 19 Toth, Andras

Referee and Linesmen:
Barreto (Uruguay) – Biwersi (Germany FR), Gordon (Scotland)
France v. Hungary

After the tension and bad results of their first two matches, France and Hungary met each other in a game which had no bearing on qualification and the teams were more relaxed in their play. The start was delayed by 40 mins by an extraordinary precedent of the French team wearing the wrong set of jerseys.

The game produced the most attractive and spectacular football of matches seen in this group, revealing the high degree of technical ability of the two teams. Because of the delay, the spectators greeted both teams with booing and hooting but stayed to salute them with appreciative applause at the end of the game.

France again changed its team so as to give remaining players in the squad of twenty-two the chance to participate in the Competition. It speaks well of the ability of so many reserves that they played as confidently and in the same vein as the first selection. The difference between them is not wide and indicates the future potential of French football.

Hungary, on the other hand, were able to include Torocsik (9) and Nyilasi (8) whose influence on the performance of the team was self-evident.

Hungary's technical, tactical combinations are a joy to see when they are executed with panache. Changing of position, penetrating on the flanks and coordinated timing of runs into space to meet a fast-running ball, can be exhilarating, but on this occasion these movements were often too precisely executed and gave the impression that there was no ambition to score a goal.

In the challenge between individual players, France were faster and supported each other better as a team. They had 24 attempts to score, with 3 goals against Hungary's 15 attempts with 1 goal.

Teams:

France:
4 Janvion, 5 Bracci, 6 Lopez, 8 Tresor, 9 Bathenay, 12 Papi (45 min 15 Platini), 13 Petit, 14 Berdoll, 18 Rochetau (75 min 19 Six), 20 Rouyer, 22 Dropsy

Hungary:
1 Gujdar, 4 Toth, 5 Zombori, 6 Kereki, 8 Nyilasi, 9 Torocsik, 10 Pinter, 12 Martos, 14 Balint, 17 Pusztai, 18 Nagy (79 min 3 Kocsis)

Goals:
1:0 (22 min) 6 Lopez; 2:0 (36 min) 14 Berdoll; 2:1 (40 min) 5 Zombori; 3:1 (41 min) 18 Rochetau

Referee and Linesmen:
Coelho (Brazil) - Silvagno (Chile), Partridge (England)
Following the opening game with no goals scored between Germany F.R. and Poland, it was confidently expected that these two teams would settle their placings for the second round groups by goal difference resulting from easy matches against Tunisia and Mexico. Mexico played well in the early stages of their first match against Tunisia and deserved their half-time lead, yet the tenacious and courageous Tunisian team lifted their attacking game in the second half to stretch the Mexican defence and score three good goals. Mexico never recovered from this setback and though they continued to make good midfield play in attacking approaches, their defence was overwhelmed against Germany F.R. with six goals and conceded three more against Poland. One felt that Germany F.R., after their runaway victory over Mexico, had regained confidence and were almost certain to head Group 2 but to everyone’s surprise the brave Tunisian team, after losing to Poland by the odd goal, played the game of their lives to hold Germany F.R. to a no-goal draw.

Poland v. Germany F.R.
The opening match of the Competition was poor, influenced by cautious play—especially by the Germany F.R. team—a capricious wind and the awkward bounce of the ball on the pitch. The last fifteen minutes of the game produced a most negative display with neither side attempting to take risks of putting pressure in attack. Poland in the first half showed more willingness to go forward as reflected in the tally of penetrating attacks. They achieved 23 attacks and made 4 attempts to score against Germany F.R.’s 15 penetrative attacks and 2 attempts to score. The second half produced 15 attacks and 3 attempts to score by Poland against 10 attacks and 2 attempts to score by Germany F.R.

Germany F.R. played in their typical tactical style, each player having a personal marking responsibility and then free- ing himself when the team had possession of the ball. All three lines of the formation participated in defence as well as attack. Against Poland the marking, especially in midfield, lacked spontaneity and purpose. Key players such as Bonhof (6), Flohe (10) and Kaltz (5) were off form. Kaltz (5) normally helps in construction in midfield but he showed few glimpses of this quality in this game. Usually in defence, German players move quickly to tackle their opponents but against the Polish team there was the tendency to run back deep into their own half of the field to await the attack. Then, as the German man-to-man marking began to operate, the Polish attack moved to one flank to create gaps on the other side. Maier (1) in goal, however, was excellent and on several occasions saved his team. Bad passing was the main reason for so little good attacking play of Germany F.R. and Flohe (10) as a key distributor did not excel. Bonhof (6) seemed to be lost in the game and though Beer (15) was hard working and sprinted upfield, he had little support. Fischer (9) and Müller (20) also worked hard but had few real scoring chances. Free kicks and corners had little threat.

Poland’s experienced players were also less effective than in the last Tournament. Many long passes found Lato (16) and he, with Lubonski (19), Szramech (17) and Deyna (12), caused trouble for the German defence. The team strangely allowed a big gap to develop between four attacking
Poland v. Tunisia

Poland's second game against Tunisia was interesting and because only one goal was scored, tension was maintained until the last minute. The Polish team seemed disappointed with their play for, though they had exerted a lot of pressure, the passing around the penalty area was inaccurate or of bad quality and though many chances were created they failed to score from them. In the last half-hour, Tunisia began to take control in midfield and only the lack of shooting ability prevented them from scoring from the chances they had.

The goal for Poland started with a passing movement between Lato (16) to Nawalka (5) whose return lob was missed by Kaabi (3) of Tunisia, leaving Nawalka (6) to pass to Deyna (12) whose return lob was covered by the Tunisian goalkeeper. This was typical of direct attack by this skilful, experienced and confident wing forward. Whilst Deyna (12) was the "general" of attack from midfield, both flank defenders also attacked to make centres to Szarmach (5) and Lubanski (19) who alternated on the right wing when Lato (16) crossed over to the left. Tunisia played far better than they did in their first match against Mexico, especially in midfield. The players were better coordinated, timing their runs into space and linking effectively with their passing. They had their best play and chances in the first and last fifteen minutes of the game. Jebali (20) controlled the defence perfectly and Lahzami (7) by his quick dribbling, fast running and dribbling, completely upset the Polish defence on two or three occasions. Ghommidh (6) worked hard in midfield, marking and tackling efficiently and cleverly timing his back covering and his attacking movements.

Dhiab (10), with his sparkle, became the darling of the spectators.

Teams:

Poland:
1 Tomaszewski, 3 Maculewicz, 4 Szynarski, 5 Nawalka, 6 Gorgon, 9 Zmuda, 11 Masztaler (84 min 8 Kasperczak), 12 Deyna, 16 Lato, 17 Szarmach, 19 Lubanski
Goals:
Nil
Referee and Linesmen:
Coezza (Argentina) - Ithurralde (Argentina), Comesana (Argentina)

Poland v. Mexico

In the last match against Mexico, Poland were confident of qualifying and therefore changed their tactics leaving only Lato (16) and Iwan (7) to play forward in order to conserve their energies for the next round. In collective play they sought to keep possession without running too much. Boniek (18) and Deyna (12) were always present in midfield exchanges. The goalkeeper Tomaszewski (1) organised the defence competently but sometimes was over-demonstrative in doing so. It was Boniek (18) who scored the first goal from five metres after 42 minutes from a near forward pass from Lato (16). Poland were physically stronger, especially in the tackling by their defenders.

Mexico tried to consolidate their defence by bringing back every forward player except one to help in the middle and rear lines of defence. They then took a long time to build up an attack by combinations of play across the field. Occasionally a player would dribble out of defence in a long dash with the ball, only to be compelled to turn and pass back. Though in physique the team were smaller than Poland, they were good at heading the ball. Goal shooting was a weakness and some good chances were missed. The team was encouraged when Ayala (9) equalised after Martinez (12) had dribbled round the Polish defence to centre some ten metres from goal. Deyna (12) gained the lead a few minutes later after Lato's (16) shot had rebounded from the goalkeeper and Boniek (18) added a third goal after a fine solo run and shot from 25 metres which surprised Ayala (5) in goal.

Teams:

Mexico:
5 Vazquez, Ayala, 7 De la Torre, 9 Rangel Ayala, 10 Ortega Martinez, 11 Sanchez Marquez, 12 Martinez Diez, 14 Gomez Castillas, 15 Flores Ocaranza, 16 Cardenas Martinez (46 min 6 Mendizabal Sanchez), 17 Cuellar Rivera, 22 Soto Moreno
Poland:
1 Tomaszewski, 3 Maculewicz, 4 Szynarski, 5 Nawalka, 6 Gorgon, 9 Zmuda, 10 Rudy, 11 Masztaler, 12 Deyna, 16 Lato, 18 Boniek (84 min 3 Maculewicz)
Goals:
0:1 (42 min) 18 Boniek; 1:1 (51 min) 9 Rangel Ayala; 1:2 (56 min) 12 Deyna; 1:3 (83 min) 18 Boniek
Referee and Linesmen:
Namdar (Iran) - Corver (Netherlands), Eriksson (Sweden)
half flattened out until the 71st minute when Germany F.R. scored their best goal from a powerful shot by Rummenigge (11) after Fischer (9) had dribbled down the left and centred for Müller (20) to feint as if to volley but instead touch the ball lightly back to the scorer. A long shot from Flohe (10) in the last minutes added the sixth goal, rounding off a relaxed performance by Germany F.R.

**Teams:**

1 Reyes Requenes (39 min 22 Soto Moreno), 3 Tena Garduno, 4 Ramos Escobedo, 5 Vazquez Ayala, 6 Mendizabal Sanchez, 7 De la Torre, 8 Lopez Zarza (46 min 18 Lugo Gomez), 9 Rangel Ayala, 11 Sanchez Marquez, 12 Martinez Diez, 17 Cuellar Rivera

**Germany F.R.:**

1 Maier, 2 Vogts, 3 Dietz, 4 Rüssmann, 5 Kaltz, 6 Bonhof, 9 Fischer, 10 Flohe, 11 Rummenigge, 14 Müller, Dieter, 20 Müller, Hans

**Goals:**

0:0 (14 min) 4 Vazquez; 0:1 (37 min) 10 Flohe; 0:2 (69 min) 11 Rummenigge; 0:3 (71 min) 11 Rummenigge; 0:4 (89 min) 10 Flohe

**Referee and Linesmen:**

Bouzo (Syria) - Rion (Belgium), Da Silva Garrido (Portugal)

**Tunisia v. Mexico**

In the first match against Tunisia, Mexico's young team started in a lively fashion using a variation of attacking approach sometimes with quick penetration in depth. However, when the scores were equalised, they lost control and reverted to much more individual play with repeated attempts to penetrate through the centre and were often caught in the offside trap. Their main fault lay in the marking by defenders in the backfield, especially when players in the midfield were disorganised.

Mexico deserved their lead by a penalty goal at halftime as it is shown by the tally of attacking penetration, with 27 attacks and 7 attempts to score, against 17 attacks and 4 attempts by Tunisia. They had good chances to increase their lead in the early part of the second half before Tunisia equalised through an overlap movement and fine run and shot by Kaabi (13). From then on, Tunisia taking more risks and relying on offside tactics, improved in their passing and were ready to use the longer pass across field. Two more goals were scored by good breakaway counter attacks. Mexico must have been dejected about losing this match after having made so many attacks, 58 with 17 attempts to score, against Tunisia's 39 with 11 attempts to score. For Tunisia, this was a major achievement which gave them confidence to play even better football in their later games against the might of Poland and Germany F.R.

**Teams:**

**Tunisia:**

2 Dhouieb, 3 Kaabi, 5 Labidi, 6 Ghommidh, 7 Lahzami (88 min 12 Labidi, Khemais), 8 Ben Rehaiem, 9 Akid, 10 Dhiab, 11 Ben Aziza (70 min 14 Karoui), 20 Jebali, 22 Naili

**Mexico:**

1 Reyes Requenes, 3 Tena Garduno, 4 Ramos Escobedo, 5 Vazquez Ayala, 6 Mendizabal Sanchez (67 min 18 Lugo Gomez), 7 De la Torre, 9 Rangel Ayala, 11 Sanchez Marquez, 12 Martinez Diez, 17 Cuellar Rivera, 21 Isiordia Avon

**Goals:**

0:1 (45 min) 5 Vazquez; 1:1 (54 min) 3 Kaabi; 2:1 (79 min) 6 Ghommidh; 3:1 (86 min) 2 Dhouieb

**Referee and Linesmen:**

Orozco (Peru) - Comesana (Argentina), Pestarino (Argentina)
Austria's opening match against Spain gave an indication of their good condition and teamwork, especially in defence and in fast counter attacks. Though the Spaniards were superior in number of attacks and had more chances to score, they surprisingly fell away, playing much more as individuals, after a gift first goal. Spain achieved some consolation by defeating Sweden who seemed to lack the speed and verve they displayed in their opening game.

