


XXIInd Olympic Games  
Moscow 1980

Olympic Football Tournament  
19 July - 3 August


## Technical Study



XXIInd Olympic Games  
Moscow 1980

Olympic Football Tournament  
19 July - 3 August


**Technical Study**



XXIInd Olympic Games  
Moscow 1980

Olympic Football Tournament  
19 July - 3 August

**Technical Study**



## Preface by FIFA President Dr João Havelange



*Within the context of the technical assessment of FIFA competitions, the FIFA Executive Committee has instructed its Technical Committee to establish a technical report about the 1980 Olympic Football Tournament in Moscow as well.*

*The Technical Committee appointed a study group for this consisting of Messrs Roger Quinche (Switzerland), member of the Technical Committee, Professor José Bonetti (Brazil), Dr Josef Venglos, national coach of CSSR, as well as Heinz Marotzke (Germany FR), FIFA technical adviser.*

*The report of this technical study group, which was summarized and written by Roger Quinche, is ready now. This report shall not only be of an informative nature. At the same time, it represents a further contribution within the framework of the FIFA Development Programmes and offers findings from an international FIFA competition to developing countries in particular.*

*Thus, I sincerely hope that all Associations affiliated to FIFA will pass on this study to the right places in order to achieve the aim of transmitting information and findings to the technical heads of the Associations.*

*The report will be distributed to all FIFA officials and, of course, to the representatives of the mass media.*

*I thank the authors for this interesting work.*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read 'João Havelange'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

*Dr. João Havelange*



Dr. João Havelange (Brazil), President  
Dr. Helmut Käser (Switzerland), General Secretary

**TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF FIFA**

Harry H. Cavan (Northern Ireland), Chairman  
Joseph S. Blatter (Switzerland), Secretary

**TECHNICAL STUDY GROUP**

Roger Quinche (Switzerland), Co-ordinator  
José Bonetti (Brazil)  
Heinz Marotzke (Germany FR)  
Dr. Josef Venglos (Czechoslovakia)

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## Preface

Although the qualifying rounds for the Olympic Football Tournament in Moscow in 1980 were not born under a lucky star because of different events which we do not care to dwell on here – several substituting teams had to be appointed or convoked even – a sporting unity of 16 teams could be formed all the same for the final round in the Soviet Union.

In order to say first things first, the Football Tournament was the real attraction of the 22nd Olympic Games. There was a spectator count of 1,821,624 in the four cities: Moscow, Minsk, Kiev and Leningrad (in fact there were more even, these figures representing the tickets sold without including the officers, journalists, police forces and organising officials), which represented 35,5% of the total number of spectators at the Olympic Games. Thus, the next important sports discipline, athletics, which attracted 1,102,706 spectators or 21,5%, was greatly exceeded. Both these sports disciplines drew 57% of the spectators at all the Games.

In view of the importance of such a competition, it was considered befitting to appoint a technical study group to record the events within a footballing context.

Such a study can be of an interesting nature, especially at the Olympic Games, since the developed footballing continents like Asia and Africa are represented by 3 participants each.

People were especially curious about the performance of the Olympic teams from South America and Europe, because a FIFA Congress decision made in 1978 imposed a restriction to the qualification of players from South American and European Confederations.

However, this measure did not turn out to be very effective although it is not clear whether the above-mentioned events were solely responsible for this.


During the preliminary round, the tournament was very exciting. All the 24 group matches were significant; during the knock-out system in the quarter-finals, the Eastern European teams proved to be the strongest; in fact, they won all the medals for themselves.

After a thrilling final match against the titleholders, German DR, the CSSR representative team finally became the Olympic champions. This match, which was not very high-level in a technical sense, was satisfactory as far as tactical moves and intensity were concerned.

In conclusion, may I congratulate the medal-winners of this competition, praise the Organising Committee of FIFA and the Football Association of the Soviet Union for the excellent organisation and thank the members of the Technical Study Group for their work. May it contribute towards the promotion of the game of football and the understanding between all peoples throughout the world.

*J.S. Blatter*

Technical Director FIFA



# Introduction

## *a) Study Group*

Every four years, the World Cup comes as another new climax in FIFA history. Since the 1966 World Cup finals in England, football experts have been appointed to form special Study Groups at these events, to take a close look at the tournament and make a detailed analysis. The final evaluation of the group's observations is then published in the form of a written technical report, serving as a valuable source of information. The report is supposed to make particular note of outstanding features in the organisation of the tournament and trends evident in the matches, and suggest possible alterations that should be made in the future.

This system of technical reports was expanded in 1977 for the first time, when a similar Study Group was also appointed to observe the finals in Tunisia of the first World Youth Tournament for the FIFA/Coca-Cola Cup. The technical report covered not only the matches themselves, but also the structure and the development of youth football in the countries involved.

Another technical Study Group was set up for the second World Youth Tournament in Japan in 1979, with a report again being produced on the matches – some of them very exciting – played by the 16 finalists. Trainers, coaches and officials at all levels of the game found the report contained many valuable points in its coverage of the structural and training problems facing the teams taking part, with comments made on the matches played and various conclusions drawn. No doubt there will be another such group in action at the third World Youth Tournament which in the meantime has been re-titled the “FIFA World Youth Championship for the Coca-Cola Cup” in Australia in 1981.

The XXII. Olympic Football Tournament in the USSR in 1980 fell within the framework of the extended world football development programme as outlined by FIFA President, Dr. Joao Havelange, in 1974; part of this programme has been realised since then through Project 1 (started in 1976) and Project 7 (started in 1980). The following members of the special Study Group were appointed during the winter of 1979/80 to observe and analyse the 32 matches of the XXII. Olympiad:

*Roger Quinche* (Switzerland) Member of the Technical Committee of FIFA

*José Bonetti* (Brazil) FIFA Technical Adviser

*Heinz Marotzke* (Federal Republic of Germany) FIFA Technical Adviser

*Dr. Josef Venglos* (Czechoslovakia) FIFA Technical Adviser

*J. Sepp Blatter* (Switzerland) Director of the Technical Department of FIFA.

The technical report has been produced by teamwork. It was possible to compile it quickly because of the detailed discussions held on the spot, together with those held with team officials where they were living during the Olympic Games. This system helped avoid language problems and made it unnecessary to make inquiries afterwards.

*b) Study Group's Work Programme*

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June 1980	Zurich	First meeting. Definition of objective; delegation of responsibilities, distribution of documentation.
Wednesday July 16	Moscow	Co-ordinating meeting. Definition of criteria and methods; deadlines set. Referees: Fitness training and Cooper Test (Lenin Stadium).
Thursday July 17	Moscow	Referees: Warming-up training session and test (50 metre sprint).
Friday July 18	Moscow	Referees: Meeting and party.
Saturday July 19	Moscow	In the Olympic Village: Meeting with team officials (managers, coaches, trainers, doctors). Five delegations absent.

---

Departure of the various members of the Study Group  
(delegated according to language):

Kiev	Heinz Marotzke
Leningrad	José Bonetti
Minsk	Roger Quinche
Moscow	Dr. Josef Venglos

Saturday July 20  
until  
Sunday July 27

Group matches and quarter-finals  
(24 + 4 = 28 matches)

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Monday July 28	Members of the Study Group return to Moscow
Tuesday July 29 until Sunday August 3	Moscow Daily co-ordinating meetings. Discussions, appraisal, evaluation. Joint visit to semi-finals, final and match for third place.
August/September	Basle/Zurich Draft of the Technical Report
October	Basle Definitive version (German)
November	Zurich Printing (German). Translation (English)

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
*Venglos*

*Quinche*

*Blatter*


*Marotzke*

*Bonetti*



*Team heads (Yugoslavia) during group discussion*

### Criteria for systematic observation of matches



# Objective

Our observations and studies were made on the 16 teams and the matches they played in the Olympic Football Tournament of the XXII. Olympiad in the Soviet Union. We have deliberately only touched upon the questions of qualification and selection (together with the subsequent invitations made as an emergency solution to the problems caused by the boycott) when this was of direct relevance to the technical aspect of the tournament. The draw for the Final Tournament has only been mentioned because of the unequal effects it had on the 16 teams in the four groups; the actual programme of matches in the Final Tournament obviously lay outside the competence of the Study Group itself.

Within this context, the Study Group was set the following objectives

- The report aims to provide an objective and neutral account of the XXII. Olympic Football Tournament in the Soviet Union in 1980, according to the criteria established by the FIFA International Academy.
- The reports on the group matches and the quarter-finals reflect the personal opinions of the various members of the Study Group (Kiev: Marotzke; Leningrad: Bonetti; Minsk: Quinche; Moscow: Venglos).
- The statistical section of the report contains a graphical summary of the 32 matches. The different diagrams provide information on various aspects of the Tournament, which are primarily of interest to trainers, coaches, players, referees, officials and the press. This section enables comparisons to be made.
- The comments on the matches to decide the first four places reflect discussions based on the opinions of all four members of the Study Group.
- The final part is one of appraisal and evaluation, and is the product of discussions between all members of the Group. Useful views and opinions were also gathered and incorporated from numerous conversations with specialists from the Organising Committee, the Referees' Committee, the press, radio and television, as well as with trainers and heads of team delegations.

Outstanding features of organisation, physical fitness, technique and tactics – and ways of maintaining, reinforcing or otherwise modifying them – should indicate how team training and preparation, management and coaching, or even the organisation of the tournament in general may be rationalised or even improved. These points are also stimulating and helpful and fit appropriately into FIFA's overall plans for an extended programme of football development.



# Match Appraisal

## Summary (Group matches)

\* Invited teams not qualifying directly for the final tournament

Group A	USSR	Cuba	Venezuela	Zambia
USSR		8:0	4:0	3:1
Cuba *	0:8		2:1	1:0
Venezuela*	0:4	1:2		2:1
Zambia *	1:3	0:1	1:2	

1. USSR	3	3	0	0	15:1	6
2. Cuba	3	2	0	1	3:9	4
3. Venezuela	3	1	0	2	3:7	2
4. Zambia	3	0	0	3	2:6	0
	12	6	0	6	23:23	12

Group B	CSSR	Kuwait	Colombia	Nigeria
CSSR		0:0	3:0	1:1
Kuwait	0:0		1:1	3:1
Colombia	0:3	1:1		1:0
Nigeria *	1:1	1:3	0:1	

1. CSSR	3	1	2	0	4:1	4
2. Kuwait	3	1	2	0	4:2	4
3. Colombia	3	1	1	1	2:4	3
4. Nigeria	3	0	1	2	2:5	1
	12	3	6	3	12:12	12

<b>Group C</b>	<i>Germ. DR</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Syria</i>
<i>Germ. DR</i>		1:0	1:1	5:0
<i>Algeria</i>	0:1		1:1	3:0
<i>Spain</i>	1:1	1:1		0:0
<i>Syria</i> *	0:5	0:3	0:0	

1. German DR	3	2	1	0	7:1	5
2. Algeria	3	1	1	1	4:2	3
3. Spain	3	0	3	0	2:2	3
4. Syria	3	0	1	2	0:8	1
	<u>12</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>13:13</u>	<u>12</u>

<b>Group D</b>	<i>Yugoslavia</i>	<i>Iraq</i>	<i>Finland</i>	<i>Costa Rica</i>
<i>Yugoslavia</i>		1:1	2:0	3:2
<i>Iraq</i> *	1:1		0:0	3:0
<i>Finland</i> *	0:2	0:0		3:0
<i>Costa Rica</i>	2:3	0:3	0:3	

1. Yugoslavia	3	2	1	0	6:3	5
2. Iraq	3	1	2	0	4:1	4
3. Finland	3	1	1	1	3:2	3
4. Costa Rica	3	0	0	3	2:9	0
	<u>12</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>15:15</u>	<u>12</u>

## Group Reports

Group A	Moscow	<i>Dr. Josef Venglos (José Bonetti)</i>					
	1. USSR	3	3	0	0	15:1	6 points
	2. Cuba	3	2	0	1	3:9	4
	3. Venezuela	3	1	0	2	3:7	2
	4. Zambia	3	0	0	3	2:6	0
		12	6	0	6	23:23	12

Teams also observed:

*Kuwait,*  
*Colombia*  
*Nigeria*  
*Czechoslovakia*

*Quarter-final in Moscow*  
USSR 2, Kuwait 1 (1:0)

### General Remarks

Most of the eight teams observed in Moscow had been in a position to prepare thoroughly for the Olympic Games, with training camps and friendly matches. The USSR, Kuwait and Czechoslovakia had the advantage of being certain qualifiers, while Nigeria (as the 1980 African Champions), Venezuela, Zambia and Cuba all only reached the last 16 through special invitation after the withdrawal of other teams who had been placed above them in the qualifying groups. The eight teams had virtually no selection problems. Clubs readily made available the players whom the coaches wanted in their squads, and there was good co-operation between trainers and coaches.

Group A could be broken down as follows according to the relative strength of the four teams in the group:

*The USSR* had the best team of the Moscow group in every respect, except in that of improvisation, with the coach drawing on no less than eight players from his own club, Spartak Moscow. They were well-balanced as a team, switching be-

tween attack and defence with both elements of the team supporting each other well. What they lacked was a personal style or any sense of improvisation, which deprived the team of the elements of surprise and creativity.

*Zambia* had clearly made considerable progress, both technically and tactically, and also showed greater determination and a more systematic approach to their game. They were well led by their coach and this was reflected in the way they played. Their only problem appeared to be one of equipment.

*Venezuela and Cuba* distinguished themselves above all by their good sportsmanship. But they were noticeably short of tactical ability, not least because they ignored the principles of using blocks of players from the same club. The young players were drawn from many different clubs (Cuba from seven and Venezuela from nine). Their planning was clearly aimed at longer-term goals, with the Olympic Football Tournament forming a sort of stepping-stone to the future.

Zambia, Venezuela and Cuba all put the accent on individual play, with no sign of any planned combined moves but rather an improvised succession of fast and impromptu individual efforts. Zambia, especially, revealed impressive strength of will and forcefulness in their attacks, while Cuba, on the other hand, applied little pressure and were too reluctant to play through-passes.

## **Fitness**

The teams in Group A were well prepared physically by their coaches and trainers. Players had speed, strength and endurance, as well as skill on the ball and this enabled them to carry out their trainers' tactical instructions. Some of the players in the Cuban and Zambian teams caught the eye with their quite natural skill and dexterity with the ball, and their "aesthetic" approach to the game was well received. The players were generally strong in jumping for high balls, and heading was also generally good. The Russians had the most to offer as far as pure football fitness was concerned, but the Venezuelans were obviously lacking in match fitness even though the pace of nearly all the games was not particularly fast, and indeed was quite modest for national teams.

Only a few players were capable of applying their physical attributes of speed, skill and endurance to the good of their own game or to that of the team as a whole. Four Russian players were particularly worthy of mention in this respect: Andreev (7), Gazzaev (11), Shavlo (6) and Bessonov (8), as well as three Kuwait players, Marzouq (7), Sultan (9) and Aldaakhil (16) and two Zambians, Chola (9) and Chitalu (10).



*Good heading work in defence (jumping ability, general view)*

In brief, the positive and negative aspects of physical fitness displayed by teams in Group A may be summarised as follows:

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- Jumping ability for high balls
- Individual skill on the ball
- Speed without changes of direction
- Powerful tackling.

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-

- Unfair tackling, including from behind
  - Bringing down opposing forwards
  - Lack of suppleness in feints, tricks and surprise dribbling
  - Illegal body-checking; little tricks like shirt-pulling and holding back opponents with the hands.
- 

Compared with the World Cup, the group matches in the Olympic Football Tournament failed to meet a very high standard as far as pure physical fitness was concerned. Teams appeared anxious to conserve their energy, in order to be able to survive the whole Tournament.

## Technique

The overall impression of technical standards in the group matches was not a particularly good one. Ball control and passing often went wrong when players were under pressure, either from an opponent or from a change of pace, and technical errors made it impossible to complete combined moves and denied teams the chance of finishing off with a shot at goal. Individual skills only really came off well when the players involved were able to use the ball as they wanted to, without an opponent challenging them.

It was a rare sight to see passes or shots struck with spin or swerve.

In attack, forwards did not have the technical prowess to withstand powerful challenges from opposing defenders, and this meant there was little attractive combined football rounded off with an attempt at goal. Technical shortcomings under pressure and in acceleration made it difficult for players to carry out their tactical instructions. The physically strong players clearly dominated those who were technically more refined. Technical standards as a whole were below those which prevailed at the 1979 World Youth Tournament in Japan.

A summary of the positive and negative aspects of technical play:

+	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Heading: passes and defence</li><li>- Ball control without an opponent challenging</li><li>- Some good individual dribblers, moving straight ahead: USSR: Andreev (7), Bessonov (9), Gazzaev (11) Kuwait: Marzouq (7), Sultan (9), Aldaakhil (16) Zambia: Chola (9), Chitalu (10), Czechoslovakia: Radimec (4), Vizek (7).</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Inadequate ball control under pressure and in the tackle</li><li>- Very few balls given spin and swerve</li><li>- Few dribbling runs with change of direction or dummies</li><li>- Stereotyped dribbling, repetitive and lacking surprise</li><li>- Few triangular movements.</li></ul>

It was particularly noticeable from a technical point of view what a difference there was between the tall defenders and the shorter forwards, who were at a distinct physical disadvantage and thus hardly ever able to make use of their technical skills.

## Tactics

The intention of "playing for a result" meant that there was little or no attractive attacking football played. The most common systems were 4-3-3 or 4-4-2.

Teams except the USSR and Czechoslovakia played without a real libero, marking space and without their defence deliberately retreating in depth. The switch from defence to attack was consequently usually rather slow, with a lot of diagonal and back passes to ensure retaining possession of the ball, while defenders were poor at giving support to their own forwards.

