REPORT ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE RUSSIAN BID TEAM

Dr. Cornel Borbély
Deputy Chair
Investigatory Chamber
FIFA Ethics Committee
# CONTENTS

1. REPORT ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE RUSSIAN BID TEAM ............................................. 1

2. DECISION FROM THE RUSSIAN BID TO RUN ............................................................. 2
   A. Structure of the Bid – persons involved ................................................................. 2
   B. Link with the Football Union of Russia ................................................................. 3
   C. Reasons to Bid ........................................................................................................ 4
   D. Budget of the Bid ................................................................................................... 4
   E. Government Support of the Russian Bid ............................................................... 6
   F. Support of the Russian Bid through private persons/entities ............................... 7

3. EVALUATION OF THE RUSSIAN BID ........................................................................ 8

4. VOTING RESULTS ......................................................................................................... 10

5. INVESTIGATIONS ........................................................................................................ 10
   A. Steps undertaken by the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee ................................................................. 10
   B. Documents and information submitted by the RFU ............................................. 11
   C. Summary of Cooperation by the Russia Bid Committee with this inquiry ............ 13

6. FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS ..................................................................... 13
   A. Collusion with another Bid Committee ................................................................. 13
   B. Involvement of Mr Vitaly Mutko in the Russia Bid Committee ......................... 16
   C. Contacts with FIFA ExCo Members and Compliance with Reporting Requirements to the FIFA Ethics Committee ................................. 17
   D. Gifts and Coverage of Travel Costs for the Benefit of FIFA ExCo Members ................................................................. 19
   E. Allegations or Indications of Undue Influence by the Russia Bid Committee ......... 21
i. Undue Influence on the FIFA Evaluation Group and its Chairman Mr Harold Mayne-Nicholls ................................................................. 21
ii. Undue Influence on Dr Michel D’Hooghe ........................................................................... 22
iii. Undue Influence on Mr Amos Adamu ........................................................................... 23
iv. Undue Influence on Mr Franz Beckenbauer ................................................................... 24
v. Allegations of Payments made to FIFA ExCo Members from CAF Countries prior to Voting ........................................................................... 25
vi. Other FIFA ExCo members .................................................................................. 25
F. Friendly matches .................................................................................................. 26
G. Use of Political Influence to Support the Russian Bid ........................................ 27
H. Development-related Benefits directed at the Bidding Process .............................. 28
I. Concerns & recommendations from members of the Russia Bid Committee .......................... 30

7. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 31

ANNEXES

Annexe A: Enclosures 1-52, see separate Table of contents: “Enclosures Russia Report” .36 and separate USB stick

Annexe B: All other enclosures, see separate USB stick
1. REPORT ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE RUSSIAN BID TEAM

The Report on Issues Related to the Bidding Process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cup Venues (the “Overall Report”) details the genesis of, and jurisdictional authority for, the present inquiry into that process and those sections are incorporated by reference herein. See Overall Report at Part I. As noted therein, the overall inquiry was led by Mr Michael Garcia, independent Chairman of the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee and Dr Cornel Borbély, independent Deputy Chairman of the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee. Since Mr Garcia recused himself from the investigation of the Russia 2018 Bid Committee (“Russia Bid Committee”), the review of the Russia Bid Committee’s conduct during the Bidding Process was conducted solely by Dr Cornel Borbély and all findings and conclusions in this report with respect to the activities of that team are his alone (cf. art. 35 par. 2 lit. c of the FIFA Code of Ethics).

The analysis of the Russia Bid Committee’s compliance with the FIFA regulations, including the FIFA Code of Ethics and the Rules of Conduct during the Bidding Process, was thereby conducted on the basis of documents provided upon request by members of the Football Union of Russia, the Russia Bid Committee who are now also involved in the Local Organising Committee of the 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia™ (“LOC”), interviews held with three members of the Russia Bid Committee (Mr Vitaly Mutko, Mr Alexey Sorokin and Mr Alexander Djordjadze), as well as an interview conducted with Ms Ekaterina Fedyshina. Dr Borbély further analysed the following allegations made through media and documents provided by or statements made in interviews of other involved persons:

- allegations that Dr Michel D’Hooghe accepted a work of art in exchange for his vote for the Russian bid;
- allegations that the Russia Bid Committee attempted to unduly influence Mr Amos Adamu’s vote in exchange for helping to fund development programs in Nigeria;
- allegations that Mr Franz Beckenbauer entered into a contract with a Russian gas company in exchange for his vote for the Russian bid;
- allegations made by Lord Triesman that there was collusion between the Russian and Spanish bids.

In addition, he analysed the relevant documents of the entire FIFA World Cup investigation that were available to the Investigatory Chamber of FIFA’s Ethic Committee, contained in the formal records to that Overall Report, as far as they were relevant to the Russian bidding process.
The investigation and review of the Russia Bid Committee’s conduct during the Bidding Process is limited to the investigation and review of the latter’s conduct in relation to the applicable FIFA regulations within the scope of applicability of the FIFA Ethic’s Committee, in force at the time. In particular, no political occurrences prior, during or after the Bidding Process were taken into consideration.

The report on the conduct of the Russia Bid Committee during the Bidding Process was prepared separately from the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee’s overall report, which was prepared on the basis of the investigation conducted by Mr Michael Garcia ("Overall Report") and Dr Cornel Borbély. However, this report constitutes an integral part of, and should be read in conjunction with the Overall Report.

2. DECISION FROM THE RUSSIAN BID TO RUN

A. Structure of the Bid – persons involved

Pursuant to the testimonies given by Mr Mutko (Encl. no 1), Mr Sorokin (Encl. no 2) and Mr Djordjadze (Encl. no 3), the Russia Bid Committee was established with a lean structure of personnel for the purposes of Russia’s bid to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup and the 2022 FIFA World Cup ("Russian Bid"). In total approximately 15 to 16 people were employed by the Russia Bid Committee.

The key figures of the Russia Bid Committee were, according to their own statements, Mr Vitaly Mutko (Chairman), Mr Alexey Sorokin (Chief Executive Officer) and Mr Alexander Djordjadze (Director of Bid Planning and Operations).

While Mr Mutko was not involved in the day-to-day business of the Russia Bid Committee, Mr Mutko and Mr Sorokin were predominantly responsible for the interactions with the members of the FIFA Executive Committee ("FIFA ExCo Members" and "FIFA Ex-Co"). Mr Djordjadze also added that Mr Mutko also held a political role inside the country to gain the support of the main stakeholders (government etc) (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 4). According to the witness testimonies, the Russia Bid Committee used outside consultants. Both Mr Sorokin and Mr Djordjadze confirmed that the Russia Bid Committee hired Mr Markus Siegler, former Head of Communications at FIFA, as a special adviser to promote the Russian Bid internationally, namely to arrange opportunities for the Russia Bid Committee to present their Bid to FIFA ExCo Members (Sorokin Transcript, p. 7; Djordjadze Transcript, p. 5). Similarly, the Russia Bid Committee hired Mr Andreas Herren, former Director of Communications at FIFA, to handle communications and media matters (e.g. identification of media worth talking to, setup interviews, press releases, crisis management) (Sorokin Transcript, p. 8; Djordjadze Transcript, p. 5).
Mr Djordjadze further noted that an American company named Helios Partners (head office located at 3475 Lenox Rd NE Suite 850 Atlanta, Georgia, 30326 United States, owned by the French company Amaury Groupe), was hired to assist the Russia Bid Committee with creating the bid book and that external accountants were also used (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 6). Based on the independent auditor’s report on the Russia Bid Committee dated 21 January 2011, these outside accountants were from CJSC BDO (Encl. no 4: Audit Report). In addition, it remained unclear whether the services of SPORTFIVE (a sports marketing agency with its head office located at Place des Alpes 2–4 - 1201 Geneva, Switzerland, owned by French company Lagardère Unlimited) were also used. Mr Sorokin stated in this respect that the Russia Bid Committee did not have any contractual relationship with SPORTFIVE (according to Mr Sorokin, the Football Union of Russia had some contractual relationships with the company when he was an employee of the Member Association). However, SPORTFIVE was favourable to the Russian Bid and might have been helpful in "creating opinion", but otherwise did not offer any direct assistance (Sorokin Transcript, p. 9-10). In contrast, Mr Djordjadze confirmed that the Russia Bid Committee did not have any interaction with SPORTFIVE during the Bidding Process, but only thereafter (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 6).

In addition to the people mentioned above, the former FIFA ExCo Member Mr Vyacheslav Koloskov and current President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin unofficially, but actively, promoted the Russian Bid (Mutko Transcript, p. 10 and 28; Sorokin Transcript, p. 5-6, 11 and 37; Djordjadze Transcript, p. 5).

Each of Mr Mutko, Mr Sorokin and Mr Djordjadze confirmed that neither Mr Peter Hargitay, public relations executive, nor Mr Fedor Radmann, sports consultant nor Mr Andreas Abold, sports marketing consultant, was involved in any manner in the Russian Bid (Mutko Transcript, p. 18-19; Sorokin Transcript, p. 16-17; Djordjadze Transcript, p. 11-12).

Ms Ekaterina Fedyshina, who works for the Football Union of Russia, served as a translator to Mr Mutko, but was not part of the Bid Committee (Fedyshina Transcript, p. 3-5; Sorokin Transcript, p. 37). When interviewed, Ms Fedyshina had no particular knowledge relevant to the investigation and confirmed that she had not seen anything inappropriate whilst accompanying Mr Mutko (Fedyshina Transcript, p. 4).