Brazil v. Sweden
Brazil played their first match against Sweden at Mar del Plata. The weather was cool with occasional rain and the pitch was soft and wet. Brazil started spiritedly but as the game went on without scoring, their play lost rhythm and became erratic. As Sweden gained in confidence, so they put in extra effort and began to take the initiative in attacking approach. Brazil had the more skilful ball players and they showed glimpses of exciting interplay, with quick flick passes and rapid change of pace. After several narrow escapes to the Swedish goal, the Swedish defenders became more adept in reading the intention of these deceptive movements of Brazil's attack and were able to intercept passes more easily. Sweden often had ten players defending the ball they moved forward with accurate combination passing to attack Brazil's goal. Open chances to score were missed at both ends. The Brazilian spectators began to show and express their disappointment which further upset the team. They increased their efforts but lost some of their cleverness and guile. It was after a series of corners against Sweden that Wendt (11) made his way up the left flank and centred for Linderoth (7) in front of the penalty area to flick the ball with the outside of his foot over the heads of the Brazilian defenders. Sjöberg (10) forced his way through to leave the goalkeeper Leao (1) with no chance to save his shot. This goal stimulated Brazil to further effort in determination not to lose, but the resulting pressure on Sweden's goal lacked subtlety and the equalising goal was something of a gift. Toninho (2) in one of his many runs on the right flank sent over a swerving centre to find Nordqvist (4) of Sweden hopelessly positioned in line with Reinaldo (9) who quickly gathered the ball and beat goalkeeper Hellström (1) with a hard, precise shot. By half-time Sweden had made 26 penetrating attacks and 8 attempts to score against 17 attacks and 6 attempts to score from Brazil. With the soft ground churning up badly and giving insecure foothold, it became more difficult to play good football. Brazil seemed to lack dominating midfield players to inspire and control the pace and rhythm of interlinking play with the attacking forwards. As captain, Rivelino (10) did not measure up to his repu-
tation. Batista (17) on the other hand persistently served his attack in search for openings. Amaral (4), Toninho (2), Edinho (6), Cerezo (5) and Zico (8) starting from their basic positions moved about the field in an astonishing range of action, often with fast runs with the ball, but in so doing they often ignored surrounding colleagues well-positioned to receive a pass. Then, at other times, after short push-passer in midfield, the ball was played up to Reinaldo (9), the striker, but these approaches were slowly constructed giving time for Swedish defenders to organise their defence around their key midfield players Tapper (6), Larsson (8) and Nordqvist (4) as a "sweeper" libero. Sweden played their best game at full stretch, whereas Brazil, it seemed, were unable to establish their superiori of skill which was partly due to a deep sense of frustration in not living up to their reputation. In the last minutes of the game, Brazil forced three consecutive corners, and the referee blew his whistle to end the game as the last corner kick was taken. Brazil were somewhat incensed because the ball was headed directly into goal from this corner kick, fractionally after the whistle ended the game.

Teams:

Sweden:
1 Hellsund 2 Borg, 3 Andersson, 4 Nordqvist, 5 Erlandsson, 6 Tapper, 9 Linderoth, 8 Larsson, 9 Larsson, 11 Wendt

Brazil:
1 Leao, 2 Toninho, 3 Oscar, 4 Amaral, 6 Edinho, 17 Batista, 5 Cerezo, 6 Edinho, 7 Toninho, 8 Zico, 9 Reinaldo, 10 Sjoberg, 11 Wendt

Referee: Reinaldo

Goals: 1:0 (38 min) 10 Sjoberg; 1:1 (45 min) 9 Reinaldo, 8 Zico

Brazil v. Spain
Against Spain, Brazil changed their team, replacing Rivellino (10) by Dirceu (11) and playing Toninho (2) in the right forward position and Nelinho (13) at right full back. During the game Edinho (6) and Nelinho (13) switched roles and in the second half Nelinho (13) was replaced by Gil (18). Their opponents Spain used a 4.4.2 basic formation of play. The two forward attackers Alonso (10) and Gomez (8) interchanged positions to create openings for other players. Gomez (8) moved widely with an untripped commitment to make space for others and to take up position to receive a pass. The team tactics were aimed to restrict the attacking space for Brazil by setting up a narrow yet deep defence whenever Brazil took possession of the ball. Spain succeeded in slowing down the pace and destroying the rhythm of their opponents' attack. In attack, Spain were more cautious, building slowly from midfield, restricting each other from attacking intentions. In attack, Spain were more cautious, building slowly from midfield. With few exceptions, there was little drive and zest about their attack to worry the Brazilian defenders. Even so, an open goal was missed at a critical stage of the game.

Overall, the football was well below world standard, yet once again Brazil showed glimpses of their potential ability, giving hope that the team might settle down to play with a more convincing style in future games.

Teams:

Brazil:
1 Leao, 2 Toninho, 3 Oscar, 4 Amaral, 6 Edinho, 17 Batista, 5 Cerezo, 6 Edinho, 8 Zico, 9 Reinaldo, 11 Dirceu, 13 Nelinho (69 min 18 Gil), 17 Batista

Spain:
13 Gonzalez, 3 Alvarez (78 min 12 Guzman), 4 Asensi, 5 Bernardo (50 min 6 Biosca), 8 Gomez, 10 Alonso, 11 Cerdonosa, 14 Leal, 16 Olmo, 17 Perez, 21 San Jose

Goals:
Nil

Referee and Linesmen:
Thomas (Wales) – Namdar (Iran), Jaruzil (Polen)

Brazil v. Austria
In the third match against Austria, Brazil had to win to be sure of qualifying and to conciliate their disappointed supporters. They needed to play as an integrated and composed team. The versatility of all Brazilian players was a tactical asset for they were equally effective in attacking or defensive functions and able to interchange positions readily.

Starting from a basic formation, players ran freely in support of the player with the ball giving him several options; they made rapid short passes or produced a long pass to switch play and they were also capable of bursting through gaps with individual dribbling. In this game, the Brazilians defended well, taking the right tactical decisions as to whether to move to intercept the ball or tackle the opponent or stay away. Oscar (3) and Amaral (4) were very composed in stabilising the defence as a whole.

Austria played with a 4.4.2 basic formation and sometimes, when under pressure, the two attacking players also fell back to help out in defence. When in possession of the ball, players were inclined to slow down the pace of the game using short and secure passing to feet.

They seemed to be more tired and therefore less adventurous than in their first two games. Rarely did they move away from their basic positions but Sara (2) left his full back position to move across the field to attack on the wing and Pezzy (5) and Obermayer (3) went upfield to threaten with long range shots. The ball was lost too many times in individual contests and forward passes were often played too hard and long so that the ball could not be reached by chasing strikers.

Brazil launched hard attacks from midfield with Dirceu (11), Batista (17), Toninho (2) and Cerezo (5) linking with Mendonca (19) and the two strikers Roberto (20) and Gil (18). Toninho (2) constantly moved up to attack on the flank. The goal scored by Roberto (20) followed a typical centre from the wing to the far post with the Austrian defenders concentrating on the player about to cross the ball. Roberto (20) was left unmarked and had plenty of time to collect the centre and score. Defenders ought to be aware that the area beyond the far post is dangerous for the goalkeeper and that attackers in this area need to be covered when high centres are made.

Overall, the standard of football was mediocre and was spoiled by several "last ditch" fouls by both sides. Players who show a high level of skill and courage to penetrate a strong and packed defence must be protected from this unfair spoiling play.
Austria v. Spain

Austria won their first game against Spain because they were able to contain the attacks of the Spaniards, especially at the beginning and towards the end of play. For long periods they controlled the middle of the field through intelligent football by Kreuz (10), Jara (11), Prohaska (8) and Hicksberger (7). They also had the brilliance of Krankl (9) to make strikes at goal. The first goal by Austria showed a weakness in Spanish defence, when Schachner (18) receiving a pass near the halfway line on the right flank, ran down field, quickly evading de la Cruz (2) the left defender, and drew the goalkeeper before scoring with a well aimed shot in the near corner of the goal. No other Spanish defender covered against this solo run. Spain deservedly levelled the score when Pezzey (5) of Austria, after intercepting a long high ball from Martinez (18), lost possession of it for Ruiz (7) to score a simple goal from 10 metres. Surprisingly, following this goal Spain were even less secure in defence and were slower and less precise in their attacks. In contrast, Austria's collective play showed tactical flair as well as stability and the players were in good condition to keep chasing. Goalkeeper Koncilia (1) organised his defence safely and was quick to run out of goal to clear or smother the ball. He often started counter attacks by throwing the ball accurately and quickly to his colleagues. The winning goal followed a run on the right by Prohaska (8) and then quick interplay between Kreuz (10) and Jara (11). It was scored by the lively Krankl (9). Spain had only themselves to blame for dropping into an individual game and slackening their defence. At times their technique of play was clearly superior, especially in heading.

Teams:

**Austria:**
1 Koncilia, 2 Sara, 3 Obermayer, 4 Breitenberger, 5 Pezzey, 7 Hicksberger (67 min 15 Weber), 8 Prohaska, 9 Krankl, 10 Kreuz, 11 Jara, 18 Schachner (80 min 19 Pirkner)

**Spain:**
13 Gonzalez, 2 De la Cruz, 4 Asensi, 5 Bernardo, 7 Ruiz Bazan, 11 Cardenosa (46 min 14 Leal), 17 Perez, 18 Martinez, 19 Rexach (60 min 9 Castol), 20 Cano, 21 San Jose

**Goals:**
0:1 (10 min) 18 Schachner; 1:1 (21 min) 7 Ruiz Bazan; 1:2 (79 min) Krankl

Referee and Linesmen:

Wurtz (France) – Bouzo (Syria), Tesfaye (Ethiopia)

Austria v. Sweden

In the match Austria v. Sweden, there was no favourite. Each team played as though they must not lose whatever else, and thus developed a slow-moving game withoutrisks. Each team had eight players, notably Gomez (8) and Alonso (10) and under pressure from the Spanish, Hellstrom (1) in goal was again outstanding. Key players for Spain in combinations were Asensi (4), Biosca (6) and Cardenosa (11) but the whole team was mobile, exchanging places quickly and playing with determination. They made many penetrating attacks but goal attempts were ineffectual. Towards the end of the game, Spain deserved to win by Asensi's (4) good chance to score in the 76th minute of the game.

Teams:

**Sweden:**
1 Hellstrom, 2 Borg, 3 Andersson, 5 Erlandsson, 8 Larsson, Bo, 9 Larsson, Lennart, 10 Sjoberg (66 min 7 Linderoth), 15 Nilsson, 18 Nordahl, 22 Edstrom (59 min 11 Wendt)

**Spain:**
3 Alvarez, 4 Asensi, 6 Biosca, 8 Gomez, 10 Alonso, 11 Cardenosa, 13 Gonzalez, 14 Leal, 16 Olmo, 18 Martinez (46 min 18 Martinez), 17 Perez, 21 San Jose

**Goals:**
0:1 (76 min) 4 Asensi

Referee and Linesmen:

Biwersi (Germany FR) – Prokop (German DR), Ithurralde (Argentina)
Match Appraisal

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Peru v. Scotland

In their first match against Scotland, Peru started hesitantly, and Scotland frequently attacked mostly on the Johnston (11) left flank. Then, with clever interpassing in midfield, using three players against two Scots, the Peruvian team began to assert themselves giving Scotland cause for anxiety by the speed of run down the wings. It was against the run of play when Scotland scored the first goal. Quiroga (21), the goalkeeper, failed to hold a hard shot from Ríoch (6), and Jordan (9) seized an easy chance to score. Scotland were making more precise attacks, and Jordan (9), though closely marked and sometimes impeded by Velasquez (6), used his superior heading skill in attempts to supply his team mates with shooting chances.

Munante (7), Cubillas (10), Cueto (8) and Oblitas (11) made several threats on the Scottish goal and Rough (1), the Scottish goalkeeper, was forced to make two great saves. Just before half time the clever improvisation of Peru’s attacking skill through passing between Velasquez (6) and Cubillas (10), opened up the Scottish defence for Cueto (8) to score a fine equalising goal.