Safety and caution were clearly the dominating factors and this did not allow players to interchange positions among themselves or create any sort of surprises. Attacks were too often composed without making use of the empty spaces on the wings, and the only real goal chances came from individual actions. It was very rarely that we saw quick, combined moves involving several players, ending with a clear-cut attempt at goal. Gross errors by the goalkeepers led to several of the goals scored. With the long time the teams had enjoyed to prepare for the tournament, it had been expected that they would have developed better teamwork and more variety in their play, but this was hardly ever in evidence.

The positive and negative aspects of tactical play may be summed up as follows:

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+	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- USSR: Good use of man-to-man and zonal marking</li><li>- Some overlapping, with players switching roles</li><li>- Individual tactical behaviour; solo efforts</li><li>- USSR: well-rehearsed free-kicks with good dummies (stepping over the ball, pass and shot).</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Destructive football, "playing for a result", little feeling for constructive football under pressure</li><li>- Fear of taking risks. Defenders hardly ever daring to support their own forwards. Direction of play seldom switched</li><li>- Surprise element largely lacking. Little movement off the ball to open up empty spaces</li><li>- Stereotyped moves at free-kicks and corners with little originality</li><li>- Wall-pass seldom used</li><li>- Little use of change of rhythm or sharp increase in pace.</li></ul>

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Altogether it must be said that there were few attacks which had the proper support or penetration and finished with a clear chance of a goal. Individual efforts were much more common, but seldom achieved their aim. The Olympic Football Tournament confirmed the trend already detected in the 1978 World Cup finals in Argentina, for teams to put more emphasis on defence. There was clearly a great deal for trainers to do still on developing their teams' attacking tactics.

**Group B***Leningrad**José Bonetti (Dr. Josef Venglos)*


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1. Czechoslovakia	3	1	2	0	4:1	4 points
2. Kuwait	3	1	2	0	4:2	4
3. Colombia	3	1	1	1	2:4	3
4. Nigeria	3	0	1	2	2:5	1
	<hr/>	12	3	6	3	12:12 12

---

Teams also observed:

*Cuba**USSR**Venezuela**Zambia**Quarter-final in Leningrad*

Czechoslovakia 3, Cuba 0 (1–0)

**General Remarks**

Matches in Leningrad drew very big crowds with an average attendance of 68,000, but the games themselves hardly ever came up to international standards. Czechoslovakia and the USSR justified their roles as favourites; they were both fortunate to be able to profit from the way in which the matches were arranged, playing all their matches in the same city without the need to travel on their rest days. They both had powerful teams, very fit and strong-willed. But although they had individually skillful players, they were short of creative thinking and failed to use space, especially for attacks down the wings.

Kuwait played surprisingly strongly, with a strict tactical approach to the game. The religious beliefs of about a third of the Kuwait squad meant that they had to observe a fast during the tournament and this was bound to have a detrimental effect on their physical condition in a tournament such as this, with its demanding rhythm of a game every other day and a total of four games within seven days. Kuwait stood out not just because of the clear and precise way in which the team was organised, but also because of their fairness and good sportsmanship.

Cuba, Venezuela, Zambia and Nigeria had all been invited to take part in the finals without having qualified directly for the last 16, and had played a number of international games during their relatively short period of preparation. Zambia made the best impression of the four, with players capable of exploiting their individual strengths for the good of the team as a whole and for the tactics employed

by the team. The 1980 African Champions, Nigeria, are a team with a bright future, and made use of their players with experience but revealed themselves to be somewhat vulnerable psychologically (language problems and difficulties arising from cultural and political differences). Cuba and Venezuela left a rather poor impression as teams, and their young players appeared to have trouble putting their trainers' and coaches' ideas into practice on the pitch. Colombia not only appeared confused in their football on the pitch, but also suffered from internal disagreements between the administrators and the technicians among the delegation which upset the atmosphere within the team, and it was also difficult for members of the Study Group to get information directly from people in the Colombian delegation who were competent to give it.

The teams in Group B could be categorised as follows, in terms of footballing strength:

*Czechoslovakia* were clearly the best team in the group. Their physical strength, together with good individual technique, made them a powerful side who, however, had not reckoned on reaching the final. Their game was made less effective by a certain lack of creative ideas, an over-emphasis on lifted passes and an insistence on applying pressure down the centre of the pitch rather than down the wings.

*Kuwait* made a good impression with their well-defined concept of the game. The team had been carefully prepared and were skillfully managed, and their high standard of fairness and good sportsmanship were also most commendable.

*Nigeria* improved after the problems they had in the first match, when they lost 1-3 to Kuwait. This match was an unofficial play-off between the 1980 African and Asian Champions. Their strengths and weaknesses both resulted from individuals in the team: there were problems with the team captain on the one hand, and on the other they had an outstanding player with an exceptionally fierce shot in number 16, Osuigwe.

*Colombia* turned in a mediocre performance, winning one game, drawing one and losing one. They were confused on the pitch and off it, indicating general problems within the entire delegation. They did not appear very willing to release information.

### **Fitness**

Czechoslovakia were the most competitive, while there were certain factors which had their influence on the physical condition of the teams from Kuwait and Colombia – namely, the diet problems caused by religious beliefs among the Kuwait squad, and the tense internal atmosphere within the Colombian delegation.

Nigeria were well trained and benefited from a lengthy period of physical preparation. The teams playing their group matches in Leningrad appreciated the excel-



*Mental and physical preparation for a serious match*

lent installations in the city for training and recreation, which proved to be virtually ideal throughout the entire Tournament.

Overall, the teams in Group B used their physical attributes mostly for defensive purposes, in frequently over-vigorous tackles and — unfortunately — less often in attacking football, dribbling, dummying and finishing.

The respective strengths and weaknesses from a physical angle may be summarised as follows:

+	—
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— General competitiveness and a readiness to enter the tackle</li> <li>— Jumping ability for high balls</li> <li>— Speed and power in defence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— Lack of mobility and adaptability for creating unexpected moves</li> <li>— Unfair tackling from behind (one tackle resulted in a Colombian player suffering a double fracture of the leg)</li> <li>— Unsuitable programme for proper recovery between matches, massage, etc. (some players suffered from cramp).</li> </ul>

The level of physical fitness in the matches in Group B was poor by international standards. Although the players were in fact generally fit, they could not make full use of this because of their cautious approach and their determination to play efficiently, especially in defence.

## Technique

There was a clearly discernible technical difference in Group B between the European style of Czechoslovakia and the more individualistic style of teams like Nigeria, Kuwait, and Colombia.

But players also performed the techniques of the game in a mundane and straightforward manner. It was extremely rare to see subtle ways of bringing the ball under control (killing the ball, dummyming and changing direction all in one movement), cunningly struck passes cut with the outside of the foot, bent passes and centres and swerving shots. This marked the main difference from the group matches at the World Cup finals, with the football in the USSR being purely functional with no technically fine points or anything adventurous. Playing the ball high did not make it any easier for the players to play their normal game, and there was one heading duel after another and many clashes in mid-air.

With play seldom being directed down the wings, the central strikers were continually being put under pressure in front of their opponents' goal, and the massed defences usually got the upper hand thanks to their physical commitment. There was an almost total lack of creative thinking and technical finesse. Most of the teams depended more upon their physical capacities than on their technical abilities. Attempts at dribbling or anything adventurous were frequently brought to an abrupt end by hard and sometimes unfair tackles and fouls from behind.

Technical strengths and weaknesses may be summed up as follows:

+	-
<hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Good heading, especially in defence and midfield.</li></ul> <hr/>	<hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Lack of surprise tricks and too little creativity</li><li>- Too few wall-passes, even when they could create goal chances</li><li>- Few bent passes and shots, too little use made of passes into open space</li><li>- Lack of combined play.</li></ul> <hr/>

There was a generally noticeable difference in the technique involved in the collective European style of football and the more individualistic style employed by the other teams, who constructed their combined moves more or less as the accidental product of a series of improvised individual actions.

## Tactics

The four teams in Group B also differed in their tactical approach, coming as they did from four different Continental Confederations (UEFA – Europe, AFC – Asia, CONMEBOL – South America and CAF – Africa). Czechoslovakia were a very efficient side, who impressed mostly through their good individual technique rather than through a particularly creative tactical approach. Successful attacks were sought too often through the middle instead of down the wings, and too many lofted passes also caused extra problems.

Kuwait's well-prepared team turned out to be a pleasant surprise, playing clever team football as a side with a clear tactical concept and a good sense of fair play. Players overlapped and switched positions in a modern style of football. The players who particularly caught the eye were Marzouq (7), Sultan (9) and Aldaakhil (16), while goalkeeper Altarabulsi (1) was also outstanding.

Nigeria and Colombia came to the Tournament well-prepared, but as it progressed they ran up against more and more problems. They showed signs of mental and physical fatigue, and there were tensions within the delegations which also contributed to the fact that they were unable to perform the tactical plans that had been set them. It was clear from both teams' performances that they did not have enough international experience to be able to maintain the pace of such a tough tournament as this.

The positive and negative aspects of the teams' tactics may be summed up as follows:

+	–
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Clear tactical concept followed by Kuwait and Czechoslovakia</li><li>– Overlapping and interchanging positions</li><li>– Individual strengths, such as strikers' speed and defenders' robustness cleverly put to the use of team tactics.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Lack of creative thinking in attack, surprise element lacking, stereotyped moves</li><li>– Attacks concentrated down the centre and too seldom down the wings</li><li>– Too little movement off the ball to create space in attack.</li></ul>

Compared with the World Cup finals in Argentina, the teams showed only relatively modest penetrative impact and weak finishing power. The emphasis was put on defence, sometimes with all players dropping back, and this clearly showed that the main consideration was safety and the prevention of goals. Scoring goals, meanwhile, was left more and more up to individual efforts.

**Group C***Kiev**Heinz Marotzke*

1. German Dem. Rep.	3	2	1	0	7:1	5 points
2. Algeria	3	1	1	1	4:2	3
3. Spain	3	0	3	0	2:2	3
4. Syria	3	0	1	2	0:8	1
	12	3	6	3	13:13	12

Teams also observed:

*Iraq**Finland**Costa Rica**Quarter-final in Kiev*

German Dem. Rep. 4, Iraq 0 (4-0)

**General Remarks**

The group matches in Kiev, like the quarter-final between the German Democratic Republic and Iraq which ended in a 4-0 victory for the GDR, produced no football of an international quality. The bad weather, with a lot of rain and temperatures fluctuating between cold and sultry, did not make things at all easier for the teams. The GDR qualified as the reigning Olympic Champions from 1976 in Montreal and so were able to prepare for the 1980 Tournament at their leisure. As the national B-team, the squad had been together practically since 1978 and had played plenty of international matches to get used to playing as a team. None of the players who had won the gold medal in Montreal were any longer in the side. A 14-day training camp was held just before the Olympics, to give the team their final edge.

Algeria were extremely well organised, both technically as a team and in the way their delegation was led, and they thoroughly deserved to reach the quarter-finals. Their best game was that against the GDR and they were somewhat unlucky to lose 0-1. The Algerians had a small nucleus of three players who had competed in the 1979 World Youth Tournament in Japan, and they made a good impression with their systematic style of play. The other teams - Spain, Iraq, Finland and (especially) Syria and Costa Rica - used their physical reserves essentially to be strong in defence. The switch from massed defence to attack usually came in the form of counter-attacks. Players were too tightly restricted to their defensive duties and hardly ever showed the courage to take chances or to catch the opposition by surprise. As a result, they hardly produced anything attractive or exciting, and all we saw was everyday football with the accent on the physical.

The teams in Group C could be categorised as follows on the basis of their relative strength:

*The German Democratic Republic* underwent a distinct improvement during the course of the tournament. They had experienced players in Terletzki (7), Steinbach (8) and Kühn (11), who built up constructive offensive moves out of defence. The team's job was made easier by their excellent physical condition and the fact that the programme allowed them to play all their matches in the same place, without having to travel.

*Algeria* were well prepared and motivated by their success in reaching the quarter-finals of the World Youth Championship in 1979 (when they lost 0–5 to the eventual winners, Argentina). They were a well-balanced side and visibly benefited from some of their players having had experience with European teams.

*Spain* had not been able to prepare for the Tournament under the leadership of their new coach, Santamaria, as they would have wished. They included a number of good young players who were strong as individuals, but they suffered from a marked weakness in their ability to take chances in front of goal.

*Syria* had been invited to take part in the Tournament and although they went through a 20-day training camp which included a match against Jordan, they were not sufficiently well prepared. Not only were they rather short of training, they also showed a number of individual errors (including some committed by the goalkeeper) which had disastrous consequences. These mistakes were in fact the cause of the generally poor impression the Syrian team left behind.

## **Fitness**

In order to make a definitive assessment of the standards of physical fitness, we should examine one or two positive and negative aspects which arose as a result of our observations and inquiries:

- a) *the duration and intensity of the teams' preparatory period, and*
- b) *the general standard of physical fitness prevalent among club footballers in the countries concerned.*

During the course of this Tournament, a number of differences became apparent in these respects between the various countries represented in Group C. Some teams clearly grew stronger while others weakened considerably, although none of them broke down altogether. It was also clear that psychological influences left their mark on the players' physical condition; these included the influence of defeat, irregularities in the general pattern of match day / rest day / match day / rest day, with air flights of 500-800 kilometres, and internal problems within the delegations.

The two positive aspects evident in the teams' physical condition were their endurance and their strength in the air, but these were mainly used for defensive

functions. Speed, acceleration and pace – all of which would have brought more variety into the game – were usually conspicuous only by their absence, and this in turn was largely responsible for tactical and technical shortcomings such as the defence failing to move forward to support the attack or the lack of wall-passes down the wings. The matches seldom contained any changes of pace or rhythm, the games were monotonous and repetitive, and there was no attempt to slow the game down in order to introduce a sudden burst of speed.

The positive and negative aspects of physical condition may be summarised as follows:

+	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Massed physical commitment in defence</li> <li>- Endurance in defence</li> <li>- Tackling and jumping ability for high balls.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No change of pace in switching from defence to attack; long-winded play in midfield</li> <li>- No support from the defence for the attack, no backing up the forwards</li> <li>- Too little running into open spaces; too little space created by movement off the ball</li> <li>- Hardly any fore-checking; teams simply covered back and packed their defence in front of goal.</li> </ul>

Overall, within the context of international football, it must be said that the positive aspects of the teams' physical strength were used to good effect in defence, but in attack they were neglected and this was the main reason why the general level was very mediocre.

### Technique

Technical standards were also of a level influenced by the same factors as those mentioned above – namely preparation, class and experience.

There were differences apparent between the various teams in a technical sense which were due to differences in mentality and temperament. Teams like the GDR, Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Finland played a more straightforward style of football, invariably preferring to build their moves with short passes in the exposed areas of midfield not covered by the opposition; then they would try to go for goal with long passes or crosses from the wings. This required good defensive work in

the air, which could generally be said of all the teams involved here. The Latin teams from Spain and Costa Rica, on the other hand, played a more differentiated type of football, at least in the early phases of the game, and although they lost their matches they would often look better than the players who eventually beat them. What let them down, ultimately was their weak finishing. When in possession of the ball, when receiving it or when dribbling, they were much more varied in their game and their opponents were forced to try to compensate for this by making a greater physical effort. It was noticeable how they usually dribbled not so much as a direct form of attack but rather as a means to keep possession of the ball, often going backwards rather than forwards; they seldom dribbled with the aim of getting in a shot at goal or of eliminating one of the opposing defenders. Thus players dribbling in midfield often looked so successful partly because the opposition were quite happy to surrender the midfield or were using a generous form of zonal marking. And dribbling was made more difficult and ineffective near goal because of the heavy concentration of defenders in and around the penalty area, who were prepared to make a strong physical challenge.

#### Summary of technical strengths and weaknesses:

+	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ball control, dribbling in midfield</li> <li>- Heading in defence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hardly any shots at goal (overhasty, badly positioned, ill-timed)</li> <li>- Hardly any shots to round off inter-passing moves, more solo efforts than combined play</li> <li>- No wall-passes ending in shots at goal</li> <li>- Fear of shooting first time</li> <li>- Crosses made at random for headers at goal</li> <li>- Few passes into open space.</li> </ul>

Altogether there was a distinct weakness in the way teams alternated between defence and attack. Safety in defence was clearly given more attention than trying to build attacks and produce shots at goal.

#### Tactics

Statistics show that many teams were often in possession of the ball without actually having played well. It often appeared that they only had the ball at all

because the opposition put up no systematic defence in midfield but relinquished this part of the field virtually without a challenge. It is hard to understand why team officials repeatedly complained about teams slowing the game down by their ponderous build-up in midfield, when these teams would make no attempt to do anything about it themselves – such as fore-checking to force the team with the ball to get rid of it more quickly, which would have given the challenging team a chance of winning the ball back themselves sooner and closer to their opponents' goal.

There was almost no systematic attempt to switch play, the reason probably being that the teams were technically simply not capable of doing so. Costa Rica, Spain and Algeria would dribble not just to ensure retention of the ball, often going backwards in order to do so, but also as a means of trying to work a breakthrough and create a chance of a goal.

Attacks lacked support from behind and players hardly ever risked switching positions. There were no players of any real personality so moves became stereotyped, repetitive and predictable. All the teams in Group C played with a genuine libero and organised their defence accordingly. The man at the back was never anything more than a sweeper who organised his defence from a central position



*The libero in the role of the covering sweeper*

behind them, but he never moved upfield in the style of the modern attacking libero. There was strict man-to-man marking in the defensive danger areas, although Costa Rica and Algeria were the exceptions in this respect as they also sought refuge in zonal defence, which created a few chaotic moments when they were under pressure.

Tactical strong and weak points may be summed up as follows:

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Well-organised defence and well marshalled in the early stages</li><li>- Retention of the ball by careful short passing</li><li>- Dribbling to penetrate into the opposition's penalty area</li><li>- Physical strength well used in defence and in the tackle.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Lack of depth and retreating movement in defence</li><li>- No changes of rhythm, too little change of direction and creation of space</li><li>- Too little support for the attack by defenders; too many attacks launched down the centre</li><li>- Ball too often kicked aimlessly out of defence</li><li>- Strikers failing to put pressure on the libero in an attempt to cause confusion between the libero and stopper.</li></ul>

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Compared with the 1979 World Youth Tournament in Japan and the 1978 World Cup finals in Argentina, the standard of football at the Olympic Football Tournament was generally of an inferior quality, especially in the matches in Group C and the quarter-final match between the GDR and Iraq. This was especially true of the standard of attacking football, which in Japan, for instance, was technically better and tactically much more original.