B. Link with the Football Union of Russia

Mr Mutko confirmed that the Russia Bid Committee was established in accordance with the FIFA regulations as a not-for-profit organisation (Mutko Transcript, p. 5). According to the independent auditor’s report, the Russia Bid Committee was registered in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities under registration no. 10977990331582. The key personnel involved in the Russia Bid Committee have also been and/or are still involved in some capacity with the Football Union of Russia (“FUR”).
Mr Mutko served as president of the FUR (Sorokin Transcript, p. 36) until he was appointed as a minister in the Government of the Russian Federation in 2010. Currently, Mr Mutko is the Chairman of the LOC, which was incorporated by the FUR as a not-for-profit organisation (Mutko Transcript, p. 4-5).

Pursuant to Mr Sorokin’s own testimony, he was the Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer of the FUR from 2008 until 2010, when he focused his efforts exclusively on the Russia Bid Committee. Mr Sorokin currently serves as the Chief Executive Officer of the LOC (Sorokin Transcript, p. 4).

Mr Djordjadze confirmed that he is presently employed as Deputy CEO of the LOC and that he is responsible for relations with FIFA and the government (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 3).

Finally, Mr. Sergei Fursenko replaced Mr Mutko as president of the FUR when the latter took up his position in the Russian Government and also travelled with the Russia Bid Committee a couple of times to assist with the bid presentations (Sorokin Transcript, p. 37).

C. Reasons to Bid

Mr Mutko was the only Bid Committee member to address the question of why Russia decided to bid to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup or the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

Mr Mutko submitted that the most important aspect of Russia’s decision to bid was the fact that FIFA President Joseph S. Blatter had promoted the idea of football entering new territories and regions so as to ensure a widespread legacy for the sport. Since at the time there had never been a major European or world championship organised in Eastern Europe, Russia decided to submit a bid. Moreover, Mr Mutko explained that Russian football has vast traditions and that it was only through the staging of the FIFA World Cup that football stadiums would be built and modernised (Mutko Transcript, p. 7-8).

In the Russian Bid Book, the Bid Committee cites a desire to share its country’s passion for the game with the world as well as allowing all to experience traditional Russian hospitality (Encl. no 5: Russian Bid Book, p. 12). In addition, the Bid Book describes the Russian vision for a Football Development Strategy, in conjunction with the hosting of the FIFA World Cup, which would focus on contributing to the growth of the sport throughout the country (Russia Bid Book, section 3).

D. Budget of the Bid

The audit report by BDO of the Russia Bid Committee’s financial statements dated 21 January 2011 shows the following statement of eligible use of funds received (for November 2009 until December 2010) (p. 20):
In terms of expenses, the statement of eligible use of funds received shows that RUR 736,305,000 or roughly CHF 18,879,615 represents expenses for special-purpose events, which, according to Russia Bid Committee, included the production of the Bid Book (RUR 434,848,000); the production of promotional and technical films (RUR 113,799,000); a PR campaign (advertising, exhibitions, forums, conferences) (113,799,000) and organising the FIFA inspection visit (RUR 19,455) among others (Encl. no 6: letter from Mr Sorokin, 19 August 2014). According to the statement of changes filed as part of the financial statements, a total of RUR 788,674,000 was spent by the Russia Bid Committee, equalling roughly CHF 20,222,410 (on the basis of a 1:39 exchange rate), which presumably constitutes the overall amount spent by the Russia Bid Committee (including internal expenses). Based on the statement of cash flows, the vast
majority of expenses, i.e. a total of RUR 688,311,000 or roughly CHF 17,649,000, related to payments for purchased goods, services, raw materials and other current assets.

In terms of income, the statement of changes in capital shows that the Russia Bid Committee received financing in the amount of RUR 784,055,000, equalling roughly CHF 20,103,974 (on the basis of a 1:39 exchange rate). According to the description of the main accounting and reporting principles in the audit report, the Russia Bid Committee generated income from sponsor contributions in the amount of RUR 25,424,000, or roughly CHF 651,897.

No further details were provided regarding the concrete contents of the expenses outlined in the financial statements of the Russia Bid Committee.

The audit report confirmed that the financial statements of the Russia Bid Committee for the year ending 31 December 2010 presents fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Russia Bid Committee on 31 December 2010, and its financial performance and its cash flows for the year just completed, in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the Russian Federation.

In that respect, Mr Sorokin added, during his interview that the Russian bid underwent severe scrutiny by (...) Russian accounting officials because we used some federal money, so we had to keep fiscal documents for Russian (...) scrutiny (...) There were no violation found through that scrutiny. The results can be (...) could be transferred to you confidentially. (Sorokin Transcript, p. 23).

Despite the aforementioned statement, Mr Sorokin informed the Secretariat of the FIFA Ethics Committee, on 1 August 2014 that it would not be possible to submit such sensitive documents to non-authorised third parties due to the Regulations of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation (Encl. 7).

Following a review of the documents provided, including the audited financial statements of the Russia Bid Committee, there is no reason to question Mr Sorokin’s above-mentioned statement regarding the financial report from Russian officials or any indication that the internal and external financial reporting procedures have not been complied with.

E. Government Support of the Russian Bid

According to the testimonies of Mr Sorokin and Mr Djordjadze, the Russia Bid Committee received funding from the Russian Government (Sorokin Transcript, p. 34, Djordjadze Transcript, p. 4), albeit only later during the Bidding Process – around February 2010 - according to Mr Sorokin’s statement.
In addition to government funding, the Russian government also collaborated with FIFA in relation to the various government guarantees and the government legal statement that FIFA required the host country to provide (cf. Sorokin Transcript, p. 6). The foregoing is also confirmed by the Russia Evaluation Report (Encl. 8: Russia Evaluation Report, p. 5).

According to the testimony of Mr Mutko, the Russian government provided additional guarantees relating to the building of new stadiums and a guarantee affirming that the transport of fans (other than by air) between the hosting cities would be free of charge (Mutko Transcript, p. 10).

Furthermore, the government of the Russian Federation, and in particular then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, actively promoted the Russian bid (Sorokin Transcript, p. 5-6).

In this regard, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin welcomed FIFA ExCo Members on a total of six occasions (cf. Encl. no 9: Overview Contact Between Russia Bid Committee and FIFA ExCo Members). In July and August 2010, he met with Mr Hany Abo Rida in Moscow/Kazan and with Mr Chuck Blazer in Moscow/Kazan and Sochi. In October 2010, he met separately with Mr Jack Warner, Mr Mohammed Bin Hammam and Dr Chung Mong-Joon in Moscow. In addition, pursuant to FIFA President Joseph S. Blatter’s testimony, he had also been welcomed by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin when visiting Moscow (Blatter Transcript, p. 26).

None of the information provided or the interviews conducted suggest that any undue influence was exercised on FIFA Exco Members during these meetings.

Based on the above, it appears that the government guarantees provided by the Russian government met, if not exceeded, all of FIFA’s requirements.

**F. Support of the Russian Bid through private persons/entities**

Based on the testimonies heard and the analysis of the relevant documents, other than government funding from the Russian Federation, the Russia Bid Committee also received funding or other assistance from the following private sponsors (Encl. no 6):

- Non-profit partnership – Charity foundation “Art and Sport”;
- Open Joint Stock Company – “TNK-BP Holding”;
- Open Joint Stock Company – “Uralkali”;
- Open Joint Stock Company – “Gazprombank”.

The audit report of the Russia Bid Committee’s financial statements lists an amount of RUR 25,424,000, or roughly CHF 651,897, as sponsor contributions.
As the Russia Bid Committee lacked sufficient funding at the beginning of the Bidding Process, it leased computers for its offices from the football foundation “Konoplyov Football Academy” (Encl. 10: KIRKLAND0151614-617; Sorokin Transcript, p. 35). Based on Mr Sorokin’s testimony, this football foundation appeared to have been linked with Mr Roman Abramovich (the owner of Chelsea Football Club) (Sorokin Transcript, p.35).

In addition, Mr Abramovich also travelled with the Russian delegation to Johannesburg, South Africa, and Zurich, Switzerland, where the Russia Bid Committee presented its bid (Sorokin Transcript, p. 35). Mr Sorokin noted clearly in his testimony that, other than assisting with the leasing of computers and attending some bid presentations, Mr Abramovich did not provide any financial assistance to the Russia Bid Committee (Sorokin Transcript, p.35).

Mr Djordjadze also confirmed that private Russian donors and companies affiliated with certain industrial groups provided financial contributions to the Russia Bid Committee. However, he could not remember the names of these donors or companies (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 6). Regardless, pursuant to Mr Djordjadze’s statement, the overall financial contribution of these private donors, could not be compared to the funding received from the Russian government.

Furthermore, according to the oral statements made during the interviews, Mr Vyacheslav Koloskov, the former FIFA ExCo Member, as well as the company SPORT-FIVE, provided non-financial support to the Russian bid. Mr Koloskov was a big support to the Russia Bid Committee as he had good relations with FIFA ExCo Members after serving as an ExCo Member for many years, and on some occasions, also travelled with the Russia Bid Committee to promote the bid (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 5), while SPORT-FIVE informally – according to the statements, no contractual relationships existed between SPORTFIVE and the Russian bid - assisted in terms of promoting a positive view of the Russian bid (Sorokin Transcript, p. 9).

3. EVALUATION OF THE RUSSIAN BID

As a preliminary remark, the FIFA Evaluation Group, which was led by Mr Harold Mayne-Nicholls and was composed of various members of the FIFA Administration. Mr Danny Jordaan, CEO of South Africa Bid for the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™ and subsequently of the 2010 LOC South Africa, was included a few months later in the delegation as Technical Advisor (Encl. No 11: Jordaan Transcript, p. 23-24). The purpose of the Bid Evaluation Report is to evaluate the information provided by all Bidders in the Bidding Documents, to indicate the extent to which the requirements have been fulfilled and to identify potential gaps and risks in respect of FIFA’s requirements for hosting a FIFA World Cup™ (Russia Bid Evaluation Report, p. 3).
The 2018 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report for the Russian Bid ("Bid Evaluation Report") considered that the hosting of the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia represented a low legal risk for FIFA, while the risk related to stadium construction and operations, accommodation and transportation was categorised as a medium to high risk (the latter with regard to air transportation and international connections) (Russia Bid Evaluation Report, p. 4-5).