In the second half, Quiroga (21) made a brilliant save from Jordan (9) and shortly afterwards saved the penalty kick of Masson (7). These frustrations seemed to dispirit Scotland and fill Peru with confidence. Peru started to attack with variations of close interpassing play, running with change of pace and skilful ball control. Cubillas (10) scored two goals of great technical skill; the second by a deceptive free kick taken on the left hand side. Munante (7) ran on the ball and Cubillas (10) took a few steps to strike the ball using the outside of the right foot as it was going through in its stride, to curve the ball past the left side of the barrier of defenders into the goal by the near post. From then on Peru played out time and Scotland seemed too dazed to be able to lift their game. The match had produced some splendid football of contrasting styles. After scoring their first goal, Scotland began to slow down giving opportunity for Peru to exploit their superior ball skill and variation of pace. Scotland’s defence became disjointed and they lost control in the midfield. The two exceptional goals from Cubillas (10) were illustrative of his world ranking and reputation as a great player.

Teams:

**Peru:**
- Duarte, Manzo, Chumpitaz, Diaz, Velasquez, Munante, Cueto, Rivas, Jorion, Robert, Oblitas, La Rosa.

**Scotland:**

**Referee and Linesmen:**
- Eriksson (Sweden) - Franco Martinez (Spain), Tesfaye (Ethiopia)

Peru v. Holland

Play in this match was generally of a moderate standard and though the Dutch team displayed a superiority and seemed physically stronger, they were unable to produce goals. Their combined play especially on the left side of the field was too close. Too many players seemed to be on top of the ball. The Peru team, whenever they lost possession of the ball, formed defensive blocks of 7 or 8 players, thereby giving little room for Dutch forwards to move.

Though Holland shot frequently, these attempts were from long distances from goal. Quiroga (21) in goal was in good form, organising his defence well, especially in dealing with corners and free kicks. It seemed that Holland were underestimating Peru and towards the end of the game they were ready to settle for a draw with no goals. Peru used short attacking dashes through the centre with fast double passes, and made penetrating runs on the flank but their shooting was infrequent and surprisingly lacking in power. They were capable of varying their play, improvising with short corners and free kicks, but the Dutch goalkeeper Jongbloed (8) remained steadfast.

Teams:

**Holland:**

**Peru:**
- Rivas, Munante, Cueto, Velasquez, Jordan, Cueto, Diaz, Oblitas, La Rosa, 1 Rough, 4 Buchan, 6 Manzo, 10 Cubillas, 11 Oblitas, 16 Macari, 7 Masson, 19 La Rosa, 20 Solit, 21 Quiroga.
**Technical Study**

**Peru v. Iran**

Peru were clear favourites in this game and promisingly took the lead in the second minute with a powerful header by Velasquez (6) from a corner kick. They then began to attack using five players Munante (7), Cueto (8), Cubillas (10), Oblitas (11) and La Rosa (19) and produced many goal scoring chances. The midfield was abandoned except for Velasquez (6) and the defending players used a linear zone covering system which changed to man marking only near or in the penalty area. This allowed the Iranian team to make counter-attacks. The game was played in each defensive area with a gap of “no-man’s land” of 30 to 50 metres in midfield. The Iranians also used field covering in defence which landed them in trouble against the deceptive techniques and change of rhythm of Peru’s attack. Iran were heavily under pressure for most of the game and in some situations were compelled to act desperately. Two of these resulted in penalties from which Cubillas (10) scored, giving Peru a three goal lead. Some of the double passing movements with deviating flicks of the ball between Peruvian attackers were made at lightning speed, giving Iran defenders little opportunity to tackle as they had done in their first two games. Before half-time, Rowshan (10) of Iran was quite undisturbed in scoring a goal, after receiving a ball which was badly headed by the linear defence of Peru.

This defensive weakness was to prove an Achilles heel to Perú’s aspirations in the matches of the second round. As neither team used a defensive libero, their open style of attacking play produced an entertaining game. In the late stages of the second half, Cubillas (10) rounded off a good Peruvian combination of passing with a quick dribble and a safe shot.

**Teams:**

**Peru:** 21 Quiroga, 2 Duarte, 3 Manzo (67 min 15 Leguia), 4 Chumpitaz, 5 Diaz, 6 Velasquez, 7 Munante, 8 Cueto, 10 Cubillas, 11 Oblitas, 19 La Rosa (62 min 20 Sotil)

**Iran:**

1 Hejazi, 2 Danaifir, 5 Allahwardi, 7 Parvin, 8 Ghassempour, 9 Sadeghi, 10 Rowshan (66 min 3 Fariba), 14 Nazari, 18 Faraki (51 min 17 Jahani), 20 Abdullahi, 21 Kazerani

**Goals:**

1:0 (2 min) 6 Velasquez; 1:0 (2 min) 6 Velasquez; 2:0 (36 min) 10 Cubillas; 3:0 (39 min) 10 Cubillas; 3:1 (40 min) 10 Rowshan; 4:1 (78 min) 10 Cubillas

**Refreree and Linesmen:**

Prokop (German DR) - Coerezza (Argentina), Ivanov (USSR)

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**Holland v. Iran**

In this first match, Holland – a clear favourite – playing a 1.3.3.3 basic formation with interchanging functions and using the offside game, gave an impression of a coordinated and well-balanced side, looking superior in every respect and especially in attack. Even so, the offside trap did not work in the sixteenth minute of play and brought Iran a chance to score which was missed. Then, too, though Holland played mostly in their opponents’ half, they did not achieve a full performance. Having secured a lead they seemed to be content with sparing themselves and avoiding injury.

Iran used a 4.4.2 basic formation, clearly all set for defence, and, being practised in zone defending, did not use fully the “libero” cover of Kazeran (21). Their hard tackling of the ball when in possession of the opponent, led to many fouls, for the Dutch are accustomed to moving the ball quickly to evade the fast tackle. The two penalties from which goals were scored were a result of this commitment to tackle irrespective of the player-ball situation. Several times two or three Iranians were so eager to get at the man with the ball that they got in each other’s way.

Holland seemed content to contain the attacking pressure of their opponents making well-timed use of the offside trap. Only Rensenbrink (12) on the left wing had shots at goal, and he scored the 100th goal in the World Cup from a penalty kick given for a foul on Rep (16). Scotland deserved their equaliser when Dalglash (8) scored just on half-time. Immediately the game restarted, Scotland went ahead with a penalty converted by Gemmill (15). The same player later scored again, this time after brilliantly dribbling past three men in tight space in the penalty area and shooting past Jongbloed (8) as he rushed out to smother the ball.

The situation was now uncomfortable for Holland – for another goal to Scotland would tip the balance of goal difference for Scotland to qualify for the
England were not to be underestimated. They had been strong in the opening rounds and were determined to make a statement in the group stage. However, their opponents in this game were Holland, who had shown great resilience and tactical acumen in their previous encounters.

The atmosphere in the stadium was electric as the two teams took the field. England started the game strongly, with their forwards looking to create openings against the Dutch defense. Holland, on the other hand, were operating with more caution, utilizing their midfielders to control the game and create opportunities through precise passing.

In the 18th minute, England's efforts were rewarded when they took the lead through a well-taken goal. The Dutch, however, did not lose their composure and continued to press forward with their attacking flair.

The second half was marked by a shift in momentum. Holland, driven by their determination, increased their pressure on the English defense. They managed to equalize in the 65th minute, capitalizing on a defensive error by England. The game then became a tense affair as both teams looked for the winning goal.

In the final minutes, Holland pushed for an advantage but were unable to find the breakthrough. The game ended in a 1-1 draw, leaving both teams with a point each and setting the stage for a crucial final game in the group stage.

Teams:
England:
1 Rough, 2 Jardine, 3 Donachie, 4 Buchan, 6 Rioch, 8 Dalglish, 9 Jordan, 10 Hartford, 13 Kennedy, 14 Forsyth, 15 Gemmill, 18 Souness

Holland:
2 Poortvliet, 5 Krool, 6 Jansen, 8 Jongbloed, 10 Van de Kerkhof, René, 11 Van de Kerkhof, Wilhelmus, 12 Rensenbrink, 13 Neeskens (10 min 14 Boskamp), 16 Rep, 17 Rijsbergen (45 min 7 Wildschut), 20 Suurbier

Goals:
0:1 (34 min) 15 Rensenbrink; 1:1 (44 min) 8 Dalglish; 1:2 (53 min) 15 Gemmill; 2:2 (70 min) 19 Robertson

Referee and Linesmen:
N'Diaye (Senegal) – Rainea (Rumania), Coelho (Brazil)
Holland v. Austria

Holland in their first match in Group A began to attack at a pace which was to prove overwhelming for Austria. At one point the whole team except the goalkeeper surged forward into attack. Krol (5) was at the centre of these moves and his long passes found their way to the wingers especially Rensenbrink (12) who seemed able to shake off his markers with ease. After being fouled, Rensenbrink (12) took the free kick and amidst the swarm of Dutch players advancing on goal, Brandts (22) scored with a header.

Austria retaliated with Krankl (9) quick to seize on a centre from Prohaska (8) but his header was saved by Schrijvers (1) in goal. Krieger (12) also triggered off some dangerous approaches to worry the Dutch defenders. Austria missed a good chance to score after some neat passing between Jara (11) and Kreuz (10) but Poortvliet (2) intercepted.

Early in the second half Holland added a fourth goal, again initiated by Rensenbrink (12) who passed for Rep (16) to shake off his opponent and score. Krankl (9) for Austria worked hard to create attacking play and was always on the lookout for chances to shoot. Austria began to have more of the ball in midfield but they did not seem to know what to do with it, whereas when the Dutch counterattacked, they were always more dangerous. Some violent clashes occurred and Austria scored after a free kick which boosted their morale.

Yet a skilful counterattack saw Rensenbrink (12) running sixty yards, cleverly avoiding two opponents and passing to Kerkhof (11) who neatly tipped the ball into goal as the goalkeeper advanced. Austria’s control in the midfield continued but they spoiled this with some poor passes which were easily intercepted. The game ended with a score of 5-1, giving Holland the advantage of a four goal difference in their challenge for a place in the Final.
In the second half there was a transformation. Holland began to control the middle of the field and Italy were forced more and more to defend. In five minutes Brandts (22) went through a gap in the Italian defence to score an equaliser. Rossi (21) played a fine solo game in making attacking probes at the Dutch defence, but Holland were using every man to press home their attacks. Krol (5) went the length of the field before losing the ball. Then Haan (9) advanced down the left wing in an apparently harmless move and from 35 metres crashed in a shot which surprised Zoff (1) and went in off the post. Holland continued their attacks and Neeskens (13) and Rensenbrink (12) made good attempts to score. Italy's last chance came from an isolated attacking move from Rossi (21) who, after beating two defenders, was finally robbed of the ball by Jansen (6) in the goal area.

Teams:

Holland:
1 Schrijvers, 2 Poortvliet, 5 Krol, 6 Jan-
sen, 7 Wildschut (78 min 18 Nanninga -
88 min expulsion), 9 Haan, 10 Van de
Kerkhof, René, 11 Van de Kerkhof, Wil-
helmus, 12 Rensenbrink, 16 Rep, 22
Brandts

Goals:
1:2 (2 min) 7 Abraccimz; 1:1 (26 min)
9 Haan; 1:2 (69 min) 14 Müller, Dieter;
2:2 (83 min) 10 Van de Kerkhof, René

Referee and Linesmen:
Barreto Ruiz (Uruguay) – Coelho (Bra-
zil), Comesana (Argentina)

Holland v. Italy
This was a critical match for both teams. Holland had to win to qualify for the Final whereas, with their superior goal differ-
ence, Holland could get to the Final with a drawn match. Few observers had valued Italy's chances at the beginning of the Competition, but so far they had played extremely well, and the Dutch team, though never achieving their full potential, had proved to be an effective and well-coordinated side.

The match was interesting in a tactical sense though the standard of play was not as good as one had expected. In the first five minutes, Italy surprised Hol-
land by their repeated attacks on goal. Causio (16) was a source of trouble and from his centres both Tardelli (14) and Rossi (21), when well positioned, headed over the bar. Italy in defence marked their men closely and their forwards chased back to help to stop the Dutch in their fast moving game.

In the ninth minute, Rossi (21), from a pass from Causio (16), managed to beat Schrijvers (1) the Dutch goalkeeper only for Krol (5) to clear. Once again Causio (16) sent an excellent pass to Tardelli (14) and Rossi (21), when well positioned, headed over the bar. Italy in defence marked their men closely and their forwards chased back to help to stop the Dutch in their fast moving game.

In the second half there was a transformation. Holland began to control the middle of the field and Italy were forced more and more to defend. In five minutes Brandts (22) went through a gap in the Italian defence to score the equaliser. Rossi (21) played a fine solo game in making attacking probes at the Dutch defence, but Holland were using every man to press home their attacks. Krol (5) went the length of the field before losing the ball. Then Haan (9) advanced down the left wing in an apparently harmless move and from 35 metres crashed in a shot which surprised Zoff (1) and went in off the post. Holland continued their attacks and Neeskens (13) and Rensenbrink (12) made good attempts to score. Italy's last chance came from an isolated attacking move from Rossi (21) who, after beating two defenders, was finally robbed of the ball by Jansen (6) in the goal area.