An explanation for this was no doubt also because there were personalities playing in the World Youth Tournament who were able to stamp their own character on their teams' tactics. Costa Rica and Algeria had too little experience of top-class football; their players hardly seemed mature enough, although they did not make too bad an impression as footballers, despite their defeats. The GDR team consisted mostly of second-choice players, because of clauses in the Olympic regulations limiting the players eligible from the eastern European countries. The GDR players Kühn (11) and Steinbach (8) both showed signs of becoming players of distinct personality, but not consistently.

**Group D***Minsk**Roger Quinche*


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1. Yugoslavia	3	2	1	0	6:3	5 points
2. Iraq	3	1	2	0	4:1	4
3. Finland	3	1	1	1	3:2	3
4. Costa Rica	3	0	0	3	2:9	0
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	12	4	4	4	15:15	12

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Teams also observed:

*Algeria**Spain**Syria**Quarter-final in Minsk*

Yugoslavia 3, Algeria 0 (2-0)

**General Remarks**

None of the group matches played in Minsk reached an average international standard. The only time the standard was higher was when a crowd of 50,000 saw Yugoslavia beat Algeria 3-0 in the quarter-final, especially in the first half. The Yugoslav players had been very much involved in their own national championship right up to the end of June, but they soon settled down against the well-organised Algerian side and scored two goals early on through defensive errors in the 5th and 19th minutes, which gave them a feeling of security and confidence.

Syria, Finland and Iraq had all failed to qualify directly for the Moscow Olympics, and reached the last 16 at their own request and on an official invitation after other better-placed teams had declined to participate. That left them little time to prepare, and they did so by going away to training camps; Finland were at a training camp without playing any matches, while Iraq also spent ten days at a training camp but played three international matches during that time, and Syria were in their camp for 20 days and had one match. Costa Rica used a tour of Central and South America for their preparations, playing five international matches and regarding the Olympic Football Tournament as a means of building up for their imminent World Cup qualifying game against Panama in August 1980.

Algeria and Yugoslavia both had players who had played between 45 and 50 matches in the foregoing season, in their national championship and in the "Under 21" Competition, while Yugoslavia had also competed in the Mediterranean Games

and Algeria had played in a rain-soaked training match during a 23-day training camp in the Valais region of Switzerland. The Algerians had gained further experience through playing in the 12th African Cup competition. They were also very well trained for the Olympic Tournament, with training sessions together in January and February, practice matches and then finally a ten-day training camp in Cotonou (Benin) to acclimatise themselves for the games in Nigeria.

Spain's Olympic team were unable to play any practice games at all. Once the national championship was over, the Spanish players – organised as they are in a strong footballers' union – were entitled to their summer vacations, and a ten-day training camp in their own country did not produce the opportunity to prepare in the way their new coach had hoped.

The teams in Group D may be categorised as follows, in terms of their respective strengths:

*Yugoslavia* were the best team in the group, clearly improving as the Tournament progressed and reaching their peak in the quarter-final when they beat Algeria 3–0. But it was also noticeable how they suffered a number of setbacks through the over-casual attitude taken by some individual members of the team.

*Iraq* achieved their ambition by reaching the quarter-final, when they lost 0–4 to the German Democratic Republic. They were bitterly disappointed to have been beaten so convincingly by the GDR, but this was due to a number of individual players performing below their normal standards, as well as to tactical weaknesses in team play.

*Finland and Costa Rica* looked upon the Olympic Football Tournament as an opportunity to get ready for forthcoming World Cup qualifying matches for the 1982 finals in Spain.

## **Fitness**

Yugoslavia and Iraq proved to be the two fittest teams in Group D. Players were in quite good physical shape, as could be seen above all in the tackle and in one-against-one situations. Teams packed back in defence in the hope of staying in the competition or reaching the next round, and as a result their physical attributes were much less in evidence in attack. In some instances, speed was the cause of inaccuracy, misunderstandings and technical mistakes. Many attacks ended up with players making a rather hopeless shot at goal.

There were seldom any signs of players changing the rhythm of the game, slowing it down in order to speed it up again suddenly, so that there was a definite impression of the games being monotonous and one-paced. With the ball frequently played into the air, defenders and forwards often clashed in heading duels, and while there was impressive evidence of jumping ability and power in such situations, the forwards usually came off second best.

The positive and negative aspects of the fitness factors observed may be summed up as follows:

+	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Players generally quick off the ball</li><li>- Jumping ability, power in the air</li><li>- Solid, robust tackling.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Few moves at speed, players slow on the ball</li><li>- Players not very adaptable or skillful on the ball; few body-swerves, tricks and dummies</li><li>- Crude tackles from behind with no hope of winning the ball</li><li>- Players too easily hurt, too much complaining about perfectly normal tackles (refusing to get up, play-acting, tricks to waste time and trying to deceive the referee).</li></ul>

Altogether the degree of physical fitness displayed in the matches in Group D was modest by normal international standards. The monotonous impression created by the games was also due to the level of physical fitness; there were no changes of pace, teams were too anxious to protect even the narrowest of leads and to save their strength in order to be able to survive the Tournament (and win games if at all possible in the process).

### Technique

Yugoslavia also made the best impression of the four teams in the group from a technical point of view, without actually being very convincing. Their technical skills were most apparent in the build-up phase, with the ball being played slowly out of defence and through midfield towards the attack with short passes; defenders won most of the balls in the air, throw-ins were almost as long as corners, and the goalkeeper could kick the ball with perfect accuracy from his hands over a distance of some 70 or 80 metres.

It was conspicuous how passes and shots were not given any swerve, and wall-passes were seldom used to create space or to beat opponents – and hardly ever for the purpose of creating the chance of a shot at goal. The ball was rarely played first time, perhaps for safety reasons. Players clearly preferred to bring the ball under control by killing it dead, and it was a rare thing to see them bring it down on the run and change direction all in one movement. Only a few players appeared capable of making body-swerve or dummies, but then they were usually robbed of the ball quickly by inadmissible tackles, sometimes from behind.

There was only one goalless draw among the six group matches played in Minsk, between Syria and Spain. There were at least two goals scored in each of the other matches. There were certain technical shortcomings observed from the way players took their chances in front of goal; they would be wrongly placed for a shot, not in proper control of the ball, afraid to shoot first time, lacking in self-confidence or in sheer impudence and afraid to take a risk. Not only the trainers and technical experts realised all these deficiencies – the public also became aware of them, and the crowds (on average around 50,000 a match) often gave vent to their dissatisfaction.

Many of the goals were the outcome of individual mistakes by goalkeepers or defenders, much more rarely the product of attractive combined movements.

The technical strengths and weaknesses of teams in this group may be summed up as follows:

+	–
– Good heading ability in defence and in the build-up phase	– Weak shooting (technical errors in positioning and control)
– Long throw-ins like corners	– No cleverly spun passes.
– Long and accurate kick-outs.	

The group matches did not leave a particularly strong impression as far as technique was concerned, with the matches dominated rather by physical robustness and determination. The way the Tournament was arranged, with brief rest periods between matches, led teams to go sparingly with their reserves of energy, and the same could also be said of their technical skills.

### Tactics

Group matches of Group D were not satisfactory in the tactical sector either. Too much attention was paid to caution, playing safe and preventing the other team from scoring. Teams were usually slow in switching from defence to attack and were more concerned with not losing the ball once they had won it. Finland and Algeria had young players who occasionally introduced an element of surprise in their attack, changing the rhythm of their game and also using some of their defenders for finishing (Finland's libero Helin (3), for instance, who was 1m 97 tall and useful for winning balls in the air). In some of Yugoslavia's matches there were signs of certain players developing potential as outstanding personalities, such as Mirocevic (10) and Klincarski (6). Attacks generally lacked support from behind. Teams played exceptionally deep by modern footballing standards, with players

well spread out over the pitch, so that there developed a lot of “no man’s land” where teams could build their moves unopposed.

In defence it was clear to see early in the game what tactical orders the teams were under. As a move was built up, there would be mistakes in positional play which, however, teams could rectify by playing hard and determined football and by massing back in defence. Individual technical errors had more disastrous consequences, leading to goals being conceded.

It was clear to see at set plays how teams attached greater importance to defence than to attack. Teams would build defensive walls for free-kicks or have a man facing up to an opponent taking a corner; but when they were on the attacking end of similar situations, they had few ideas of how to vary their direct or indirect free-kicks, corners or throw-ins. The example has already been mentioned of the Finnish libero Helin (3), who would move up for these set plays, but he was a rare exception and the public were quick to respond to him.

Long kick-outs by the goalkeepers were cleverly exploited tactically, being taken as an opportunity to press forward quickly into the opposition’s territory. Forwards put through in this way proved, however, not to be adroit, smart or forceful enough when firmly challenged by an opponent and they were unable to round off their attacks successfully at the final decisive moment.

Tactical points may be summarised as follows:


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+	—
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— Clear defensive concept in the early stages</li><li>— Libero occasionally moving upfield (Finland)</li><li>— Variations at free-kicks and corners</li><li>— Occasional advantage taken of long kicks by the goalkeeper.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>— Positional mistakes during a move</li><li>— Little overlapping and interchanging of positions and roles defence seldom supporting the attack</li><li>— No fore-checking; players dashing back almost like handball players on losing the ball</li><li>— Nobody marshalling the defence; mere “patching up”.</li></ul>

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

If we compare the games overall with those in the 1978 World Cup, there was a very obvious difference tactically in the way space was used by the dispersal of players around the pitch. Teams playing in the USSR were organised in greater depth, with the defenders hardly ever moving up, so as not to commit themselves to taking risks. This inevitably meant that the overall impression created by the group matches was one of cautious football, with the main consideration being safety-first, while in Argentina teams were blatantly really anxious to press forward in attack.

# ARGENTINA '78



ca. 30 m

# MOSCOW '80



## Synopsis of the 24 Group matches and Quarter-finals

★	<b>Moscow</b> <i>Dr. J. Venglos</i>	<b>Leningrad</b> <i>J. Bonetti</i>	<b>Kiev</b> <i>H. Marotzke</i>	<b>Minsk</b> <i>R. Quinche</i>
<b>General Features</b> <b>Organisation</b>	USSR directly qualified Thorough preparation No travelling for the USSR (host nation's privilege) Other teams in Olympic Village	Czechoslovakia, Kuwait and Colombia directly qualified Ideal city for football, generously equipped with sports facilities Average crowd: 68,000	GDR, Algeria and Spain directly qualified (GDR as 1976 Olympic Champions) Varying weather conditions — rain, cold/sultry GDR and Algeria well prepared	Yugoslavia and Costa Rica directly qualified Very good conditions for football Good training facilities Average crowds: 50,000
<b>Physical fitness</b>	Strong in the air Individual speed Strong and hard in the tackle	Hard in the tackle Strong in the air Fast and powerful in defence	Strong and committed in defence Endurance in defence Strong tackling and jumping in defence	Speed off the ball Jumping ability and speed for high balls Powerful and hard in the tackle
<b>Technique</b>	Heading: passing and defence Ball control under no pressure from opponents Some good dribblers	Heading in defence and build-up Differences of style: European/African/Asian/South American	Ball control in build-up Heading in defence	Heading in defence and build-up Long throw-ins Long accurate clearances by goalkeepers
<b>Tactics</b>	USSR: clever zonal and man-to-man marking Well-rehearsed free-kicks Overlapping and interchanging roles	Clear tactical concept (Czechoslovakia and Kuwait) Individual strengths applied to teamwork	Well-organised defence to initiate new moves Retaining possession of the ball, short-passing Good use of physical fitness in the tackle	Clearly organised defence to initiate new moves Libero moving upfield (Finland) Variations at free-kicks and corners Long clearances by goalkeepers

	<b>Moscow</b> <i>Dr. J. Venglos</i>	<b>Leningrad</b> <i>J. Bonetti</i>	<b>Kiev</b> <i>H. Marotzke</i>	<b>Minsk</b> <i>R. Quinche</i>
<b>General Features</b> <b>Organisation</b>	Cuba, Venezuela and Zambia invited  Cuba and Zambia travelled twice, Venezuela once (recovery problems)  Problems with equipment (Zambia)	Nigeria (African Champions) invited  Kuwait and Nigeria travelled twice, Colombia once (recovery problems)  Internal problems (Colombia)	Syria invited  Algeria travelled twice, Spain and Syria once each (recovery problems)	Finland and Iraq invited  Iraq and Costa Rica travelled twice, Finland once (recovery problems)
<b>Physical fitness</b>	Crude tackles from behind  Lack of skill in dribbling  Illegal body-checking  Unfair tricks, holding opponents back	Unfair tackling from behind  Too little flexibility and adaptability  Recovery and treatment poorly planned	No changes of pace  Too little movement off the ball to create space  No fore-checking	Not very fast on the ball  Lack of adaptability and cunning on the ball  Crude tackles from behind; too much appealing
<b>Technique</b>	Ball control under pressure  Few balls given swerve  Stereotyped dribbling  Few triangular moves	Few wall-passes  Few balls hit with swerve, no surprise effect, no creativity  Few unexpected combined moves	Weak shooting (bad positioning, fear of shooting first time)  Too many individual efforts  Inaccurate crosses made at random  Passes seldom into open space	Weak shooting  Few balls hit with swerve  Dribbling seldom surprising, rather to retain possession  Few wall-passes
<b>Tactics</b>	Destructive approach  Few switches in play  Few changes of pace  Open space rarely created	Stereotyped moves with no surprise effect  Too many attacks through the centre  Too little movement off the ball or space created	Tactical orders forgotten during moves (positional errors)  Too little support for the attack by the defence  Ball kicked away blindly under pressure	Positional errors during moves  Little overlapping or support for the attack by the defence  No fore-checking  Lack of leadership

## Semi-finals

**USSR v. German DR** 0:1 (0:1)

*Lenin Stadium, Moscow –  
95,000 spectators*

1st Half

16 min. Netz (GDR)	0:1
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0:1

45

2nd Half

1st sub. GDR	4 for 5
2nd sub. GDR	14 for 6

0:1

**Yugoslavia v. CSSR** 0:2 (0:2)

*Dynamo Stadium, Moscow –  
50,000 spectators*

0 MIN

1st Half

4 min. Licka (CSSR)	0:1
18 min. Sreiner (CSSR)	0:2

MIN

0:2

2nd Half

1st sub. CSSR	6 for 10
1st sub. Yugoslavia	7 for 2
2nd sub. CSSR	9 for 11

0:2

90 MIN

### Teams



**USSR:** 1 Dasaev, 2 Sulakvelidze, 3 Chivadze, 4 Khidiyatullin, 5 Romantsev, 6 Shavlo, 7 Andreev, 8 Bessonov, 9 Gavrilov, 10 Cherenkov, 11 Gazzaev

**German DR:** 1 Rudwaleit, 2 Ullrich, 3 Hause, 5 Baum (83 min. 4 Uhlig), 6 Schnuphase (90 min. 14 Liebers), 7 Terletzki, 8 Steinbach, 11 Kühn, 12 Trieloff, 13 Müller, 17 Netz

### Teams

**Yugoslavia:** 1 Pantelic, 2 Cukrov (74 min. 7 Krsticevic), 4 Hrstic, 6 Klincarski, 9 Matijevic, 10 Mirocevic, 13 Primorac, 14 Repcic, 15 Sestic, 16 Vujovic Zlatko, 17 Vujovic Zoran

**Czechoslovakia:** 1 Steman, 3 Mazura, 4 Radimec, 7 Vizek, 8 Berger, 10 Pokluda (72 min 6 Nemeec), 11 Licka (84 min. 9 Svoboda), 12 Vaclavicek, 14 Rott, 15 Sreiner, 17 Kunzo



**General**

This match brought the two most promising teams up against one another. The USSR had played all their games in Moscow, the GDR all theirs in Kiev – but the latter had to travel to Moscow for the semi-final. Neither team had produced an outstanding team performance so far in the Tournament, and the GDR – the reigning Olympic Champions from 1976 in Montreal – came up with a completely different team. The USSR enjoyed the advantage of playing in their home country, but almost caused a calamity by losing narrowly in a grim struggle of a match with a real Cup-tie flavour; the defeat was considered a disgrace and not widely understood by the public.

**Fitness**

The match was a true Cup-tie of great commitment by both sides, a fast pace and close man-to-man marking.

The GDR managed to call upon reserves of stamina which had not hitherto been required in the Tournament against easier opponents. But the USSR were not any less fit. The main difference lay in the fact that the Russians, as expected, had to use their energy in attack, and did so. Their strikers in particular were splendid in the way they managed to keep running. But they unfortunately did not always move in the direction their tactics required, so that many well-intended attacks finished up after all in the blockaded GDR penalty area.

The USSR also had defenders and midfield players with energy to spare,

**General**

Yugoslavia had been somewhat moody and inconsistent in emerging unbeaten from Group D and then easily beating Algeria 3-0 in their quarter-final, when a 2-0 lead after 19 minutes gave them security and motivation for the semi-final with Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia themselves had used a special syrup to ward off thirst and heat in a very hot quarter-final against Cuba, which they won 3-0 without too great an effort. A 2-0 lead after only 18 minutes in the semi-final gave them the confidence never to doubt that they would beat Yugoslavia and go on to the final.

**Fitness**

Czechoslovakia were physically stronger and more robust, winning most of the tackles. Both teams had to move base after the group matches and their successful quarter-finals, with Czechoslovakia going from Leningrad to Moscow and Yugoslavia from Minsk to Moscow. The brevity of the rest period had a greater impact on Yugoslavia than on Czechoslovakia.

The Yugoslavs were to some extent inhibited by going two goals down so quickly, and they did not appear to equal Czechoslovakia in the air, in slide-tackling or especially in moving off the ball.