According to the Bid Evaluation Report, the Russian Bid offered a comprehensive and well-structured bidding concept, where 13 host cities and 16 stadiums were proposed across the European area of the country as part of a multi-cluster concept (Russia Bid Evaluation Report, p. 8).

The Bid Evaluation Report noted that the internal organisation of the stadiums and their infrastructure raised some questions about the limited space available to welcome the various target groups. In some of the proposed host cities, the Evaluation Report noted a lack of space in the areas surrounding most of the stadiums to accommodate temporary event structures (Russia Bid Evaluation Report, p. 14).

In terms of accommodation, the Bid Evaluation Report noted that significantly more hotel rooms were contracted than FIFA’s minimum requirement and that all of the candidate host cities offered sufficient capacity to meet the event requirements, even though the investments required in the hotel sector highlighted a dependence on construction and modernisation (Russia Bid Evaluation Report, p. 16).

The Bid Evaluation Report also noted that the Russian Bid submitted a comprehensive transport concept, where the candidate host cities were grouped into geographic clusters to shorten travel times. However, ground inter-city transport connections seemed feasible only in the case of a few host cities. The main cities were confirmed to have a well-equipped infrastructure comprising railway and metro lines, airports and a well-developed motorway system (Russia Bid Evaluation Report, p. 18-19). In terms of air travel, the air traffic situation was deemed to require improvement through major upgrades and capacity increases to the majority of the airports. Any delay in the completion of the airport projects could impact FIFA’s tournament operations and the proposed installation of temporary facilities. Alleviating concerns as to the airport capacity in some candidate host cities could impose a high cost burden. In particular, the Bid Evaluation Report observed that a greater number of direct flight connections to major international airports would have to be made available from all candidate host cities (Russia Bid Evaluation Report, p. 20-22).

In that regard, when questioned about the criticism lodged by the FIFA Evaluation Group relating to air transportation, Mr Mutko, Mr Sorokin and Mr Djordjadze confirmed that the evaluation raised a legitimate issue, one that could be addressed in time for the 2018 FIFA World Cup (Mutko Transcript, p. 10-11; Sorokin Transcript, p. 15; Djordjadze Transcript, p. 10-11).
The Bid Evaluation Report further noted that in terms of information technology, there were good foundations for IT and communication in some areas of the country (such as Moscow), while considerable work would have to be carried out to bring the remainder of the country, and thus the other candidate host cities, up to the standard required by FIFA. In terms of standards for major event safety and security measures, the Russian Bid met FIFA’s requirements (Russia Bid Evaluation Report, p.22-23).

Finally, the Bid Evaluation Report also observed that the guarantees, undertakings and confirmations (as set forth in the Government Guarantees, Government Declaration and the Government Legal Statement) in the form required by FIFA were given by the Russian Government (Russia Bid Evaluation Report, p.29).

From the Bid Evaluation report, it can be observed that there was no basis for concluding that Russia would not be able to host the World Cup.

4. VOTING RESULTS

An analysis of the voting results of the two voting rounds on the hosting of the 2018 FIFA World Cup shows that the Russian Bid had already received the highest amount of votes in the first round, before obtaining the requisite absolute majority of votes in the second round. In Round 1, Russia received 9 votes and in Round 2, 13 votes, which constituted an absolute majority (Encl. no 12). These voting results do not reveal any inconsistencies in relation to the Russian Bid. See Overall Report Part III(C)(10).

5. INVESTIGATIONS

A. Steps undertaken by the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee

In order to obtain information about the Russia Bid Committee’s conduct during the Bidding Process for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee led by its Deputy Chairman, sent a request to the Russia Bid Committee via the FUR dated 6 March 2014 (Encl. no 13), asking for a variety of documents.

Letters requesting further information and clarification of documentation received were sent to the Russia Bid Committee on 17 April 2014, 24 April 2014, 30 July 2014 and 12 August 2014 (Encl. no 14 a-d).

On 19 May 2014, the Secretary of the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee, sent an email to Mr Sorokin in particular asking for additional information and documentation with regard to the following matters that had arisen in the course of the inves-
tigation: (i) the Russia Bid Committee having offered an iPad to Mr Harold Mayne-Nicholls, Chairman of the FIFA Evaluation Group, (ii) the audit report of the Russian Government regarding the spending of the Russia Bid Committee, and (iii) the request sent to Google Russia to retrieve email communications from the Gmail accounts used by Russia Bid Committee during the Bidding Process, and Google Russia's answer with regard thereto (Encl. no 15 a-b).

In addition, the Deputy Chairman of the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee conducted interviews with Mr Vitaly Mutko (Chairman of the Russia Bid Committee), Ms Ekaterina Fedyshina, Mr Alexey Sorokin (CEO of the Russia Bid Committee), Mr Alexander Djordjadze (member of the Russia Bid Committee), as well as with other persons directly or indirectly involved with the Bidding Process. In that context, Dr Michel D’Hooghe, Mr Amos Adamu and Mr Franz Beckenbauer submitted information in connection with the Russian bid. Furthermore the Deputy Chairman of the Investigatory Chamber analysed all the accessible documents and interviews of the entire FIFA World Cup investigation.

B. Documents and information submitted by the RFU

In response to a request for documentation by the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee, the FUR and the Russia Bid Committee submitted limited written documentation in a letter dated 2 April 2014 from Mr Anatoly Vorobiev (Encl. no 16: KIRKLAND0150347) and in a letter dated 30 April 2014 from Mr Alexey Sorokin, CEO of the LOC and former CEO of the Russia Bid Committee (Encl. no. 17).

Specific documents mentioned in the report are referenced by the document number provided by the FUR and the Russia Bid Committee (if the documents in question belong to those documents that have been allocated numbers) as follows: KIRKLAND[document number].

Mr Sorokin also informed the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee in a letter dated 30 April 2014 (Encl. no 17):

- that all communications with FIFA ExCo Members were executed by the Russia Bid Committee through official correspondence signed by Mr Vitaly Mutko or Mr Sorokin;

- that best efforts to search for copies of any correspondence were applied and that all documents found were submitted to the Investigatory Chamber for review;

- that no copies of bidding phase communication remained in their possession, nor did the leased computers, which were returned to the owner (the Konoplyov Football Academy) at the conclusion of the Bidding Process. Upon request, the donor confirmed that the computers were destroyed once they
were returned by the Russia Bid Committee, as they were considered obsolete (Encl. no 10: KIRKLAND0151614 – 617); and

- that Google Russia was contacted immediately upon receipt of the Investigatory Chamber’s communication asking to restore the Gmail accounts the Russia Bid Committee had used during the Bidding Process (Encl. no 15a: KIRKLAND0151612 – 613).

In a letter dated 29 April 2014 (Encl. no 15b), Google Russia informed the Russia Bid Committee that it did not administer Gmail.com and that requests in relation thereto should be sent to Google USA. Mr Djordjadze sent a corresponding request to Google USA on 20 May 2014 (Encl. no 18).

In relation to the above and upon request, Mr Sorokin further notified the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee in a letter dated 1 August 2014 (Encl. no 8):

- that it would be difficult to provide the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee with the audit reports of the Russian Government of the Russia Bid Committee, since pursuant to the Regulation of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, audit reports were sensitive documents that could not be issued to non-authorised parties;

- that still no answer had been received from Google USA relating to the request to make available the communications from the Gmail accounts used by the Russia Bid Committee during the Bidding Process, even though such request had been received by Google USA on 23 May 2014; and

- that another request had been forwarded to the Konoplyov Football Academy with regard to the computers used and returned by the Russia Bid Committee, but that in the interim, ownership in the academy had changed; the current management was not aware of what was happening four years ago and former employees of the academy at the relevant time could no longer be reached.

In addition to the above mentioned limited documentation made available, Mr Vitaly Mutko, Ms Ekaterina Fedyshina, Mr Alexey Sorokin, Mr Alexander Djordjadze made themselves available for interviews by Cornel Borbély, the Deputy Chairman of the FIFA Ethics Committee. Other Officials, or former Officials, made themselves available for interviews and provided information. The statements made in their testimonies are referenced in this report as follows:

- Mutko Transcript, p. [page number] – for Mr Vitaly Mutko;

- Fedyshina Transcript, p. [page number] – for Ms Ekaterina Fedyshina;

- Sorokhin Transcript, p. [page number] – for Mr Alexey Sorokin;
C. Summary of Cooperation by the Russia Bid Committee with this inquiry

As an overall result, the Russia Bid Committee was responsive to the requests for documents and information by the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee. The Bid submitted, according to its representatives, all documentation still in its possession. It was however unable to remit all bidding phase communications. The Russia Bid Committee explained what happened, made efforts to retrieve the missing documentation and documented the steps undertaken to that end. See Overall Report Part XVI(F)(5) regarding retention requirements for bidding nations in the future.

6. FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS

A. Collusion with another Bid Committee

In accordance with FIFA Circular No. 5 dated 23 September 2010 (Encl. no 19a) and clause 11.5 of the Bid Registration (Encl. no 19b), a member association had to refrain from collaborating or colluding with any other member association or any other third party with a view to unfairly influencing the outcome of the Bidding Process. In particular, a member association and a bid committee were prohibited from entering into any kind of agreement with any other member association or bid committee as regards the behaviour during the Bidding Process, and the manner in which and when a member association or bid committee bid for the FIFA World Cups or which may influence the Bidding Process.