Teams:

Holland:
1 Schrijvers (21 min 8 Jongbloed), 2
Poortvliet, 5 Krol, 6 Jansen, 9 Haan, 10
Van de Kerkhof, René, 11 Van de
Kerkhof, Wilhelmus, 12 Rensenbrink, 16
Causio (46 min 17 Sala), 18 Bettega, 21
Rossi

Goals:
0:0 (55 min) 22 Brandts (own goal); 1:0
(68 min 15 Beer), 2:0 (88 min 18 Nanninga -
Kraaij), 22 Brandts

Referee and Linesmen:
Franco Martinez (Spain) - Orozco
(Peru), Pesarino (Argentina)

Italy v. Germany F.R.
This proved to be a tough game, with two teams challenging hard for possession of the ball. Italy had 14 fouls in the first half and Germany F.R. 5, whereas in the sec-
ond half Germany F.R. had 12 fouls and Italy 6. Germany F.R. were slightly the better side in the first half with 20
penetrating attacks and 4 attempts to score against Italy's 19 penetration attacks and 4 attempts to score.

German players were skillful in double play and in reversing positions in short passing movements. In the second half, however, Italy dominated play and
made 22 penetrating attacks with 9 attempts to score against Germany F.R.'s score of 10:2. Italy had the best chances of scoring. Early in the game
Bettega (18) brilliantly dribbled past three opponents and his shot was luckily cleared and shortly afterwards the same player missed an open goal. Kaltz
(5) of Germany F.R. cleared twice from the line with Maier (1) beaten. Italy frequently attacked with 4 or 5 advanced players. When a player ran through from behind to attract attention, others were ready to play double passes to break through the defence. Fortunately for Germany F.R., Dietz (3) was able to subdue the ebullient Causio (16).

For the second half brought more pressure from Italy with Germany F.R. misusing more tackles. In one movement seven Italian players were pushing forward in attack in an effort to score the vital goal. Vogts (2) and Rüssmann (4) changed roles in marking, Vogts (2) doing better against Rossi (21) and Rüssmann (4) better against Bettega (18). Unfortunately for Germany F.R., they had to replace two of their best players, Flohe (10) and Zimmermann (8) because of injury and they began to resort to more defensive play to hold on to the draw.

The football was ordinary but as a game it was an impressionable tussle between two very well-organised teams, especially in defence. Italy were disappointed not to have turned their supremacy in the second half into a winning margin.

Teams:

Holland:
1 Maier, 2 Vogts, 3 Dietz, 4 Rüssmann,
5 Kaltz, 6 Bonhof, 7 Abraccimz, 11 Rum-
menigge, 14 Müller, Dieter, 15 Beer, 17
Holzenbein

Goals:
0:1 (2 min) 7 Abraccimz; 1:1 (26 min)
9 Haan; 1:2 (69 min) 14 Müller, Dieter;
2:2 (83 min) 10 Van de Kerkhof, René

Referee and Linesmen:
Barreto Ruiz (Uruguay) – Coelho (Bra-
zil), Comesana (Argentina)

Italy v. Austria
This was the second match for these teams, Austria having suffered heavily against Holland and Italy feeling
anxious to win after their frustrating draw against Germany F.R. Austria disposed its side to stifle the dangerous strikers of Italy; Krieger (12) close marking Rossi (21) and Pezzey (5) normally the centre half playing against Bettega (18). The vital axis of Italy was Zoff (1) in fine form in goal, Scirea (8), a very composed sweeper, Benetti (10) a midfield player quick to anticipate the next move, and Rossi (21) a young penetrative striker with outstanding agility and feinting skills, quick off-the-mark and never tiring in his efforts to break through the opposing defence.

Italy played a 1.3.5.1 pattern with the two wingers Causio (16) and Bettega (18) drawing back into midfield. There was always a tight, close marking defence of 7, 8 or even 9 players barring the approach to goal. In attack Italy’s interpassing was quick with sudden bursts from Causio (16), Bettega (18), Tardelli (14) and Rossi (21).

Austria played a 1.3.6 in defence and 1.3.4.2 in attack. Krankl (9) and Schachner (18) were the forward target players having support from several midfield players and the two full backs. On the whole, however, they preferred making secure passes to keep possession of the ball and to try long range shooting against the packed defence of Italy.

The Italian goal against Austria was something of a gift, Tardelli (14), chasing a defender, managed to strike the ball from his feet direct into goal.

**Teams:**
- **Italy:** 1 Zoff, 2 Bellugi (46 min 4 Cuccureddu), 3 Cabrini, 5 Gentile, 8 Scirea, 10 Benetti, 14 Tardelli, 15 Zaccarelli, 16 Causio, 18 Bettega (71 min 19 Graziani), 21 Rossi
- **Austria:** 1 Koncilia, 2 Sara, 3 Obermayer, 5 Pezzey, 7 Hickersberger, 8 Prohaska, 9 Krankl, 10 Kreuz, 12 Krieger, 14 Strasser, 18 Schachner (63 min 19 Pirkner)

**Goals:**
- 0:1 (19 min) 11 Rummenigge
- 1:0 (13 min) 21 Rossi

**Referee and Linesmen:**
- Rion (Belgium) – Coerezza (Argentina), N’Diaye (Senegal)

**Germany F.R. v. Austria**

At this stage, Germany F.R., if they won this match, had the chance of playing in the third place final. There was still some doubt in the team about its coordinated tactical play. Austria, as the outsider, were modestly aiming to achieve a prestigious result in their last match. Each team knew the other and some players were colleagues in the same club sides.

The German team lacked a powerful axis from defence to attack. There was potential in the side, but no dominating midfield player to link with surrounding players. In consequence there was a lot of uncoordinated effort and running with the ball, producing many one against one combats which failed. Strikers lacked support and got lost amidst superior numbers of defenders or were upset by rough tackling.

Austria, whilst not being a spectacular team, had Obermayer (3) and Pezzey (5), two strong personality players in defence, Prohaska (8) a vivid motivator in midfield and Krankl (9) a dangerous hardworking forward. Moreover, every player seemed confident in his role.

Germany F.R. played strict man-to-man marking and defenders were strangely limited in making attacks to put pressure on the Austrian defence. There was no depth to final attacking play and on occasions when the ball was cleared, five German attackers were left stranded. The German defence looked shaky and players more and more relied on individual effort. Penetrating runs without the ball were rarely seen. Even so, Germany F.R. made some mature attacks but poor, nervous finishing spoiled these and Austria grew more confident. Germany F.R. took the lead by a goal scored by Rummenigge (11) after a series of wall passes on the right flank. With an own goal by Vogts (2) Austria equalised when there was confusion in the German defence. Krankl (9) from inside the penalty area collected a centre, lofted the ball over Maier and scored the second goal for Austria. One minute later, Hölzenbein (17) drew level with a header from a free kick on the right flank by Bonhof (6). Finally Krankl (9) scored to win the game for Austria by dribbling past two defenders into the penalty area.

The referee allowed crude tackling to go by in the early stages and then later had to caution players for wild last-second fouls. There was discord, too, in the judgement of offside.

Germany F.R. looked a strong team only when playing Holland. In spite of thorough preparation the team, without star players, lacked confidence and resorted to cautious play. Against Poland, Tunisia, Italy (2nd half) and Austria, Germany F.R. played below their best standard of invigorating, aggressive football. Then, too, the changes in attack did not work out well, probably due to the inexperience of some of the players. Overall the team seemed to suffer from the heavy responsibility of living up to their reputation as World Champions.

**Teams:**
- **Austria:**
  - 1 Koncilia, 2 Sara, 3 Obermayer, 5 Pezzey, 7 Hickersberger, 8 Prohaska, 9 Krankl, 10 Kreuz, 12 Krieger, 14 Strasser, 18 Schachner (71 min 17 Oberacher)
- **Germany F.R.:**
  - 1 Maier, 2 Vogts, 3 Dietz, 4 Rüssmann, 5 Kaltz, 6 Bonhof, 7 Abramczik, 11 Rummenigge, 14 Müller, Dieter (60 min 9 Fischer), 15 Beer (46 min 20 Müller, Hans), 17 Hölzenbein

**Goals:**
- 0:1 (19 min) 11 Rummenigge
- 1:1 (59 min) 2 Vogts (own goal)
- 2:1 (66 min) 9 Krankl
- 2:2 (67 min) 17 Hölzenbein
- 3:2 (87 min) 9 Krankl

**Referee and Linesmen:**
- Klein (Israel) – Da Silva Garrido (Portugal), Jarguz (Poland)
Match Appraisal

Group B

Brazil and Argentina, as joint favourites in this group, had to win their first matches. Brazil improved their form against Peru and held on to a 3-0 lead despite several spirited thrusts by their opponents late in the game. Argentina fought well to triumph over Poland who had themselves to blame for missed chances. Poland, in beating Peru by the odd goal, gave themselves an outside chance of finishing in the first four of the Competition should either Brazil or Argentina falter. The match between these teams was extremely tense and spoiled by the many aggressive and petulant fouls committed by both teams. With equal points both teams had all to play for in their last matches. Brazil played earlier in the day and their victory over Poland by 3-1 left Argentina with the knowledge that in their evening match against Peru, they must win by a margin of 4 goals to qualify for the Final. The defeat of Peru by six clear goals was the most sensational result of the Tournament, proving bitterly disappointing to Brazil, the only team to remain undefeated throughout the Competition.

Argentina v. Poland

Argentina were fortunate to play all their Group B matches in Rosario where the enthusiastic local support became an important factor in stimulating the team to victory. The first match against Poland was of special interest, with differences in general style and between individual players. Then both teams had to play to win. It proved to be an exceptional match with rich play in many parts. Both teams were aiming for positive football but in Poland's case every part of the team was organised as a strong, cooperative unit. In contrast to Argentina, the Polish defence used man-to-man marking, usually with Gorgon (6) playing a deep sweeper role. For this match, however, Gorgon (6) was injured and his replacement Kasperczak (8), being a midfield type of player was less experienced in covering the back defenders. In the circumstances Kempes (10) of Argentina crept through the defensive line without further intervention to score both goals. Then too, Zmuda (9), normally strong in man-to-man marking, was unable to keep in touch with the wandering Kempes (10), giving him greater freedom of movement.

In the middle of the field, Poland were most efficient; Boniek (18), Nawalka (5) and Masztaler (11) covering and upsetting the combined play of Ardiles (2), Gallego (6), Valencia (21) and then Villa (22) in the second half. Then these players joined in the constructive game led by Deyna (12), and made several efforts to score. Boniek (18) had two chances and Nawalka (5) and Deyna (12) one each. The high pace of the rhythm of play of Poland could not be followed by the Argentinian team. Deyna (12) was everywhere but in vital situations he failed to follow all the intentions of his colleagues and was unsettled when he missed a penalty in a decisive moment of the game. In attack, Lato (16) was the penetrator with the ball and Szarmach (17) the forward player moving from the left into goal spaces to strike. By constantly changing position they confused the zone defence of Argentina and gave time for other Polish players to join in their forays, creating six good scoring chances. Fillol (5), however, was in great form and defended his goal superbly. The Argentinian team, in addition to their two goals, had only one other real chance to score.
Luque (14) had not recovered and therefore Kempes (10) was again playing as striker but this time he moved in all directions making it difficult for his opponent to keep in contact, but came back to the centre for his scoring chances.

Teams:
Poland:
1 Tomaszewski, 3 Maculewicz, 4 Szymanski, 5 Nawalka, 8 Kasperczak, 9 Zmuda, 11 Marszalter (64 min 2 Mazur), 12 Deyna, 16 Lato, 17 Szarmaszewski, 18 Szmarz

Argentina:
2 Ardiles, 4 Bertoni, 5 Fillol, 6 Gallego, 7 Galvan, 9 Houseman (83 min 16 Ortiz), 10 Kempes, 15 Olguin, 19 Passarella, 20 Tarantini, 21 Valencia (46 min 22 Villa)

Argentina v. Brazil

Every game in the tournament had its relative importance, yet the match between Argentina and Brazil was crucial to both teams for if either lost they would not feature in the Final and could even be eliminated. The more recent history of past matches between these teams gave Brazil the edge. Brazil had still to find a form reflecting the true potential of their players, but in this game they were familiar with the tactics and abilities of the Argentinian team. In addition, the four-man defence was experienced in individual marking of opponents, and in the midfield Brazil also used four players with specific defensive roles with Chicaco (21), a tall and strong player, marking Kempes (10).