Feeling safe and sure of success, the Czechoslovak coach made two substitutions in the second half, with the final clearly very much in his mind.

but they did not use it. These players failed to support their forwards because the defence were too rigidly oriented backwards by the dictates of their excessively inflexible marking plans.

This is what gave the GDR their decisive physical superiority; their defence and midfield players followed up their attacks effectively and the men in midfield were constantly moving backwards and forwards between defence and the occasional counter-attacks of their own forwards.

### Technique

The GDR defence were put under a lot of pressure to use their ability in the air, as the USSR kept trying to find a way through their defence with a series of high crosses. The GDR's defensive approach and the USSR's general superiority made extra demands on their reserves of energy and their competitiveness, with too little attention being paid to technical skills. Fitness and tactics were more relevant factors, with technique playing very much a background role.

Special mention should again be made of the glaring weakness in shooting, which was more noticeable among the Russians as they remained on top, but which was also evident in the occasional counter-attacks launched by the GDR. (See statistics, p. 66).

Czechoslovakia played economically, with the roles clearly defined when alternating between defence and attack. Players covered for one another and this enabled them to play together well — and also made it easier to control what was happening.

Determination and the will to win helped Czechoslovakia dictate the course of the game, and to force their own game upon their opponents.

### Technique

Czechoslovakia managed to have most of the ball and dictate the game, especially in the first half, by careful ball control during combined play and applying technical skills such as dribbling, dummying and unexpected passes to create space.

Attacking possibilities were created by changes in pace in combined play, and players interchanging their positions and overlapping. But their finishing left a lot to be desired, with three-on-two situations never producing a goal even though Yugoslavia, in particular, found themselves in such situations more than once in the second half.

The Czechoslovak defenders impressed as individuals with their positional play and anticipation, frequently winning the ball without a direct challenge and triggering off a new attack. But inadequate technical ability to strike long passes gave the players less confidence to try to switch the play, and these attempts were few and far between.

## Tactics

The two teams' basic approach was predictable before the game even began: the USSR had to attack and the GDR had to defend. The GDR kept to the defensive patterns they had already used in their group matches, reinforcing them however with an extra line of defence in midfield, into which even the strikers were sometimes incorporated.

But the GDR were not entirely devoted to defence. They tried, whenever possible, to hold on to the ball and to calm the game down a little.

A surprising tactical device – which may have ultimately proved to be the decisive factor in this match – was the use of space in midfield. One player, the GDR's Steinbach (8), succeeded in putting the trainer's ideas into practice, individually initiating most of his team's attacks. But this tactic was denied its crowning moment when a quick counter-attack launched by Steinbach was rounded off with a poor shot which should have made it 2–0.

## Tactics

Czechoslovakia made the better impression with regard to creating space and switching the point of their attacks, while there was still room for improvement in both teams' powers of penetration.

The Czechoslovak defenders were clearly always ready to move up in support of their forwards, overlapping and interchanging amongst themselves. This also created a certain amount of confusion in the Yugoslavs' defensive cover, and they were anything but faultless especially when marking man-to-man. Czechoslovakia's superiority forced their opponents to adapt their tactics to those of the Czechoslovaks themselves.

Czechoslovakia also caught the eye with their perceptive combination of zonal and man-to-man marking, while the forwards also had defensive duties to fulfil. They were mutually well balanced and some defenders also indicated they had useful attacking qualities.

The libero in the Czechoslovak team played a modern kind of game, positioning himself well and showing a good instinct for attack.


Czechoslovakia created goal chances by attacking down the wings. In the second half, they were content just to retain control of the game.

## Match for Third Place


**Soviet Union v. Yugoslavia**

**2:0 (0:0)**


*Dynamo Stadium, Moscow – 50,000 spectators*



**0:0**




**2:0**



### Teams

**USSR:** 1 Dasaev, 2 Sulakvelidze, 3 Chivadze, 4 Khidiyatullin, 5 Romantsev, 6 Shavlo, 7 Andreev, 8 Bessonov, 9 Gavrilov, 10 Cherenkov (72 min. 13 Baltacha), 11 Gazzaev (46 min. 15 Oganessian)

**Yugoslavia:** 2 Cukrov, 3 Gudelj, 6 Klincarski, 7 Krsticevic (78 min. 14 Repcic), 8 Secerbegovic, 11 Pesic, 12 Ivkovic, 13 Primorac, 15 Sestic, 16 Vujovic Zlatko, 17 Vujovic Zoran



### General

After having both lost their semi-finals, neither of the two teams in the match for third place appeared particularly motivated to win the bronze medal. The USSR were intent on avoiding another disgrace in front of their own fans, and played a typically cautious game with their normal line-up. Yugoslavia used only six of their regular players and introduced some new men after finding the strain had been simply too great in playing six games within twelve days. The USSR's six matches were spread over 13 days and the team did not have to travel at all between games, while Yugoslavia had to uproot themselves and fly from Minsk to Moscow to meet Czechoslovakia in the semi-final. The match was a disappointment, with the two halves turning out quite different one from the other; the first half was poor and the second was mediocre.

### Fitness

A feature of the game, especially the first half, was how vigorously players went into the tackle, often from behind. With the game developing mainly in midfield, and hardly at all down the wings, teams marked each other closely, man-to-man, and a lot of fouls were rightly punished. Yugoslavia made a disagreeable impression in the way they tended to hold back their opponents whenever they broke through the Yugoslav defence. Strength in the air was again a positive feature worth noting.

## Technique

Individual technical skills only came into their own when players did not feel under pressure from an opponent or were not moving too quickly themselves. But even then, there were signs of poor concentration, with players losing the ball again – and this was a clear sign that the players were not particularly well motivated for the match. In fact this match reflected the general over-saturation of football more than any other in the Tournament.

Heading skills were in evidence again, although more so in defence and in passing than in taking chances offered in the air in front of goal.

## Tactics

One of the reasons why there was no good football played in the first half, when the marking was skin-tight, was because the ball was very rarely played wide into the empty spaces out on the wings. Teams sought a way to goal too stubbornly through the middle, which left the defences very much in command. Moves lacked



*Good heading defence – a typical feature of the Olympic Football Tournament*



*Individual moves of the strikers were mainly stopped by the physically strong defence*

imagination or inspiration, and strikers never seemed to believe in themselves whenever they tried to go it alone.


There was an improvement in the second half, partly as a result of the three substitutions and especially because teams had been told to use their wings more. Some of the Russian players – such as Shavlo (6) and Gavrilov (9) – began to stamp their mark on the game, but the Yugoslavs left the impression of a team not accustomed to playing together, which was not altogether surprising with some nervous reserve players coming into the side for their first game. The Yugoslav defence made similar mistakes to those they had made in their semi-final against Czechoslovakia, becoming confused and unsettled through problems of covering each other and retreating to adjust their positions to give depth in defence. They did not succeed in keeping to the duties which they had no doubt been given before they went out onto the pitch. The USSR won without being particularly convincing, in a game which was no more than a mere formality and which was definitely one of the most disappointing in the whole competition.

# Final


German DR v. Czechoslovakia

0:1 (0:0)


Lenin Stadium Moscow – 80,000 spectators



0:0




0:1



## Teams

**German DR:** 1 Rudwaleit, 2 Ullrich, 3 Hause (81 min. 14 Liebers), 5 Baum, 6 Schnuphase, 7 Terletzki, 8 Steinbach, 11 Kühn, 12 Trieloff, 13 Müller, 17 Netz

**Czechoslovakia:** 1 Seman, 2 Macela, 3 Mazura, 4 Radimec, 5 Rigel, 7 Vizek (73 min. 9 Svoboda), 8 Berger, 10 Pokluda (63 min. 6 Nemeč), 11 Licka, 14 Rott, 16 Stambacher



### General

The final was played in front of 80,000 spectators and proved to be the best match of the whole Tournament, especially as far as tactics were concerned. Both teams knew each other well. With the rain pouring down non-stop, they played careful and disciplined football and tried to adapt to the difficult conditions underfoot by keeping the ball low.

The first half was one of caution and discipline, with hardly any initiatives or creative ideas for producing surprise moves. The second half was more lively; they made more use of the open spaces, their moves showed more imagination, more surprises and greater freedom of action.

The incident which led to Steinbach (8) of the GDR and Czechoslovakia's Berger (8) both being sent off in the 58th minute created a completely new situation, with each team losing a key player (Steinbach had already been cautioned, while Berger had not). A crude foul provoked a wrestling match between the two players and a punch was thrown. The Czechoslovak team reacted smartly, with the trainer bringing on Nemeč (6) in place of Pokluda (10) as Nemeč took over the role that had been played by Berger before he was sent off; that left Czechoslovakia with only two men up front. The GDR responded differently to Steinbach's dismissal; his departure upset the team's game and nobody came on to take his place as the man who directed operations. The second substitution made by

Czechoslovakia in the 73rd minute, with Svoboda (9) coming on for Vizek (7), was amply rewarded, as it was Svoboda who scored the only goal of the match just four minutes later.

Only one incident marred the otherwise good humour of the match and the victory ceremony which followed it. The Russian crowd were not satisfied with their team finishing only third, and showed their displeasure by whistling at their team when they appeared, dressed in civilian clothes, to receive their bronze medals; the other nationalities present failed to understand the reason for all the whistling.

The victory ceremony was graced by the presence of two leading personalities: International Olympic Committee President, Lord Killanin, and FIFA President, Dr. João Havelange, who made the presentations together. All the first three teams – Czechoslovakia as Champions, the runners-up from the GDR and the USSR as bronze medallists – were represented by all their players and reserves both at the victory ceremony and at the subsequent closing ceremony.





*The winners of the 1980 Olympic Football Tournament: Czechoslovakia*



*The runners-up: the German DR Olympic Team*

*(Photos: Tass)*



*The USSR, bronze medallists in Moscow*

**Fitness**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>+</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Good basic physical condition after adequate time for recovery, 3 days after semi-finals</li> <li>- Speed on and off the ball (in wet weather)</li> <li>- Changes of pace, a lot of running off the ball</li> </ul> <p>- Faster and stronger in the air</p> <p>-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unfair tackling, incl. tackles from behind</li> </ul> <p>- Too little pressure for a final offensive in the last 15 minutes</p> <p>- Lack of strength and endurance</p> <p>- Individual shortcomings</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Resourceful, especially Radimec (4) and Nemeč (6), Vizek (7) quick on and off the ball</li> </ul> <p>- Energy conserved partly by clever substitutions; roles interchanged</p> |
|--|---|
- 

**Technique**

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>+</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Surprising skill on the ball, especially Steinbach (8) and Terletzki (7)</li> <li>- Good headwork</li> <li>- Some dangerous long-range shots on a slippery pitch</li> </ul> | <p>+</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Balls hit with swerve (not evident in previous games) dummies, clever use of slippery pitch especially Radimec (4) and Stambacher (16)</li> <li>- General good control of the ball, passing it around, retaining possession, sensible and safe passes with the inside of the foot</li> <li>- Care taken to find a teammate rather than just clearing the ball aimlessly</li> <li>- Good crosses from the wing and switching the play</li> </ul> |
|---|---|
-

## GDR

---

- Individual technical mistakes, including a serious error by the goalkeeper in the 77th min. which led to the goal
  - Misunderstandings leading to the ball being lost
- 

## Czechoslovakia


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- Difficulties heading the wet ball

## Tactics


The final was tactically the best game of the entire Tournament. The coaches and trainers had read their opponents very well indeed, while the Czechoslovaks reacted to the unforeseen circumstances (both teams' key midfield players being sent off) by turning the situation to their own advantage, making clever substitutions and modifying the roles some of the team were already playing.

The GDR officials, on the other hand, more or less left it up to the players on the pitch to decide how to adapt to the new circumstances, and only tried to introduce a new impulse into their game after they had gone a goal down. They made a second substitution but this was not enough. It was the GDR's misfortune that the one and only goal of the match came as a result of a mistake by the otherwise very reliable goalkeeper, Rudwaleit.



**CSSR: Creation of free space**

*by first concentrating the attack on the left wing. Then, play shifted to the other half resulting in the finish.*



## GDR (. . . Tactics)

---

- +
  - Strict application of tactical instructions, shadow marking, rigid adherence to positions (especially in the first half)
  - Second half brought more individual improvisation and the game became more varied and faster
  - Stubborn attempts to score, even with long shots
  - Individual exploitation of chances within the limitations of tactical roles
  
  - 
  - Difficulties covering when opposing libero Radimec moved upfield; occasional confusion
  - Too stubborn adherence to tactical plan, with no surprise element especially in the first half
  - No switching of roles after Steinbach had been sent off; no playmaker to take his place and thus a lack of continuity
  - Few original ideas at set plays
- 

## Czechoslovakia (. . . Tactics)

---


- +
  - Modern approach, with the libero also used in attack
  - Libero Radimec (4) very lively and distracting for the GDR defence
  - Effective switches in roles, overlapping and interchanging positions, mutual co-ordination in positional changes
  - Macela (2) had a definite defensive function, while Vizek (7) was completely free to build moves whenever possible
  - Wing play, attacks switched; style maintained even when Berger had been sent off
  - Free-kicks taken quickly
  
  - 
  - Positional problems when the GDR countered quickly; sometimes slack marking in the penalty area
  - Defence too poorly organised in depth, players not sufficiently covering one another
  - Libero and midfield players had trouble when players interchanged roles suddenly
  - Finishing too indecisive and too unadventurous
- 



The decisive moment of the match came, from a tactical point of view, as a result of a free-kick being taken quickly. Nemeč (6) had been fouled and took the kick himself, catching no less than four GDR players by surprise; Stambacher (16) was able to cross the ball almost unhindered, finding Svoboda (9) over on the right wing, who had just come on as a substitute four minutes earlier in place of Vizek (7), and his header rebounded off goalkeeper Rudwaleit before he snapped up the chance to score the only goal of the game.

Thus Czechoslovakia surpassed the silver medal they had won at the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo, by becoming Olympic Champions for the first time in their history.

**Making of the winning goal  
in the final**


*after this foul committed  
on Nemeč*





*Nemec immediately takes the free kick. . .*

*onto Svoboda's head; Goalkeeper Rudwaleit lets the ball rebound. . .*




*to Stambacher who plays the ball over. . .*

*and Svoboda scores 1:0 for CSSR*

# Statistics

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# Schedule of the Olympic Football Tournament



**Match timetable and rest days** (including travel between matches)


	JULY											AUGUST		
	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1.	2.
CSSR		LE +		LE x		LE x		LE +	650 MI	MI +				MI +
GDR	MI x		MI +		MI +			MI +	750 MI	MI +				MI -
USSR	MI +		MI +		MI +			MI +		MI -				MI +
YUGOSLAVIA		MI +		MI +		MI x		MI +	700 MI	MI -				MI -
ALGERIA	MI +	500 MI		500 MI		MI x			MI -					
CUBA	LE +		LE +	650 MI		MI -	650 LE							
KUWAIT		MI +		MI x	650 LE	MI x	650 MI							
IRAQ		MI +		MI x	500 MI	MI x	500 MI							
COLOMBIA		LE -	650 MI		MI x		MI +							
COSTA RICA			500 MI		500 MI		MI -							
FINLAND		MI -	500 MI		MI x		MI +							
NIGERIA		MI -	650 MI		MI x	650 LE	MI -							
SPAIN	MI x	500 MI		MI x		MI x								
SYRIA	MI -		MI x	500 MI		MI -								
VENEZUELA	MI -	650 MI		MI -		MI +								
SAMBIA	MI -	650 MI		MI -	650 MI	MI -								

**Key:**

- MI Moscow
- MI Minsk
- LE Leningrad
- KI Kiev
- MI / KM ...km flight
- + win
- draw
- x defeat


## Analysis of Players used by the 4 Finalists

- △ = *expulsion*
- = *all matches*
- = *regular player*




### Czechoslovakia

- (1) & (4) All matches
- (8) sent off (final)
- Distinct nucleus of 9 regular players
- One player (goalkeeper) not used at all
- Player No. 9 used as a trump-card — scored the only goal in the final 4 minutes after coming on as a substitute
- 2 players used throughout all 6 matches



### German Democratic Republic


- (8) sent off (final)
- (12) All matches
- All players used
- Distinct nucleus of 9 regular players
- One player used throughout all 6 matches



### USSR

(2, 3, 4, 5) & (7, 8) All matches

- Distinct nucleus of 11 regular players
- 6 players used throughout all 6 matches



### Yugoslavia

(6) & (13) All matches

- All players used
- 2 players used throughout all 6 matches
- Nucleus of 9 regular players

## Statistically Evaluated Remarks

(free-kicks, corner kicks, goal kicks)


### 1/2-Finals

USSR v. German DR 0:1

||||| ||| || *direct freekicks*

| || *indirect freekicks*

|||| | ||| *corners*



Yugoslavia v. CSSR 0:2

||||| ||| ||| | ||| ||| ||| ||| |

|| |||

|||| | ||



### Final

German DR

CSSR

0:1

||||| ||| ||| ||| ||| *direct freekicks*

|||| ||| ||

| *indirect freekicks*

*indirect freekicks*


|| *corners*

*corners*

||



*shots on goals*



### Match 3/4 place

USSR

Yugoslavia

2:0

||||| ||| ||| ||| *direct freekicks*

*direct freekicks*

||||| ||| ||| ||| |||

| *indirect freekicks*


*indirect freekicks*

||||


|||| *corners*

*corners*


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*shots on goals*




# Football Delegations Diagram




**Diagram of Delegation and Team Officials**  
*(maximum of ten)*

1. Head of Delegation
2. Trainer (with assistant), P.E. instructor
3. Coach (with assistant and kit-man)
4. Doctor (with assistant, first-aid man and masseur)





**Diagram of Delegation and Team Officials**  
*(minimum of five)*

1. Head of Delegation
2. Chief Coach
3. Doctor (with first-aid man)
4. Administrator



**Diagram of Delegation and Team Officials**  
*(ideal structure)*

1. Head of Delegation
2. Chief Coach (with two assistant trainers)
3. Doctor (with first-aid man)
4. Administrator (with kit-man)