Very few documents out of the documentation received from FUR or the Russia Bid Committee concern correspondence between the Russia Bid Committee and other bid committees.

One document relates to the notification of Mr Mutko by the Japan 2022 Bid Committee that it withdrew its bid to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup and requesting a meeting to present the Japan bid to Mr Mutko in his capacity as a FIFA ExCo Member (Encl. no 20: KIRKLAND0150338). Other documents relate to allegations of collusion raised by Lord David Triesman against the Russian and Spanish bids, published by the English
newspaper "The Mail on Sunday" (Encl. no. 21: KIRKLAND0150342, 0151573, 0151571).

The existence of alliances between the Russia Bid Committee and other bid committees was categorically denied by Mr Mutko, Mr Sorokin and Mr Djordjadze. In particular, when asked about allegations of an alliance between the Russia Bid Committee and the Australian Bid Committee, Mr Mutko, Mr Sorokin and Mr Djordjadze denied these allegations, Mr Mutko and Mr Sorokin in particular explaining that, hypothetically, such an alliance would not have been beneficial since there was no FIFA ExCo Member from Australia (Mutko Transcript, p. 15; Sorokin Transcript, p. 16; Djordjadze Transcript, p. 11). Mr Mutko further confirmed that he had not accepted an invitation by Mr Frank Lowy, chairman of the Australian Bid Committee, to have lunch on his yacht (Mutko Transcript, p. 18).

In his testimony, Mr Frank Lowy confirmed that there was no cooperation between Australia and Russia, as the Australia Bid Committee had nothing to offer the Russia Bid Committee (Encl. no 22: Lowy Transcript, p. 30).

On the basis of the relevant documentation made available by the Russia Bid Committee, and the testimonies given, there is no evidence upon which to conclude that the Russian Bid Committee attempted or succeeded in entering into any kind of agreement with the Australian Bid Committee or any other member association or bid committee with the purpose of influencing the bidding process for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cup.

As to the collusion allegations against the Russian Bid raised by Lord David Triesman, former Chairman of the English Bid Committee for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, upon request of the FIFA Ethics Committee dated 17 May 2010 (Encl. no 23), he clarified these allegations in a letter to the FIFA Ethics Committee dated 20 May 2010 as follows: "The comments reproduced in the newspaper article were never intended to be taken seriously as indeed is the case with many private conversations. They were not allegations on my part." (Encl. no 24).

Lord Triesman further noted: "The speculation expressed was not the view of the Bid Committee or The FA or me. Nobody should be under any misapprehension that The FA or the Bid Committee are disrespectful of other nations or FIFA and I regret any such inference that may have been drawn from what has been reported."

After having looked into the allegations raised by Lord Triesman, after having received and analysed the statements made by Lord Triesman as well as The Football Association on 20 May 2010 (Encl. no 25.), the former Chairman of the FIFA Ethics Committee, Mr Claudio Sulser, noted that The Football Association and the England 2018 FIFA World Cup™ apologised for the football associations of Spain and Russia and that Lord Triesman stepped down from his role as chairman of the England Bid Committee. Furthermore, after having been in contact with the FUR and the Real Federación Española de Fútbol (RFEF) and examined all of the information in its possession, Chairman Sulser de-
cided not to pursue the matter any further (Encl. no 26: Media Release dated 28 May 2010).

In his testimony, Mr Sorokin added that the Russia Bid Committee had complained about the allegations of Lord Triesman and had received an apology in return. Accordingly to Mr Sorokin, this was the only instance of official interaction between the Russia Bid Committee and another bid committee (Sorokin Transcript, p. 19).

In view of Lord Triesman’s clarifications and the lack of any evidence suggesting collusion between the Russian and Spanish bids to host the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, one cannot reasonably conclude that any collusion existed in relation to the Russian and Spanish bids. In addition, this conclusion is further warranted by the fact that the Russian and Spanish bids were both competing to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup.

On 6 August 2014, a letter was sent to the legal representative of the England Bid Committee inviting him *inter alia* to address, by 15 August 2014, any topic or information he or the England Bid believed may be relevant (Encl. no 27a). The England Bid Committee did not mention any element regarding the Russia Bid Committee (Encl. no 27b).

In addition, when questioned, Mr Khozo Tashima, CEO of the Japan Bid Committee and Vice-President and Executive General Secretary of the Japan Football Association, made a somewhat vague suggestion in his testimony that a vote trading agreement had been in place between Japan and Russia, which was initiated by the Russian Bid one day before the election (Tashima Transcript, p. 35-37, 45). As stated by Mr Tashima in his interview, leading up to the vote, the Russian Bid Committee had not contacted the Japan Bid Committee, then “*one day before the election suddenly come in and they contact with us and (...) they needed some (...) help support to the Russia*” (Tashima Transcript, p. 37).

However, Mr Khozo Tashima did not provide any supporting evidence or details about what appeared to be his suggestion of an arrangement between the two bid committees. Furthermore, no documentation or testimony by any other persons interviewed revealed any corroborating evidence or information to support this statement. In relation to these statements, the General Secretary of the Japan Football Association, Mr Hiromi Hara stated in a letter dated 15 August 2014, that he is confident that the Japan Bid Committee adhered to the Rules of Conduct during the Bidding Process and denies that any vote trading agreement took place with the Russia Bid Committee (Encl. no 28).

As a consequence, there is insufficient proof to reasonably confirm collusion between the Japan and Russia Bid Committees.

Notwithstanding the above, one cannot fully exclude that any attempts towards collusion or collaboration with any other member association or bid committee were made by the Russia Bid Committee. However, based on the documentation, interviews and
other information, there is insufficient evidence in the record at this time that would justify opening proceedings in this matter.

B. Involvement of Mr Vitaly Mutko in the Russia Bid Committee

Mr Vitaly Mutko acted as Chairman of the Russia Bid Committee while at the same time serving as FIFA ExCo Member. In 2010 he was appointed as Minister of Sports, Tourism and Youth Politics of the Russian Federation.

This double function (i.e. FIFA ExCo Member and an active involvement in a bid committee) does not run contrary to the FIFA Rules of Conduct and the majority of the bid committees submitting bids to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup or the 2022 FIFA World Cup included FIFA ExCo Members.

With regard to Mr Mutko’s concrete involvement in the Russia Bid Committee, based on the documentation and information made available, there is no evidence that Mr. Mutko acted inappropriately in carrying out his duties as an ExCo member during such time or that he used that position to promote the Russian Bid in a manner unduly influencing the Bidding Process. Nevertheless, the Overall Report will provide recommendations on how to avoid such potential conflict of interests, or the appearance of a conflict, in the future. See Overall Report Part XVI(B).

The documentation provided did show that Mr Mutko had sent numerous letters to his FIFA ExCo counterparts inviting them to visit Russia and/or thanking them for the opportunity for the Russia Bid Committee to present its bid (Encl. no 29: KIRKLAND0151577-0151604). While Mr Mutko’s close contact with his FIFA ExCo counterparts may have assisted the Russia Bid Committee to be given the opportunity to present its bid to FIFA ExCo Members, contacting FIFA ExCo Members does not violate any FIFA Rules of Conduct (regarding the Russia Bid Committee meeting its reporting requirements, see section C. below).

When asked whether he had shared with the Russia Bid Committee information he had learned as a FIFA ExCo Member, Mr Mutko noted that, as a FIFA ExCo Member, he did not receive any information on the Bidding Process. This process was handled by the FIFA Evaluation Group, which had not provided him with any information whatsoever (Mutko Transcript, p. 12-13).

Mr Sorokin confirmed in his testimony that Mr Mutko had not provided the Russia Bid Committee with any information on other bid teams. Furthermore, Mr Sorokin noted that Mr Mutko had indeed made a formal request to FIFA in a letter dated 6 October 2010 (Encl. no 30: KIRKLAND0151599) for the bid books and once received, they were made available to the other members of the Russia Bid Committee, after the bid books had already been officially submitted (Sorokin Transcript, p. 14) and were therefore of little value to the Russia Bid Committee.
Mr Djordjadze also confirmed that Mr Mutko had not provided the Russia Bid Committee with any information on the other bid committees, except for making the bid books available, as previously mentioned. (Djordjadze Transcript, p.10).

The above-mentioned testimonies do not provide a credible basis for concluding that Mr Mutko abused of his position as FIFA ExCo Member to unduly influence the Bidding Process in favour of the Russian Bid.

Finally, Mr Mutko also confirmed that no other bid committee had attempted to influence his vote or had engaged in any inappropriate conduct in this regard (Mutko Transcript, p. 13).

A review of the documentation and interviews seems to support this statement, since there is no indication that a competing bid committee had attempted to influence Mr Mutko’s vote.

C. Contacts with FIFA ExCo Members and Compliance with Reporting Requirements to the FIFA Ethics Committee

FIFA informed the member associations and the bid committees participating in the Bidding Process for the hosting of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups of FIFA's new policy relating to interactions between a bidding association (including a bid committee), and FIFA ExCo Members or a member association of a FIFA ExCo Member in FIFA Circular No. 3 dated 7 July 2010 (Encl. no 31). See Overall Report Part III(C)(5).

Starting from 7 July 2010, each direct or indirect contact and/or initiative of a bidding association (including the bid committees) with a FIFA ExCo Member or a member association of a FIFA ExCo Member had to be reported in advance and in writing to the secretariat of the FIFA Ethics Committee, whereby an explanation as to the reasons for the contact as well as any further information potentially affecting the Bidding Process needed to be provided.

The overview attached as enclosure number 9 hereto shows the contacts made by the Russia Bid Committee with FIFA ExCo Members during the Bidding Process that could be extracted from the documentation made available by the Russia Bid Committee.