For Argentina there was the fear that playing their positive football in a free way would mean taking risks. Yet they must not lose. Luque (14) was back in the team but could not immediately pick up his previous form, particularly against Oscar (3) the Brazilian centre half, helped ably by Amaral (4). Entrance through the centre of play for Argentina proved to be most difficult and in later stages Luque (14) seemed a spent force and Kempes (10) was also below his best. It was left to Bertoni (4) and Ortiz (16) to try to make openings through the flanks. On one occasion Bertoni (4) outwitted the Brazilian defence only for Ortiz (16) to miss an open goal. Yet, Brazil being slightly faster on the ball and more fluid in play were able to break away quickly from defence to attack. Thus Brazil produced more penetrating attacks and more attempts to score with shots on target.

The game was spoiled by personal fouling, obstruction and poorly timed tackling and handling of the ball. As both goalkeepers were in fine form, a no-score draw seemed to be the inevitable outcome of the game, acceptable to both teams.

Argentina:
2 Ardiles (46 min 22 Villa), 4 Bertoni, 5 Fillol, 6 Gallego, 7 Galvan, 10 Kempes, 14 Luque, 15 Olguin, 16 Ortiz (60 min 1 Alonso), 19 Passarella, 20 Tarantini

Brazil:
1 Leao, 2 Toninho, 3 Oscar, 4 Amaral, 5 Ronald, 6 Rodrigues Neto (34 min 6 Endinho), 16 Valenca, 17 Batista, 18 Gil, 19 Pinto Mendonca (67 min 8 Zico), 20 Roberto, 21 Chicaco

Goals:
Argentina: 0:1 (15 min) 10 Kempes; 0:2 (71 min) 10 Kempes

Brazil: 1:0 (20 min) 10 Kempes; 2:0 (43 min) 20 Tarantini; 3:0 (48 min) 10 Kempes; 4:0 (50 min) 14 Luque; 5:0 (60 min) 9 Houseman; 6:0 (72 min) 14 Luque

Referee and Linesmen:
Eriksson (Sweden) - Namdar (Iran), Tesfaye (Ethiopia)

Argentina v. Peru

The third match for Argentina against Peru was amazing in every respect. The result of the game between Brazil and Poland meant that Argentina had to win by at least four goals to qualify for the Final. This was a gigantic task but, in the heady atmosphere of emotional support from their spectators, the zest and verve of attacking pressure by the Argentinian team quickly began to overwhelm their opponents. Argentina took risks in going all out for goals and indeed were fortunate that Peru missed two good scoring chances, one of which hit the upright.

Kempes (10) scored a fine first goal using a wall pass to race past the last defenders and then neatly controlled the return pass to shoot. There followed a series of near goals which increased the tension and anxiety as half-time grew near, to be relieved when Tarantini (20) headed another fine goal. In this half, Argentina had mounted 38 penetrating attacks against 7 by Peru and made 15 attempts to score against 3, figures giving a clear indication of the irrepressible attacking pressure by the Argentinians. The question at half-time in every onlooker's mind was whether Argentina could score another two goals in the second period. Three minutes after the restart, the third goal was scored by Kempes (10) following a free kick by Olguin (15) and the Peru team began then to lose heart and legs to keep chasing and challenging. Within 5 minutes, Luque (14) had scored the vital fourth goal and then Houseman (9) set the issue beyond all doubt by scoring a fifth goal, followed shortly after by another goal from Luque (14). Argentina had played with total commitment, calling upon inner resources of physical effort to produce an incessant drive at their opponent's goal, which the Peruvian players, try as they did, were unable to stop.

Teams:
Argentina:
10 Kempes, 12 Larrosa, 14 Luque, 15 Olguin, 16 Ortiz, 19 Passarella, 20 Tarantini

Peru:
2 Duarte, 3 Manzo, 4 Chumpitaz, 6 Velasquez (51 min 16 Gorriti), 7 Munante, 8 Cueto, 10 Cubillas, 11 Oblitas, 17 Quezada, 21 Quiroga, 22 Rojas

Goals:
Argentina: 1:0 (20 min) 10 Kempes; 2:0 (43 min) 20 Tarantini; 3:0 (48 min) 10 Kempes; 4:0 (50 min) 14 Luque; 5:0 (60 min) 9 Houseman; 6:0 (72 min) 14 Luque

Referee and Linesmen:
Wurtz (France) - Biwersi (Germany FR), Gonella (Italy)

Brazil v. Peru

Brazil must have been well pleased by the scale of their victories over Peru and Poland with scores of 3-0 and 3-1 and have been hopeful of qualifying once more for a Final before Argentina swamped Peru.

With no specific target to aim at, Brazil produced their best attacking game against Peru, achieving a total of 56 penetrating attacks with 24 attempts to score and 3 goals. The game was not all one way, however, and Peru did well to make 38 penetrating attacks and 18 attempts to score. In one phase in the second half, Peru began to control the play with good approach but Brazil's defence stood firm. The football was typical of South American style, full of
running with the ball and excellent short passing, but both sides failed to take chances, though there were some near misses. Dirceu (11) scored the first goal from a curving free kick which completely deceived Quiroga (21) in goal. Then he added a second with an unexpected hard shot from well outside the penalty area. Zico (8) had only just joined the team as a substitute midway through the second half to score the third goal from a penalty kick.

Teams:
Brazil:
1 Leao, 2 Toninho, 3 Oscar, 4 Amaral, 5 Cerezo (76 min 10 Rivelino), 11 Dirceu, 16 Rodrigues Neto, 17 Batista, 18 Gil (70 min 8 Zico), 19 Mendonca, 20 Roberto
Peru:
21 Quiroga, 2 Duarte, 3 Manzo, 4 Chumpitaz, 5 Diaz (11 min 14 Navarro), 6 Velasquez, 7 Munante, 8 Cueto, 10 Cubillas, 11 Oblitas (46 min 9 Rojas), 19 La Rosa

Goals:
1:0 (14 min) 13 Nelinho; 1:1 (45 min) 16 Lato; 2:1 (57 min) 20 Roberto; 3:1 (62 min) 20 Roberto

Referee and Linesmen:
Rainea (Rumania) – Dubach (Switzerland), Winsemann (Canada)

Brazil v. Poland
The different styles were well marked in this game, Poland using longer passes and Brazil their short combinations of interpassing play. In the second half, both teams had several goalscoring chances but Poland flattered them away. Without reaching the speed or quality of their game against Peru, Brazil deserved to win. When Mendonca (19) replaced Zico (8), the Brazilian attack assumed more offensive qualities. After the first quick goal from a curving free kick by Nelinho (13), the defensive line of Brazil played without taking undue risks to prevent Polish efforts to equalise. Boniek (18) of Poland was the only Polish player to create danger and he was the instigator of the goal just on halftime, scored by Lato (16). In the second half, Brazil made some excellent attacking moves culminating in shots against the posts and crossbar. Roberto (20) took clever advantage of rebounds to add two further goals. Dirceu (11) was a tireless worker in many good movements, especially that which produced the third goal. With the score at 3-1, the Poles took risks and exerted strong pressure on the Brazilian defence.

Teams:
Brazil:
1 Leao, 2 Toninho, 3 Oscar, 4 Amaral, 5 Cerezo (77 min 10 Rivelino), 8 Zico (7 min 19 Pinto Mendonca), 11 Dirceu, 13 Nelinho, 17 Batista, 18 Gil, 20 Roberto
Poland:
3 Maculewicz, 4 Szymanowski, 5 Nawalka, 6 Gorgon, 8 Kasperczak (64 min 19 Lubanski), 9 Zmuda, 12 Deyna, 16 Lato, 17 Szarmach, 18 Boniek, 21 Kukla

Goals:
1:0 (13 min) 13 Nelinho; 1:1 (45 min) 16 Lato; 2:1 (57 min) 20 Roberto; 3:1 (62 min) 20 Roberto

Referee and Linesmen:
Silvagno (Chile) – Archundia (Mexico),
Third Place Final Match

Brazil 2 : Italy 1

Before this match, the Italian team had played two difficult games against Germany F.R. and Holland. Italy had dominating periods of play in both matches followed unfortunately by bad patches, which lost them the lead against Holland and led to defeat from two goals from long shots. This disappointment following their success in winning all their matches in Group 1 had affected their attitude for their game against Brazil, more especially because they were also without three key players - Tardelli (14) and Benetti (10) because of infringements in previous matches and Zaccarelli (15) through injury.

In the 1974 competition, Brazil had played and lost by the odd goal to Poland. In view of the pending Final between Argentina and Holland, the game against Italy also had something of a "consolation match" atmosphere, yet Brazil had to prove themselves and show that they were deserving of greater things.

The game started brightly enough with Italy attacking and then Brazil but after the first 15 minutes, it slowed down and became dull. Italy were able to absorb the attacks of the Brazilian team and when Causio (16), Bettega (1) and Rossi (21) attacked and switched positions they looked dangerous. Wherever he went, Rossi (21) was able to gather a pass and turn to cause trouble to the Brazilian defenders. It was a centre from Rossi (21) on the right which found Causio (16) running in at the left of the far post to head a good goal. Shortly afterwards Causio (16) struck the crossbar and hit a post with further shots. Indeed, despite more frequent pressure from Brazil in the first half, Italy were superior, though in midfield Batista (17) and Dircceu (1) of Brazil were constantly in action supported by other busy Brazilian players, especially the raiding full-backs.

The second half almost entirely belonged to the Brazilian players who lifted their game. Italy adopted a traditional defensive role seemingly to hold on to their single goal lead. Nelinho's (13) equaliser was an exceptional goal coming from a curving shot from near the right corner which escaped the reach of goalkeeper Zoff (1). Nelinho (13), it seems, has scored several goals of this nature. From then on Brazil piled on the pressure with Dircceu (11) and Batista (17) becoming more effervescent. When Rivelino (10) replaced Cerezo (5) he created a diversion with some strangely aggressive and provocative play which gave Dircceu (11) more freedom and his brilliant long shot in the 70th minute won the game for Brazil. Italy then started to attack again in order to retrieve the situation and almost on time Bettega (18) had the misfortune to head against the bar from a free kick.

During the first 30 minutes players on both sides played open football and the referee had no problems but after Italy had scored the first goal, several fouls were committed and referee Klein had to show two yellow cards to Brazilians, the last to Batista (17) just before half time. The second half was quiet until Rivelino (10) came on as a substitute and played wildly bringing retaliating action from Italy.

Italy's system of play had been a mixture of the old and new, but for long periods they used seven or eight player defence as a basis for counter attacking, which they created by a mixture of quick but secure interpassing and sudden bursts. Brazil showed their customary skill of moving with close ball control, drawing an opponent and releasing the ball the very instant of the tackle. Their interpassing was varied in pace and range and often an individual player would run with the ball and dribble over a long distance. The outstanding feature of their play was that nearly all field players interchanged positions over a wide area when moving into attack.

Teams:

**Italy:**
1 Zoff, 3 Cabrini, 4 Cuccureddu, 5 Gentile, 6 Maldera, 8 Scirea, 9 Antognoni (78 min 17 Sala, Claudio), 13 Sala, Patricio, 16 Causio, 18 Bettega, 21 Rossi

**Brazil:**
1 Leao, 3 Oscar, 4 Amaral, 5 Cerezo (64 min 10 Rivelino), 11 Dircceu, 13 Nelinho, 16 Rodrigues, Neto, 17 Batista, 18 Gil (46 min 9 Reinaldo), 19 Pinto Mendonca, 20 Roberto

**Goals:**
1:0 (38 min) 16 Causio; 1:1 (64 min) 13 Nelinho; 2:1 (71 min) 11 Dircceu

**Referee and Linesmen:**
Klein (Israel) - Palotai (Hungary), Gonzalez Archundia (Mexico)
Argentina 3: Holland 1

This Final was a match to be remembered, full of football action, drama and swaying fortune. Holland were disconcerted by the prolonged delay in starting the game due to the late arrival of the Argentinean team on the field and angered by the protest about the wrist strapping on René van de Kerkhof (10). These incidents seemed to engender an antagonistic attitude and many fouls were committed by both sides but chiefly by Holland. Argentina were a superior attacking force in the first half, making 21 penetrating attacks and 11 attempts to score against 14 and 5 by Holland. Both teams were taking risks often leaving only four rear defenders to face counter attacks, yet players moving up in attack were equally willing to chase back and tackle at the ball, and both defences used the offside trap.