**Official Results, Classifications and Referees**  
**Résultats officiels, classements et arbitres**  
**Resultados oficiales, clasificaciones y árbitros**  
**Offizielle Resultate, Klassemente und Schiedsrichter**

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**Group A – USSR, Venezuela, Zambia, Cuba**

20.7.	Moscow	USSR v. Venezuela	4:0 (3:0)	F. Wöhler, Austria
	Leningrad	Zambia v. Cuba	0:1 (0:0)	M. Raus, Yugoslavia
22.7.	Moscow	USSR v. Zambia	3:1 (1:1)	M. Arafat, Syria
	Leningrad	Venezuela v. Cuba	1:2 (0:0)	E. Guruceta, Spain
24.7.	Moscow	USSR v. Cuba	8:0 (5:0)	R. Valentine, Scotland
	Leningrad	Venezuela v. Zambia	2:1 (0:0)	L. Siles C., Costa Rica

**Group B – Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Nigeria, Kuwait**

21.7.	Leningrad	Czechoslovakia v. Colombia	3:0 (2:0)	B. Lacarne, Algeria
	Moscow	Nigeria v. Kuwait	1:3 (1:2)	K. Scheurell, German DR
23.7.	Leningrad	Czechoslovakia v. Nigeria	1:1 (1:0)	E. Labo, Peru
	Moscow	Colombia v. Kuwait	1:1 (0:0)	A. Mattson, Finland
25.7.	Leningrad	Czechoslovakia v. Kuwait	0:0 (0:0)	R. Lattanzi, Italy
	Moscow	Colombia v. Nigeria	1:0 (0:0)	S. Al-Hachami, Iraq


**Group C – German DR, Spain, Algeria, Syria**

20.7.	Kiev	German DR v. Spain	1:1 (0:0)	U. Eriksson, Sweden
	Minsk	Algeria v. Syria	3:0 (1:0)	V. Christov, Czechoslovakia
22.7.	Kiev	German DR v. Algeria	1:0 (0:0)	R. Arppi Filho, Brazil
	Minsk	Spain v. Syria	0:0 (0:0)	J. Castro Losada, Venezuela
24.7.	Kiev	German DR v. Syria	5:0 (3:0)	G. Velasquez, Colombia
	Minsk	Spain v. Algeria	1:1 (1:0)	E. Azim-Zade, USSR

**Group D – Yugoslavia, Finland, Costa Rica, Iraq**

21.7.	Minsk	Yugoslavia v. Finland	2:0 (0:0)	M. Rubio Vasquez, Mexico
	Kiev	Costa Rica v. Iraq	0:3 (0:1)	K. Chayu, Zambia
23.7.	Minsk	Yugoslavia v. Costa Rica	3:2 (2:1)	B. Eyo-Honesty, Nigeria
	Kiev	Finland v. Iraq	0:0 (0:0)	R. Calderon Castro, Cuba
25.7.	Minsk	Yugoslavia v. Iraq	1:1 (0:0)	A. Daina, Switzerland
	Kiev	Finland v. Costa Rica	3:0 (1:0)	A. Albanni, Kuwait

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### Classifications:

#### Group A

1. USSR	3	3	0	0	15:1	6
2. Cuba	3	2	0	1	3:9	4
3. Venezuela	3	1	0	2	3:7	2
4. Zambia	3	0	0	3	2:6	0
<hr/>						
	12	6	0	6	23:23	12

#### Group B

1. CSSR	3	1	2	0	4:1	4
2. Kuwait	3	1	2	0	4:2	4
3. Colombia	3	1	1	1	2:4	3
4. Nigeria	3	0	1	2	2:5	1
<hr/>						
	12	3	6	3	12:12	12

#### Group C

1. German DR	3	2	1	0	7:1	5
2. Algeria	3	1	1	1	4:2	4
3. Spain	3	0	3	0	2:2	3
4. Syria	3	0	1	2	0:8	1
<hr/>						
	12	3	6	3	13:13	12

#### Group D

1. Yugoslavia	3	2	1	0	6:3	5
2. Iraq	3	1	2	0	4:1	4
3. Finland	3	1	1	1	2:2	3
4. Costa Rica	3	0	0	3	3:9	0
<hr/>						
	12	4	4	4	15:15	12

### Quarter finals / Quarts de finale / Cuartos de final / Viertelfinals

27.7.	Moscow	USSR v. Kuwait	2:1 (1:0)	M. Rubio Vazquez, Mexico
	Leningrad	Czechoslovakia v. Cuba	3:0 (1:0)	E. Labo, Peru
	Kiev	German DR v. Iraq	4:0 (4:0)	R. Arppi Filho, Brazil
	Minsk	Yugoslavia v. Algeria	3:0 (2:0)	K. Scheurell, German DR

### Semi-finals / Demi-finales / Semifinales / Halbfinals

29.7.	Moscow	USSR v. German DR	0:1 (0:1)	U. Eriksson, Sweden
	Moscow	Yugoslavia v. CSSR	0:2 (0:2)	F. Wöhrer, Austria


### Match for the 3rd place / Match pour la 3ème place

#### Partido por el 3er puesto / Spiel um den 3. Platz

1.8.	Moscow	USSR v. Yugoslavia	2:0 (0:0)	R. Valentine, Scotland
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### Final / Finale

2.8.	Moscow	German DR v. Czechoslovakia	0:1 (0:0)	E. Azim-Zade, USSR
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**Statistical details of the matches**  
**Données statistiques des matches**  
**Detalles estadísticos de los partidos**  
**Statistische Angaben zu den Spielen**

**Key / Légende / Leyenda / Aufschlüsselung**

<i>Match No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Kick-off time</i>	<i>Stadium</i>	<i>Match</i>	<i>Result</i>
<i>Match No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Heure du coup d'envoi</i>	<i>Stade</i>	<i>Match</i>	<i>Résultat</i>
<i>Partido No.</i>	<i>Fecha</i>	<i>Hora de saque de salida</i>	<i>Estadio</i>	<i>Partido</i>	<i>Resultado</i>
<i>Spiel Nr.</i>	<i>Datum</i>	<i>Anstosszeit</i>	<i>Stadion</i>	<i>Spiel</i>	<i>Resultat</i>

**Teams / Equipes / Equipos / Mannschaften**

**a) Goals / Buts / Goles / Tore**

**b) Referee and Linesmen / Arbitre et Juges de touche / Arbitro y Jueces de línea  
Schiedsrichter und Linienrichter**

**c) Referee Inspector and Official Inspector / Inspecteur d'arbitre et Inspecteur officiel  
Inspector de árbitro e Inspector oficial / Schiedsrichter-Inspektor und Offizieller Inspektor**



## Group matches / Matches de groupe / Partidos de grupo / Gruppenspiele

### Group A – USSR, Venezuela, Zambia, Cuba

1 20.7. 18.00 Loujniki Moscow USSR v. Venezuela 4:0 (3:0)

*USSR:* 1 Dasaev, 2 Sulakvelidze, 3 Tchivadze, 4 Khidiatullin, 5 Romantsev, 6 Shavlo, 7 Andreev, 8 Bessonov, 9 Gavrilov (37 min 15 Ogenesian), 10 Tcherenkov (63 min 16 Prokopenko), 11 Gazzaev

*Venezuela:* 1 E. Sánchez, 2 Aguirre, 3 Campos, 4 Acosta, 5 Cichero (56 min 16 Carrero), 6 Elie, 7 Peña (66 min 11 Castillo), 8 A. Sánchez, 10 Añor, 13 Carvajal, 17 Vidal

- a) 1:0 (3 min) 7 Andreev / 2:0 (25 min) 10 Tcherenkov / 3:0 (34 min) 9 Gavrilov  
4:0 (51 min) 15 Ogenesyan  
b) Wöhrer (Austria) / Scheurell (German DR), Valentine (Scotland)  
c) Dr. A. Franchi (Italy) – R. Alcantara (Senegal)
- 

2 20.7. 20.00 Kirov Leningrad Zambia v. Cuba 0:1 (0:0)

*Zambia:* 1 Mwape, 2 Muke, 3 Kalambo, 4 Musonda (61 min 14 Sinkala), 5 Katumba, 6 Katebe, 7 Simwala, 8 Banda, 9 Chola, 10 Chitalu, 11 Kaimana

*Cuba:* 16 Madera, 2 López, 4 Sanchez, 5 Dreke, 7 Roldán (90 min 8 Povea), 9 Lara, 10 Nunez, 13 Pereira (80 min 6 Espinosa), 14 Delgado, 15 Masso, 17 Loredo

- a) 0:1 (58 min) 7 Roldán  
b) Raus (Yugoslavia) – Guruceta (Spain), Labo (Peru)  
c) F. Alvarez (Philippines) – J. Soria Terrazas (Mexico)
- 

9 22.7. 20.00 Loujniki Moscow USSR v. Zambia 3:1 (1:1)

*USSR:* 1 Dasaev, 2 Sulakvelidze, 3 Tchivadze, 4 Khidiatullin, 5 Romantsev, 7 Andreev, 8 Bessonov, 11 Gazzaev, 13 Baltachia, 16 Prokopenko, 17 Tchelebadze (63 min 10 Tcherenkov)

*Zambia:* 1 Mwape, 2 Muke, 3 Kalambo, 14 Sinkala, 5 Katumba, 6 Katebe, 7 Simwala, 8 Banda, 9 Chola, 10 Chitalu, 11 Kaimana

- a) 1:0 (9 min) 4 Khidiatullin / 1:1 (13 min) 10 Chitalu / 2:1 (51 min) 4 Khidiatullin /  
3:1 (87 min) 10 Tcherenkov  
b) Arafat (Syria) – Al-Hachami (Iraq), Mattson (Finland)  
c) F. Seipelt (Austria) – K. Schlegel (German DR)
-



**10 22.7. 19.00 Kirov Leningrad Venezuela v. Cuba 1:2 (0:0)**

*Venezuela:* 1 E. Sánchez, 2 Aguirre, 17 Vidal, 4 Acosta, 3 Campos, 8 A. Sánchez (54 min 11 Castillo), 6 Elie, 16 Carero, 10 Añor (70 min 15 Febles), 13 Carvajal, 9 Zubizarreta

*Cuba:* 16 Madera, 2 Lopez, 17 Loredó, 5 Dreke, 4 Sánchez, 14 Delgado, 15 Masso, 9 Lara, 7 Roldán, 10 Nuñez, 11 Hernández (81 min 8 Povea)

- a) 0:1 (49 min) 11 Dreke / 1:1 (68 min) 9 Zubizarreta / 1:2 (71 min) 11 Hernández
- b) Guruceta (Spain) – Siles Calderón (Costa Rica), Lacarne (Algeria)
- c) F. Alvarez (Philippines) – J. Soria Terrazas (Mexico)

**17 24.7. 20.00 Dynamo Moscow USSR v. Cuba 8:0 (5:0)**

*USSR:* 1 Dasaev (64 min 12 Pilguy), 2 Sulakvelidze, 3 Tchivadze, 4 Khidiatullin, 5 Romantsev, 6 Shavlo, 7 Andreev, 8 Bessonov, 9 Gavrilov, 10 Tcherenkov, 11 Gazzaev (46 min 14 Nikulin)

*Cuba:* 16 Madera, 4 Sanchez, 5 Dreke, 6 Espinosa, 7 Roldan, 8 Povea, 9 Lara, 10 Nuñez, 15 Masso (24 min 2 Lopez (80 min 3 Frometa), 17 Loredó, 19 Hernández


- a) 1:0 (8 min) 7 Andreev / 2:0 (20 min) 5 Romantsev / 3:0 (27 min) 7 Andreev / 4:0 (43 min) 6 Shavlo / 5:0 (44 min) 7 Andreev / 6:0 (55 min) 10 Tcherenkov / 7:0 (75 min) 9 Gavrilov / 8:0 (77 min) 8 Bessonov
- b) Valentine (Scotland) – Wöhrer (Austria), Arafat (Syria)
- c) F. Seipelt (Austria) – C. Carrera (Guatemala)

**18 24.7. 19.00 Kirov Leningrad Venezuela v. Zambia 2:1 (0:0)**

*Venezuela:* 1 E. Sánchez, 14 Pereira (75 min 2 Aguirre), 6 Elie, 4 Acosta, 3 Campos, 8 A. Sánchez, 16 Carrero, 10 Añor, 13 Carvajal, 9 Zubizarreta, 7 Peña (64 min 11 Castillo)

*Zambia:* 1 Mwape, 2 Muke, 3 Kalambo, 14 Sinkala, 5 Katumba, 6 Katebe, 7 Simwala, 8 Banda, 12 Kashimoto (63 min 15 Tembo), 10 Chitalu, 11 Kaimana

- a) 0:1 (73 min) 10 Chitalu / 1:1 (86 min) 9 Zubizarreta / 2:1 (90 min) 6 Elie
- b) Siles Calderón (Costa Rica) – Lipatov (USSR), Jushka (USSR)
- c) F. Alvarez (Philippines) – J. Soria Terrazas (Mexico)



## Group B – Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Nigeria, Kuwait

**5 21.7. 19.00 Kirov Leningrad Czechoslovakia v. Colombia 3:0 (2:0)**

*Czechoslovakia:* 1 Seman, 2 Macela, 3 Mazura, 4 Radimec, 5 Rygel, 14 Rott, 8 Berger, 16 Stambacher, 7 Vizek, 10 Pokluda, 11 Licka (69 min 9 Svoboda)

*Colombia:* 1 Valencia, 2 González, 3 Romero, 4 Viafara, 7 Porras, 10 Hernandez, 17 R. García (24 min 14 Fiorillo), 9 Sarmiento, 8 Peluffo (58 min 13 A. García), 6 G. García, 11 Cardona

a) 1:0 (14 min) 10 Pokluda / 2:0 (18 min) 8 Berger / 3:0 (85 min) 7 Vizek

b) Lacarne (Algeria) – Lattanzi (Italy), Labo (Peru)

c) J. Arriaga (Mexico) – R. Hemmer Colmenares (Venezuela)

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**6 21.7. 20.00 Dynamo Moscow Nigeria v. Kuwait 1:3 (1:2)**

*Nigeria:* 1 Ogedegbe, 4 Okpalla, 5 Boateng, 7 Bamidele, 8 Okey (19 min 6 Orlando), 9 Mohamed, 12 Owolabi, 14 Lawal, 15 Ameisimaka, 16 Osuigwe, 17 Kadiri (46 min 10 Atuegbu)

*Kuwait:* 1 Altarabulsi, 3 Mubarak, 4 Alqabendi, 5 Almubarak, 6 Alhouti, 7 Marzouq, 8 Albuloushi, 9 Sultan (86 min 10 Alhaddad), 11 Bohamad, 14 Alshemmari, 16 Aldaakhil

a) 0:1 (16 min) 16 Aldaakhil / 1:1 (25 min) 3 Mubarak / 1:2 (40 min) 16 Aldaakhil / 1:3 (85 min) 16 Aldaakhil

b) Scheurell (German DR) – Mattson (Finland), Al-Hachami (Iraq)

c) N. Latyshev (USSR) – Dr. H. Geró (Austria)

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**13 23.7. 19.00 Kirov Leningrad Czechoslovakia v. Nigeria 1:1 (1:0)**

*Czechoslovakia:* 1 Seman, 2 Macela, 4 Radimec, 7 Vizek, 8 Berger, 9 Svoboda, 10 Pokluda, 11 Licka (65 min 12 Vaclavicek), 15 Sreiner, 16 Stambacher, 17 Kunzo


*Nigeria:* 1 Ogedegbe, 3 Adiele, 5 Boateng, 7 Bamidele, 6 Orlando, 4 Okpalla, 10 Atuegbu (46 min 9 Mohamed), 13 Odgebami (46 min 14 Lawal), 11 Nwosu, 16 Osigwe, 15 Ameisimaka

a) 1:0 (25 min) 7 Vizek / 1:1 (84 min) 11 Nwosu

b) Labo (Peru) – Raus (Yugoslavia), Lattanzi (Italy)

c) J. Arriaga (Mexico) – R. Hemmer Colmenares (Venezuela)

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**14 23.7. 20.00 Dynamo Moscow Colombia v. Kuwait 1:1 (0:0)**

*Colombia:* 12 Rios, 2 González, 3 Romero, 4 Viafara, 7 Porras, 9 Sarmiento, 8 Peluffo (42 min 5 Viloria), 13 A. García (69 min 15 Molinares), 11 Cardona, 6 G. García, 14 Fiorillo

*Kuwait:* 1 Altarabulsi, 14 Alshemmari, 3 Mubarak, 4 Alqabendi, 5 Almubarak, 6 Alhouti, 8 Albuloushi, 11 Bohamad, 9 Sultan, 7 Marzouq, 16 Aldaakhil

- a) 0:1 (64 min) 9 Sultan / 1:1 (73 min) 19 Molinares
  - b) Mattson (Finland) – Valentine (Scotland), Scheurell (German DR)
  - c) F. Seipelt (Austria) – Dr. A. Halim (Sudan)
- 

**21 25.7. 19.00 Kirov Leningrad Czechoslovakia v. Kuwait 0:0 (0:0)**

*Czechoslovakia:* 1 Seman, 2 Macela, 3 Mazura, 4 Radimec, 6 Nemeč, 7 Vizek, 8 Berger, 10 Pokluda (68 min 16 Stambacher), 11 Licka, 14 Rott, 17 Kunzo

*Kuwait:* 1 Altarabulsi, 3 Mubarak, 15 Alhashash, 14 Alshemmari, 5 Almubarak, 8 Albuloushi (46 min 2 N. Mubarak), 6 Alhouti, 13 Hasan (46 min 12 Alsawayed), 11 Bohamad, 9 Sultan, 16 Aldaakhil

- a) –
  - b) Lattanzi (Italy) – Siles Calderon (Costa Rica), Guruceta Muro (Spain)
  - c) F. Alvarez (Philippines) – R. Hemmer Colmenares (Venezuela)
- 