With regard to such contacts made by the Russia Bid Committee, the overview reveals the following:

- Once the FIFA Circular No. 3 dated 7 July 2010 was issued, the Russia Bid Committee submitted a total of three letters in which it reported, in advance, the contact it wished to make with the following FIFA ExCo Members:
Mr Chung Mong-Joon (Encl. no 32: KIRKLAND0151598), Mr Jack Warner (Encl. no 33: KIRKLAND0151600), and Mr Amos Adamu (Encl. no 34: KIRKLAND0151606).

- On 30 April 2014, the Russia Bid Committee provided an overview of its contacts with FIFA ExCo Members (Encl. no 35). This overview covered most, but not all contact with FIFA ExCo Members that could be extracted from the documents made available for review. The overview also listed further contact in relation to which no underlying documentation (such as letters or emails) was provided. Enclosure number 9 provides an overview of all reported and non-reported contact between the Russia Bid Committee and FIFA Exco Members, based on the documentation provided as well as the interviews conducted.

As to how the meetings with FIFA ExCo Members normally occurred, Mr Sorokin commented that the Russia Bid Committee generally presented its bid followed by a Q&A session. Such presentations took place during lunch or during (official) meetings (Sorokin Transcript, p. 22).

In his testimony, Mr Sorokin mentioned that the Russia Bid Committee prepared the list by reconstructing the contacts based upon (travel) documents and its members’ recollection (Sorokin Transcript, p. 22-23). In a letter to the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee on 19 August 2014, Mr Sorokin reconfirmed that there is no other documentation available relating to the contact made with FIFA ExCo Members by the Russia Bid Committee and listed in enclosure number 9 since these communications were done through email accounts that are no longer accessible (Encl. no 10).

Since FIFA Circular No. 3 dated 7 July 2010 required any contacts by bid committees with FIFA ExCo Members to be reported in advance, the Russia Bid Committee’s retroactive reporting failed to comply with these requirements. In addition, not all of the contacts that can be extracted from the documents submitted were contained in the list provided by the Russia Bid Committee.

In response to a question about reporting contact by the Russia Bid Committee with FIFA ExCo Members, Mr Sorokin stated that: “We always, (…), notified FIFA about these visits to the point when FIFA told us not to notify them anymore because they were not interested.” (Sorokin Transcript, p.25). This statement seems to relate to the Russia Bid Committee’s letter to the FIFA Ethics Committee dated 27 July 2010, in which they ask for permission to invite Mr Amos Adamu to Russia for a presentation of the Russian bid (Encl. no 34: KIRKLAND0151606).

The FIFA Ethics Committee responded on 3 August 2010 (Encl. no 36: KIRKLAND0151575) explaining that FIFA’s permission is not required before contact can be made with Exco Members and that the purpose of Bid Circular no. 3 is to report all contact made rather than to get FIFA’s approval for each potential contact. Based on these communications as well as Mr Sorokin’s above-mentioned statement, it is possible that
the Russia Bid Committee misunderstood the explanation of the FIFA Ethics Committee and believed that they were not required to report each contact.

However, in letters dated 18 October 2010 and 3 November 2010, several months after the aforementioned exchange with the FIFA Ethics Committee, the Russia Bid Committee informed the FIFA Ethics Committee of its intention to invite Mr Jack Warner and Mr Mong-Joon to Russia. In addition, in a letter to the FIFA Ethics Committee dated 19 August 2014 (Encl. no 6), Mr Sorokin explains that the reporting requirement was taken seriously, but acknowledges that in some cases, even after having received the aforementioned letter from the FIFA Ethics Committee on 3 August 2010, the Russia Bid Committee did not report meetings that took place in the context of official international football events or in some cases, in the busy period leading up to the vote. Therefore, although it is possible that the Russia Bid Committee believed that they were acting correctly, it is still difficult to conclude that the Bid Committee misunderstood the reporting requirements in relation to contact with FIFA Exco Members.

D. Gifts and Coverage of Travel Costs for the Benefit of FIFA ExCo Members

Chapter 11 of the Rules of Conduct of the FIFA Ethics Committee stipulates that the member associations and the bid committees shall, amongst other things, refrain from providing any FIFA ExCo Member or the FIFA Inspection Group or any of their respective relatives, companions, guests or nominees with:

- any monetary gifts;
- any kind of personal advantage that could give the impression of exerting influence, or conflict of interest, either directly or indirectly, in connection with the bidding process, such as the beginning of a collaboration, whether with private persons, a company or any authorities, except for occasional gifts that are generally regarded as having symbolic or incidental value and that exclude any influence on a decision in relation to the bidding process; and
- any benefit, opportunity, promise, remuneration or service to any of such individuals, in connection with the bidding process.

The written correspondence of the Russia Bid Committee made available does not contain any reference to gifts being offered to FIFA ExCo Members. However, an overview was provided by the Russia Bid Committee listing in detail the gifts presented to FIFA ExCo Members on the occasion of various meetings and events (Encl. 37: KIRK-LAND0151640 – 641)).
In general, the gifts offered by the Russia Bid Committee appear to have a symbolic or incidental value, which posed no risk of improperly influencing the Bidding Process.

Based on the Russia Bid Committee’s own overview, gifts given to FIFA ExCo Members included the following (Encl. no 38: KIRKLAND0151618 – 627):

- Branded souvenirs (cufflinks, tie, business card holder, keychain, pen) with a value between RUB 485.99 – 3'600 (approx. CHF 12.50 – 92.30, based on a RUR-CHF exchange rate of 1:39). These amounts are partially confirmed by receipts provided in the documentation (Encl. no 39: KIRKLAND0151637-9);

- Russian traditional souvenirs (toy «Cheburashka», Matrioshka, Lady Scarf, Lacquer Box) with a value between RUB 385 – 4'350 (CHF 9.80 – 111.50). These amounts are partially confirmed by receipts provided in the documentation (Encl. no 40: KIRKLAND0151629, 0151633-6)

While Mr Sorokin confirmed that the most expensive gift offered was a Waterman pen valued at between USD 100-200 (Sorokin Transcript, p. 11-12), Mr Mutko noted that "(…) we were always sticking to very symbolic gifts about Russia; it was all within reasonable limits. And we do understand the whole thing; we never, (…), stepped out of the limits." (Mutko Transcript, p. 14). Mr Djordjadze emphasised in respect of the gifts given by the Russia Bid Committee: "(…) we felt, (…), a very, (…), thorough scrutiny on us on the part of the British investigative sports media. So apart from our genuine detachment to follow the rules of conduct, we had a double incentive to be very cautious of here because we were under the magnifying glass of British media." (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 8).

The documents submitted by the Russia Bid Committee also show that Mr Mutko invited FIFA ExCo Members to visit Russia (Encl no 41: KIRKLAND0151576 - 82; 0151585 - 89; 0151592 - 97; 0151602 - 05). Some FIFA ExCo Members accepted this invitation and visited Russia, in some cases, accompanied by their families. In this regard, Mr Sorokin and Mr Djordjadze both confirmed in their testimonies that the travel and accommodation costs associated with these visits, including business class airfare, were fully covered by the Russia Bid Committee (Sorokin Transcript, p.24-25; Djordjadze Transcript, p. 14-15).

During these visits, the overview provided by the Russia Bid Committee shows that Mr Rafael Salguero, Mr Amos Adamu, Mr Jack Warner, Mr Mohammed Bin Hammam, Mr Hany Abo Rida and Dr Chung Mong Joon (some accompanied by their families) were also provided with tickets for tours of the Kremlin, St. Petersburg and Peterhof, the Diamond Fund exhibition and for the ballet at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. The documentation provided for review contains the following purchase receipts, which relate to the foregoing events: Kremlin tour (RUR 350 per person), the Diamond Fund exhibition (RUR 500 per person), and ballet tickets at RUR 4,000 per person (Encl. no 42: KIRKLAND0151630-2).
Even though the full travel and accommodation costs for FIFA ExCo Members and their families exceeds what one would ordinarily consider as having an incidental value, coverage of these costs was not per se prohibited under the FIFA Rules of Conduct in force at the time. Those Rules of Conduct, among other things, reminded all the Member Associations and the Bid Committees to conduct any activities in relation to the Bidding Process in the accordance with basic ethical principles and refrain from attempting to influence members of the FIFA Executive Committee or any other FIFA officials, in particular by offering benefits for specific behaviour. Furthermore, the Rules of Conduct contain a clear section on "Gifts" (Encl. no 43: Rules of Conduct). In Mr Sorokin’s testimony, (Sorokin Transcript, p. 25), he noted that before assuming these costs, the Russia Bid Committee reviewed the applicable FIFA Rules of Conduct and concluded that nothing prohibited these expenses.

This point will be discussed in the recommendations in the Overall Report to clarify the future behaviour of bidding nations and visits by those who will directly participate in the voting process. See Overall Report Part XVI(E).

E. Allegations or Indications of Undue Influence by the Russia Bid Committee

i. Undue Influence on the FIFA Evaluation Group and its Chairman Mr Harold Mayne-Nicholls

Allegations were made that the Russia Bid Committee had provided the FIFA Evaluation Group, including its Chairman Mr Harold Mayne Nicholls, with iPads during their inspection visit in Russia. (Encl. no 44: p. 84, Mayne Nicholls Transcript).

In this regard, the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee requested by email on 19 May 2014 that the Russia Bid Committee provide its comments and any relevant documentary evidence in relation to the iPads.