Passarella (19) twice surprised the Dutch team by moving unmarked at goal, first to shoot and then to head, but Jongbloed (8) saved well. At the other end Fillol (5) made a thrilling acrobatic save from a shot by Rep (16). The Dutch were clearly superior in heading and on another occasion Neeskens (13) nodded the ball down to Rensenbrink (12) whose close range shot Fillol (5) stopped with his foot. After a complex interpassing and dribbling sequence which included Gallego (6), Ardiles (2) and Luque (14), the ball was finally passed to Kempes (10) racing into space at speed who then dribbled and managed to make his shot and score the first goal.

In the second half, the Dutch team raised the level of their play. Their superiority is shown by the tally of 31 penetrating attacks with 11 attempts to score against Argentina's 10 attacks and 2 attempts to score. The equalising goal resulted from a quick turn and run by René van de Kerkhof (10), which escaped the offside trap of the Argentinean defence. His centre was perfectly placed for substitute Nanninga (18) to head a splendid goal, disturbed as he was by two Argentinean defenders. With only 30 seconds before the end of the second half, the defensive line of Argentina again attempted to play offside, and again one defender failed to respond, which allowed Rensenbrink (12) to break through but with only Fillol (5) to beat, his shot hit the post and fortunately for Argentina it rebounded directly to one of their players who kicked out of play.

Holland were unable to sustain this effort in extra time and their marking and tackling in defence became less effective. Passarella (19) taking a free kick for offside, passed the ball to Bertoni (4) who escaped his opponent and sent the ball into space which Kempes (10) controlled on the run and dribbled past two opponents. He then made a double pass, running by three defenders to appear alone with the ball in front of Jongbloed (8), the Dutch goalkeeper.

His first shot rebounded back to him, and, evading two opponents, he then scored. Holland stretched themselves further to try to gain a goal and it was a pity that Argentina spoiled their achievement by wasting time and handling the ball to stop Dutch attacks.

The third goal for Argentina again started with a free kick and came about from combined and very tight interpassing between Bertoni (4) and Kempes (10) leaving Bertoni (4) to score from a favourable position close to goal. Argentina had matched Holland in physical condition during normal play and they seemed fresher and stronger in extra time. Fillol (5) had saved Argentina in their desperate moments and Kempes (10) had excelled to make the winning goals – but overall it was a team effort of persistence as, for example, the way in which Bertoni (4) started to win his duels with Poortvliet (2), the attacking roles of Passarella (19), Gallego (6), Olguin (15) and Tarantini (20), and the way in which Ardiles (2), Kempes (10) and Gallego (6) chased their opponents Haan (9), Kerkhof (11) and Neeskens (13). Holland had the opportunity to win the game during the long periods of superior play in the second half when they quietened the vociferous support from Argentinean spectators. Yet over the whole game these supporters were a contributory influence in inspiring their team to a great triumph.

**Teams:**

**Argentina:**
2 Ardiles (65 min 12 Larrosa), 4 Bertoni, 5 Fillol, 6 Gallego, 7 Galvan, 10 Kempes, 14 Luque, 15 Olguin, 16 Ortiz (74 min 9 Houseman), 19 Passarella, 20 Tarantini

**Holland:**
2 Poortvliet, 5 Krol, 6 Jansen (72 min 20 Suurbier), 8 Jongbloed, 9 Haan, 10 Van de Kerkhof, 11 Van de Kerkhof, Wilhelmus, 12 Rensenbrink, 13 Neeskens, 16 Rep (59 min 18 Nanninga), 22 Brandts

**Goals:**
1:0 (38 min) 10 Kempes; 1:1 (81 min) 18 Nanninga; Extra-time: 2:1 (15 min) 10 Kempes; 3:1 (24 min) 4 Bertoni

**Referee and Linesmen:**
Gonella (Italy) – Barreto (Argentina), Linemayr (Austria)
Opening Ceremony - Cérémonie d'ouverture - Ceremonia de apertura - Eröffnungszeremonie
# Étude Technique

## Coupe du Monde de la FIFA

### Argentine 1978

#### Compétition Finale

### Groupe d'Étude Technique

- **Harry H. Cavan** (Irlande du Nord) - Président
- **Sir Walter Winterbottom** (Angleterre) - Directeur
- **José Bonetti** (Brésil) - Membre
- **Karl Heinz Heddergott** (RF d'Allemagne) - Membre
- **Dr. Vaclav Jira** (Tchécoslovaquie) - Membre
- **Hans Lang** (RF d'Allemagne) - Membre
- **Rinus Michels** (Pays-Bas) - Membre
- **Milan Miljanic** (Yougoslavie) - Membre
- **Roger Quinche** (Suisse) - Membre
- **J. Sepp Blatter** (Suisse) - Secrétaire

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1. Introduction

Le Dr João Havelange, Président de la FIFA, dans son bref discours, lors de l'ouverture de la phase finale de la Coupe du Monde, 1978 en Argentine - au Stade de River Plate le ler juin 1978 - a rendu un hommage tout spécial à l'Argentine pour avoir accompli une tâche gigantesque de préparation. Le Dr Alfredo Cantillo, Président de la Fédération Argentine de Football s'est écrié: «Tous les yeux du monde sont fixés sur l'Argentine. Faisons en sorte de ne pas les décevoir!» Durant le tournoi, l'organisation a été efficace et les craintes manifestées quant à la sécurité ont fait place à une franche admiration pour la chaleur de l'accueil et l'attitude joyeuse et enthousiaste des Argentins encourageant leur équipe. Dans ce sens, la Coupe du Monde a été un très grand triomphe pour un pays qui a nettement fait la démonstration de son amour pour son football. Il était donc tout à fait heureux que l'équipe argentine, après bien des moments d'anxiété et d'incertitude, réussisse à obtenir sa place en Finale et, après un match très serré contre les Pays-Bas, à s'octroyer le trophée durant les prolongations.

Comme dans le cas des Jeux Olympiques et d'autres manifestations sportives mondiales, l'organisation d'une compétition finale de la Coupe du Monde demande la coopération tout à fait sincère du gouvernement et des autorités publiques. Il est nécessaire qu'elles soient disposées à mettre à disposition des stades modernes, des installations pour la Presse et la télévision, le logement requis pour les équipes finalistes et les supporteurs en visite, ainsi que le transport et les services de sécurité. Ce n'est qu'avec la constitution de l'Ente Autarquico Mundial qu'il a été possible de garantir à la compétition de la Coupe du Monde en Argentine les ressources financières et les moyens d'organisation requis. Le Général Jorge Rafael Videla, Président de l'Argentine et son gouvernement peuvent bien se prévaloir de l'immense succès de cette compétition et en être fort satisfaits, de même qu'en ce qui concerne la considération qui a été créée vis-à-vis de l'Argentine et de sa nation dans le monde entier.

Depuis 1966, la FIFA a désigné un groupe d'experts techniques officiels ayant pour tâche d'étudier la compétition de chaque Coupe du Monde, d'évaluer l'organisation, le contrôle des matches et les performances des équipes et de formuler des commentaires sur le sujet. Dans le cas de la présente compétition, le Dr Havelange et la Commission Technique de la FIFA, sous la présence de Harry Cavan, ont demandé aux personnalités suivantes de former un Groupe d'Etude Technique:

Sir Walter Winterbottom (Angleterre), Directeur; Jose Bonetti (Brésil), Karl-Heinz Heddergott (République Fédérale d'Allemagne), Dr Vaclav Jira (Tchécoslovaquie), Hans Lang (République Fédérale d'Allemagne), Rinus Michels (Pays-Bas), Miljan Miljanic (Yougoslavie), Roger Quinche (Suisse).

Quatre des membres du Groupe d'Etude ont été attachés aux divers groupes du ler tour: Groupe I - Miljan Miljanic; Groupe II - Rinus Michels; Groupe III - Karl-Heinz Heddergott; Groupe IV - Jose Bonetti. Ils se sont entretenus avec le chef de délégation, l'entraîneur et le médecin de chaque équipe, afin de discuter avec eux de la préparation de leur équipe et leur ont demandé ensuite leurs avis quant à l'organisation, les niveaux de jeu et l'arbitrage des matches. Ils ont aussi fait dans la mesure du possible, des observations et des rapports sur les matchs de leurs groupes. Sir Walter Winterbottom s'est attaché avec l'aide du Dr Vaclav Jira et de Roger Quinche, à étudier certains aspects spécifiques du jeu et d'autres matchs. Roger Quinche a également dirigé les sessions d'études techniques des arbitres et leur a fait subir les tests durant leur cours qui précéda la compétition. Hans Lang a assumé la tâche d'évaluer les installations et l'organisation sur les terrains.

Après discussion à l'intérieur du Groupe d'Etude puis avec les entraîneurs nationaux, il a été reconnu unanimement qu'en ce qui concerne le niveau du football, il était inférieur à ce qu'on avait vu en RF d'Allemagne (1974) et au Mexique (1970). Certains entraîneurs d'équipe ont exprimé l'espoir que le Groupe d'Etude Technique ferait preuve de franchise dans ses rapports à ce sujet et s'efforçeraient d'aller au cœur du problème. S'il est relativement aisé de formuler des critiques après une manifestation et de s'entendre sur des critères d'amélioration, il est plus difficile de dire quelles seraient les mesures susceptibles d'être prises pour apporter une amélioration réelle dans la structure de la compétition, dans l'organisation et dans les niveaux d'arbitrage du jeu.

On a le très vif sentiment que des pressions extérieures et des influences - dues essentiellement à la politique, au prestige national à la publicité, aux critiques de la Presse et de la Télévision, et à l'exploitation commerciale - empêchent les équipes et les joueurs individuellement d'avoir des performances maximales; elles affectent aussi la conduite des arbitres. Au cours des matchs du ler tour final, des équipes ont eu tendance à jouer avec précaution, cherchant avant tout la qualification. On a eu trèes nettement le sentiment qu'on a recherché à imposer de nouvelles valeurs hors du jeu même par le biais de méthodes scientifiques de plus en plus généralisées. La tactique impose aux joueurs une conduite stéréotypée et des systèmes défensifs et limite leur liberté d'improvisation et d'innovation. Certains entraîneurs disent qu'une telle grande responsabilité est placée en l'entraîneur de l'équipe nationale et qu'il conviendrait de trouver le moyen d'alléger son fardeau.

Ce rapport analyse ce qui s'est passé lors de la compétition et s'efforce de montrer la voie pour une action future. La FIFA distribuera un nombre d'exemplaires suffisant de ce rapport aux associations membres, afin qu'il puisse être lu et discuté sur une grande échelle par ceux qui se intéressent au développement ultérieur du jeu sur le plan international.
2. Impressions générales et propositions objectives


Installations et organisation de la compétition

1. En général, les installations sur tous les terrains ont été de haute qualité. Malheureusement, le fait d'avoir mis tardivement le gazon en place et le temps humide qui régnait au cours de la compétition, ont empêché que les surfaces de jeu - à l'exception du stade de Cordoba - n'atteignent la qualité qu'on est en droit d'exiger pour une Compétition Finale. C'est le terrain de Mar del Plata qui a souffert le plus de ces inconvénients et le gazon trop mou a donné une mauvaise adhésion et de mauvaises conditions pour les tirs, affectant les qualités réelles de déplacement et de rebondissement du ballon.

2. Les stades nouvellement construits ou rénovés ont entièrement correspondu à toutes les spécifications de la FIFA. Il s'agissait de constructions bien conçues et mises à part quelques détails de peu d'importance, ils ont fort bien servi leur but.

3. Les accès aux terrains ont été clairement signalés mais certaines places de parking se trouvaient trop éloignées des stades et n'ont pas toujours été éclairées suffisamment lors des matchs en nocturnes. Les précautions de sécurité ont été excellentes et l'enceinte à l'intérieur du stade a été maintenue libre de circulation. Ainsi les spectateurs ont eu un accès aisé au stade.

4. Les tableaux de résultats électroniques ont été tous bien placés dans les stades. La composition des équipes devrait être montrée plus souvent, alors qu'on ne devrait pas le faire pour les résultats des autres matchs, sinon à l'arrêt de la mi-temps ou à la fin du match.

5. Les fossés profonds se trouvant près du terrain de jeu et les bandes de ciment près des lignes de touche peuvent présenter des dangers pour les joueurs qui doivent courir hors du terrain de jeu. Ces fossés provoquent également des pertes de temps lorsqu'il faut aller y récupérer le ballon avant la reprise du jeu, comme ce fut le cas à Mendoza et Rosario. A l'avenir des dispositions devront être prises pour que le ballon du match puisse être remplacé rapidement, chaque fois qu'il sort hors des limites du jeu et que sa récupération cause du retard dans la reprise du jeu.