**22 25.7. 20.00 Dynamo Moscow Colombia v. Nigeria 1:0 (0:0)**

*Colombia:* 12 Rios, 2 González, 4 Viafara, 3 Romero, 5 Viloria, 9 Sarmiento, 7 Porras, 11 Cardona (89 min 8 Peluffo), 6 G. García, 15 Molinares, 16 Pérez (59 min 13 A. García)

*Nigeria:* 1 Ogedegbe, 3 Adiele, 5 Boateng, 7 Bamidele, 6 Orlando, 4 Okpalla, 10 Atuegbu, 11 Nwosu, 14 Lawal, 16 Osuigwe, 9 Mohamed

- a) 1:0 (55 min) 11 Cardona
  - b) Al-Hachami (Iraq) – Wöhrer (Austria), Arafat (Syria)
  - c) N. Latyshev (USSR) – Y. Tessema (Ethiopia)
-



**Group C – German DR, Spain, Algeria, Syria**

**3    20.7.    20.00    Kiev    German DR v. Spain    1:1 (0:0)**

*German DR:* 1 Rudwaleit, 2 Ullrich, 3 Hause, 5 Baum, 6 Schnuphase, 7 Terletzki (82 min 14 Liebers), 8 Steinbach, 9 Bähringer (72 min 10 Peter), 11 Kühn, 12 Trieloff, 17 Netz

*Spain:* 3 Buyo, 16 Urquiaga, 4 De Andres, 13 Ramos, 1 J. Alonso, 6 Gajate, 2 M. Alonso (90 min 11 Ortega), 10 Muñoz, 14 Rincon, 9 Lopez (74 min 8 Guerri), 7 Gonzalez

- a) 1:0 (49 min) 11 Kühn / 1:1 (50 min) 2 Alonso
- b) Eriksson (Sweden) – Albanni (Kuwait), Calderón Castro (Cuba)
- c) J. Mowat (Scotland) – G. Edwards (USA)

**4    20.7.    20.00    Dinamo Minsk    Algeria v. Syria    3:0 (1:0)**

*Algeria:* 1 Amara, 5 Merzekane (79 min 16 Derouaz), 13 Larbes, 2 Guendouz, 6 Kheddis, 4 Mahyouz, 7 Madjer, 8 Fergani, 9 Bensaoula, 10 Belloumi (79 min 14 Menad), 11 Assad

*Syria:* 1 Beirakdar, 2 Chit, 3 Dahman, 4 Asfahani, 5 Mahallame, 6 Hadna, 7 Jazaeri, 8 Abdulkader (80 min 13 Haouache), 9 Mardikian, 10 Hojeir, 11 Madrati

- a) 1:0 (36 min) 10 Belloumi / 2:0 (48 min) 7 Madjer / 3:0 (73 min) 5 Merzekane
- b) Christov (Czechoslovakia) – Daina (Switzerland), Azim-Zade (USSR)
- c) Dr. R. Barde (France) – R. Fougère (France)

**11    22.7.    19.00    Kiev    German DR v. Algeria    1:0 (0:0)**

*German DR:* 1 Rudwaleit, 12 Trieloff, 4 Uhlig, 3 Hause, 2 Ullrich, 6 Schnuphase, 7 Terletzki, 8 Steinbach, 9 Bähringer, 11 Kühn (87 min 14 Liebers), 10 Peter

*Algeria:* 1 Amara, 5 Merzekane, 13 Larbes, 2 Guendouz, 4 Mahyouz (83 min 16 Derouaz), 6 Kheddis, 7 Madjer (78 min 14 Menad), 8 Fergani, 9 Bensaoula, 10 Belloumi, 11 Assad

- a) 1:0 (61 min) 7 Terletzki
- b) Arppi Filho (Brazil) – Velasquez (Colombia), Calderón Castro (Cuba)
- c) J. Mowat (Scotland) – G. Edwards (USA)



**12 22.7. 19.00 Dinamo Minsk Spain v. Syria 0:0 (0:0)**

*Spain:* 1 J. Alonso, 2 M. Alonso, 4 De Andrés, 6 Gajate, 7 González (81 min 17 Zufiiga), 9 Lopez, 10 Muñoz, 13 Ramos, 14 Rincon (65 min 11 Ortega), 15 Rodriguez, 16 Urquiaga

*Syria:* 1 Beirakdar, 2 Chit, 3 Dahman, 5 Mahallame, 6 Hadna, 7 Jazaeri, 8 Abdulkader, 9 Mardikian, 10 Hojeir, 11 Madrati, 16 Shana (86 min 21 Assassa)

a) —

b) Castro Losada (Venezuela) — Daina (Switzerland), Eyo-Honesty (Nigeria)

c) Dr. R. Barde (France) — M. Angelescu (Rumania)/R. Fougère (France)

**19 24.7. 19.00 Kiev German DR v. Syria 5:0 (3:0)**

*German DR:* 3 Hause, 5 Baum, 6 Schnuphase, 7 Terletzki, 8 Steinbach (46 min 14 Liebers), 9 Bähringer (67 min 10 Peter), 11 Kühn, 12 Trieloff, 13 Müller, 16 Jakubowski, 17 Netz

*Syria:* 1 Beirakdar, 2 Chit, 3 Dahman, 4 Asfahani, 5 Mahallame, 6 Hadna, 8 Abdulkader, 9 Mardikian, 10 Hojeir (46 min 15 Aref), 13 Haouache, 21 Assassa (73 min 16 Shana)

a) 1:0 (6 min) 3 Hause / 2:0 (25 min) 17 Netz / 3:0 (45 min) 17 Netz / 4:0 (75 min) 10 Peter / 5:0 (82 min) 7 Terletzki

b) Velasquez (Colombia) — Arppi Filho (Brazil), Albanni (Kuwait)

c) J. Mowat (Scotland) — G. Edwards (USA)

**20 24.7. 19.00 Dinamo Minsk Spain v. Algeria 1:1 (1:0)**

*Spain:* 3 Buyo, 16 Urquiaga, 4 De Andres, 6 Gajate, 13 Ramos (66 min 5 Felipe), 9 Lopez, 1 Alonso, 10 Muñoz, 2 M. Alonso, 14 Rincon, 7 González (66 min 11 Ortega)

*Algeria:* 1 Amara, 16 Derouaz, 5 Merzekane, 13 Larbes, 2 Guendouz, 4 Mahyouz (51 min 10 Belloumi), 7 Madjer, 8 Fergani, 9 Bensaoula, 18 Ghrib, 11 Assad

a) 1:0 (38 min) 14 Rincon / 1:1 (63 min) 10 Belloumi

b) Azim-Zade (USSR) — Stupar (USSR), Milchenko (USSR)

c) Dr. R. Barde (France) — R. Fougère (France)



## Group D – Yugoslavia, Finland, Costa Rica, Iraq

**7 21.7. 19.00 Dinamo Minsk Yugoslavia v. Finland 2:0 (0:0)**

*Yugoslavia:* 1 Pantevic, 17 Vujovic, 5 Jovin, 9 Matievic, 13 Primorac, 6 Klincarski, 16 Zlatko Vujovic, 15 Sestic, 11 Pesic (46 min 8 Secerbegovic), 10 Mirocevic (68 min 2 Cukrov), 14 Reptic

*Finland:* 1 Isoaho, 2 Lahtinen, 3 Helin, 4 Virtanen, 5 Heikkinen (63 min 13 Vilen), 6 Turunen, 7 Dahllund (63 min 14 Kuuluvaainen), 8 Pulliainen, 9 Himanka, 10 Tissari, 11 Alila

- a) 1:0 (56 min) 8 Secerbegovic / 2:0 (58 min) 15 Sestic
- b) Rubio Vasquez (Mexico) – Castro Losada (Venezuela), Eyo-Honesty (Nigeria)
- c) Dr. A. Zouiten (Tunisia) – M. Angelescu (Rumania)

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**8 21.7. 19.00 Kiev Costa Rica v. Iraq 0:3 (0:1)**

*Costa Rica:* 1 Morales, 2 Masis, 3 Garcia, 4 Toppings, 11 Obando, 8 Velasquez, 14 Arroyo, 9 White, 10 Alvarez (54 min 16 Quesada), 7 Hernandez, 15 Fernandez (59 min 6 Marshall)

*Iraq:* 1 Jassim Abdul Fatah, 5 Hassoun Hassan Farhan, 12 Kadhum Ibrahim Ali, 7 Hafidh Adil Khdhayir, 2 Mutar Adnan Derchal, 6 Khdhayir Alaa Ahmed, 8 Jasim Falah Hassan, 10 Mohammed Hussain Saeed, 14 Salman Nazar Ashraf (46 min 15 Nasir Ali Kadhum), 9 Basheer Hadi Ahmed (83 min 4 Mohammed Saad Jassim), 3 Hamza Jamal Ali

- a) 0:1 (45 min) 9 Basheer Hadi Ahmed / 0:2 (49 min) 10 Mohammed Hussain Saeed / 0:3 (75 min) 8 Jasim Falah Hassan
- b) Chayu (Zambia) – Shklovsky (USSR), Butenko (USSR)
- c) J. Mowat (Scotland) – G. Edwards (USA)

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**15 23.7. 19.00 Dynamo Minsk Yugoslavia v. Costa Rica 3:2 (2:1)**

*Yugoslavia:* 2 Cukrov, 4 Hrstic, 6 Klincarski, 7 Krsticevic, 8 Secerbegovic, 9 Matijeivic, 10 Mirocevic (46 min 14 Reptic), 11 Pesic (46 min 15 Sestic), 12 Ivkovic, 13 Primorac, 16 Vujovic

*Costa Rica:* 1 Morales, 2 Masis, 3 Garcia, 4 Toppings, 5 Jimenez (14 min 12 Alpizar), 7 Hernandez, 8 Velasquez, 9 White, 10 Alvarez (60 min 13 Avila), 11 Obando, 14 Arroyo

- a) 1:0 (6 min) 16 Vujovic / 2:0 (24 min) 13 Primorac / 2:1 (35 min) 9 White / 3:1 (46 min) 16 Vujovic / 3:2 (90 min) 14 Arroyo
  - b) Eyo-Honesty (Nigeria) – Christov (Czechoslovakia), Azim-Zade (USSR)
  - c) Dr. A. Zouiten (Tunisia) – M. Angelescu (Rumania)
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**16 23.7. 19.00 Kiev Finland v. Iraq 0:0 (0:0)**

*Finland:* 1 Isoaho, 2 Lahtinen, 3 Helin, 4 Virtanen, 13 Vilen, 6 Turunen, 7 Dahllund, 8 Pulliainen, 9 Himanka, 10 Tissari (24 min 16 Soini), 11 Alila (74 min 15 Jalo)

*Iraq:* 1 Jassim Abdul Fatah, 5 Hassoun Hassan Farhan, 3 Hamza Jamal Ali, 9 Basheer Hadi Ahmed, 14 Salman Nazar Ashraf (62 min 15 Nasir Ali Kadhum), 7 Hafidh Adil Khdayir, 6 Khdayir Alaa Ahmed, 8 Jasim Falah Hassan, 10 Mohammed Hussain Saeed, 2 Mutar Adnan Derchal, 12 Kadhum Ibrahim Ali

a) —

b) Calderon Castro (Cuba) — Eriksson (Sweden), Chayu (Zambia)

c) J. Mowat (Scotland) — G. Edwards (USA)

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**23 25.7. 19.00 Dynamo Minsk Yugoslavia v. Iraq 1:1 (0:0)**

*Yugoslavia:* 1 Pantelic, 2 Cukrov, 5 Jovin (75 min 4 Hrstic), 9 Matijevic, 13 Primorac, 6 Klincarski, 16 Vujovic Zlatko (41 min 17 Vujovic Zoran), 15 Sestic, 14 Repcic, 10 Mirocevic, 8 Secerbegovic

*Iraq:* 1 Jassim Abdul Fatah, 5 Hassoun Hassan Farhan, 12 Kadhum Ibrahim Ali, 2 Mutar Adnan Derchal, 7 Hafidh Adil Khdayir, 9 Basheer Hadi Ahmed, 6 Khdayir Alaa Ahmed, 3 Hamza Jamal Ali (85 min 13 Muhyi Wathiq Aswad), 11 Elias Thamir Assoufi (62 min 14 Salman Nazar Ashraf), 8 Jasim Falah Hassan, 15 Nasir Ali Kadhum

a) 0:1 (61 min) 8 Jasim Falah Hassan / 1:1 (63 min) 17 Vujovic Zoran

b) Daina (Switzerland) — Rubio Vazquez (Mexico), Losada Castro (Venezuela)

c) Dr. A. Zouiten (Tunisia) — M. Angelescu (Rumania)

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**24 25.7. 19.00 Kiev Finland v. Costa Rica 3:0 (1:0)**

*Finland:* 1 Isoaho, 2 Lahtinen, 3 Helin, 4 Virtanen, 6 Turunen, 7 Dahllund, 8 Pulliainen, 9 Himanka (61 min 16 Soini), 10 Tissari (78 min 17 Rissanen), 11 Alila, 13 Vilen

*Costa Rica:* 1 Morales, 2 Masis (69 min 6 Marshall), 3 Garcia, 4 Toppings, 7 Hernandez, 8 Velasquez, 9 White, 10 Alvarez (46 min 16 Quesada), 11 Obando, 12 Alpizar, 14 Arroyo

a) 1:0 (18 min) 10 Tissari / 2:0 (58 min) 11 Alila / 3:0 (88 min) 16 Soini

b) Albanni (Kuwait) — Eriksson (Sweden), Kabalamula (Zambia)

c) J. Mowat (Scotland) — G. Edwards (USA)

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## Quarter finals / Quarts de finale / Cuartos de final / Viertelfinals

**25 27.7. 18.00 Dynamo Moscow USSR v. Kuwait 2:1 (1:0)**

*USSR:* 1 Dasaev, 2 Sulakvelidze, 3 Tchivadze, 4 Khidiatullin, 5 Romantsev, 6 Shavlo, 7 Andreev, 8 Bessonov, 9 Gavrilov (80 min 11 Gazzaev), 10 Tcherenkov, 17 Tchelebadze (46 min 15 Oganesyanyan)

*Kuwait:* 1 Altarabulsi, 2 Mubarak Na'eem, 3 Mubarak Mahboub, 4 Algabendi, 5 Almubarak (61 min 15 Alhashash), 11 Bohamad, 14 Alshemmari (67 min 12 Alsuwayed), 6 Alhouti, 18 Aldakhil, 7 Marzouq, 9 Sultan

- a) 1:0 (30 min) 10 Tcherenkov / 2:0 (51 min) 9 Gavrilov / 2:1 (59 min) 9 Sultan
  - b) Rubio Vazquez (Mexico) – Wöhrrer (Austria), Mattson (Finland)
  - c) F. Seipelt (Austria) – R. Hemmer Colmenares (Venezuela)
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**26 27.7. 18.00 Kirov Leningrad Czechoslovakia v. Cuba 3:0 (1:0)**

*Czechoslovakia:* 1 Seman, 2 Macela, 3 Mazura, 4 Radimec, 7 Vizek, 8 Berger, 10 Pokluda, 11 Licka, 14 Rott, 15 Sreiner, 17 Kunzo

*Cuba:* 16 Madera, 4 Sanchez, 5 Dreke, 7 Roldan, 8 Povea, 9 Lara, 10 Nuñez, 13 Pereira (64 min 11 Hernandez), 14 Delgado, 15 Masso, 17 Loredo


- a) 1:0 (29 min) 7 Vizek / 2:0 (59 min) 7 Vizek / 3:0 (90 min) 10 Pokluda
  - b) Labo (Peru) – Raus (Yugoslavia), Jushka (USSR)
  - c) F. Alvarez (Philippines) – J. Soria Terrazas (Mexico)
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**27 27.7. 18.00 Kiev German DR v. Iraq 4:0 (4:0)**

*German DR:* 1 Rudwaleit, 12 Trieloff, 13 Müller, 3 Hause, 5 Baum, 7 Terletzki (72 min 14 Liebers), 6 Schnuphase, 8 Steinbach, 9 Bähringer, 11 Kühn (46 min 15 Trautmann), 17 Netz

*Iraq:* 1 Jassim Abdul Fatah (23 min 17 Abdulsada Kadom Shibib), 5 Hassoun Hassan Farhan, 2 Mutar Adnan Derchal, 10 Mohammed Hussain Saeed, 9 Basheer Hadi Ahmed, 15 Nasir Ali Kadhum, 6 Khdhayir Alaa Ahmed, 7 Hafidh Adil Khdhayir, 8 Jasim Falah Hassan, 3 Hamza Jamal Ali (74 min 14 Salman Nazar Ashraf), 12 Kadhum Ibrahim Ali

- a) 1:0 (4 min) 6 Schnuphase / 2:0 (11 min) 17 Netz / 3:0 (17 min) 8 Steinbach / 4:0 (22 min) 7 Terletzki
  - b) Arppi Filho (Brazil) – Kabalamula (Zambia), Velasquez (Colombia)
  - c) J. Mowat (Scotland) – G. Edwards (USA)
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**28 27.7. 18.00 Dinamo Minsk Yugoslavia v. Algeria 3:0 (2:0)**

*Yugoslavia:* 1 Pantelic, 2 Cukrov, 4 Hrstic, 6 Klincarski, 9 Matijevic, 10 Mirocevic (81 min 3 Gudelj), 13 Primorac, 14 Repcic, 15 Sestic (77 min 7 Krsticevic), 16 Vujovic Zlatko, 17 Vujovic Zoran

*Algeria:* 1 Amara, 2 Guendouz, 4 Mahiouz, 5 Merzekane, 6 Kheddis, 7 Madjer, 8 Fergani, 9 Bensaoula, 10 Belloumi, 11 Assad (73 min 14 Menad), 13 Larbes

- a) 1:0 (5 min) 10 Mirocevic / 2:0 (19 min) 15 Sestic / 3:0 (70 min) 17 Vujovic Zoran
- b) Scheurell (German DR) – Azim-Zade (USSR), Christov (Czechoslovakia)
- c) Dr. R. Barde (France) – R. Fougère (France)