In his testimony, Mr Djordjadze confirmed that iPads had been given to the members of the FIFA Evaluation Group as a working tool containing the entire bid content and the relevant information on the host cities visited by the FIFA Evaluation Group (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 9).

iPads were given to the FIFA Evaluation Group as a working tool to be used in connection with the evaluation of the Russian Bid. Taking into account the Russian Bid Committee’s intention in providing the iPads as well as their overall value, one can conclude that, standing alone, providing the iPads was not a violation of the rules on gifts in force at the time.

Other than providing iPads as set out above, the documents made available and the testimonies given do not contain any evidence of an attempt to unduly influence members of the FIFA Evaluation Group. As to the assessment of the FIFA Evaluation Group’s con-
uct concerning other bids (including the conduct of its Chairman, Mr Harold Mayne-Nicholls), reference is made to the Overall Report (see Part XIV(E)(1)) and related recommendations concerning the composition and rules governing future evaluation teams (see Part XVI(D)).

ii. Undue Influence on Dr Michel D’Hooghe

Reports appeared in the English media alleging that FIFA ExCo Member Dr Michel D’Hooghe had received a Picasso from Mr Vyacheslav Koloskov, former ExCo Member and lobbyist for the Russian Bid, in order to secure a vote for Russia (Encl. no 45: KIRKLAND0164501 – 508, KIRKLAND0021599 – 601).

In reaction to this allegation, Dr D’Hooghe submitted a written statement to FIFA, dated 13 August 2011, rejecting the claim that any undue influence had been exerted by way of Mr Koloskov’s gift (Encl. no 45: KIRKLAND0164503 – 505). Instead, he explained that the painting was given to him by Mr Koloskov as a personal gift between friends who had known each other for more than 20 years and was therefore unrelated to the Russian Bid.

Furthermore, Dr D’Hooghe noted that he was not aware at the time of the meeting, on 27 April 2010, that Mr Koloskov was formally associated with the Russian bid and it was only during their lunch together, with their wives and an “interpreter” (only later identified as Russian bid CEO Mr Sorokin), that Mr Koloskov informed him that he had been asked to advocate for the Russian bid. Dr D’Hooghe stated that at this meeting with Mr Koloskov, they both discussed the benefits of the respective bids of their home countries. In that regard, Dr. D’Hooghe asserted that Mr Koloskov had been fully aware that Dr D’Hooghe would support the Belgian-Dutch bid.

Dr D’Hooghe further observed that when Mr Koloskov gave him the gift, it was wrapped and he could not see its contents and assumed that it was a photo of sentimental value only (Encl. no 46: D’Hooghe Transcript, p. 46). After unwrapping it and noticing that it was a painting, his opinion was that it could be of no real value. In order to get another opinion, he submitted the painting to a local antiques dealer, who concluded that it was worthless (D’Hooghe Transcript, p. 46).

A few weeks later, when rumours were circulating in the English press that Dr D’Hooghe had accepted “fine Russian art”, one English journalist even suggesting that Dr D’Hooghe had received a Picasso (Encl. no 45: KIRKLAND0164504), he informed FIFA President Joseph S. Blatter of the incident in a letter dated 10 August 2011 and proposed to have the painting appraised.

Dr D’Hooghe submitted the appraisal of the painting done on 12 August 2011, in which the Russian art specialist stated the following: "This painting only has a decorative value. It is painted on cardboard and the name of the painter is unknown to me. Additional information from Russia confirms this theory." (Encl. no 45: KIRKLAND0164507).
In his testimony, Dr D’Hooghe recounted the events he had described earlier in the above-mentioned account (D’Hooghe Transcript, p. 43-56). For a full discussion of Dr. D’Hooge’s conduct and testimony with respect to the gift of the painting, see Overall Report Part XII(A).

When asked about the painting given by Mr Koloskov to Dr D’Hooghe, Mr Sorokin confirmed in his testimony that he was also present at the meeting and that the painting was given to Dr D’Hooghe as a personal gift by Mr Koloskov. Mr Sorokin further noted that "(...) I’m certain that the painting had no value whatsoever. (...) if the painting had any value, Mr. Koloskov or me could never have, (...), taken it through customs. (...). Both (...), in Russia and Belgium. (...) It was a token of appreciation from one friend (...) to another and I think in the media, at one point, Mr. D’Hooghe, being a very careful person, had even had it, (...) appraised and he (...) clearly stated that he was—was certain at the time that the painting (...) had completely no value." (Sorokin Transcript, p. 13).

In his testimony, Mr Djordjadze mentioned that he had no direct knowledge about the painting, but based on what he heard, it came from Mr Koloskov's private collection and did not have any value (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 9).

Based on a review of the existing record, there is no basis for further proceedings involving Mr Koloskov or Mr. Sorokin. See Overall Report Part XII for an assessment of Dr. D’Hooge's conduct in this bidding process.

**iii. Undue Influence on Mr Amos Adamu**

In a letter dated 26 May 2010, Mr Mutko contacted Mr Amos Adamu, thanking him for the cordial welcome he had given to the delegation of the Russia Bid Committee on their visit to Abuja, Nigeria in May 2010 (Encl. no 47).

In this letter, Mr Mutko further noted: "Nigeria is an important partner of Russia in Africa. After the last year's visit of President Medvedev to Nigeria our bilateral relations acquired new impetus. I am pleased to inform you that a letter from Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev to President Goodluck Jonathan regarding our partnership in the bidding process will be signed and sent to the Russian Embassy in Abuja shortly."

When asked about the contents of this letter, Mr Mutko explained in his testimony that the formulation "partnership in the bidding process" had no deeper meaning and was standard wording used in correspondence (Mutko Transcript, p. 25-26). Mr Sorokin, who was present during Mr Mutko’s interview, was of the opinion that Mr Adamu had asked the Russian Bid committee to write a letter to his president in which his name was mentioned, because Mr Adamu had political aspirations (Mutko Transcript, p. 26).

Both Mr Mutko and Mr Sorokin further stated that they did not believe that this letter was ever sent by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (Mutko Transcript, p. 26). In a let-

23
ter dated 1 August 2014, upon request, Mr Sorokin confirmed that President Medvedev had not prepared or sent this letter to President Goodluck Jonathan.

Mr Djordjadze further asserted in his testimony that there was no "partnership" between the Russia Bid Committee and Mr Adamu (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 19).

In his testimony, Mr Adamu rejected the notion that the Russia Bid Committee attempted to unduly influence his vote and stated that the Russia Bid Committee was simply lobbying for their bid in the same manner as all other bid committees (Adamu Transcript, p. 21-22 and 26).

Based on the documentation provided, the testimonies given by Mr Mutko, Mr Sorokin and Mr Adamu as well as on the basis of the letter dated 1 August 2014, affirming that no letter from President Medvedev to President Jonathan was sent, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that the language in the letter sent by Mr Mutko to Mr Adamu dated 26 May 2010, "partnership in the bidding process", referred to any improper relationship between Mr Adamu and the Russian bid team. In any case, the language used did create an unfortunate perception and should be avoided in the future.

iv. Undue Influence on Mr Franz Beckenbauer

In June 2010, a British media outlet, the Daily Mail Online, alleged that Mr Franz Beckenbauer agreed to become an ambassador to Gazprom, Russia’s oil company, at some point during the Bidding Process and that this relationship was linked to an effort to unduly influence his vote for the 2018 FIFA World Cup.

In response to a request from FIFA dated 8 April 2014, Mr Beckenbauer submitted a written statement on 18 June 2014 in which he refuted the allegations and denied that he had any agreement with Gazprom (Encl. no 48: Beckenbauer written statement, p.6). Rather, Mr Beckenbauer noted that the firm commercially exploiting his personality rights had entered into an agreement with the Russian Gas Society (RGS) in the context of which Mr Beckenbauer was to undertake various advertising and representation activities (Encl. no 48: Beckenbauer written statement, p.7).

Mr Beckenbauer further noted that such agreement with RGS was entered into in February 2012, i.e. subsequent and he claimed unrelated to his earlier activities as a FIFA ExCo Member and after the Bidding Process.

In his testimony, Mr Djordjadze also asserted that the Russian Bid Committee had no relationship with Mr Beckenbauer (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 15).

Since Mr Beckenbauer’s agreement with RGS occurred in February 2012 only, i.e. more than one year following the vote on the hosting of the 2018 FIFA World Cup, and since there are no further indications suggesting otherwise, one cannot reasonably conclude from the allegations made against Mr Beckenbauer and his explanations given in this respect that the Russian bid team made any attempt to unduly influence his vote relat-
ing to the hosting of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Nevertheless, FIFA should consider adopting rules related to ExCo members entering into negotiations or discussions for contracts benefiting themselves or their companies, with companies or entities from bidding nations during the formal bidding process. See Overall Report Part XVI.

Mr Beckenbauer’s further conduct relating to his contract with RGS or any other event is not subject to this investigation and report on the Russia Bid Committee and thus will be further analysed in the Overall Report Part V(B).

v. Allegations of Payments made to FIFA ExCo Members from CAF Countries prior to Voting

In their interviews, Mr Mutko, Mr Sorokin and Mr Djordjadze were asked about the allegation that, shortly before the vote on the hosts of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups took place in Zurich in December 2010, a person supporting the Russian Bid had made or negotiated payments to be made to FIFA ExCo Members in return for their support of the Russian Bid.

In his testimony, Mr Mutko pointed out that the Russia Bid Committee consisted of a small team and that there was no possibility that anybody from the Russia Bid Committee would have been involved in these alleged exchanges. He further made clear that "there were no (...) absolutely no unnecessary people in our bid, and (...), the only thing I can imagine, if somebody wanted to harm us, or put a shadow of doubt on us, and that's why they were doing – making such allegations." (Mutko Transcript, p. 28-29).

Mr Sorokin and Mr Djordjadze also rejected the allegation and further noted that in any case, it would have been too late to influence any of the FIFA ExCo Members at that point in the Bidding Process, as they had already decided who to vote for (Sorokin Transcript, p. 27-28; Djordjadze Transcript, p. 16).