6. Si cela est souhaitable, il n'est guère possible compte tenu de l'implantation des terrains d'organiser les matchs, de manière à ce que toutes les équipes soient traitées de façon identique quant au voyage. Et pourtant la Pologne semble avoir eu raison de se plaindre à cet égard: elle a été contraite de voyager bien plus que d'autres équipes de son groupe. C'est un facteur qu'il convenira de considérer lors des prochains arrangements quant aux compétitions finales. Il semble que personne n'ait prévu l'éventualité que le brouillard vienne perturber le déroulement de la compétition. Si les matchs heureusement n'en ont pas été affectés, il a obligé un groupe arbitral à un voyage de 24 heures en train de Buenos Aires à Cordoba avant d'avoir à diriger un match immédiatement, ce qui n'est pas pour des arbitres la meilleure façon de se préparer.

C'est un point à considérer au moment de décider s'il faut centraliser les arbitrages en un seul point ou les disperser en groupes aux sous-groupes. En une occasion, l'équipe allemande a également été retenue lors d'un de ses déplacements par avion, on a éprouvé un sentiment de soulagement au moment où le brouillard s'est dissipé et a permis le décollage.

7. La télévision, les films tournés sur les matchs et les rapports de Presse ont permis à des millions de personnes dans le monde de voir les matchs tels qu'ils ont été joués et d'en lire les commentaires. Dans toutes les villes où se déroulaient les matchs, un centre de presse était à disposition des journalistes de la télévision, de la radio et de la Presse; à Buenos Aires avait été construit un centre de Presse splendide mettant à la disposition des journalistes des installations complètes pour la télévision et la radio. Dans chaque stade il y avait des places assises spéciales pour les journalistes et des cabines pour les commentateurs de télévision et radio. Chaque stade possédait des locaux pour la Presse et la télévision pour les interviews d'après matchs.

Les demandes d'accréditation croissantes des part des journalistes, photographes et commentateurs de radio crée de gros problèmes. Il y eut tellement de photographes qu'il fallut en restreindre le nombre à certains matchs et contrôler leurs déplacements sur le terrain en cours de match. Tous firent preuve d'une grande discipline en respectant la place qui leur était affectée.

Le problème de prévoir le nécessaire pour le nombre toujours croissant des
journalistes ne se limite pas aux installations sur les terrains où se disputent des matches. Il s'étend aux quartiers généraux des équipes et aux arrangements à trouver pour les interviews des entraîneurs et des joueurs. A l'avenir, il faudra songer à amplifier les installations pour les interviews en utilisant des interprètes et l'équipement pour la traduction simultanée et ce aux quartiers généraux des équipes.

8. Dans des rapports précédents, le Groupe d'Étude Technique avait fait des suggestions à propos de changements dans la structure de la Compétition Finale. Mais l'opinion du Groupe d'Étude Technique demeure qu'il serait idéal que la FIFA passe à un système de compétition préliminaire qui, réellement, désigne les seize meilleures équipes du Monde pour la Compétition Finale. On peut prétendre qu'alors qu'au Mexique (70) et en R.F. d'Allemagne (74) des pays moins importants au point de vue football – comme le Salvador, Haiti, le Zaire et l'Australie – avaient épuisé bien des difficultés à se mesurer aux équipes européennes et sud-américaines, Israël et le Maroc (70), de même que la Tunisie et l'Iran (78) ont surpris bien des équipes par leur niveau de jeu.

Bien sûr, les Confédérations – CONCACAF Asie, Afrique et Océanie – insistent sur le fait que, pour arriver à un développement ultérieur de leur football, dans le contexte socio-politique qui est le leur, davantage d'équipes de leurs régions du monde devront avoir la possibilité de participer à la Compétition Finale. Cette attitude est compréhensible, c'est la raison principale de la proposition qui vise à porter la Compétition Finale de 16 à 20 ou même 24 équipes. Mais à part l'organisation plus lourde que cela impliquerait pour le pays organisateur et les frais supplémentaires causés par un nombre plus élevé d'équipes, il y aurait en outre le problème créé par l'augmentation de la durée de la Compétition Finale alors que de nombreux entraîneurs et joueurs la trouvent déjà trop longue! Certes, certains pensent que l'on devrait réduire la durée de la Compétition en ne prévoyant que 2 jours de repos entre les matches, ce qui aiderait à résoudre le problème de l'ennui. Mais auparavant, le Groupe d'Étude avait violemment demandé d'espaceer les matches de trois jours afin de permettre un repos suffisant et afin que les joueurs puissent se remettre de blessures peu importantes. Quant aux médecins ils étaient en faveur de quatre jours de repos entre les matches pour les mêmes raisons.

9. Il y a plusieurs moyens d'établir le calendrier des matches d'une Compétition Finale chacun ayant les inconvénients. Le système consistant à constituer 4 groupes de 4 équipes, qualifiant 8 équipes pour un deuxième tour disputé par deux autres groupes de 4 équipes et aboutissant à la finale et au match pour les 3ème et 4ème places a été proposé dans le Rapport d'Étude Technique de la Compétition Finale de 1970. Il a été essayé en Allemagne en 1974 où on s'est aperçu qu'après que deux matches ont été joués au cours du second tour, les quatre équipes finalistes étaient connues. Les derniers matches des groupes perdaient toute signification. La situation en Argentine a encore été aggravée par le fait que les coups d'envoi des matches n'ont pas eu lieu à la même heure. C'est ainsi que l'Argentine quand elle est entrée sur le terrain pour affronter le Pérou, savait quelle performance elle devait accomplir pour se qualifier pour la Finale. Ce n'est pas la première fois que l'on accorde un privilège au pays organisateur, on peut le justifier par les seuls aspects financiers. Pourtant, la FIFA doit absolument s'efforcer de faire preuve d'équité dans toutes ses structures de compétitions, sinon son éclat pourrait céder devant les soupçons et l'acquisition de partialité, suivis de désillusion et de manque d'intérêt.

10. Il est remarquable que les matches d'ouverture de la compétition des quatre dernières Coupes du Monde, aient montré un football d'un niveau bas et se soient soldés par des résultats nuls et vierges. En 1966 et 1970, le fait que les pays organisateurs ont joué les matches d'ouverture, aurait pu suggérer quelque avertissement quant à la nature de ces matches. En 1974 et 1978, les Champions du Monde Brésil et R.F. Allemagne ont rencontré des adversaires de force et doivent donc avoir calculé que, bien qu'ils eussent eu la possibilité de ne pas perdre, ils pouvaient s'estimer satisfaits d'un résultat nul et tout particulièrement s'il était vierge. Dès lors, nous aimerions proposer qu'à l'inverse la pression qui s'exerce sur les équipes, les premiers matches dans les groupes du goupier devraient se jouer le jour d'ouverture dans chaque sous-centre qui aurait sa propre cérémonie d'ouverture. La cérémonie d'ouverture principale dans la ville la plus importante précédrait le premier match de l'équipe du pays organisateur. En Argentine, chaque sous-centre a organisé une cérémonie plaisante pour son premier match.

11. D'autres rapports de groupes d'études techniques ont préconisé aux entraîneurs du monde entier de s'éloigner du football négatif, hautement défensif et de s'orienter plutôt vers une méthode de jeu équilibré à tendances offensives. Toutefois, si la structure d'une compétition permet d'obtenir le succès grâce à une tactique défensive et défensive sans aucun risque, c'est cette méthode de jeu qu'adopteront les entraîneurs.

La qualification pour le second tour final implique forcément un élément de calcul stratégique. L'équipe qui gagne ses deux premiers matches peut se permettre de jouer le troisième en toute décontraction, par là même la confusion et l'égarement parmi les autres équipes qui se battent pour se qualifier. Au Mexique (70), l'Italie se qualifie dans son groupe en n'ayant marqué qu'un seul but au cours des 3 matches de qualification. En R.F. d'Allemagne (74), la qualification des équipes des Groupes 1 et 4 pour le second tour final a dépendu du nombre de buts marqués contre l'équipe la plus faible dans chaque groupe.

12. La compétition a été plus serrée dans les groupes durant l'été en Argentine, même si un entraîneur national a déclaré que dans le but d'encourager les équipes à gagner tous les matches de ce tour, il faudrait tenir compte des résultats durant le second tour. Cela pourrait sembler raisonnable si les groupes du premier tour étaient équilibrés et que toutes les équipes avaient une bonne chance de se qualifier. Mais si, comme ce fut le cas en R.F. d'Allemagne (74), certains groupes ont des équipes faibles, les équipes se qualifiant à partir de ces groupes auraient un avantage anormal lors du second tour de la compétition.

13. Il semble qu'il y ait trois considérations importantes à prendre en compte lors de l'élaboration du système qui sera retenu pour la Compétition Finale.

a) Les demandes des Confédérations à être mieux représentées

b) La nécessité pour chaque équipe participante de disputer au moins trois matches

c) La durée de la Compétition et le nombre de matches que les quatre équipes
parvenant aux matchs finals doivent disputer.

Le Groupe d'Etude Technique est toujours favorable à la proposition faite dans les Rapports de 1970 et 1974 de structurer la compétition préliminaire, afin de prévoir des matchs éliminatoires aller et retour joués par 30 équipes pour trouver les 15 équipes qui, avec l'équipe du pays organisateur, formeront l'ensemble des 16 équipes de la Compétition Finale.


15. Aussi, à l'unanimité le Groupe d'Etude Technique et les entraîneurs nationaux sont contre l'élargissement de la Compétition Finale, car la durée de la compétition doit être raccourcie et non pas étendue. Par ailleurs, il est déjà bien assez difficile de veiller à l'intendance pour seize équipes et de conserver un niveau de football élevé et attirant tout au long de la compétition. Un meilleur système pour vingt-quatre finalistes serait d'avoir un premier tour de 6 groupes de quatre équipes, les équipes classées première et deuxième de chaque groupe ainsi que les quatre autres équipes ayant les meilleures performances se qualifient pour participer au reste de la compétition qui se ferait selon une formule d'élimination directe. Chaque équipe aurait au moins trois matchs à disputer et les quatre équipes parvenant aux finales en auraient sept, c'est-à-dire autant qu'avec le système actuel.

6 groupes de 4 = 3 matches par équipe et 36 matches en tout (1ers et 2es pourraient avec quatre du reste ayant les meilleures performances quant aux points, différence de buts et buts marqués)

16. Effectif d'une équipe — Nombre de remplaçants
Les avis sont partagés quant à l'effectif idéal d'une équipe participant à la Coupe du Monde. Certains entraîneurs estiment que le nombre de joueurs autorisés devrait être porté à vingt-trois pour permettre la participation d'un troisième gardien, poste particulièrement spécifique. Si l'équipe ne comprend que deux gardiens et que l'un est blessé, l'équipe peut alors se trouver gravement handicapée. D'autres entraîneurs trouvent au contraire que vingt-deux joueurs sont trop. Les joueurs inutilisés peuvent, par dépit, créer un mauvais climat préjudiciable au moral de l'équipe. Cependant, la plupart des entraîneurs estiment satisfaisant l'effectif actuel de l'équipe et pensent qu'il est toujours possible d'inclure trois gardiens si on l'estime nécessaire. Par ailleurs, quelques entraîneurs pensent qu'il faut porter le nombre de remplaçants autorisés à entrer au cours des matchs de deux à trois — soit: deux joueurs de champ et un gardien à n'impor te quel moment du match. D'autres, tout en manifestant leur compréhension quant à l'intérêt d'un tel changement, ne sont pas disposés à insister vivement pour qu'on l'introduise.

17. Abus de drogues
La nouvelle qu'un joueur écossais avait présenté une réaction positive lors d'un contrôle antidopage a fait l'effet d'une bombe. Les officiels de la Fédération Écossaise de Football ont réagi avec promptitude en envoyant immédiatement le joueur dans son pays. Mais le fait que le joueur ait admis — étant membre d'un club anglais de 2ème division — qu'il utilisait des drogues « régulièrement », montre la nécessité pour les associations nationales d'introduire des contrôles antidopages dans leurs propres compétitions. Certaines fédérations internationales d'autres disciplines suivent les tendances du Comité International Olympique en introduisant dans leurs manifestations nationales les contrôles antidopages pour protéger l'éventuelle utilisation de stimulateurs et d'anabolisants. Pour un footballleur l'usage de produits dopants présente moins d'advantages que pour des athlètes ou des sportsifs d'autres disciplines faisant plus appel à la détermination ou à la force — cependant, les responsables du football doivent prendre des mesures énergiques pour débarasser notre sport de telles méthodes avant qu'elles ne répandent et se mettent à affecter les jeunes joueurs. De nombreux entraîneurs expérimentés affirment que les pressions qui s'exercent sur les équipes pour qu'elles gagnent sont tellement fortes qu'un contrôle très strict doit, dès à présent, être mis en place. Si l'on sait que des joueurs enfreignent les lois et règlements et réussissent à ne pas être pris, l'usage de telles méthodes deviendra vite. On ne devrait pas employer de demi-mesures pour étouffer dans l'œuf les abus de ce genre.