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### Semi-Finals / Demi-finales / Semifinales / Halbfinals

**29 29.7. 20.00 Lenin Moscow USSR v. German DR 0:1 (0:1)**

*USSR:* 1 Dasaev, 2 Sulakvelidze, 3 Chivadze, 4 Khidiyatullin, 5 Romantsev, 6 Shavlo, 7 Andreev, 8 Bessonov, 9 Gavrilov, 10 Cherenkov, 11 Gazzaev

*German DR:* 1 Rudwaleit, 2 Ullrich, 3 Hause, 5 Baum (83 min 4 Uhlig), 6 Schnuphase (90 min 14 Liebers), 7 Terletzki, 8 Steinbach, 11 Kühn, 12 Trieloff, 13 Müller, 17 Netz

- a) 0:1 (16 min) 17 Netz
- b) Eriksson (Sweden) – Albanni (Kuwait), Siles Calderón (Costa Rica)
- c) Dr. A. Zouiten (Tunisia) – Dr. A. Halim (Sudan)

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**30 29.7. 20.00 Dynamo Moscow Yugoslavia v. Czechoslovakia 0:2 (0:2)**

*Yugoslavia:* 1 Pantelic, 17 Vujovic Zoran, 4 Hrstic, 9 Matijevic, 13 Primorac, 6 Klincarski, 16 Vujovic Zlatko, 15 Sestic, 2 Cukrov (74 min 7 Krsticevic), 10 Mirocevic, 14 Repcic

*Czechoslovakia:* 1 Steman, 3 Mazura, 12 Vaclavicek, 4 Radimec, 17 Kunzo, 14 Rott, 8 Berger, 7 Vizek, 10 Pokluda (72 min 6 Nemecek), 11 Licka (84 min 9 Svoboda), 15 Sreiner

- a) 0:1 (4 min) 11 Licka / 0:2 (18 min) 15 Sreiner
  - b) Wöhrer (Austria) – Lacarne (Algeria), Salim Najy Al-Hachami (Iraq)
  - c) F. Alvarez (Philippines) – R. Alcantara (Senegal)
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**Match for the 3rd place / Match pour la 3ème place  
Partido por el 3er puesto / Spiel um den 3. Platz**

**31 1.8. 20.00 Dynamo Moscow USSR v. Yugoslavia 2:0 (0:0)**

*USSR:* 1 Dasaev, 2 Sulakvelidze, 3 Chivadze, 4 Khidiyatullin, 5 Romantsev, 6 Shavlo, 7 Andreev, 8 Bessonov, 9 Gavrilov, 10 Cherenkov (72 min 13 Baltacha), 11 Gazzaev (46 min 15 Oganessian)

*Yugoslavia:* 12 Ivkovic, 17 Vujovic Zoran, 6 Klincarski, 3 Gudelj, 13 Primorac, 7 Krsticevic (78 min 14 Repcic), 16 Vujovic Zlatko, 15 Sestic, 11 Pesic, 2 Cukrov, 8 Secerbegovic

- a) 1:0 (67 min) 15 Oganessian / 2:0 (82 min) 7 Andreev
- b) Valentine (Scotland) – Velasquez (Colombia), Arafat (Syria)
- c) Dr. R. Barde (France) – Dr. H. Käser (Switzerland)

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
**Final / Finale**

**32 2.8. 19.00 Loujniki Mosc. German DR v. Czechoslovakia 0:1 (0:0)**

*German DR:* 1 Rudwaleit, 12 Trieloff, 13 Müller, 3 Hause (81 min 14 Liebers), 2 Ullrich, 6 Schnuphase, 7 Terletzki, 5 Baum, 17 Netz, 11 Kühn (58 min 10 Peter), 8 Steinbach


*Czechoslovakia:* 1 Seman, 2 Macela, 3 Mazura, 4 Radimec, 5 Rigel, 7 Vizek (73 min 9 Svoboda), 8 Berger, 10 Pokluda (63 min 6 Nemeec), 11 Licka, 14 Rott, 16 Stambacher

- a) 0:1 (77 min) 9 Svoboda
- b) Azim-Zade (USSR) – Mattsson (Finland), Lattanzi (Italy)
- c) F. Seipelt (Austria) – A. d'Almeida (Brazil)



## List of Goalscorers / Liste des buteurs / Lista de goleadores / Torschützenliste

1	7 Sergey Andreev (USSR)	5 goals	6 matches
2	17 Wolf-Rüdiger Netz (German DR)	4	5
3	7 Ladislav Vizek (Czechoslovakia)	4	6
	10 Fyodor Cherenkov (USSR)	4	6
5	16 Faisal Aldaakhil (Kuwait)	3	4
6	9 Yuri Gavrilov (USSR)	3	5
7	7 Frank Terletzki (German DR)	3	6
8	9 Iker Joseba Zubizarreta (Venezuela)	2	2
9	10 Godfrey Chitalu (Zambia)	2	3
	15 Khoren Oganesyanyan (USSR)	2	3
11	8 Fatah Hassan Jasim (Iraq)	2	4
	10 Lakhdar Belloumi (Algeria)	2	4
	9 Jasem Sultan (Kuwait)	2	4
14	17 Zlatko Vujovic (Yugoslavia)	2	5
15	10 Lubos Pokluda (Czechoslovakia)	2	6
	16 Zoran Vujovic (Yugoslavia)	2	6
	4 Vagiz Khidiyatullin (USSR)	2	6
	15 Milos Sestic (Yugoslavia)	2	6
19	11 Henry Nwosu (Nigeria)	1	2
	15 Carlos Molinares (Colombia)	1	2
	16 Jouko Soini (Finland)	1	2
22	10 Hussain Saeed Mohammed (Iraq)	1	3
	9 Jorge White Hooker (Costa Rica)	1	3
	14 Omar Arroyo (Costa Rica)	1	3
	2 Marcos Alonso (Spain)	1	3
	6 Robert Elie (Venezuela)	1	3
	10 Ari Tissari (Finland)	1	3
	11 Jouko Alila (Finland)	1	3
	11 Benjamin Cardona (Colombia)	1	3
	14 Hipolito Rincón (Spain)	1	3
	15 Zdenek Sreiner (Czechoslovakia)	1	3
32	10 Werner Peter (German DR)	1	4
	8 Dzevad Secerbegovic (Yugoslavia)	1	4
	9 Hadi Ahmed Basheer (Iraq)	1	4
	10 Ramón Nuñez (Cuba)	1	4
	7 Rabah Madjer (Algeria)	1	4
	5 Chaabane Merzekane (Algeria)	1	4
	7 Andrés Roldán (Cuba)	1	4
	11 Luis Hernández (Cuba)	1	4
	9 Jindrich Svoboda (Czechoslovakia)	1	4
41	6 Sergey Shavlo (USSR)	1	5
	8 Jan Berger (Czechoslovakia)	1	5
	10 Ante Mirocevic (Yugoslavia)	1	5
44	11 Dieter Kühn (German DR)	1	6
	3 Lothar Hause (German DR)	1	6
	6 Rüdiger Schnuphase (German DR)	1	6
	8 Wolfgang Steinbach (German DR)	1	6
	11 Werner Licka (Czechoslovakia)	1	6
	13 Boro Primorac (Yugoslavia)	1	6
	8 Vladimir Bessonov (USSR)	1	6
	5 Oleg Romantsev (USSR)	1	6



Moscow



## Disciplinary Measures

### Cautions

#### ALGERIA

4	Algeria v. Syria	13 S. Larbes	foul play
11	German DR v. Algeria	4 B. Mahiouz 8 A. Fergani 7 R. Madjer	tripping an opponent ungentlemanly conduct dissent
20	Spain v. Algeria	2 M. Guendouz	dangerous play
28	Yugoslavia v. Algeria	5 C. Merzekane	foul play

#### COLOMBIA

5	Czechoslovakia v. Colombia	6 G. Garcia	dangerous play
14	Colombia v. Kuwait	3 A. Romero	foul play
22	Colombia v. Nigeria	11 B. Cardona 4 H. Viafara	intentional handling pushing an opponent

#### COSTA RICA – *No cautions*

#### CUBA

2	Zambia v. Cuba	14 R. Delgado	ungentlemanly behaviour
10	Venezuela v. Cuba	11 L. Hernandez	ungentlemanly behaviour
17	USSR v. Cuba	17 C. Loreda 6 R. Espinoza 10 R. Nuñez	tripping an opponent tripping an opponent foul play
26	Czechoslovakia v. Cuba	14 R. Delgado	foul play

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

5	Czechoslovakia v. Colombia	8 J. Berger	ungentlemanly behaviour
13	Czechoslovakia v. Nigeria	7 L. Vizek 10 L. Pokluda	foul play foul play
21	Czechoslovakia v. Kuwait	2 L. Masela 6 P. Nemeč	kicking an opponent time-wasting
30	Czechoslovakia v. Yugoslavia	17 F. Kunzo 9 J. Svoboda	foul play foul play
32	German DR v. Czechoslovakia	14 O. Rott 4 L. Radimec	foul play foul play



**FINLAND — No cautions**

**GERMAN DR**

3	German DR v. Spain	9 J. Bähringer	tripping an opponent
27	German DR v. Iraq	3 L. Hause	tripping an opponent
32	German DR v. Czechoslovakia	5 F. Baum	foul play
		7 F. Terletzki	foul play
		8 W. Steinbach	foul play

**IRAQ**

8	Costa Rica v. Iraq	10 M. Hussain Saed	ungentlemanly conduct
16	Finland v. Iraq	5 Hassan F. Hassoun	dangerous charging
		6 Alaa A. Khdhayir	ungentlemanly conduct
23	Yugoslavia v. Iraq	15 Nasir Ali Khadhum	foul play

**KUWAIT**

6	Nigeria v. Kuwait	7 F. Marzouq	intentional handling
21	Czechoslovakia v. Kuwait	14 H. Alshemmari	tripping an opponent
		6 S. Alhouti	ungentlemanly conduct
25	USSR v. Kuwait	3 M. Mahboub	holding an opponent
		9 J. Sultan	foul play

**NIGERIA**



13	Czechoslovakia v. Nigeria	11 H. Nwosu	holding an opponent
		16 E. Osuigwe	kicking an opponent
		4 S. Okpala	kicking an opponent
		5 L. Boateng	foul play
22	Colombia v. Nigeria	3 J. Adiele	dissent

**SPAIN**

3	German DR v. Spain	16 S. Urquiaga	violent charge from behind
		2 M. Alonso	violent charge from behind
20	Spain v. Algeria	14 H. Rincon	dangerous play
		9 J. Lopez	foul play

**SYRIA**

4	Algeria v. Syria	4 R. Asfahani	foul play
		3 M. Dahman	foul play
12	Spain v. Syria	1 J. Beirakdar	time-wasting
19	German DR v. Syria	21 Samer Assassa	tripping an opponent
		2 J. Chit	tripping an opponent



## USSR

25	USSR v. Kuwait	2 T. Sulakvelidze	foul play
29	USSR v. German DR	5 O. Romantsev	foul play
31	USSR v. Yugoslavia	3 A. Chivadze	tripping an opponent

## VENEZUELA

10	Venezuela v. Cuba	14 F. Pereira	unsporting behaviour
		15 P. Febles	unsporting behaviour
18	Venezuela v. Zambia	1 E. Sanchez	holding an opponent

## YUGOSLAVIA

28	Yugoslavia v. Algeria	4 M. Hrstic	foul play
		10 A. Mirocevic	time-wasting
30	Czechoslovakia v. Yugoslavia	8 O. Secerbegovic	foul play
31	USSR v. Yugoslavia	15 M. Sestic	tripping an opponent
		13 B. Primorac	tripping an opponent

## ZAMBIA

9	USSR v. Zambia	5 K. Katumba	dissent
		7 M. Simwala	foul play

## Expulsions / Suspensions

*(in accordance with the provisions of the FIFA Memorandum on Disciplinary Measures)*

22.7.80 *Venezuela v. Cuba* *E. Guruceta Muro, Spain*  
Cuba: No. 14 R. Delgado time-wasting  
2nd caution: suspended for the next match (USSR v. Cuba 24.7.80)

23.7.80 *Finland v. Iraq* *C. Lozada Castro, Venezuela*  
Iraq: No. 10: M. Hussain Sæed dangerous charging  
2nd caution: suspended for the next match (Yugoslavia v. Iraq 25.7.80)



- 25.7.80**      *Colombia v. Nigeria*      *Salim Naji Al-Hachami, Iraq*  
Nigeria:      No. 16: Emmanuel Osuigwe      pushing an opponent  
2nd caution: suspended for the next international "A" match
- 27.7.80**      *Czechoslovakia v. Cuba*      *E. Labo, Peru*  
CSSR:      No. 2: Ludek Macela      foul play  
2nd caution: suspended for the next match (CSSR v. Yugoslavia 29.7.80)
- 27.7.80**      *German DR v. Iraq*      *R. Arppi Filho, Brazil*  
Iraq:      No. 5: Hassan Farhan Hassoun      tripping an opponent  
2nd caution: suspended for the next international "A" match  
  
No. 6: Alaa Ahmed Khdayir      tripping an opponent  
When leaving the field, the player spat at the referee — this was considered as "violent conduct" within the meaning of section (n) of Law XII:  
suspended for 12 months, i.e. 27.7.80–26.7.81
- 27.7.80**      *Yugoslavia v. Algeria*      *K. Scheurell, German DR*  
Algeria:      No. 4: Bouzid Mahiouz      dangerous play  
2nd caution: suspended for the next international "A" match
- 1.8.80**      *USSR v. Yugoslavia*      *R. Valentine, Scotland*  
USSR:      No. 5: Oleg Romantsev      holding an opponent  
2nd caution: suspended for the next international "A" match
- 6.8.80**      *German DR v. Czechoslovakia*      *E. Azim-Zade, USSR*  
German DR:      No. 8: Wolfgang Steinbach      foul play  
Expulsion: suspended for the next international "A" match  
  
CSSR:      No. 8: Jan Berger      foul play  
Expulsion: suspended for the next international "A" match


## Fair-Play Trophy – Final Classification

<i>Final Placings Teams</i>	<i>First match Points deducted Number of points after first match</i>	<i>Second match Points deducted Number of points after second match</i>	<i>Third match Points deducted Number of points after third match</i>	<i>Quarter finals Points deducted Number of points after quarter finals</i>	<i>Semi-finals Points deducted Number of points after semi-finals</i>	<i>Third place match and Final Points deducted Number of points after finals</i>	<i>Total number of points divided by the number of matches</i>	<i>Final standing (average)</i>
1 Yugoslavia	5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 0 = 10	+5 - 0 = 15	+6 - 2 = 19	+7 - 1 = 25	+8 - 2 = 31	31:6 = 5,16	
2-4 USSR	5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 0 = 10	+5 - 0 = 15	+6 - 1 = 20	+7 - 1 = 26	+8 - 4 = 30	30:6 = 5	
Finland	5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 0 = 10	+5 - 0 = 15	-	-	-	15:3 = 5	
Costa Rica	5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 0 = 10	+5 - 0 = 15	-	-	-	15:3 = 5	
5-6 German DR	5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 0 = 9	+5 - 0 = 14	+6 - 1 = 19	+7 - 0 = 26	+8 - 8 = 26	26:6 = 4,33	
Zambia	5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 2 = 8	+5 - 0 = 13	-	-	-	13:3 = 4,33	
7-8 Kuwait	5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 0 = 9	+5 - 2 = 12	+6 - 2 = 16	-	-	16:4 = 4	
Venezuela	5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 2 = 8	+5 - 1 = 12	-	-	-	12:3 = 4	
9-10 Colombia	5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 1 = 8	+5 - 2 = 11	-	-	-	11:3 = 3,66	
Spain	5 - 2 = 3	+5 - 0 = 8	+5 - 2 = 11	-	-	-	11:3 = 3,66	
11 Syria	5 - 2 = 3	+5 - 1 = 7	+5 - 2 = 10	-	-	-	10:3 = 3,33	
12 Czechoslovakia	5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 2 = 7	+5 - 2 = 10	+6 - 3 = 13	+7 - 2 = 18	+8 - 7 = 19	19:6 = 3,16	
13-14 Algeria	5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 3 = 6	+5 - 1 = 10	+6 - 4 = 12	-	-	12:4 = 3	
Cuba	5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 4 = 5	+5 - 3 = 7	+6 - 1 = 12	-	-	12:4 = 3	
15 Nigeria	5 - 0 = 5	+5 - 4 = 6	+5 - 4 = 7	-	-	-	7:3 = 2,33	
16 Iraq	5 - 1 = 4	+5 - 5 = 4	+5 - 1 = 8	+6 - 57 = -43	-	-	-43:4 = -10,75	

# Referees' Fitness Test

(Cooper Test: Distance run in 12 minutes)

30 Olympic Tournament referees  
Moscow



Minimum requirements:	Cooper Test 25-39 years	2300 m
	40-50 years	2000 m
	General national limit	2400 m
	400 m run	75 sec.
	50 m run	8 sec.
	Relay race (shuttle) 4x10 m	11.5 sec.

# Evaluation, Conclusion, Deduction

## General

A total of nearly two million spectators watched the 32 matches of the XXII. Olympic Football Tournament in the USSR. There were 1,821,624 tickets sold — representing about 35.48% of all the tickets sold for the entire Games.

The first four places went, as expected, to the teams from Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the USSR and Yugoslavia, who won their respective preliminary groups. Following the decision of seven teams not to take part in the Tournament despite having qualified for it, other teams who had finished second or third in their qualifying groups were invited to participate instead. Thus it was still possible to hold the Olympic Tournament with four groups of four teams. The decision to invite Iraq as one of the last 16, after the incidents which occurred during the qualifying match between Iraq and Kuwait, was not regarded as a happy solution.