Also Mr Mustapha Fahmy, then General Secretary of the Confederation of African Football (CAF), when asked whether he recalled that Russia had been offering development funds to CAF, responded in his testimony as follows: "No, I don't, (...), I don't remember that there was any, anything, (...), discussed directly (...) at CAF level."

Based on the above, there is no evidence that could reasonably lead one to conclude that any payments were made to CAF countries on behalf of the Russian Bid prior to the vote on the hosting of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups taking place in Zurich in December 2010.

vi. Other FIFA ExCo members

The Investigatory Chamber also reviewed all interviews and documentation available in relation to the interactions between the Russia Bid Committee and former FIFA ExCo Members who, since the conclusion of the Bidding Process, have been found guilty of corruption. Based on this review, there is no evidence to suggest that the Russia Bid
Committee attempted to unduly influence the vote of any of these former FIFA ExCo Members.

**F. Friendly matches**

The documentation provided for review showed only two friendly matches being played in the relevant period:

- a friendly match between the men’s national teams of Qatar and Russia on 14 March 2011 in Doha, to which FIFA President Joseph S. Blatter was invited (Encl. no 49: KIRKLAND0150346). Even though no further documentation (such as the contract and terms for the friendly match) was provided, this friendly game does not reasonably suggest any potential undue influencing of the Bidding Process since this match was planned after Russia and Qatar were appointed as hosts of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, respectively, i.e. after the vote had taken place in December 2010; and

- a friendly match between the Belgian and Russian men’s representative teams on Wednesday 17 November 2010 in Voronezh, Russia. The documentation provided contains the match contract between the FUR and the Belgian Football Association (Encl no 50: KIRKLAND015348-355). Based on the terms of such contract – remuneration for the Belgian Football Association: EUR 300’000 without any grant of TV or advertising rights (KIRKLAND0150348) – and the fact that Belgium was a direct competitor of Russia in the bid to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup, there is no reasonable concern as to any impropriety in this regard.

In relation to friendly matches being used to influence votes of FIFA ExCo Members, Mr Mutko further noted in his testimony that Russia had never used friendly matches for such purposes (Mutko Transcript, p. 19).

With regard to the friendly match played against the Belgian men’s representative team, Mr Gilbert Timmermans, a member of the Executive Committee of the Netherlands and Belgium Bid Committee, confirmed in his testimony that the friendly game between Belgium and Russia was not misused to unduly influence the Bidding Process (Timmermans Transcript, p. 24-25).

A third friendly match involving the Russian representative team seems to have taken place, although no documentation seems to have been provided in that respect. Mr Henny Smorenburg, Director of Operations and Finance for the Netherlands and Belgium Bid Committee, mentioned in his testimony that the Netherlands paid Russia for the Netherlands-Russia friendly match in exchange for television and promotional rights, as is standard practice for these matches (Smorenburg Transcript, p. 33). Since the Netherlands and Belgium bid was a direct competitor of the Russian Bid and since pursuant to this testimony, no payments were made by Russia to a third party (but rather
the contrary), this friendly game should not raise any concerns as to having been used to
unduly influence the Bidding Process.

G. Use of Political Influence to Support the Russian
Bid

A number of politicians were involved in the Russian Bid Committee’s campaign to host
the FIFA World Cup.

At the beginning of 2010, Mr Vitaly Mutko, Chairman of the Russia Bid Committee, was
appointed Minister of Sports, Tourism and Youth Politics for the Russian Federation (So-
rokin Transcript, p. 36). Following his political appointment, Mr Mutko was required –
by decree of President Medvedev – to resign as president of the FUR, but not from his
function as Chairman of the Russia Bid Committee. In his correspondence with his fel-
low FIFA ExCo Members in relation to the Russian Bid, Mr Mutko used both Russia Bid
Committee and Russian Ministry for Sports, Tourism and Youth Politics official letter-
heads (e.g. KIRKLAND151585 Encl. no 51).

According to the testimonies of Mr Mutko and Mr Sorokin, then Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin was actively involved in promoting the Russian Bid (Mutko Transcript, p. 10 and
28; Sorokin Transcript, p. 5-6, 11 and 37).

In a letter to FIFA ExCo Member Mr Chuck Blazer dated 4 May 2010, Mr Mutko further
confirmed that then President Dmitry Medvedev fully supported the Russian Bid (KIRK-
LAND0151585).

Based on the overview provided by the Russia Bid Committee, there were a number of
meetings between FIFA ExCo Members and Russian government officials. On five sepa-
rate occasions, Mr Putin met with FIFA ExCo Members visiting Russia:

- 24 – 27 July 2010: Meeting between Mr Hany Abo Rida and Prime Minister
  Vladimir Putin as well as meeting between Mr Hany Abo Rida and then Presi-
  dent of Tatarstan Mr Rustam Minnikhanov in Moscow/Kazan;

- 8 August 2010: Meeting between Mr Chuck Blazer and Prime Minister Vladi-
 imir Putin in Moscow/Kazan/Sochi;

- 6 – 11 August 2010: Meeting between Mr Rafael Salguero and First Deputy
  Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov in Moscow/St. Petersburg;

- 29 – 31 August 2010: Meeting between Mr Amos Adamu and First Deputy
  Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov in Moscow;
24 – 27 October 2010: Meeting between Mr Jack Warner and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, as well as meeting with the Minister of Transport Mr Igor Levitin in Moscow;

29 – 30 October 2010: Meeting between Mr Mohammed Bin Hammam and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Moscow; and

16 – 18 November 2010: Meeting between Dr Chung Mong-Joon and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

In addition, FIFA President Joseph S. Blatter confirmed in his testimony that he had also met with then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin when visiting Russia (Blatter Transcript, p. 26).

The above list of meetings shows that Russian politicians other than Prime Minister Putin were also involved in the promotion of the Russian Bid.

Mr Djordjadze confirmed in his testimony that the Russia Bid Committee had deliberately made use of political support to garner more weight for its campaign. In this regard, Mr. Djordjadze explained as follows: "(…) but nothing of that activity can compare when a person comes to Russia and sees himself the level of preparation and level of intentions when he meets, (…), with the – with the leaders of the country, for example, so we felt this is an important element of the bidding." (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 15).

Given the above, it is clear that the Russian government officials, in particular, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, actively supported the bid. As discussed in the Overall Report Part X(A), Russia was by no means alone in garnering such support -- in fact it was a standard occurrence among bid committees. There was nothing inherently improper in doing so. Moreover, based on the documentation and information available, there is nothing to suggest that Russian government officials, including Prime Minister Putin, offered improper inducements on behalf of the bid effort. While Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s support and involvement appears to have been significant, there is no apparent violation of the FIFA Rules of Conduct in this regard. There are no indications that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s involvement was meant to unduly influence the Bidding Process, e.g. by means of granting any kinds of benefits or promises (see below).

**H. Development-related Benefits directed at the Bidding Process**

The documentation made available for review did not contain any information on development projects undertaken by the Russian Federation or the FUR.

Even though Mr Vitaly Mutko had sent numerous letters to his fellow FIFA ExCo Members, where he at times referred to the furthering of "bilateral relations" between their respective countries in the area of sports (e.g. KIRKLAND0151576, 0151578, 0151586, 0151587, 0151588,
0151592, 0151596, 0151602, 0151604 Encl. no 52), there is no reference or suggestion of any development project or other benefit that could be seen as aimed at influencing the vote of the ExCo Members.

When asked to clarify the inclusion of this wording in his letters, Mr Mutko explained that this was standard language he had used in his correspondence to all FIFA ExCo Members when he invited them to Moscow to promote the Russian Bid and that “nothing actually went (...) outside the framework of just writing.” (Mutko Transcript, p. 20-21).

The Bid Evaluation Report noted that the Russian Bid’s proposals for football development programmes were focused “on Russia's vast domestic market, and in some cases also on the former Soviet republics” (section 4.3 Bid Evaluation Report).

In his testimony Mr Sorokin confirmed that all, or at least most of the football development projects mentioned in the Russian bid book concerned development programs in Russia, and were in large part aimed at getting people involved in the FIFA World Cup in Russia. The football development programmes were a derivate of this central idea (Sorokin Transcript, p. 19-21). When asked to confirm that no development projects were planned for countries other than Russia, Mr Sorokin noted the following: "I honestly cannot remember. We never – we never made it our strong advantage. We never promoted it through any presentations, through any communications. It was never the main idea of our bid. (...) so to the best of my knowledge, no, we never focused on development programs in other countries." (Sorokin Transcript, p. 21).

Mr Djordjadze also affirmed in his testimony that the Russian Bid focused on development projects in Russia only. In this respect, Mr Djordjadze commented as follows: "(...) as we began working on our bid book, it was, (...) sort of a discussion between us how to – should we offer some infrastructural or development programs abroad or we should concentrate, (...) on our country and in the end we decided that (...) one of – in fact, the – the essence of the bid and the hosting the World Cup for Russia (...) is developing the infrastructure inside the country, so we decided to concentrate mostly on Russia, on development of football and infrastructure of football in the country. So far as I remember, we did not promise anything infrastructurally or development-wise, (...), abroad for any other countries." (Djordjadze Transcript, p. 12-13).

In his testimony, Mr Adamu, rejected the suggestion that the Russia Bid Committee had attempted to influence his vote by proposing football development projects for Africa. Mr Adamu confirmed that the Russia Bid Committee was simply lobbying in the same way as the other bid committees (e.g. the English, Australia and Korean bids) (Adamu Transcript, p. 27). Rather than proposing football development programs for Africa, the Russia Bid Committee had suggested that if the FIFA World Cup would be held in Russia, seminars and meetings could be organised in Russia and Africa, to exchange knowledge between representatives of both regions (Adamu Transcript, p. 24-26).
When asked expressly whether someone from the Russia Bid Committee wanted to influence his vote, Mr Adamu stated as follows: "No. What I thought is that they are trying to sell their bid to me. (...) So that they can get my vote. (...) But there is nothing to influence it. It is what any other person says to me (...)." (Adamu Transcript, p. 26).