18. Contrôle des matchs par les arbitres et juges de touche
On craint, avant que ne débute le Mondial, que l'opposition des styles et des tempéraments entre le football européen et sud-américain conjuguée à la volonté exacerbée de toutes les équipes de l'emporter coûte que coûte dicte incontestablement le jeu. En réalité, la conduite des joueurs dans la plupart des matchs du premier tour a été notablement meilleure qu'on ne s'y attendait.

Dans ces premiers matchs, l'arbitrage a été d'une qualité suffisante, puis, alors que rien ne le laissait prévoir, le niveau de l'arbitrage a été moins bon durant le 2ème tour bien que les matchs aient été arbitrés par des arbitres plus expérimentés. Tout au cours de la compétition, les vieux problèmes de l'arbitrage ont resurgi et un certain doute a régné quant à l'impartialité de certains arbitres.

Les points qui devraient retenir l'attention sont:
(a) L’utilisation des cartes jaunes et rouges
Certains arbitres n’ont pas averti les joueurs et ont montré la carte jaune même pour des fautes graves. D’autres ont montré la carte jaune à divers joueurs mais ont évité la carte rouge même si, par la suite, des fautes commises par des joueurs déjà avertis ont été bien plus graves. Il y a eu divers cas où des joueurs commettant des fautes telles que : manipulation intentionnelle du ballon, retenue d’un adversaire ou croc-en-jambe, afin d’arrêter de bonnes attaques de pénétration en dehors de la surface de réparation, n’ont pas été punis d’avertissements. En une occasion, après des efforts répétés pour déjouer le piège du hors-jeu, un joueur a réussi à se dégager, le gardien s’est alors avancé bien en dehors de la surface de réparation pour se saisir du ballon, ce gardien n’a pas été averti. Face aux tactiques défensives actuelles les attaquants ont de plus en plus de difficulté pour se trouver en position de marquer, Il est démoralisant de voir de telles tentatives réduites à néant par un jeu déloyal. Si les joueurs et les entraîneurs se rendent compte que de l’anti-jeu caractérisé est accepté par les arbitres comme étant une faute mineure, ils le commettent alors plus souvent. Les entraîneurs nationaux sont préoccupés par le fait que les arbitres laissent impunis un jeu bien trop brutal et une conduite antiprotective. Nombre de fautes »de la dernière minute» ont été commises en dehors de la surface de réparation sans que le joueur fautive soit puni.
On prétend que les arbitres hésitent à se servir de la carte jaune parce qu’une autre faute du même joueur signifie la suspension pour le prochain match, dans certaines situations cela peut sembler une sanction trop dure. Mais le fait de se montrer indulgent n’est pas une réponse et cela provoque aussi des problèmes. La loi est nette et si les arbitres sont fermes quand ils l’appliquent, les joueurs réagiront en conséquence. La proposition d’un degré intermédiaire de sanction – expulsion temporaire pour quinze minutes – a été examinée et rejetée.
L’International Board est l’autorité responsable pour définir les Lois du Jeu. La FIFA choisit les arbitres pour cette compétition prestigieuse parmi ceux proposés par les Associations nationales. Ces arbitres doivent avoir une intégrité et un courage ayant fait leurs preuves. Ils doivent savoir clairement ce qu’on attend d’eux. La Conférence des Arbitres qui a lieu avant le début de la Compétition Finale doit imposer des directives précises pour qu’on puisse s’entendre sur les problèmes relevant du domaine de l’interprétation; ainsi le contrôle des matchs sera rigoureux et bien plus conséquent quand il s’agira d’évaluer la nature des fautes et des sanctions à appliquer.
Nous avons constaté des améliorations lorsqu’il a fallu aux arbitres empêcher le traitement des blessures sur le terrain, en maintenant les entraîneurs et les préparateurs physiques hors du terrain ils ont agi pour empêcher les contestations de leurs décisions. Les arbitres ont le pouvoir, avec l’appui des associations nationales et de la FIFA, de débarrasser le football de cette gangrène que sont les actes d’anti-jeu.

(b) Pousser ou tenir un adversaire
Les fautes consistant à pousser ou à tenir un adversaire n’ont pas été souvent vues par les arbitres, peut-être ont-ils fait semblant de ne pas les voir? Certains attaquants, tout particulièrement au bord du terrain, ont étendu le bras pour repousser un adversaire. Il a été souvent remarqué des poussées des défenseurs sur des attaquants s’appuyant à centrer, de même bien des défenseurs sur le point d’être passifs retenaient l’attaquant d’une façon irrégulière. Dans beaucoup de ces cas, les arbitres ont bien accordé des coups francs mais aucun avertissement. Certaines fautes n’ont pas été vues par l’arbitre et alors qu’elles étaient par leur juge de touche. Comme on le sait, la coopération entre les joueurs de touche et l’arbitre est meilleure quand on choisit une équipe arbitrale d’un pays.

(c) Hors-jeu
L’utilisation systématique du hors-jeu est une tactique défensive contraire à l’esprit de la loi du hors-jeu. Lorsqu’elle est bien jouée cette tactique peut difficilement être contrée par l’adversaire sauf si ce dernier dispose de joueurs adroits et utilise la tactique du contre. Dans le cas d’un match où un équipe utilise la tactique de hors-jeu, la tâche de juge de touche est particulièrement délicate.
Dans bien des cas il apprécie la situation au moment où l’attaquant reçoit le ballon au lieu de jouer celle-ci au moment du départ de ballon, quantité de bonnes attaques ont ainsi évité.
Un autre inconvénient de l’utilisation de cette tactique réside dans le fait que le dernier défenseur n’hésite pas à recourir à l’anti-jeu (arrêt de ballon à la main, croc-en-jambe) pour enrayer une attaque ayant déjoué le piège du hors-jeu d’autant qu’il sait que l’arbitre ne le pénalisera que d’un coup franc.

(d) Coups francs
Il est temps que, dans le monde entier, les arbitres permettent davantage aux attaquants victimes de fautes de ne pas attendre leur signal pour tirer les coups francs. Trop d’arbitres persistent à obliger le tireur du coup franc à attendre leur signal, ils permettent ainsi aux défenseurs de fuir avant que les défenseurs se trouvent bien de 9,15m du ballon et demeurent à distance jusqu’à ce que le coup ait été donné.
Certains arbitres ont réussi à maintenir une distance raisonnables de 7,3 à 8,2m mais d’autres se sont estimés satisfaits avec des distances de 5,5 ou 6,4m et ont permis aux joueurs de s’avancer encore, lorsque le joueur chargé de tirer le coup franc courait en avant.
La difficulté d’obtenir le respect des 9,15m est un tel souci persistant pour les arbitres que les autorités doivent tout mettre en œuvre pour essayer de trouver des solutions. Si les arbitres utilisent un petit disque de plastique qu’on peut voir aisément quand il est planté dans le terrain, cela, permettrait d'établir une marque vue de tous qui leur permettrait de mieux faire respecter les distances.
Bien qu’à l’occasion on puisse encore voir des buts spectaculaires marqués à partir de tels coups francs directs, il y avait un certain nombre de tentatives qui ratèrent. Dès lors le ballon ne faut pas s'étonner que les équipes utilisent l'anti-jeu pour faire avorter les attaques dangereuses aux abords de la surface de réparation puisqu’elles ont davantage de chance d’empêcher le but à partir d’un coup franc. Cette manière d’agir pourrait être changée si l’on permettait aux attaquants de tirer ces coups francs aussi rapidement que possible.
D'autres remèdes ont été proposés comme celui de limiter à six par équipe le nombre de joueurs de champ se trouvant devant le ballon au moment où le coup franc est tiré. Toutes les solutions qui permettraient un meilleur coefficient de réussite de buts sur coup franc tendraient à éliminer les actes d’anti-jeu à la limite de la surface de réparation.
Les arbitres varient dans leur attitude quant au coup franc qui doit être tiré rapidement au milieu du terrain. Certains
insistent sur le fait que le ballon doit être placé exactement à l’endroit de la faute - alors que d’autres donnent l’avantage à l’équipe lésée, à condition que le ballon soit botté d’une position suffisamment proche du lieu où la faute a été commise. Les joueurs qui ajoutent à leurs fautes le fait de retarder délibérément la reprise du jeu en retenant le ballon ou en le bottant au loin devraient recevoir un avertissement.

(e) Fautes du gardien
Les arbitres tendent à se montrer plus cléments vis-à-vis des gardiens. Des fautes telles que la perte de temps au moment de dégager le ballon, l’exécution de plus de quatre pas en portant le ballon, n’ont pas été réprimées.

(f) Sessions - Conférence des Arbitres
Comme lors des Coupes du Monde précédentes, les arbitres sélectionnés ont été rassemblés dix jours avant le début de la compétition. Au cours de ce rassemblement on a insisté sur la condition physique et les tests. Presque tous les arbitres se trouvaient en bonne forme à leur arrivée et beaucoup ont obtenu d’excellents résultats lors du test de Cooper. Les associations nationales dont les arbitres ont été sélectionnés pour cette compétition feraient bien d’insister auprès d’eux pour qu’ils se présentent à la Conférence.

Quelques arbitres au cours de leurs matchs ont trop couru et ont fait trop de gestes expressifs pour montrer qu’ils suivraient bien le jeu quand les fautes se produisaient. Si un arbitre trop près du ballon en jeu est un obstacle s’il n’y prend pas garde, un arbitre qui suit l’action de trop loin se trouve souvent mal placé pour apprécier une faute. Il doit donc choisir une solution intermédiaire.

Il existe une divergence d’opinion quant à certains aspects techniques et tactiques de l’arbitrage qu’il convient de discuter afin d’obtenir une ligne de conduite uniforme. Ce fut le cas lorsqu’un arbitre britannique siffla la fin du match lors du tir de 3 corners successifs sans attendre le résultat de ce 3ème corner qui malheureusement se termina directement dans le but, mais qu’il ne valida pas. Telle est l’habitude en Grande-Bretagne: un arbitre qui va siffler la fin du match attend qu’on ait donné le coup ou fait balle à terre pour une reprise, avant de siffler. Certains pensent que le jeu devrait se terminer au moment où le ballon sort du jeu, que cela arrive un peu avant la fin du match, ou le match prolongé de quelques instants afin de voir quel est le résultat du jeu immédiatement après la reprise. Dans ce cas le jugement de l’arbitre britannique a donné lieu à controverse, il semble toutefois que certains défenseurs actent cessé de jouer en entendant le coup de sifflet avant que le ballon ne soit entré dans le but.

Les deux périodes de retard avant le coup d’envoi au cours de la Finale ont été malheureuses; à l’avenir il faudrait s’efforcer d’éviter de telles situations. On ne peut excuser le retard d’une équipe à se rendre sur le terrain et la FIFA devrait tout mettre en œuvre pour éviter que ne se reproduise de tels contretemps. Par ailleurs, la protestation formulée à l’encontre du joueur néerlandais qui portait une attelle en plastique au poignet aurait dû être déposée bien avant le début du match. Dans tous les cas, si l’on jugeait que cela pouvait être dangereux pour les autres joueurs, l’arbitre aurait dû s’en apercevoir au moment de l’inspection de l’équipement avant le match. La FIFA devrait insister sur le fait que tout pansement au bras ou à la main d’un joueur doit être signalé à l’arbitre, afin qu’une décision puisse être prise d’avance sur le fait de savoir si cela est dangereux en cours du match.

Mais il serait inexact de prétendre ou de donner l’impression que l’arbitrage a été particulièrement faible. En effet, plusieurs matches ont été dirigés de façon exemplaire aussi bien par l’arbitre que par les juges de touche. D’autres matches ont été rendus difficiles à diriger à cause des attitudes et des actions des joueurs; mais à ce niveau, les arbitres doivent être suffisamment expérimentés et avoir suffisamment de caractère pour surmonter les situations embarrassantes et sévir contre le jeu dur.

Des efforts continus sont nécessaires pour résoudre les divergences entre les pratiques d’Amérique du Sud et d’Europe; un certain contrôle est nécessaire sur la liberté de l’arbitre de faire des commentaires à la Presse et à la télévision à propos des questions relatives à la sélection et à la performance des autres arbitres. La Conférence des Arbitres doit imposer des directives précises, afin d’unir les arbitres en une équipe loyale et coopérative et d’encourager chacun d’eux à être ferme dans son arbitrage.