The finalists were drawn from the various Continental Confederation as follows:

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Africa (CAF)	America (CONCACAF)	(CONMEBOL)	Asia (AFC)	Europe (UEFA)
Algeria	Costa Rica	Colombia	Iraq*	Czechoslovakia
Nigeria*	Cuba*	Venezuela*	Syria*	GDR
Zambia*			Kuwait	Finland*
				Yugoslavia
				Spain

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\*Invited teams

The GDR, as the Olympic Champions in Montreal in 1976, and the USSR as the host country were both automatically qualified for the finals.

On the basis of the *playing strengths* of the teams and judging by the *observations* made by the members of the Study Group, the 16 teams could be categorised as follows, regardless of the actual results achieved during the Tournament:

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<i>Czechoslovakia, GDR, USSR, Yugoslavia</i>	– well-established teams with a modern approach to the game and international experience
<i>Algeria, Kuwait, Spain</i>	– systematically trained teams; Kuwait and Algeria were the real surprise-packets of the Tournament and had clearly made progress
<i>Costa Rica, Finland*, Iraq*, Zambia*</i>	– good basis of young players; rather to be regarded as teams of the future, now preparing for greater aims
<i>Cuba*, Nigeria*, Colombia, Syria*, Venezuela*</i>	– still inconsistent and lacking international experience.

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These groups obviously do not indicate which of the teams had their best players available to play in the national side, and which were most affected by the eligibility restrictions. There are restrictions on which players from Europe and South America may compete, and all National Associations are obliged to adhere to the FIFA regulations on this point. Each team's preparation and expectations for an Olympic Football Tournament depend largely upon how much prestige the national side enjoys within its own country.

More than a few national teams and their officials regarded participation in the Olympic Tournament as a form of preparation for the higher stakes of the World Cup and the qualifying matches leading up to the 1982 finals in Spain. *A place in the Olympic finals does not necessarily mean the climax to a phase in a team's development; it can quite easily represent no more than a certain stage in a build-up process.* This is what most distinguishes football from most other Olympic sports. (But teams reaching the semi-finals obviously become motivated to achieve a definite goal and to go on to win the Olympic gold medal.)

*A place in the finals of the World Cup, on the other hand, is a peak of footballing achievement for every national team.* Preparations are quite different, with national domestic championships re-arranged and dates left free for special fixtures, with everything aimed at achieving a given objective and enabling the team to prepare in the best possible way.

Hardly any national championships are adapted for the sake of the Olympic Tournament; players continue to play their normal club matches (championship,

Cup and international club competitions) and are only at the national team trainer's disposal for relatively short periods. The Olympics themselves come at a time of year which is the close season for many national teams, at the end of a tiring season and just when players are normally taking their annual rest. The increase in club matches, championships, Cup games and – for some – international commitments can mean a total of 50 or 60 matches a year for players who then have to play in the Olympic Tournament as well, and who are thus unable to produce the same sort of freshness and inspiration as an athlete who has been building up all year specifically for his Olympic event. Some national teams whose success on the football field plays a major part in building up the country's international prestige enjoy the chance given by the state to make more thorough preparations for the Olympics, but such countries are the exception rather than the rule.

Looked at in this way, the Olympic Football Tournament cannot simply be compared at face value with the other sports in the Olympic programme. When the tournament is well organised (as it was in 1980) it provides an excellent opportunity for teams from all the Continental Confederations who have qualified for the finals to gather valuable international experience and to cultivate useful international contacts. *And the Olympic Football Tournament is definitely justified in having a place within the framework of the various international competitions:*



*Altogether*, it must be said that the Olympic Football Tournament plays a valuable role from a technical angle. But by its very nature it cannot offer the best and most attractive football because of the limitations set by the rules governing the eligibility of players which do not allow all the countries to use their very best players.

The Study Group is fully aware of the need for restrictions of this kind for the Olympic Games, otherwise the Olympic Tournament would turn into another World Cup. The tricky question of defining professional football will remain, and the answer will only come through trial and error. There are no absolutely correct answers. And it is not for the Study Group to enter into the whole issue of eligibility restrictions.

The XXII. Olympic Football Tournament finished up with the four teams from eastern Europe clearly dominating the others. Most of the teams invited in the wake of the withdrawal of those countries who chose to boycott the Games took their task very seriously and proved a pleasant surprise. They turned out to be more than mere stop-gaps or cannon-fodder for the stronger teams. There was a marked contrast in styles of play which provided the chance to make interesting comparisons. The teams from Kuwait and Algeria were seen to have made remarkable progress as a result of more systematic training and coaching, while Nigeria, Costa Rica and Zambia also showed occasional signs of improvement and were felt to have a bright future. They were capable of causing respected teams like Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia or the USSR a few uneasy moments.

*The general standard of football at the XXII. Olympic Football Tournament proved to be better than had generally been anticipated. Football remains one of the most attractive of the team sports in the Olympic movement, even if the definition of the professional footballer influences and limits the choice of the players who may take part. The average attendance at the matches was around 57,000.*

## **Organisation**

The system of *allocating each of the four four-team groups to a different city* – Kiev, Leningrad, Minsk and Moscow – enabled the 24 group matches and the four quarter-finals to proceed without the slightest organisational problem. Unlike the players in Moscow, the footballers based in the other three cities enjoyed being the only Olympic competitors there, with no other Olympic events being held in either Kiev, Leningrad or Minsk. It also proved a successful idea to *centralise* the four decisive matches (two semi-finals, final and match for third place) in Moscow. Reaction was generally favourable to this way of organising the 32 matches, with special approval given to the idea of playing the four *opening matches on July 20 simultaneously* in the four different cities.



*Football has its legitimate place at the Olympics and enables international contacts*

The *facilities* provided, the stadia, accommodation for the delegations and medical facilities were all of the highest order. The teams were always transported to their training sessions or matches strictly according to plan or according to their own wishes. In some cases, there were training facilities located close to where the players were living. Most of the participants were unaccustomed to the detailed checks and security precautions brought into force.

The *system of the Tournament*, with its strenuous programme, put the players and team officials under a great deal of pressure. Playing six games within twelve days can bring problems not just of a physical nature. The timing of the football matches is of course also partly dependent upon the overall Olympic programme and cannot be changed at will. The rhythm of a match day alternating with a rest day put an extra burden on teams who had to move from one city to another and make a trip of at least 500 kilometres between the two. Algeria, Costa Rica, Nigeria and Zambia repeatedly had to travel for their group matches, while Czechoslovakia, the GDR, the USSR and Yugoslavia were able to stay quietly in one place without moving. The programme could surely be drawn up more sensibly, with an effort made to treat all the teams more or less equally. This was also the opinion of other trainers present at the matches as observers for their own National Associations of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Yugoslavia. (See statistics p. 63).

The games were played under good strong floodlights. Teams were able to *warm-up* in the spacious changing-rooms and in the corridors, but there were no special

areas for warming-up in the stadia or under the stands, such as a small gymnasium or a training pitch. The pitch itself could not always be used for this purpose because of opening ceremonies taking place there.


A squad of 20-24 ball-boys had been well instructed in returning the ball immediately to the field of play when it went out, rather like the ball-boys at the Wimbledon tennis championships. These ball-boys were always dressed in such a way so as not to confuse them with the players, and at one game in Minsk a reserve referee ensured that the ball-boys went and changed their kit for this very reason.

Announcements over the stadium *loudspeakers*, giving results and information of medal-winners in all the other Olympic events, tended to be disturbing, provoking applause from the crowd which had nothing to do with what was happening there on the football pitch. And all the announcements were dutifully repeated in Russian, French and English.

*Dope tests* were performed with great thoroughness. Players were chosen for the tests by lot, the names being drawn from the players' identity cards a quarter of an hour before the end of the match. The officials in charge of the dope tests persisted with the players selected until they produced the necessary urine sample. All the test results were negative.



*Limited possibilities of warming-up available*



*Doping test after decision by draw*

A quarter of an hour after the end of each match, the *trainers and coaches* of the two teams involved made themselves available to journalists in the *press room*. It was noticeable how the questions tended to be angled not so much at the match which had just finished, but at predictions for the games due to be played next. The individual games at first represented only a small component part of the overall Tournament, and it was not until the last four matches that the games themselves were analysed more closely.

*Team officials* attended a meeting in the Olympic Village in Moscow before the Games had been officially opened, to be told in detail about the order in which the matches were to be played, precise information on sendings-off, cautions, handball infringements, dope tests, team colours and official reports and lists of players. Unfortunately five delegations were conspicuous by their absence from the meeting, which did not make the administration of the Tournament any easier.

It was encouraging to see how well members of the *Study Group* were able to work with *referees* and the *official match observers* appointed to inspect the

referees themselves. This applied in all four cities – Kiev, Leningrad, Minsk and Moscow – and covered such things as fitness training, match control (with a post-match discussion and criticism), use of leisure time (trips and visits) and travel arrangements. *Teamwork* of this kind is absolutely essential and makes it possible to follow set guidelines before, during and after each match and to achieve a measure of *practical consistency*.

### Physical Fitness

With a total of 32 games within the space of 13 days (July 20 – August 2, 1980), the XXII. Olympic Football Tournament put considerable physical demands on the players and trainers of the teams taking part. The rigorous rhythm of match days alternating with rest days meant the teams had to *expend their energy very economically* if they were to survive and progress through the group matches into the quarter-finals.

Trainers generally felt that the *limit of 17 players* per squad was too low, suggesting *20 as the ideal maximum figure*, and they made special mention of the need to include three goalkeepers. By using reserve players, trainers were able to introduce a new impulse into matches or to save their most valuable men for games still to come. The main block of the Russian team remained unchanged for all six matches they played in the Tournament, while all the other teams made greater use of their full squad. (See Statistics, p. 64 – 65).

Some teams revealed signs of fatigue (cramp, injuries and so on), and not just because they were lacking in physical fitness; it was rather because the *rest periods* and times set aside for the *treatment* of injuries had not been properly planned or not fully utilised. Another inconvenience was that of continually having to change quarters, with all the air flights and formalities of travelling.

*Between matches*, trainers arranged their training sessions into loosening-up exercises and little games to keep their players supple, with light gymnastics and ball games. Players who had not yet played in actual matches in the Tournament were normally put through extra training, which was tougher and aimed at keeping them in shape. Observations made during the teams' warming-up sessions *before their games* differed greatly. *Individual warming-up*, with gymnastic and athletic exercises and then with a ball, contrasted with *joint warming-up routines* where all the players went through the same drill together. First there were organised athletic exercises (limbering-up, sprinting, changing pace, changing direction, general gymnastics, jumping, exercises with partners, gradual acceleration); and then they would switch to group exercises with ball skills (passing, shooting, heading, passing moves, dummying, changing pace on the ball). All the teams put their *goalkeepers* through special warming-up routines, although these were some-



*Individual, athletic  
warming-up*



*Warming-up in groups*



*Warming-up and easy kicks of the ball at the goalkeeper outside the goal*

what less intense than those observed among teams playing in the World Cup finals. The USSR would round off their warming-up sessions with a little match across the width of the pitch, using all the field players (five against five or six against six), with one team practising passing, combined moves and running off the ball, while the other concentrated more on challenging, tackling and winning the ball.

There was one interesting detail spotted while the *substitutes of the GDR team were warming-up*. The coach would always get all the substitutes to limber up, and this would create a certain amount of tension not only among their own colleagues on the pitch but also among the opposition. Sometimes this tactic disturbed the game depending exactly where the players were doing their exercises, and the reserve referee had to intervene.

Observations of the matches themselves also enabled conclusions to be drawn about standards of physical fitness. With the ball frequently played *in the air*, it was noticeable how strong players were in this respect, and how quick and *well co-ordinated*. Next came their *strength and forcefulness in the tackle*, but unfortunately a lot of tackles were made illegally from behind, taking the opponent's legs. *Speed* was a quality seen to have had little impact; the pace of the game was often slowed right down and it was not until the decisive games of the semi-finals and the final itself that individual players made full use of their speed. Unlike matches in the World Cup, where players would often set off on dynamic dribbling runs with sudden changes of pace and direction, speed and manoeuvrability of this kind were very seldom seen in the games in the USSR.

The Tournament imposed great demands on the players' capacities of *endurance*. Only two teams used their preparatory period before the Tournament to play matches at a rhythm similar to that of the Tournament itself: Yugoslavia played four games in Palic on the same alternating rhythm, while Kuwait put their players through a test in Brazil by playing ten games in 45 days.

The *referees* also put their *physical fitness* to the test, under the leadership of the members of the Study Group. Before the matches began, they completed three joint training sessions in Moscow with tests (Cooper Test and a 50 metre sprint see Statistics, p. 88). It had been planned to run a 400 metre test as well, but this was dropped for fear of the referees being injured on the tartan running-track in the pouring rain. The referees all trained every day in the four centres, putting the accent on *limbering-up gymnastics and running exercises*. They were put under much greater physical strain than usual, as none of the referees or linesmen were used to such a programme of matches following on so quickly after one another.



*The referees during limbering up exercises*

## Technique

Whenever there was a discussion on standards of technical skill, it always arrived at the same conclusion: that of a *lack of players of real personality*, with the technical capacity to be able to stamp their own mark on their team and dictate the course of the action. In some games there were certain players who managed to do this to some extent and to bring colour to the match, such as the GDR's midfield player Steinbach (8) or Czechoslovakia's libero Radimec (4), or Osuigwe (16) of Nigeria with his incredibly powerful shooting.

The most common type of player, though, was the *workmanlike* sort of footballer who dutifully played his part in the team and stuck closely to his trainer's instructions and hardly dared to do any more than that. What the Brazilian member of the Study Group, above all, missed in the Tournament was any element of creativity and improvisation, together with touches of technical finesse; but Zambia and Nigeria did provide an isolated glimpse or two of what he was looking for.

*Individual technical skills* were clearly used to ensure that the trainer's instructions were *safely* followed. *Passes struck with the inside of the foot* were used for safe and accurate *short-passing* moves, especially in rainy weather. *Long passes* aimed at switching the play were made with the *instep and without spin*. There was seldom any swerve imparted on the ball for centres, corners or free-kicks, and there was little variety in the way the kicks were taken.

Mention has already repeatedly been made of the *glaring weaknesses in shooting* evident in most games of the Tournament, and it was significant how many goals were due to mistakes by defenders or goalkeepers and that far fewer were scored as



*A swerve was hardly imparted on the ball for long passes and centres. Strength and safety predominated*

an outcome of adventurous and dynamic finishing after an effective build-up.

The Study Group was unanimous that as far as technique is concerned there must be *an improvement in levels of individual technical skills under pressure*, either when the player with the ball is challenged by an opponent or when he changes pace when moving in possession of the ball. More attention must be paid to this point in training. For players can only inspire their teams with imaginative and unexpected football if they are themselves soundly familiar with all the technical skills of the game.

The standard of *heading* in defence and in midfield was *impressive*, but there were fewer occasions when moves were finally rounded off with a successful header at goal – not least because of the poor quality of the centres, which were invariably inaccurate and practically never delivered with any swerve.

## Tactics

Tactically, the most obvious factor was the *difference in style between the European teams and those from South America and Africa*. The Europeans marked their men closely, while the latter used a system which combined man-to-man marking with zonal marking. Most teams lined up in a *4-4-2 formation, with a*



*Tactical concepts were clear at the start yet defective and weak in action*

*libero* (1-3-4-2) to take responsibility for sealing the defence and giving it depth. This 4-4-2 pattern *often developed into* 4-3-3 (1-3-3-3 with the *libero*) whenever a team wanted to dominate the match.

All the teams defended by pulling practically all their players back, frequently *leaving the midfield to the opposition without a challenge*. There was hardly any fore-checking to be seen in the group matches. As an indication of how solidly the defences were organised, none of the teams ever dared even to use the off-side trap as a tactical device.

The switch from defence to attack was usually long-winded, with a subtle build-up in midfield. Quick counter-attacks with deep through-balls proved to be the exception. Only in the last four decisive games did teams start to try to create space by playing wider and using the wings, and it was a *rare sight* to see teams *attacking down the wings and trying to get to the by-line* and pull the ball back across the face of their opponents' goal.

Midfield players and defenders often gave insufficient support to their own forwards when they went forward on the attack, because they were too concerned with their defensive duties, and *strikers had to go it alone*. The Study Group made what may be a significant observation when its members noticed how outstanding players tended to be either defenders (Czechoslovakia's number 4, Radimec) or midfield men (the GDR's number 8, Steinbach) rather than forwards.

There was not a single game in which teams came up with really original ideas for *set plays*, although the decisive goal in the final did come from a free-kick being taken quickly so the opposing defence were taken by surprise.

Generally, the tactics employed were too transparent and predictable. One may suggest that this *lack of imagination was also due to the technical limitations* of the players. The tendency to *pack back in defence* and play it safe meant there was never a time when teams could play modern moves – like, for instance, the *libero* moving forward into the attack, or wing defenders attacking forcefully down the wings, or a general total offensive following on immediately after an opposing attack had been broken down.

# Final Remarks

The XXII. Olympic Football Tournament was certainly not held under ideal conditions, with teams withdrawing because of the boycott. But thanks to the excellent organisation and thanks to the generously equipped and functional football stadia in Kiev, Leningrad, Minsk and Moscow, the Study Group were able to carry out their work according to plan and to their own wishes.

Co-operation with the leaders of the 16 teams taking part in the Tournament was not always easy or fruitful. But by working together as a team, our Study Group succeeded in summarising all the events of the Tournament relatively quickly, comparing notes and observations and writing a full report on every aspect. For future technical studies of this kind, plans should be made in time for a photographer to work with the group and carry out special assignments. A technical expert should also be called in when visits are being made to the sites chosen for forthcoming major football events, so that he can supply technical advice on the spot.

Our Study Group believes this technical report will serve as a useful practical contribution towards the extensive coaching programmes initiated by FIFA, as it will have given a special assessment of the status of the Olympic Football Tournament.

Roger Quinche

## GENERAL INFORMATION

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**General Secretary:**

Dr. Helmut Käser, Switzerland

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Vladimir Klykov, co-opted USSR 1980

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