Finally, on 1 August 2014, upon request, Mr Sorokin stated that, to the best of his knowledge, the FUR is not implementing any development projects anywhere in the world.

On the basis of the documents provided for review and the above-mentioned testimonies, it does not appear that the Russia Bid Committee intended to sponsor, as part of the Bidding Process, football development related activities in countries other than Russia (including certain former Soviet states). As a consequence, there is no evidence that the Russian Government, the Football Union of Russia or the Russia Bid Committee promised to launch or launched development projects directed at influencing the Bidding Process.

I. Concerns & recommendations from members of the Russia Bid Committee

The interviewed members of the Russia Bid Committee raised the following concerns and recommendations about the bidding process:

Mr Mutko

- FIFA should not conduct a bidding process for the hosting of two FIFA World Cups concurrently.

- The bidding process should be simplified and the assessment made on the basis of clear criteria, which should be communicated to interested parties from the beginning (e.g. by clarifying that 70% of the bidding evaluation is made on the basis of infrastructure). A short list of evaluation criteria should be provided, indicating the weight given for each requirement.

- The bidding process should also be more independent and more transparent. The evaluation should be made by a bidding commission that is completely independent and that would evaluate the bids in accordance with the evaluation criteria established beforehand.

- This in turn would make the bidding process more professional, reducing the "dog-eat-dog race" mentality and making the bidding process less costly, thus, allowing more countries to participate.
Mr Sorokin

- The bidding process should be conducted to determine the host for one FIFA World Cup at a time.

- In this regard, Mr Sorokin stated that it is too complicated for one candidate to prepare bids for two FIFA World Cups concurrently. During the Bidding Process, when FIFA decided that the 2018 FIFA World Cup would be hosted by a European country and the 2022 FIFA World Cup would be hosted by a non-European country, the Russia Bid Committee had to re-work all of its budget calculations, requiring an extra effort that could have been avoided.

- Asked whether he would prefer to have the entire FIFA Congress vote on the appointment of a FIFA World Cup host, Mr Sorokin was not sure whether he would favour such a change. To have the FIFA Congress vote would make the decision process more transparent and less amenable to corruption allegations. On the other hand, Mr Sorokin also stated that as a "professional bidder" to have the entire FIFA Congress vote would bring with it a less professional approach, since a group of 200 cannot be expected to professionally review and evaluate all aspects of a bid, particularly those of a technical nature.

Mr Djordjadze

- Mr Djordjadze recommended not to conduct a joint bidding process for two FIFA World Cups in the future, since this would be extremely difficult for bidders and for FIFA.

- He noted that the change made by FIFA in the midst of the Bidding Process, where the European bidders were asked to focus on the 2018 FIFA World Cup, required significant changes to the content of the Russian bid book.

- Mr Djordjadze further suggested that a short list of candidates be made before a final vote on the bids.

7. CONCLUSION

This report on the Russian Bid Committee and the following conclusions are based on the documentation available to the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee. If any new evidence or allegations are communicated to the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee following the publication of this report, they will be reviewed and analysed in a future report.

The Russia Bid Committee made only a limited amount of documents available for review, which was explained by the fact that the computers used at the time by the Russia
Bid Committee had been leased and then returned to their owner after the Bidding Process. The owner has confirmed that the computers were destroyed in the interim. The Russia Bid Committee also attempted to obtain access to the Gmail-accounts used during the Bidding Process from Google USA. However, the Russia Bid Committee confirmed in a letter dated 1 August 2014 (Encl. no 7) that Google USA had not answered their request, even though it had been received on 23 May 2014.

Based on the documents that were made available for review by the Russia Bid Committee, the entire documentation relating to the World Cup investigation and the testimonies of Mr Vitaly Mutko, Mr Alexey Sorokin and Mr Alexander Djordjadze, and other connected or involved persons, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. **No evidence of collusion of Russian Bid with another bid committee or member association**

   Apart from the statement made by Mr Kohzo Tashima (Transcript Tashima, p. 35-37; 45), there are no indications that the Russia Bid Committee has engaged in conduct aimed at colluding or collaborating with another member association or bid committee to influence the Bidding Process.

2. **Only partial compliance with reporting requirements on contact made with FIFA ExCo Members**

   The Russia Bid Committee has only in part complied with the reporting requirements on contact made with FIFA ExCo Members. In particular, the obligation to report, in advance, any contact with FIFA ExCo Members was complied with in only three cases. The other contact with FIFA ExCo Members was reported retroactively and some meetings or contact that can be extracted from the documents submitted have not been reported.

   Notwithstanding the above, insufficient evidence was found in the documents made available and testimonies given suggesting that the Russia Bid Committee had attempted to unduly influence the Bidding Process by contacting FIFA ExCo Members.

3. **No violation of FIFA Rules of Conduct on gifts, grant of benefits or development assistance**

   The policy of gifts and benefits made available by the Russia Bid Committee appears to have been in line with the FIFA Rules of Conduct.

   The gifts offered by the Russia Bid Committee to FIFA ExCo Members were, as far as evidenced in the documents provided and testimonies given, of a symbolic and incidental value.

   Even though the travel and accommodation costs for FIFA ExCo Members (partly accompanied by their families) were fully assumed by the Russia Bid Committee, such cost coverage was acceptable under the FIFA Rules of Conduct in force at the relevant time.
No documents made available for review or statements made by interviewed persons reasonably indicate that the Russia Bid Committee or the Russian Government attempted to unduly influence the Bidding Process through football development projects or friendly matches.

4. **No undue influence exerted on FIFA ExCo Members in an attempt to secure votes**

Despite only a partial compliance with the requirements on contact made with FIFA ExCo Members, as detailed above, there is no evidence in this record to suggest that the Russia Bid Committee attempted to exert undue influence on any FIFA ExCo Members in order to secure their votes.
Table of Contents:
Enclosures Russia Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mutko Transcript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sorokin Transcript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Djordjadze Transcript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Russia_Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Russia Bid Book (folder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Letter Sorokin_Borbely 19.08.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Letter Sorokin_Borbely 01.08.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Russia Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Overview Contact Between Russia Bid Committee and FIFA ExCo Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>KIRKLAND0151617 Response of Football Academy regarding computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jordaan Transcript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Voting Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Letter FIFA to FUR_06.03.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>a. Letter_17.4.2014 Ethics to Vorobiev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Letter_24.4.2014 Ethics to Alaev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Letter_30.7.2014 Ethics to Sorokin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Letter_12.8.2014 Ethics to Sorokin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>a. Request to Google Russia 23.04.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Google Russia Response 29.04.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Letter Vorobiev to FIFA Ethics 02.04.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Letter Sorokin-Borbely_30.04.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>LOC Letter to Google USA 20.05.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>a. FIFA Bid Circular No. 5_23.09.2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Bid Registration 11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>KIRKLAND0150338 Letter from Japan Bid 10.05.2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>KIRKLAND0150342 - 573 - 571 Triesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Lowy Transcript Part 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>FIFA Ethics fax to the FA 17.05.2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Letter Lord Triesman to FIFA Ethics Committee 20.05.2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The FA letter to the FIFA Ethics Committee 20.05.2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>FIFA media release re Lord Triesman 28.05.2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 27 | a. Letter from the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee 06.08.2014  
   | b. Letter from England Bid to FIFA Ethics Committee 14.08.2014 |
| 28 | JFA to FIFA (WC bid 2018-2022) 15.08.2014               |
| 29 | KIRKLAND0151577-604 Letters to FIFA ExCo                |
| 30 | KIRKLAND0151599 Request for bid books 06.10.2010        |
| 31 | FIFA Bid Circular No. 3 07.07.2010                      |
| 32 | KIRKLAND0151598 Mong-Joon 03.11.2010                    |
| 33 | KIRKLAND0151600 Warner 18.10.2010                       |
| 34 | KIRKLAND0151606 27.07.2010                              |
| 35 | Russia2018BidCom_FIFA_EXCO_Contacts                      |
| 36 | KIRKLAND0151575 FIFA Ethics to Sorokin 03.08.2010       |
| 37 | KIRKLAND0151640 Russia 2018 Bid Committee Symbolic Gifts Information |
| 38 | KIRKLAND0151618-627 Gifts                               |
| 39 | KIRKLAND0151637-639 Receipts gifts                      |
| 40 | KIRKLAND0151629_633-635 Receipts traditional gifts      |
| 41 | KIRKLAND0151576 etc. Meetings ExCo                     |
| 42 | KIRKLAND0151630-632 Receipts tickets                    |
| 43 | Rules of Conduct                                        |
| 44 | Mayne Nicholls Transcript                               |
| 45 | a. KIRKLAND0164501-08 D’Hooghe painting allegation     |
| 46 | b. KIRKLAND0021599-601 D’Hooghe painting allegations   |
| 47 | D’Hooghe Transcript                                    |
| 48 | a. Responses_FranzBeckenbauer_18.06.2014 German        |
| 49 | b. Responses_FranzBeckenbauer_18.06.2014 English       |
| 49 | KIRKLAND0150346 letter to Blatter re friendly match Qatar 14.03.2011 |
| 50 | KIRKLAND0150348-355 friendly match Russia Belgium |
| 51 | KIRKLAND0151585 Mutko to Blazer 04.05.2010 |
| 52 | KIRKLAND0151576 etc. letters to ExCo |